

THE  
EUROPEAN UNION  
COLLECTIVE  
ENEMY OF ITS  
MEMBER STATES

A STUDY IN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN STRATEGY  
To complete Lenin's World Revolution

BY

CHRISTOPHER STORY

The Leninist strategists 'take particular heart from the fact that American and West European policymakers have no understanding of their strategy and its dialectic nor any means of countering it'.

ANATOLIY GOLITSYN, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 58, Memorandum of 4th January 1988.

'Western experts fail to perceive the strategic continuity behind [events]. They accumulate facts but are unable to see their strategic interaction and cannot build them into a strategic picture. They lack vision and insight, which is why they are floundering in the face of the onslaught which they fail to understand'.

ANATOLIY GOLITSYN, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 38, Memorandum of March 1989.

This prevents the West from appreciating 'the irreconcilable differences of principle between the Western and Soviet versions of democracy and the market economy. In the West, elections usually decide which party achieves political power'. In the USSR and now in the 'former' Soviet Union, 'the Communist Party continues to decide the outcome. It maintains its monopoly of political power ... through a controlled "multi-Party system" [in which all the participants, without any exception, are covert Communists masquerading under false, Western style 'non-Communist' labels, or overt Communists wearing their own labels. In the 'former' Soviet Union, the continuing Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) controls and supervises all the political 'fractions' splintered out of the CPSU itself, as is explained and proved with documentation in Part One - Ed.]. ANATOLIY GOLITSYN, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 127, Memorandum of September-November 1990

'And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, Backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents. Without understanding, covenantbreakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful: Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them'.

The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, Chapter 1, verses 28-32.

With special respect for and gratitude to:

**Anatoliy Golitsyn**

whom I have never met.

And in memory of: my father,

**Colonel H H Story MC,**

Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)

and all who like him fought in two World Wars

only to watch the compromised Foreign Office

and successive British Governments

prepare the ground for the

abolition of the ancient British nation

for which they fought and in which they believed.

## IMPORTANT NOTICE

The Author draws attention to two important points about this book. First, the underlying purpose of the work is to provide, as far as possible, a documented primer of contemporary 'post'-Soviet and Pan-German strategy for Europe and the world, so as to show the lack of strategic discontinuity in both cases. Given the environment of wholesale mis- and disinformation (the 'Luciferian fog') in which we live, and the egregious left-wing bias which predominates in the 'mainstream media', the sources are more than usually important. In a work that challenges the received version of events, faithful documentation is indispensable. Anyone who, after reading this book, chooses nevertheless to doubt the accuracy of the analysis herein, will face the obstacle that the sources cited throughout the book - given in the Notes at the end of each section - stand in the public domain. The reader is urged to make maximum use of these clearly referenced Notes, many of which contain supplementary information to illuminate the main text. The second point is that, because of its focus, this work does not extensively address a fundamental dimension of the accelerating Leninist World Revolution, which targets the nation state for destruction - namely, the relentless, long-term assault on morality, national institutions, true Christianity and civilisation itself, which is based upon a complementary Leninist strategy elaborated by the Italian Communist, Antonio Gramsci, to introduce a 'common mind'. Gramsci was 'the originator of the cultural "war of position" strategy that stresses... social struggle as a prelude to the conquest of power, that counters Lenin's "seizure of the Winter Palace" approach with a gradual buildup towards socialist hegemony within the [existing] political structure of society' [Carl Boggs, in his book 'Gramsci's Marxism']. Although the Soviet use of 'criminalism' - the exploitation of organised criminality in the interests of strategy - is alluded to here, as is the Soviet involvement in the global drugs scourge, 'the Gramsci dimension' is of such importance in its own right that, God willing, it will form the subject of a separate work. Many people are dismayed at the shameless, seemingly open-ended deluge of filth which is corrupting public discourse, education, religion, television, the cinema, and almost all aspects of our lives. With the use of documentation, the Author will show, in the intended separate study, how these great evils stem from the same global revolutionary source as those discussed in this work. ■

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

None of those people to whom I am most indebted for such understanding as I have acquired concerning the extent of Soviet deceit and the true nature of the European Union as a political collective and the enemy of its Member States, have had any hand in the preparation of this work. The insights, elaborations and research, and any shortcomings and omissions, are entirely mine. It goes without saying that, although I was a student of Soviet Leninist strategic deception before he approached me, I owe much of my understanding of the Leninist mind and behaviour chiefly to Anatoliy Golitsyn, whose analyses and predictions have proved almost 100% correct, and who puts all other Soviet analysts - not to mention whole intelligence communities - to shame.

Among those others who have influenced my thinking most profoundly, I must mention first of all the late and dearly loved Dr Malachi Martin, of New York City, who miraculously assisted me with the basis for faith and determination to carry out this and related projects; and after Malachi's untimely death, my other Irish friend in America, Des Griffin, of Oregon, a man of glowing faith and shining knowledge and understanding of true Christianity and thus of the Truth, and our mutual friend Mrs Betty Sakuma, of Long Island, truly a jewel of light; my special friend Lawrence Kohn, of Wisconsin, a Sovietologist whose eagle eye and remarkable expertise, acquired despite his many demanding tasks as Education Director at Temple Beth El, Madison, WI, have brought countless 'post'-Soviet ruses to my notice; Don McAlvany, of Colorado, whose great generosity and support in these endeavours has been both unexpected and invaluable; the Rev Richard Wurmbrand, a Romanian priest of Jewish background whose work 'Marx and Satan' [1990: ISBN 0-89107-379-5] definitively identifies from Karl Marx's papers, he whom Marx worshipped; Dr Paul Busiek, of Springfield, Missouri, who is surely the wisest private Lenin scholar of our time, to whom I owe all my higher training in, and understanding of, Lenin and his evil works; Joel Carmichael, the distinguished veteran author and former editor of *Midstream*, New York, for his illuminating insights into 'the Mongol mentality' and his detailed knowledge of Lenin's mind, of Trotsky and of the Russian Revolution; Jimmy Clabough ('Brooklyn Jimmie'), of Brooklyn, New York, whose rich and encyclopaedic knowledge and understanding of continuing Communist global revolutionary thinking, methodology and achievements, and whose perpetual agitation to awaken opinion-formers and specialists to the grave dangers we face from rampant Leninism, has achieved far more than he may acknowledge; Bill Jasper, of California, a Senior Editor of *The New American*, the delightful colleague with whom I penetrated the offices of the Gorbachev Foundation /USA at the Presidio, San Francisco, in 1995; Dr Joseph D. Douglass Jr., of Virginia, for sharing with me his open-ended knowledge of Soviet global drug operations and other dimensions of satanic Soviet activity; the Rt Hon the Lord Bruce of Donington, formerly 'Mr Europe' in an earlier Labour Government, whose first-hand knowledge of, and relentless determination to expose, the abuses and undemocratic practices of the European Union, have inspired so many; Ian Milne, publisher of the invaluable UK fortnightly paper *Eurofacts*, which specialises in the exposure of the EU's lies and arrogance; the brilliant Marie Ciliberti, formerly of *Voice of America*; Martin Dewhurst, the doyen of British Sovietologists, of Glasgow University, who has freely given me many leads since I became Editor of 'Soviet Analyst'; Christopher Gill, the MP for Ludlow, Shropshire until 2001, and now Chairman of the Freedom Association who, though ploughing a sometimes lonely furrow as a dedicated and implacable opponent of the European Union Collective, enjoys the rare satisfaction of political integrity; and many others on both sides of the Atlantic too numerous to mention. Finally, I must thank my wife Janet for having tolerated my subversive thinking for so many years, without resorting to drastic measures. ■

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christopher Edward Harle Story was born in the United Kingdom in 1938 and was educated at Eton College and Christ Church, Oxford. After working as an industrial writer in Canada for a number of years, he established an intelligence publishing company based in London in 1963, which has maintained an office in New York since 1977. As the Editor and Publisher of the intelligence journal 'Soviet Analyst', which specialises in the exposure of Soviet strategic deception, he was approached by the widely-cited genuine Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn, in May 1992, and subsequently edited and published the defector's second classic book 'The Perestroika Deception'. In 1995, the Author founded this publishing company, Edward Harle Limited, which specialises exclusively in 'politically incorrect' intelligence works - that is to say, in books which defy the fashion for controlled 'politically correct' thinking, in order to reveal truths about the contemporary world. ('Political correctness' is a Leninist concept which fosters the imposition of an intolerant 'common global mind'). Mr Story is married to Janet, from Adelaide, Australia. They have four daughters. ■

# THE MODERN TOWER OF BABEL



A poster published by the Council of Europe: The Tower of Babel is taken from the famous painting by the 16th Century Flemish artist Breughel, showing the well-known scene from the Book of Genesis. The Bible says that for their arrogant behaviour, God divided and confused the builders of this monstrosity by causing them to babble at each other in different languages. The choice of this motif to symbolise 'the building of Europe' shows that, as one would expect, the secular designers of this poster were either ignorant or sceptical of the moral of the Biblical story. However, in 1993, shortly after the Author first republished this illustration in one of our intelligence serials, and pointed out its irony, the poster was suddenly withdrawn. The inverted stars are intended to replicate the 'stars' of the European symbol, which have remained 12 in number-the number of the Apostles, and also the number of the stars itemised in Revelation 12, verse 1, which depicts 'a woman clothed with the sun... and upon her head a crown of twelve stars', an image extensively used by the European Union: see page XXVIII). The stars mimic the upside-down pentagram used in occult contexts [see inset]. The expanding EU's retention of 12 stars, and their use upside-down here (one being obscured), conveys a conscious yet subliminal occultic message. Bernard Connolly, who was the senior Brussels official formerly in charge of the European Monetary System, refers in his book 'The Rotten Heart of Europe' [Faber and Faber, London, 1995] to 'the sinister motives and back-to-front reasoning' of Euro-ideologues and of the 'builders of Europe'. 'Back-to-frontness' and 'upside-downness' are characteristic of evil. No doubt the poster was withdrawn because of a fear or superstition that 'the European edifice' may well suffer the same fate as the Tower of Babel. Since there is no place for God in Lenin's 'Common European Home', which the deluded European elites are 'building', this is a certainty. They forget that 'except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it' [Psalm of Solomon 127, verse 1]. ■

## NATIONAL DESTABILISATION PLAN OF KGB/GRU BASED ON SOVIET DEFECTOR INTELLIGENCE

'DEPARTMENTS' OR 'AREAS' OF THE TARGETED SOCIETY	METHODS EMPLOYED	INTENDED RESULTS
<b>'IDEAS' [sic]</b>		
<b>DEMORALISATION STAGE [15-20 years*]</b>		
1 Religion, especially true Christianity	Politicisation, commercialisation, scurrilous 'happy-clappy' events, entertainment. In the case of true Christianity, ignorance of scripture. Empty ritual. Women priests. Racism.	Diversionsary claptrap, simony, false religion, sects, divination, magic, sorcery, charisma, death wish, spiritual desert, emptiness and ignorance.
2 Education	Permissiveness, relativity.	Ignorance, zero historical knowledge.
3 Media	Monopolisation of 'news' and comment. Manipulation of information and thought. Constant criticism and discrediting of institutions. Concentration on fake, non-issues, double-standards.	'Political correctness'. 'Groupthink'. 'Luciferian fog'. Uninformed myopia; opinions = facts. Reiteration of lies as facts, which are accepted as such by the uninformed. Emergence of the 'common mind'.
4 Culture	Substitution of false, cheap heroes and rôle models for inspiration and morals.	Addictive fads, salacious and empty culture, mumbo-jumbo, 'ape' speech.
<b>STRUCTURE</b>		
5 Law and order	Legislated, imposed, inconsistent, unwarranted bias in favour of offender, victimisation of victim.	Mistrust of 'justice', legal cynicism. In EU context, 'justice' is whatever promotes the EU's interests.
6 Social relations	Rights, not obligations.	Erosion of individual responsibility.
7 Security	Penetration and demoralisation of intelligence community, police, military [homosexuality etc.]	Degradation of intelligence quality, military power and recruitment pool. Defencelessness. Total unawareness of strategy. Idolatry of 'cooperation'. Inability to act decisively and alone.
8 Internal politics	Women in military. Collectivisation of military power and security.	Infrastructure decay.
	Aggressive, poisonous party antagonisms, sense of drift, failure to get to grips with issues, constant lying and equivocation, careerism and egoism.	National disunity, cynicism, posturing by top leadership, lack of purpose. Government by 'spin doctorate'. Substance subordinated to image.
9 Foreign relations	Entanglement in ever-expanding net of bilateral treaties, accords and bilateral treaties underpinning them. Diplomats identify with foreign states rather than their own.	Enveloping sense of oppressive impotence on world stage. Double-standards (e.g., IRA terrorists = 'freedom fighters', not 'international terrorists'). Confusion at the top, wrong priorities.
<b>'LIFE'</b>		
10 Family, society	Foster breakdown, destroy marriage.	Destroy loyalty, leaving state to claim it.
11 Health	Junk food, drugs, state-provided conditional health care, mass sports	Alcohol, drug abuse, obesity, impotence. Enfeebled masses.
12 Race	Mixing of races, elevation of 'racism' to Hitlerian level, promotion of 'diversity', degradation of breeding, 'genetics vs. environment' debate.	
13 Population	Alienation from countryside, urbanisation, drug addiction, vulnerability to mass epidemics.	Hatred, divisions, evil compromises.
14 Labour	Trade unions vs. society. Public sector chaos.	General alienation, victimisation, sense of impending breakdown, demoralisation.
<b>TRIUMPH OF SUBVERSION</b>		
<b>DESTABILISATION STAGE [2-5 years*]</b>		
15 Power struggle	Populism, irresponsible power struggle.	Big Brother appears in the wings. In the E.U. context, Big Brother is the Collective – 'The Beast' which has 'emerged' and is not yet recognised as such, as the oppressor.
16 Economy	Destruction of legal substructure, bargaining process, industry, currency. Red tape, excessive taxation, arbitrary abuse of power by bureaucrats, Grass roots participation in everything, maximisation of indignation, exposures.	Big Brother gains credibility, power. Reaction, mobocracy, breakdown of law and order, rioting, street deaths.
17 Society, law	Destroyed, as nation is subsumed in multi-national mechanisms, all influence lost.	Psychological collapse, destruction of all past values and self-esteem, encirclement.
18 Position in the world		
<b>REVOLUTION</b>		
<b>CRISIS [2-6 months*] CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED</b>		
* Soviet sources indicate these timeframes were/are in dispute.		
<b>'NORMALISATION' [ = de facto Communism] and 'PEACE' [ = effective cessation of all opposition to Socialism/Communism]. Oupion of bloodbath [ 'perestroika' ].</b>		

The national revolutionary subversion process, based on details revealed by the Soviet defector Yuriy Bezmenov (a.k.a. Tomas Schuman), using his own knowledge of KGB strategy and details conveyed to John Barron, [the author of 'KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents'[1974] and 'KGB Today: the Hidden Hand'[1983], Hodder and Stoughton, London], by the GRU-KGB officer Stanislav Levchenko, who had attended the Soviet Academy of [Leninist] Sciences' Oriental Studies Institute with Bezmenov. The chart, which has been elaborated by this Author on the basis of new information, shows the four stages of Soviet/Leninist ideological subversion: Demoralisation, Destabilisation Crisis and 'Normalisation'. Source: 'Soviet Analyst'.

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## ABOUT THIS BOOK

This work has been written in order to clear up profound, egregious and dangerous misconceptions about the nature and purpose of the European Union Collective - the most advanced of the regional blocs intended as the pillars of a long-planned One World Government which will represent the final realisation of Lenin's global revolution against the nation state. By definition, a Single World Government, from the arbitrary decisions of which there will be no appeal, will be a brutal dictatorship, perhaps ultimately engaged in 'population reduction'. The idea of a global holocaust has been discussed in certain revolutionary circles - shockingly, for example, at various 'State of the World Forum' events staged from 1995 to 2000 by the Gorbachev Foundation/USA, an influence-building and propaganda organisation named after the parallel Leninist powerhouse in Moscow. This is a 'New Form' of Leninist revolutionary instrument developed via the Lenin School and the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] under the late Georgiy Shakhnazarov, who was prominent in the 'structures' during Gorbachev's time. The CPSU continues to function 'underground', directing, supervising and controlling all the political parties formed out of the CPSU itself. In November 2001, Izvestia described the intended merging of President Vladimir Putin's so-called 'Unity' Party with two other key factions in the Duma, as 'a movement, a front, a league - the CPSU, in effect' [The New York Times, 6th November 2001].

The Soviet Bloc was 'folded' not, as is commonly believed, because Communism and the Soviet Union 'collapsed', but because the Soviet strategic collective, after long preparation spanning much of the 40-year postwar period during which the wartime allies had agreed that Germany should be occupied, entered in 1989-91 upon a new phase of the World Revolution in pursuit of Lenin's objectives 'by other means' (to quote Lenin himself). These objectives presuppose the destruction of all nation states, the collectivisation of every dimension of human existence, the obliteration of religion, the development of a uniform global mentality (agenda-setting and 'the common mind'), and the gradualist establishment of World Government. For the continuing Soviet Communist strategists, the European Union is a primary infiltrated instrument for the furtherance of these objectives.

The European Union is a revolutionary organisation which seeks to supplant its constituent nation states. Its arrogance is such that it presumes that certain of its decisions - the locking of national exchange rates, for instance - can be taken 'irrevocably', which is to say, for all eternity. But even Hitler was clear-headed enough to realise that he could not realistically claim that his Reich would last for more than a thousand years. Hitler's heirs, the Pan-German disciples of Dr Konrad Adenauer, are meanwhile on the brink of using the European Union for the fulfilment of Hitler's aims - again, by 'other means'. On 1st November 1993, even as the EU collective's Maastricht Treaty came into force, Moscow Television proclaimed that the Treaty was 'the culmination of plans agreed 50 years ago'.

The inadequate label 'Eurosceptic', used in Britain to pigeon-hole activists engaged in various forms of direct and indirect opposition to Britain's participation in the European Union, signifies ultimate submission to the intended federation - since scepticism implies not so much a determination to resist, as resignation to, or a sullen acceptance of, an unpalatable state of affairs which it is assumed cannot ultimately be prevented. This book seeks to inject backbone into the efforts of those who are sickened by the European Union - by exposing the parallel, coordinated strategies of Russia and Germany in Europe. That can only be done by showing that there has been no strategic discontinuity in either case.

The European Union Collective is part of a wider, pernicious Man-centred project to 'organise' the entire world along revolutionary Leninist lines - dispensing with the nation state. Today's successor of the biblical Tower of Babel [see page VII] has no time or space for God. For this reason alone, it is a certainty that it will share the fate of that edifice. ■



Federation is a transitional form towards the complete union... of all nations'.

Theses on the National and Colonial Questions adopted by the Second Comintern Congress, 28 July 1920 [Protokoll, ii, page 224]

'The aim of socialism is not only to abolish the present division of mankind into small states, and all national isolation, not only to bring the nations closer to each other, but also to merge them.... The merging of states is inevitable '.

V. I. LENIN, 'Imperialism and the Right to Self-determination', cited in a paper by the British Communist R. PALME DUTT, published in 1949 by International Publishers, New York.

• The right of self-determination, the stage of possible separation or alternatively federation is, Lenin insisted, only a prelude or transition to the ultimate aim of the merging of nations'. R. PALME Dutt, in the paper mentioned above, published in 1949 by International Publishers, New York. In this statement, the author accurately anticipated, by a margin of 48 years, the precise twin threats Britain faces at the beginning of the 21st century, as a consequence of the blindness of its leaders and policymakers: separation, to be followed by federation. This is Lenin's idea.

'An example... is what is happening in the Soviet Union. Separation must come before integration '. The United Nations in the 1990s: A Second Chance?', MAX JAKOBSON, TWENTIETH Century Fund [A United Nations front group], 1993, page 123.

'The Soviet United States of Europe is the only correct slogan pointing the way out from European disunity, a disunity which threatens not only Germany but the whole of Europe with complete structural and cultural decline'. LEON TROTSKY, writing in his journal 'The Bulletin of the Opposition', Number 17-18, November-December 1930, page 53.

'[The aim is to] carry forward the ideas of the New World Order'. KARL MARX, cited in 'Karl Marx and the United States', JAMES E. JACKSON, International Publishers, New York, July 1983.

'The transition step to the New World Social Order involves merging the newly captive nations into regional governments '. F. PETRENKO and V. POPOV, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, Objectives and Principles', Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985.

'The objective of Communist strategy is [to set up] the New World Social Order '. WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, the late leader of the Communist Party USA, in 'Toward Soviet America', Elgin Publications, Balboa Island, California, 1961, originally published in 1932.

'If we... are by nature too primitive to rise above our aggressive instincts and selfish greed, must we not be forced by a supranational authority to submit to a New World Order that will ensure survival? As has been pointed out by one of its advocates, the German physicist, Karl Friedrich von Weizsacker, such a world order would have to be a harsh dictatorship '. 'The United Nations in the 1990s: A Second Chance?', MAX JAKOBSON, Twentieth Century Fund, 1993.

'Today I have had to speak about a New World, a world that is at a risky, but promising stage in its historic long march toward unity '. MICHEL CAMDESSUS, former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, in a speech at the LMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, 10th October 1995 [page 7 of text and as delivered].

'We are experiencing an increasing abandonment of sovereignty within the European Community in favour of this community and, as I hope, also in favour of [a] European Parliament equipped with full rights'. HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, the German Foreign Minister and agent of influence (controlled by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh - the chief Soviet controller of agents of influence - under the code-name 'Tulpe', or 'Tulip'), 'Der Spiegel', September 25, 1989.

'We set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state'. Vladimir V. Lenin 'State and Revolution', International Publishers, New York, 1961 Edition, page 68.

'The 'nation state' in the style of the last century has ceased to exist as an impermeable structure, and to be quite plain, nor should it exist any longer '.

DR PROFESSOR ROMAN HERZOG, President of the German Federal Republic, 17th September 1996.

'National sovereignty is becoming irrelevant and meaningless for all that many still cling to it'. OTTO VON DER GABLENTZ, the German Ambassador to Russia, spouting Russian policy in the journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 'International Affairs', June 1994.

'All countries are basically social arrangements. No matter how permanent and even sacred they may seem at any one time, in fact they are all artificial and temporary '.

STROBE TALBOTT, who later became Deputy US Secretary of State, 1992.

'Our vision of the European space from the Atlantic to the Urals is not that of a closed system. Since it includes the Soviet Union [sic: he said this in June 1992, six months after the USSR had 'ceased to exist'], which reaches to the shores of the Pacific, it goes beyond nominal geographical boundaries'. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, Oslo, June 1992.

'I look forward to the day when Russia is a fully-fledged member of the European Community '.

JOHN MAJOR, the former British 'Conservative' Prime Minister, spouting Russian policy in his 1992 New Year's Day broadcast on BBC Radio 4.

'Thou art Euro and on this Euro I will build Europe '.

Pedro Solbes, Spanish Finance Minister of the day, Madrid, 15th December 1995, cited in

'The New York Times', 16th December 1995. This blasphemous statement is typical of the 'builders' of the European Union Collective and the 'New World Social Order', from which God is excluded.

'The achievement of German unification, which we jointly welcome, gives a new dimension and a broader horizon to our cooperation, the aim of which has been from the very outset to advance together the cause of European unification in all spheres'.

Joint statement issued by CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL and the late PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND at their meeting in Munich on 18th September 1990, cited by the controlled agent of influence Hans-Dietrich Genscher in a Policy Statement on the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, in the Bundestag on 20th September 1990. This statement referred obliquely to the requirement in the bilateral Franco-German Treaty of the Elysee [22nd January 1963] for the two countries to 'reach... an analogous position' on all international, especially European, issues.

'The EC must turn itself into a new superpower [and should start work immediately on] a new political and institutional programme for a structure comprising 24 or 30 countries'.

JACQUES DELORS, former President of the European Commission, and also the most determined advocate of full-blooded socialism in France, citing Soviet strategy for the achievement of 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' - which, thanks to the provisional, Leninist 'independence' of the 'former' Soviet Republics and the controlled 'liberation' of Eastern Europe in the context of the inexplicable eastward expansion of the European Union (the 'replacement collective'), is well on the way towards realisation - in 'Der Spiegel', Germany, and also in 'Belvedere', Paris, October 1991.

'... Blake said that he believed 'individual choice would eventually be mastered by a central Soviet control of thought process". GEORGE BLAKE, Soviet spy, explaining the Soviet conspiracy to achieve thought-hegemony and agenda control (the 'common mind') as a key means of furthering Leninist revolutionary objectives, to the late Kenneth de Courcy, cited by Chapman Pincher, in 'Traitors: The Labyrinths of Treason', Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1987, page 157.

'Citizens may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective'.

'Human Rights in China', Information Office of the State Council, November 1991, Beijing. ■

# FOREWORD

This study seeks to place the phenomenon of the European Union Collective in a perspective that is much broader than the usual narrow context in which European issues are considered. The dangers associated with the narrow perspective include: blindness to the relationship, interaction and significance of Russian and German-French strategy and the continuity of each in the European context; a consequent lack of any coherent frame of reference with which to make sense of Brussels' collectivist track record, policies and behaviour; the masking from view of underlying forces propelling this frankly evil,

divisive, anti-nation state experiment; the absence of common sense rationales for certain consistently pursued Euro-policies - such as the subdivision of the constituent EU nation states into Euro-regions, or the unexplained 'imperative' of eastwards expansion and the wholesale collectivisation of every aspect of our lives, all of which are either irrelevant or harmful to national wellbeing; a failure to ask basic questions - such as why it is 'necessary' for the EU to duplicate institutions, policies, services and activities established by the EU countries themselves; an unwarranted assumption that the political collective's intentions and actions are benevolent, which is the reverse of the truth; and a tendency towards resigned acceptance of the entire superfluous EU apparatus on the ground that it has been sanctioned by democratically elected legislatures. In short, the familiar narrow perspective impedes our ability to perceive the simplest truths about this geopolitical monstrosity - for instance, its fundamentally undemocratic, revolutionary character and objectives. The literal meaning of 'revolution' is 'going round and round in circles'.

One penalty of becoming intellectually enmeshed in the octopus-like tentacles of any given dimension of the European Union Collective's activities is that the victim soon discovers that all 'answers' or 'solutions' to Euro-issues are required and calculated to be strictly provisional - because, typically, Euro-issues are never actually intended to be resolved, but rather to be elaborated and exploited in cynical furtherance of the overriding political interests of the collective, which always supersede and displace those of its constituent members and their populations. As with the parallel 'joint actions' of the international community, as displayed for instance with respect to the Irish question, the main objectives do not include the resolution of the relevant issues, but rather the establishment and exploitation of a 'process' for the furtherance of an internationalist agenda which is intended to contribute towards the ultimate objective, enunciated so clearly by Lenin, of 'the destruction of the nation state'. The 'process', enshrining these revolutionary operations, becomes 'sacrosanct' and thus furthers their realisation.

A second obvious penalty of the narrow perspective is that the victim's mind is soon controlled and dominated by the oppressively open-ended agenda of the collective, or segments thereof: and once this state of mind has developed, it becomes impossible for the victim to see the wood from the trees, to come to his or her senses, and to step outside the Euro-context, so as to be able to see the broader picture. Only a handful of 'professionals' have ever done this - perhaps the best known being Lord Bruce of Donington, a former 'Mr Europe' for the British Labour Government in the 1970s, and Bernard Connally, a senior official of the European Commission, formerly in charge of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and author of the famous work *The Rotten Heart of Europe* [Faber and Faber, London, 1995] which exposed *inter alia* the corruption of the EU's exchange rate manipulation regime.

Among 'Euro-sceptic' politicians in Britain, the receding option of exit from the EU collective is seen as unthinkable, whereas in fact it is the only option available to Britain other than national annihilation. Since such people persist with their illusions about 'renegotiating' the collective EU treaties and 'repatriating' powers from Brussels back to Westminster - neither of which possibilities are or are ever likely to be on offer -

it must be presumed that in practice they stand ready and willing to accept the decapitation and termination of their country, since as experienced politicians they cannot imagine that in any such negotiations their objectives would be attained. Their attitude is all the more insupportable and open to criticism, in that they were among those who voted for the powers of the ancient Westminster Parliament to be handed over to the political collective.

Obviously, if sovereignty is pooled, it is diluted and diminished. But a primary characteristic of everything to do with the European Union, as with the Leninists, is that the truth is turned upside-down, or back-to-front-a primary characteristic of evil: in black masses, the Mass is read backwards. This illuminates the European Union's well-deserved reputation for lies, distortions and deception - a fact lost on those who have no true religion, no faith, and thus fundamentally no values. For such people, the annihilation of the nation state is no big deal - even though it is only the nation state which can mobilise physical protection from the people's real enemies. The European Union Collective seeks to overcome this objection by proclaiming inaccurately that it alone has been responsible for keeping the peace on the European Continent since the Second World War (whereas this was pre-'perestroika' NATO's achievement), and by accommodating the collectivisation of security - which a head of the Russian Academy of [Leninist] Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada has officially described as 'the highest goal' of Russian foreign policy', as discussed elsewhere in this book. It stands to reason that once West European military power has been collectivised along with everything else, including the constituent nation states themselves, Europe will be at the permanent mercy of de facto continuing Soviet power.

However perception of that reality, and indeed of the perils associated with Britain's continued involvement with the subversive EU Collective at every level, presupposes a basic understanding of continuing Soviet/Russian Leninist World Revolutionary strategy, of which the European Union Collective has become a willing component. This is exposed in Part One of this book, entitled 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'. The Soviet dimension in turn must be understood in the context of the parallel continuity of German strategy - explained in Part Two, entitled 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' - and of its interplay with the web of relationships spun by the Soviet strategists, who are directed by the continuing KGB<sup>1</sup>-GRU<sup>2</sup>- protected CPSU. And German strategy, driven by the Pan-German agenda which represents the continuation of the agenda of National Socialism, as is proved in Part Two, has seen to it that France has been co-opted as a full participant in the realisation of Germany's plans. But German-French collaboration with the continuing Soviet Leninists spells ultimate disaster for the Pan-German hegemony project.

It was the Comintern which laid down [see page XI] that 'federation is a transitional form towards the complete union... of all nations'. And it was Lenin who taught that 'separation precedes federation' [page XI]. The Moscow-directed 'long march through the institutions' of the West, beginning with the infiltration decisions of the Comintern, has left the Western powers deeply compromised, subverted and increasingly, as the Leninists intended, of a 'common mind' - the creation of which has all along been a key objective of the World Revolution. The late Jesuit author, Malachi Martin, used the apt term 'Luciferian fog' to describe to me the blindness which has enveloped the minds of Western policymakers in the face of this evil, relentless and largely unrecognised revolutionary onslaught. ■

Christopher Story, London, January 2002

1. KGB, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or the Committee of State Security, has undergone innumerable name changes since it was established by Lenin's decree of 20th December 1917 as the Cheka, meaning 'linchpin', an acronym for its first Russian name All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage. See also page 129.

2. GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence), the Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, or the Chief Intelligence Directorate, is a division of the Soviet General Staff. It was not relabelled following the false Leninist 'changes' of 1991, and has continued operating seamlessly from overt to covert Communism. It continues to regard the domestic political space as 'the Soviet Union', and refers to St Petersburg as Leningrad.

# PREFACE

## WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Understanding the nature of the European Union is, self-evidently, an essential prerequisite to fighting this revolutionary supranational entity effectively. But in order to do so, those who instinctively recognise that the European Union is a Godless collective destructive power, must submit their minds to a certain perhaps unfamiliar discipline.

This is necessary because serious thought on this subject cannot take place unless the observer is able to break the spell that the European Union, which is familiar with the occult, exercises over the mind, notably the British and European mind. What must be addressed first and foremost is the nature of this unprecedented political phenomenon which has emerged in order to destabilise, collectivise and usurp the sovereignty of European nations. For the scales to be removed from one's eyes, it is necessary to be clear what the European Union is, and to understand what it is not. It is not compatible with the continued existence of its constituent nation states.

Exactly what, then, is the European Union?

The essence of Europe's crisis, which is a key component of the malaise afflicting the whole world, is that the European Union threatens national sovereignty. Indeed, its only purpose is precisely to supplant its constituent nation states, in conformity with Lenin's seminal directive that the nation state is to be destroyed [page XII]. In short, the European Union has properties which set it in opposition to the continued existence of its members. If they wish to remain

sovereign nation states, and thus to retain the option to avoid 'irreversible oppression', they must heed the voice from heaven described in Chapter 18, verse 4 of the Book of Revelation:

'Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues'<sup>1</sup>.

For the European Union structures are engaged in relentless low-level, but prospectively terminal, secret warfare against their constituent nation states, while posing as their benefactors. Under the guise of open-ended and ever-expanding 'cooperation' - the preferred weasel alibi of the penetrated British Foreign Office - the European Union is in practice engaged in wholesale collectivisation via relentless, open-ended regulation: the very essence of Communism. It was therefore no surprise that Mikhail Gorbachev, during a brief visit to London on 23rd March 2000, described the European Union as 'the new European Soviet'<sup>2</sup>.

Until the political and policymaking elites of the European Union's tamely compliant member countries, with their shallow, socialistic comprehension of what is happening around them wake up to this unpleasant reality - a process which entails recognising the nature of the European Union itself - the level of malaise of which the European Union is both a primary cause and a malevolent manifestation, will continue to increase, with ever more destabilising consequences for European societies, and therefore in parallel for the whole world.

In conformity with Lenin's objective, national boundaries are being openly called into question. It is a pressing purpose of the ideologically possessed strategists who are pushing the European Union project with such revolutionary determination, to hide for as long as possible from the people of Europe their ultimate objective of destroying and replacing the European nation states which the EU collective is supposedly established to serve. In the meantime, everything conceivable is being done to detract from the prestige, the value and the importance of nationhood as the proven structure for the organisation of society. By every devious and subliminal means available to it, the European Union seeks to diminish and usurp the concept and reality of nationhood, in preparation for the day, not far hence, when its constituent nations will have been absorbed and snuffed out of existence by the European Union itself.

### MAIN OBJECTIVE 'LIFTED' FROM THE SOVIET TEXTBOOK

Why else do the advocates of 'ever closer European union'<sup>3</sup>, mimicking an objective laid down in the Soviets' primary World Revolutionary blueprint 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' [see pages 17-18<sup>4</sup>], repetitively insist upon the importance of 'preserving' the special national characteristics that distinguish one ancient European civilisation from another? As the former German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, pronounced at Konigswinter on 17th March 1997<sup>5</sup>, 'Europe draws its strength and vitality from its diversity of cultures, languages and traditions, and this rich potential needs to be sustained and developed'.

This 'line' - the 'Euro-propagandists' frequent refrain that 'national characteristics must be preserved at all costs' - masks the European Union's underlying aggressive intention that the ancient constituent nations themselves are to be liquidated by means of a continuing 'coup d'etat' by installments' [see Part Two]. The insistent propaganda promising the preservation of national characteristics is intended as a substitute for continued nationhood, and disguises the main objective, which is national extinction.

For if the European Union has its way, that is what will occur; and the targeted nation states themselves will have cooperated in their own destruction, in accordance with Lenin's best-known dictum along the lines that if the self-interested bourgeoisie is given enough rope, it will collectively hang itself. This is what its treacherous national leaderships have been doing, to the indifference or subdued resentment of their captive populations, who are seemingly too demoralised to offer resistance.

Robert Burton [1576-1640], the English philosopher, pronounced in 'The Anatomy of Melancholy' that it is 'the Devil himself, which is the author of confusion and lies'. Burton was of course reiterating Jesus Christ's familiar, searing condemnation of the legalism of the Pharisees, who worshipped not God, but Regulation:

'Ye are of your father the Devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it'<sup>6</sup>.

The Euro-ideologue weavils and deceivers- resident within, for instance, the British Foreign Office, the Home Office and inside the intestines of the long since compromised British political parties-know well, as the Devil himself knows, that they are pursuing, by facilitating obsessive and oppressive EU regulation, collectivist policies which are anathema to the overwhelming majority of the targeted European populations, and which are against the peoples' most fundamental interests. They exert pressure in pursuit of their brazen objective by relying upon their apparently inexhaustible stock of guile and deceit, upon the relentless propaganda spin which they interleave in the public domain through their control of media minds, and most significantly of all, upon the fact that they have forced the targeted countries into sullen conformity with the drudgery of compliance with their obsessive, ever-expanding, dreary and coercive agenda of incremental collectivised control.

Many worthy antagonists of the European Union have committed the fatal error over the years of allowing their thinking and responses to become interminably bogged down in the horrendous detail of the insidious 'evolving Treaty' and its consequences, without realising that the Treaty invites control of their minds. It is a trap which has a certain attraction, in particular, for those with legal training; indeed large firms of expensive lawyers have sprung up which specialise in 'European Law'. Certain influential parliamentarians have become so attached to the obsessive legalism of the ever-evolving Treaty that they cannot bear the thought of being without it. They are truly infested by a perverse 'spirit of legalism'. Despite encyclopaedic knowledge of its oppressive, devious and contradictory Articles, Protocols, Paragraphs and Statutes, and of the resulting Directives, Regulations and Rules, they are by no means in favour of Britain (say) leaving the Collective. Instead, they obtusely argue, the EU must be 'reformed', and Great Britain's membership 'renegotiated' - which the Collective could never permit.

It is not suggested that serious students of these matters should pay only superficial attention to the small print of the avalanche of documentation spewed out by the collectivist EU structures - thereby emulating the eccentricity of Kenneth Clarke, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who made a point of stating that he had never read the Maastricht Treaty<sup>7</sup>, or of Douglas Hurd (now Lord Hurd) who, when he was Foreign Secretary, was overheard after he had signed the Maastricht Treaty, to exclaim: 'Well, we'd better find out what we've just signed'.

On the contrary, one must be familiar with at least the skeleton of the collective Treaty in order to be in a position to look at it dispassionately and to understand its underlying purpose - without permitting oneself ever to become mesmerised or intimidated by its grandiose Utopian generalities, its oppressive mission to 'organise' every aspect of European relationships and lives<sup>8</sup>, its obtuse Marxist prescriptions, its deliberately ambivalent and empty yet Aesopian language uncoincidentally reminiscent of Nazi Pan-German drafting from which so much of its confused and contradictory gobbledegook is derived [see Part Two], and its typically perverse Leninist terminology ('common', 'joint action', etc).

## WILFUL BLINDNESS AND COWARDICE OF POLITICIANS

Having perceived the sombre reality of how the European Union seeks to impose the pressure of what can reliably be described as its demonic collective will on the peoples and nations of Europe under the cover provided by their subverted Governments' misguided consent, one must, then, so as to appraise the spirit of this mechanism for collectivised coercion, stand aside from the Treaty's beguiling text, and consider its true intent. This can perhaps be most clearly seen from a British perspective, given that the extinction of British sovereignty is proving to be the most painful process of all - because Britain, unlike some of the other EU countries, has a history of sovereignty going back for over a millennium.

The misguided notion that British membership of the European Union, can or ought to be 'renegotiated', pinpoints the actual nature of the European Union itself. A dissatisfied tenant may well wish to renegotiate his or her lease with a landlord. The level of the tenant's dissatisfaction with the existing lease may reach the point at which continuing to live in the property may have become near-intolerable. However, if the landlord in question indicates he is unwilling to accommodate the dissatisfied tenant by granting a new and modified lease which takes the sources of the tenant's dissatisfaction into account the tenant is wasting time and energy complaining about the situation or seeking to persuade the landlord that a new lease should be granted. If the landlord is indeed unwilling to respond as requested, the tenant will be frustrated and will be faced with the options of putting up with the situation, or else leaving the premises and enduring the consequences. These may, on reflection or in the event, turn out to be much less severe than continuing to tolerate a state of affairs which has long since become insupportable. To mix metaphors, if you jump fully clothed into a swimming pool, you can hardly complain of the unpleasant sensation created by the soaking garments you are wearing, and nor can you object that your clothes are wringing wet. The only solution to your problem is to come to your senses, climb out of the pool, pull off your soaking clothes, dry yourself, and put on some dry ones. To elaborate the parable to its ludicrous extremity, neither can you reasonably complain, after the event, that you had not appreciated the extent to which your clothing would be liable to absorb the water.

This crude analogy falls apart, though, when considering why the United Kingdom, for example, has found itself in such a terminal mess over its membership of the European Union. For when Britain made the fatal mistake of agreeing to join the European Economic Community in 1972, most British people imagined the organisation was concerned primarily with trade. British parliamentarians remained culpably blind to the reality, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister of the day, Edward Heath, and other Euro-political ideologues, including at least one very prominent known agent of the Communist International (Comintern)<sup>9</sup>, had openly revealed their use of the Marxist stratagem - first employed in the early 1900s by the Russian Social Democrats - of exploiting the lure of economic progress as their primary lever for establishing the revolutionary framework upon which political federation in Europe was to be achieved. The



elites' chronic geopolitical blindness, coupled with the treachery of actives within the political classes who do understand the strategy, has, in just over a generation, brought the United Kingdom and the other EU Member States to the very edge of national extinction.

For national democratic institutions have been exploited, after the Comintern's own model, for the state's destruction. 'It is', as the Second Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow in 1920 laid down, 'only possible to speak of utilising the bourgeois organisations with the object of

destroying them'<sup>10</sup>. And Lenin himself wrote that 'no parliament can in any circumstances be for Communists an arena of struggle for reforms.... The only question can be that of utilising bourgeois state institutions for their own destruction'<sup>11</sup>.

Blindness to the nature of the regional political incubus which has evolved into the European Union Collective reflects a failure to discern this monstrosity's true nature, coupled with a cowardly refusal to take meaningful political steps to decisively arrest the progress of the conspiracy: for this 'process' is indeed a conspiracy, as explained on pages 50-51. As a consequence, national politicians who appear to be antagonists of the European Union, usually shy away from any suggestion that the many intractable problems which are overwhelming the EU member countries and their parliaments (as a direct result of the shameful decisions they have taken, and of the Euro-ideological commitment of the national bureaucracies which are supposed to be subservient to them but which in reality rule them), can only be resolved once and for all by abandoning it.

Inexplicably, this prospect appears to terrify many prominent people, especially among the compromised political classes - in spite of daily insults to our intelligence perpetrated by the Euro-ideologues, as they scrabble to construct their doomed Tower of Babel. Indeed, national political figures and their advisers themselves may regard their EU colleagues and counterparts with ill-disguised scorn. This certainly seems to be the case with British officials. According to The Sunday Times [16th December 2001], reporting from the EU Summit meeting held at Laeken, Belgium, in December 2001, one very senior member of the British delegation told UK reporters: 'Many of these people are buffoons. We view them with a mixture of horror and amusement'. Another British delegate described the far-Left Belgian Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, as 'a complete idiot'. These UK officials were merely expressing views which have evidently been widely held by political circles in London for many years. Why, then, does Britain continue to squander official time and resources on its disastrous membership of this confused, corrupt yet ideologically offensive, political collective? By 1996, it had been shown that the net cost of membership to Britain was of the order of £300 billion<sup>12</sup>, enough to build modern hospitals in every large town in the world. It seems that after several decades of membership, European countries are willing to countenance any amount of bureaucratic arrogance and incompetence, regulatory oppression, corruption and Euro-abuse in order to avoid what their elites and their diplomatic communities fear most -being 'left out in the cold'. In reality, of course, a determinedly independent national leadership

stance would mesmerise the rest of the world, command global attention and respect, transform the demoralised captive population's morale, and usher in many decades of vigorous economic growth. As usual, logical thinking (as is the case on all Euro-issues) is turned upside-down.

If the United Kingdom persists with its EU membership, it will pay a much heavier economic (let alone political) price in the years ahead than it has already had to pay since 1972. For the European Union Collective faces a bleak economic future, compared with that beckoning the United States, and even Britain. This is because, according to United Nations projections, the population of the European Union 15 will decline from 376.5 million in 2000, to about 339.3 million in 2050, with the working component of the population (that is, people aged between 15 and 55 years old) falling from 231.5 million to an estimated 167.6 million (a decline of 27.6%). In Japan, where the overall population is projected by the United Nations to contract from 127.1 million in 2000, to 109.2 million by 2050, the working age population will fall from 78.9 million to 49.4 million (-29.5%).

By contrast, Britain's population is expected to remain more or less unchanged (59.5 million in 2000, and 58.9 million in 2050 as more and more people live longer lives, with the working age population falling from about 35.9 million to around 30.1 million, a decline of 16.2%. But the outlook for the United States is quite different the 283.2 million US population will rise to 397.1 million by 2050, with the working age component rising from 176.0 million to an estimated 217 million, an increase of 23.3%. This means that markets for goods and services (homes, consumer durables, household goods, automobiles, electronic goods, and supporting services) will increase progressively in the United States, whereas, on the basis of these projections the opposite will inevitably be the case in Continental Europe and Japan. Moreover, the EU's economic salvation does not - contrary to the traditional Pan-German ideology (see Part Two) - lie to the East, where populations are declining even more sharply than in parts of the European Union. The most extreme case is that of Ukraine, the population of which contracted by 4.9% between 1994 and 2000 (from 52.11 million to an estimated 49.57 million, according to the International Monetary Fund), and where the working segment will fall from 30.5 million in 2000, to about 14.7million by 2050. In Russia, too, where the population fell, on the basis of IMF data, from 147.97 million in 1994 to 145.49 million by June 2000 (-2.48%), a simple extrapolation shows that the overall population will have declined to 115.42 million by 2050 - within which the working-age population will have been reduced, according to UN projections, from 92 million in 2000, to just 51 million in 2050, a contraction of 44.6%. Over the years ahead, the Russian economy will be assisted by exploitation of its energy resources in collaboration with Western corporations and experts - this being the single main tactical community of interest between Russia and the West, especially Great Britain (mainly through British Petroleum) and the United States. But overall, these data demonstrate starkly, for Britain, that its so far largely disastrous and fraught attachment to the European Union is leading it towards a relatively bleak economic future - whereas disengagement and identification with the

North American economy offers incomparably greater rewards. Britain's population is not collapsing; although the working component will diminish over the years, as indicated. What is crystal clear is that collectivisation of savings (especially of pensions), which is intended and will follow the 'consummation' of European Union collectivisation generally, would be grossly to Britain's detriment, but greatly to the benefit of the Euro Zone economy which faces a far more decisive decline of its working and productive population. In other words, for demographic-economic reasons alone, Britain's future lies definitively with North America.

However, because of the corrosive impact of collectivist EU ideology, basic logic such as this usually falls on stony ground. The main historical reasons for the defeatist attitude shared by the European elites, notably by the British, are not easy to identify. Some trace it back to the weariness of the post-Second World War years and to a resigned and pragmatic determination among European policymakers that 'cooperation' must be institutionalised, at all costs, in order to preclude any repetition of the horrors suffered by European countries during the first half of the 20th century. But evidence is advanced in this work for a less complacent explanation for the progressive collectivisation of sovereignty that has occurred. First, as a prerequisite for this, the present phase of the Leninist World Revolution was preceded by the abandonment of the European colonial empires, long agitated for, procured and demanded by the Communist International. At the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], convened in 1986, the former Georgian police chief and Party Secretary, MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, boasted that the Comintern's decolonisation objective - that is to say, the dismantling of the West European Empires, in parallel with the de facto establishment of the overt and covert Communist empire - had been all but achieved<sup>13</sup>; and this Leninist sentiment was echoed by Douglas Hurd not long before the British Government handed the priceless jewel of Hong Kong over to the amazed Communist Chinese not just for nothing, but accompanied by the free gift of foreign exchange reserves then held by the Hong Kong authorities worth over \$70 billion. Secondly, following the 'Long March' of agents and agents of influence through the institutions of the West, accompanied by the Gramscian radicalisation offensive associated with the Soviet-launched 'permissive society', elements have risen to policymaking positions throughout Europe that are wedded to the self-same Leninist collectivist agenda thought by the unwary to have been abandoned in 1989-91.

Such developments have facilitated the triumph and the de facto hegemony of the Soviet strategic collective's key 'convergence strategy', which presupposes that 'convergence' between East and West is to take place only on the terms laid down by the Soviet Leninists. Those terms, which were spelled out by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Nobel Peace Prize Lecture in June 1992 and in his earlier 'End of the Cold War Lecture' at Fulton, Missouri, essentially amounted to crude blackmail - consisting of an implied threat that international relations had been reoriented (by the Soviets) onto 'new rails', so that 'mankind' would henceforth be travelling in the same train

together, and thus in the same single political direction - since the alternative of global conflict was simply too dreadful to contemplate. What that meant in Soviet Aesopian terms was that the West had no choice: 'Either you do as we say, or you precipitate the Third World War'.

## THE WORLD'S LARGEST POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

The European Union is a political collective. It is manifestly a tautology and a truism that in a collective of any kind, decisions are taken collectively. By definition, collectivisation inevitably tends towards oppression, since those whose views do not prevail are required by virtue of their membership of the collective to accept the unpalatable opinions and decisions of the collective as a whole, by whatever technical means these decisions may actually be reached. Since the political collective has been imposed upon the European populations by a combination of rigged referenda, diktat, and deceit, all the EU Member countries' populations are, and feel, oppressed. The present level of oppression is, however, nothing to what lies in store. Even as the Author was putting the finishing touches to this text, he was informed, only semi-mockingly, that because of his 'obdurate' refusal to accept the 'politically correct' view of the European Utopia, he should anticipate 'having your toe-and fingernails extracted by red-hot tongs'.

The decisions of the institutions of the European Union Collective are usually deceitful and totalitarian in character. One technique, a general proxy for the collectivist 'decision-making' methodology employed by the European Union's undemocratic institutions, masquerades as 'consensus-building', and will be familiar to anyone who has had the misfortune to attend a 'visioning meeting', a 'stakeholder' council or similar socialistic mind-control-oriented conference. Consensus-building does not involve actually convincing anyone to alter his or her views.

On the contrary, it avoids and disposes of conflicting views - beginning and ending with a predetermined position, which may or may not be made known to the group. Consensus-building, a revolutionary technique developed by Leninist strategic planners, is implemented by trained 'facilitators' who ask questions designed to elicit silence, or else to force individuals who might be opposed to a given policy, to identify themselves. In the unusual event that the lone objector gains the upper hand in the forum, he or she is usually silenced by means of slogans, aggressive responses and counterallegations - such as that the said antagonist is engaged in 'type-casting' or 'finger-pointing'. These were, in fact, elements of a torrent of gratuitous invective directed at the Author during a press conference at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Prague in September 2000, by Mary Robinson, the ex-President of Ireland and later the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Facilitators do not ask if everyone agrees (which would encourage everyone to start talking), but ask if there is anyone who does not agree with the predetermined proposition - which usually encourages everyone to stay silent, since most people fear (irrationally) what their peers may think of them. Moreover questions at such meetings are typically phrased so that they appear to express an idea universally thought to be good, or else gener-

ally felt to be bad. In the environmental context (a dimension of revolutionary operations in which the continuing revolution is heavily invested, given its underlying anti-property and 'population reduction' intentions), a facilitator might ask: 'Does anyone think we should not be concerned about the future well being of our species?'

The underlying deception principle here is that it is almost impossible to prove that a consensus on such a predetermined issue does not exist. Thus the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] declared at one stage that a consensus among 2,000 scientists had determined that global warming was as caused by human activity - a dubious point of view very strongly denied by much authoritative expert opinion. But the so-called 'consensus' stands firm in the public perception (as was intended by Soviet intelligence, since this initiative was launched at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1986), despite the vocal non-concurrence of thousands of scientists. When asked why the alleged consensus had not been validated even by means of a straw vote, Michael Cujatar, Executive Secretary of the Conference of Parties, replied:

'Consensus is not unanimity: it is very much up to the president'. This cynical, arrogant, totalitarian, collectivist and anti-democratic attitude is routinely encountered in the European Union context.

More broadly, history shows that collectivisation and totalitarianism are interchangeable. Under Stalin, the poor Russian peasants who had been deceived by the Bolsheviks into believing that they would gain their own land for cultivation, only to discover that title to it was being withheld from them, learned that the minimal rights they had temporarily 'enjoyed' under the self-styled champion of the working classes and peasants, V. I. Lenin, were to be wrenched from them altogether through the wholesale completion of agricultural collectivisation - so that their position only a few years after the Russian Revolution, and following the Red Terror and the civil war, was far worse than it had been under serfdom, which had technically been abolished in 1861<sup>14</sup>.

Collectivisation led straight to oppression, with opposition to it on the part of the wealthier peasants countered by physical annihilation.

These practical and historical observations remind us in principle of the potentially extreme risks one runs by membership of any collective. Depending on the context, membership of a collective unavoidably entails taking representatives of co-members on trust - which can be reckless, foolish, hazardous and unwise - and pointlessly placing oneself unnecessarily in a position to be obliged to accept prospectively unpalatable decisions, without being offered any prospect of such decisions ever being reversed - let alone any worthwhile quid pro quo.

Indeed, all collective decisions are by definition and intention 'irreversible' - a word extensively used, by no means accidentally, in the Maastricht Treaty and its sequels, the blueprint of the insidious European Union Collective. Furthermore, the EU Collective - which has interests, self-evidently, that diverge from those of its participants - is forever venturing onto national territory not previously authorised by the individual members, since it is inherently driven by 'the imperative to collectivise' every dimen-

sion of existence within its ever-expanding jurisdiction [see page XXVII et seq.]. But the ever-careful revolutionary European long-range strategists have anticipated this and thought of a 'solution' - since their frenetically restless and haunted brains, bent on the pursuit of total control, have anticipated virtually every conceivable response to complaints about their fundamentally oppressive intentions.

In line with the standard practice of overt Communists - who proceed towards their mad political objectives by enforcing the rule that no meeting is permitted to conclude before the date of the next meeting has been set - the European Union Treaty is subject to 'revision' every four years. By means of this device, derived from Communist practice, the strategists have been able to lead the unwitting, penetrated national political and bureaucratic establishments towards national extinction by the nose, under cover of the slogan of 'cooperation'. For the prospect of quadrennial 'revision' of the collective Treaty is perpetually dangled before them, fostering the illusion that ground unfortunately ceded to the political collective can always be retrieved later, despite the EU's 'acquis communautaire' doctrine [see page XXV].

This practice further reveals the true nature of the European Collective. Self-evidently, if the collective Treaty is only intended to last in its present form for four years, it acquires a built-in bias towards expansion of its jurisdiction, since it requires revision on a permanent basis, as there are no 'sunset clauses'. This means that no issues are ever 'settled' - a curious paradox, since, as already noted, the decisions of the collective cannot be reversed, as democratic ones can. The political collective's decisions are never reversed, merely amended in further pursuit of the interests of the collective as a whole, rather than those of its members.

Indeed, in the collective, issues are not regarded as being in need of 'solution' per se, but rather as means to further the interests of the collective. Hence, EU issues are never resolved, other than in the collective's interests, and even then, only on a provisional basis. What is being described is the essence of revolution. For the true meaning of 'revolution', of course, is 'going round and round and round in circles' [page XIII]. No revolution ever achieves its objective: rather, it is its own objective. This consideration, in turn, illustrates the central truth that revolutions are inherently demonic. Even those who do not believe in God must concede that anyone who spends his or her life going round and round in circles, winds up raving mad.

We have therefore illuminated both the fundamentally revolutionary character and intent of the European Union Collective, definitively linking it to the broader revolution which is harassing the contemporary world, as it has done since the French Revolution more than two centuries ago. For as will be seen, the revolutionary role of the European Union Collective cannot be properly understood without a sound parallel understanding of the false, Leninist nature of the 'changes' ('collapsible Communism') which occurred in 1989-91, giving rise to the phenomenon of 'non-Communism' designed to hoodwink the West that the threat from Communism had suddenly evaporated - whereas in reality, overt Communism in Eastern Europe was abruptly 'folded' in a controlled series of events, while the 'former' Soviet Union

was subdivided, precisely to clear the way for the eastward expansion of its replacement - the European Union Collective. The final meeting of the representatives of COMECON held in Budapest, convened for the purpose of formally closing the organisation down, lasted for less than half an hour.

In the British domestic political context, the illusion that 'sovereignty can be repatriated from Brussels', which presupposes a comprehensive failure to understand the nature and collectivist purpose of the European Union, has typically assumed a number of recognisable formats. Among officials in Conservative Central Office, for instance, it was often said, prior to the Conservative Government's defeat at the 1997 General Election, that whatever mistakes had been made over 'Europe' could always be 'put right in a subsequent parliament', because no British Parliament has the power to bind its successors. Since this information was provided by a former Conservative Central Office official, it cannot be argued with<sup>15</sup>.

Such illusions reveal the extent to which the relentless 'progress' of the European Union project has outstripped the capacity of even those at the fulcrum of party policymaking to understand what has been taking place. The actual net consequence of detailed involvement in any dimension of European affairs is revolutionary - by which is meant here that the victim finds himself going round and round in circles, the unchanging object of the exercise. And by extension and design, collectivisation defines, and precipitates, open-ended confusion - which the collective then seeks endlessly to tame with ever more oppressive and onerous regulation offensives.

#### A SLOW-MOTION COLLECTIVIST COUP D'ETAT BY INSTALLMENTS

The illusion that powers can one day be repatriated from the EU political collective back to its constituent nation states is a pipedream, which was encapsulated in the former Conservative Government's confused document entitled 'A Europe of Nations'. This is not what is intended: what is envisaged, rather, is a Europe of Regions; and these European regions are to be progressively amalgamated into a regional bloc en route towards World Government. The 'repatriation of ceded powers' diversion overlooks the European Union's insidious collectivist dogma of the 'acquis communautaire', whereby every component of national jurisdiction, once ceded and thus 'acquired' by the European Union Collective, whether 'legislatively' (that is to say, by means of Directive, Decision, or Regulation) or else by means of a decision handed down by the European Court of Justice, thereafter belongs to the Collective in perpetuity. And because the European Court of Justice was established not to dispense justice as such, but rather to safeguard and to enhance the powers of the European Union Collective, it is rarely an ally of the cowed constituent nation states. As for the European Commission, it is endowed by the national parliaments with 'general powers', which grant it the privilege of proposing supranational legislation - and which presuppose that it is driven to expand them. (Lenin's principle that national parliaments are to be exploited by the Revolution only for their own destruction, was first applied outside Russia in postwar Czechoslovakia, when the 'bourgeois' parliamentarians voted for a Communist dictatorship [see page XXIX and Note 18]).

'General powers' were also the foundation of the Hitler dictatorship. Less than two months after he had been appointed Germany's Chancellor by the elderly President Hindenburg on 30th January 1933, Hitler banned the Communist deputies and, by resorting to intimidation and mendacity, secured, on 23rd March, the required two-thirds majority in the Reichstag for an enabling act which transferred all legislative authority from the Legislature to his Cabinet, ostensibly for a period of four years<sup>16</sup>. He did this under cover of a sweeping emergency decree granted to him by the President following a mysterious fire which had gutted the Reichstag building in February - now known to have been a Nazi provocation.

Thereafter, a wave of Nazi purges followed, with one institution after another being subjugated, and with arbitrary rule replacing government by rule of law in what a contemporary, Konrad Heiden, accurately described as 'a coup d'etat by installments'<sup>17</sup>. The European Union is engaged in an infinitely more sophisticated and long-range 'coup d'etat by installments' inspired by the Pan-German tradition, against its constituent nation states.

Among certain British parliamentarians, there has long been a suspicious facilitating tendency to 'delay' meaningful political responses which could have arrested the 'progress' of this 'creeping coup d'etat', on the pretext of awaiting a 'more opportune' moment at some time in the future. Short-term political calculations have usually been the deciding factor. Because MPs failed, at crucial junctures which are a matter of UK parliamentary record and history, to confront the source of the torment - as an exorcist is always obliged to do at an exorcism - the tormentor has grown inexorably in arrogance, power and strength, so that the continued existence of the United Kingdom is now being called into question.

Because a political collective, with its inherent 'imperative to collectivise' all dimensions of existence not yet collectivised, is inherently oppressive, it is the enemy of freedom - that is to say, of freedom of choice, and of the exercise of free will, which is a divine gift. It follows from this perception that all political collectives are manifestations of evil. The European Union is an incorrigibly malevolent structure because, as a collective, it denies some of its members - and a significant proportion of its disenchanting subject populations - freedom of choice, through its imposition upon them of decisions contrary to their interests, which are justified by the 'collective decision-making process'. As under overt Communism, this process deposits all power in the hands of the implementing bureaucracy, and thence into the hands of the self-perpetuating cabal which directs it. Senior positions are hawked around and traded within the small revolutionary elite of internationalist collectivists recruited from the national elites - each of whom, though having recklessly betrayed his country, is indifferent to having done so on the pretext that the interests of the collective take precedence because they override 'narrow national interests'. In practice, these have been largely abolished, since it is, by definition, only the political collective which has interests. It purports to exercise these in the interests of the collective, 'on behalf of the individual members and the European Commission. Therefore, whenever we hear of a national politician of an EU Member State writing or speaking about 'the



national interest', like Italy's Sig. Berlusconi, he is talking nonsense and deceiving his audience. Whether he is himself deceived, or else confused or just plain misled, varies. Many national politicians have never understood this.

A dissenting member of any political collective is powerless to alter the political collective's decisions. By the same token, a dissenting member cannot realistically expect to be in a position to alter the nature of the collective itself, let alone, as a consequence, the political orientation of the decisions it takes. Once again, the European Union's strategists have a clever 'solution' to the frustrations thereby arising among the collective's membership. Under the EU's regime of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), members of the political collective at the national level can in theory ally themselves with other disaffected Members, in such a way (they might hope) as to be able to carry sufficient votes under this system to frustrate what would otherwise be the 'perverse' will of the collective.

This can indeed still sometimes be achieved; but the possibility of altering the collective's decisions by this means is strictly limited, and in any case will not endure because of the European Union's inherent 'imperative' to achieve total collectivisation. Residual national vetoes are at loggerheads with this 'imperative', being inconsistent with the collective's purpose. The continued existence of the national veto, which is under constant attack, is seen as a temporary expedient, fit only for the 'salami tactics' approach: thus, at every opportunity, prominent EU and German figures compete among themselves to denounce the residual national veto powers 'enjoyed' by EU Member States, which have not yet been systematically abolished at the quadrennial Intergovernmental Conferences [IGs], and to demand that they should be progressively or completely liquidated.

Naturally, too, the larger the political collective becomes, the less voting strength will be left to individual members, and the more remote will be any possibility of achieving variations of the perverse will of the collective. And as the European Union expands eastwards, its collectivist characteristics will become ever more obviously pronounced, given its intended absorption of countries which have supposedly been released from overt Communism - but which, as demonstrated in Part One, remain in practice controlled by overt or covert Leninist actives, politicians, officials, interior ministries and intelligence agencies - all of them, in one way or another, just as beholden to Moscow today as before. For instance, in 2001, 18 out of 19 members of the Czech Cabinet were 'former' members of the Communist Party. None of these people had ever 'renounced' their Communist past and all remained Communists who were fulfilling Lenin's advice to 'work by other means' at certain stages of the World Revolution. In Volume XVII of his 'Collected Works' [1923 Edition, pages 142-145], Lenin wrote that 'a Communist must be prepared to make every sacrifice and, if necessary, even resort to all sorts of schemes and stratagems, employ illegitimate methods, conceal the truth, in order... to conduct revolutionary work within...'. In 1989-91, the Communists throughout Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union, adopted the 'Third Way': the acquisition of false political labels to mask their continuing covert Communist/socialist orientation.

Nor should it be assumed that they did this spontaneously, in the context of the mythical 'collapse of Communism': on the contrary, as will be shown in Part One, they followed Communist Party instructions and directives.

A prominent British 'Eurosceptic' once told the writer that expansion of the European Union was desirable in principle, since the consequence would be that its power and effectiveness would be diluted. Like almost everything connected with the European Union, this weird logic is upside-down and back-to-front. Diluting the voting power of EU member countries through expansion, diminishes the residual 'power' of the countries even further, but leaves that of the collective enhanced.

Moreover since the EU collective pursues power for its own sake, rather than, as its apologists misleadingly profess, in the interests of the populations of its member countries, the question of whether or not the European Union is 'relevant' and 'effective' in the sense invoked by those mild antagonists who remain imprisoned by its agenda, will remain a matter of permanent indifference to the collective power. For its entire motivation and *raison d'être* is the fundamentally demonic one of power and control. The lust for control is the very essence of evil, and a brazen form of idolatry.

These secular considerations help us to understand the source of the pressurising presence which sits on the shoulder of every concerned and politically aware inhabitant of the European Union's member countries. To imagine that geographical expansion of the European Union will result in a diminution of the power of the political collective itself, is obtuse: it is to see the future upside-down. The reverse will be the case.

### INACCURATE, NAIVE AND PERVERSE PERCEPTIONS

Although the discredited former British Conservative Government under John Major affected, for electoral purposes, to have seen the light in the final weeks of its existence, for most of his years in power the former British Prime Minister reiterated a tired slogan about the desirability of Britain being 'at the heart of Europe'. At the same time, his senior Ministers insisted upon using a cliché stressing the need for Britain 'to fight its corner in Europe'. By resorting to these vacuous phrases, Ministers inadvertently revealed the emptiness and confusion at the core of their 'European policy', since, by definition, a corner is peripheral to the heart or centre. One cannot be 'at the heart' of the collective if one is simultaneously 'fighting one's corner'.

Note, too, the official admission that it is always necessary to 'fight' within the EU context. What did those failed British politicians think they were fighting for? National interests? These, as indicated, had been largely collectivised. No, the intellectual confusion which made them a laughing-stock, was a direct product of their failure to analyse the collectivist nature of the beast with which they were dealing.

Unfortunately, the Godless European Union does have associations with 'The Beast'. It cannot be a coincidence that a massive Brussels-based computer called Euro Net, capable of storing all the personal data of the world's entire population, is nicknamed 'The Beast'. The disturbing motif of the wanton woman riding a modified beast from the Book of Revelation,

Chapter 17, verse 3, is in widespread use throughout the EU - for instance, on wall paintings in the European Parliament at Strasbourg, on a German rive deutschemark note pre-dating the political collective from 1948, on a British postage stamp dated 1984 commemorating the Second European Parliamentary 'Elections', in the form of an unattractive sculpture located immediately outside the European Council building, on a German ECU coin dated 1992, and on a recent German telephone card.

And everywhere is to be seen EU's ubiquitous circle of twelve stars, which the ignorant comfort themselves by believing that they represent the crown of Mary (symbolism derived from Revelation, Chapter 12, verse 1). In reality, the 12 stars are an attribute of the pagan 'Queen of Heaven', a name given to the mother of Nimrod (meaning, in Chaldean, 'the horned one'), the builder and ruler of Babel. The hideous new circular European Parliament building in Strasbourg is modelled upon Pieter Breughel's famous painting called 'The Tower of Babel', replicated in the Council of Europe's notorious poster shown on page VII. Symbology, which is much too large a subject to be dealt with adequately here, is a crucial component of the occult focus of all such Man-oriented collectivist 'New World Social Order' constructions - the EU being a conspicuous consumer of such neo-pagan symbolism. But the occult underlying nature and motivation of the European Union is not an issue that concerns the EU political and policy-making classes, which are mesmerised by economics and ideology.

In any case, not a single politician belonging to or supporting successive British Conservative Governments nor (much less surprisingly) the fellow-travelling British Fabian Socialist Government (which, given its political orientation, shares the objectives of Lenin's World Revolution but proceeds towards those objectives by stealth, just like the European Union Collective itself), has had the insight to recognise the collectivist orientation of the European Union, let alone the political courage to renounce the Leninist World Revolution he or she serves (whether knowingly or unwittingly), and to acknowledge the truth: that Britain and the other EU Member States are in thrall to the 'opposite' revolutionary method to that applied by the continuing Soviets. For whereas the Soviet Communists 'changed the face' of Soviet Communism and destroyed 'the image' of the enemy, the approach being applied in Britain is the diabolically ingenious alternative: 'the face' of the existing system is being maintained, while its supporting ideology and substructure has been suborned and annexed by the World Revolution - in conformity with the opinion of the Danish philosopher, Kirkegaard, who declared that the most successful revolutions are those which take place within the framework of the decaying ancient regime. Confronted with such realities, prominent British political personalities who understand the position perfectly well, usually shrug their shoulders and say: 'Yes, but no-one will ever believe it'. That is exactly what happened in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War - when the Czech Parliament voted for Communism without realising what was happening<sup>18</sup>.

The confusion bedevilling the minds of non-ideologues among the compromised British political classes today is derived from a perverse assessment of the nature of the European Union. The former British Prime

Minister, a prisoner of the political collective's deliberately complex agenda, took immense pride in what he trumpeted as his 'achievement' in 'negotiating' Britain's opt-outs from the Single Currency and from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. But given the political collective's 'imperative to collectivise', these opt-outs were always dubious and tentative, while the Labour Government was able to reverse Mr Major's position on the Social Chapter overnight. These errors arose due to the former Prime Minister's inadequate understanding of the nature of the European Union itself.

Had he and his ill-fated Government and Party understood, or even wanted to understand, that the European Union is a political collective, the British Government of the day might have perceived in good time that a Conservative Government should have had nothing to do with this collectivist venture. That realisation would have enabled its Ministers to see such nuances as that 'opt-outs' are inconsistent with political collectivism, since, to repeat: a political collective endowed with 'general powers' must strive to collectivise everything without respite; for it abhors and cannot permanently tolerate any dimension of human existence remaining uncollectivised and beyond the collective's reach. There can never be more than temporary exceptions to this imperative, since - once again - collectives are driven to collectivise everything, with no exceptions whatsoever. It is therefore absurd for 'Eurosceptic' politicians to sustain illusions such as 'a Europe of Nation States' or 'renegotiation' of EU membership terms.

We have seen that membership of the European Union is inconsistent with the continued existence of the sovereignty of its constituent member states, since the Union exists precisely to supplant them and thus to snuff out their existence. Since a political collective must collectivise everything - otherwise it remains 'incomplete' and 'unconsummated' - the European Union political collective will not be satisfied until every dimension of the lives of Britons and Europeans has been comprehensively collectivised. Health, education, housing, property, agriculture, fishing, defence and security, intelligence, police, the legal system, the currency and monetary and fiscal policy, are all targeted along with national sovereignty for collectivisation in one form or another; and dissenting members of the collective will be powerless to resist - since all power will have been ceded to the collective's centre, with objections overruled by collective decision. The outcome will be, and is becoming, an environment characterised by the prospect of an ever more obvious encroachment by stealth, of a regime of regulated collectivist oppression.

And the degree of stealth being employed is extraordinary. The guiding rule is that the captive populations should not only be rendered powerless to resist the 'coup d'etat by installments', but should at the same time be resigned and relatively indifferent to its slow-motion, yet always accelerating, progress. Here again, the EU strategists, as is their usual form, seek to deceive. For instance, the Regional Policy contained within the EU political collective's 'evolving Treaty' appears to seek to 'devolve' powers to the new regions, or rather seems to give the regions a say in the decisions of the collective. In practice, the Regional Policy serves the interests not of the regions but of the collective, in the following ways. First, it establishes revolutionary,

new and Leninist anti-nation state relationships between the regions and the centre of the collective's power (Brussels), thereby further diminishing the residual sovereignty of the national centre - in the United Kingdom's case, the ancient sovereignty of the Monarch in Parliament at Westminster.

Secondly, it seeks to undermine the relevance of national borders, as of course does the policy to remove border controls, by creating regions which deliberately traverse borders. Thus, for instance, certain districts of southern English counties are absurdly grouped along with the Pas de Calais, part of the Channel Coast region of northern France and Picardy, as a 'region' of the European Union, notwithstanding the obvious fact that there is virtually no cultural contact between the relevant parts of Sussex and Kent with the selected areas in northern France. The EU's Regional Policy has licence to develop such outrageous proposals because the European Commission is endowed with 'general powers' and can therefore initiate what it likes.

Armed with subversive anti-state 'general powers' modelled upon the Hitlerian precedent, the European Commission's command of the privilege of initiating the collective's policies means that it literally bombards the self-subjugated EU national governments with an avalanche of initiatives, draft Directives, Rules and Regulations - as it enjoys carte blanche to foster wholesale collectivisation by stealth, including the collectivisation of sovereignty itself, in order to accelerate the de facto abolition of the constituent nation states. This objective corresponds precisely with the revolutionary aim of the continuing Communists, reflecting a common Leninist purpose.

The Rev. Richard Wurmbrand, who served years as a prisoner of the Communist Government in Romania, has written with pinpoint accuracy<sup>19</sup> that.. 'the word "Communism" in itself is vague. It is taken to mean only an economic system in which everyone will work according to his needs. There will be no state, no division of the world into countries..'

#### COLLECTIVE SECURITY: 'HIGHEST OBJECTIVE' OF SOVIET POLICY

As the Communist International's Second Congress in 1920 also reiterated, Lenin's 'Communist society... recognises no form of state' whatsoever<sup>20</sup>. Americans have a crude but useful vernacular cliché: 'If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck, it is a duck'. Since the European Union Collective is incompatible with the continued existence of its constituent nation states - as the 'ever-evolving Treaty' and the ever-expanding 'general powers' and anti-national agenda of its frenetic executive centre make clear - it is obvious that the European Union passes the 'duck test': for it is what Lenin would call a 'New Form' for the realisation of objectives identical to those of the covert Communists.

It was Lenin himself who wrote that 'we set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state'<sup>21</sup>. And to Stalin is attributed the observation that 'as growing numbers of nations fall to the Revolution, it becomes possible to reunite them under a Communist world regime'<sup>22</sup>. Such an outcome was provided for by the Comintern in point number seven of its 'Theses on the National and Colonial Question' adopted by the Second Comintern Congress on 28th July 1920<sup>23</sup>: 'Federation is a transitional form towards the complete

union of...all nations'. Some two years later, Leon Trotsky, the leading organiser of Lenin's Revolution, wrote in his 'Bulletin of the Opposition', that 'the Soviet United States of Europe is the only correct slogan pointing the way out from European disunity'<sup>24</sup>.

How bizarre it appeared at the time, then, for the confused former British Conservative Prime Minister to have seen fit to state, as he did in his BBC Radio 4 broadcast on New Year's Day 1992, that 'I look forward to the day when Russia is a fully-fledged member of the European Community'. Perhaps Mr Major's remarks were ghosted for him by the senior Downing Street official who used to display on his office wall a framed copy of what he called his favourite newspaper, Pravda. Mr Major was, in the event, only rephrasing the Leninist sentiments expressed by MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, who, interviewed at length on Moscow Television on 19th November 1991, had invoked the familiar Bolshevik theme of Lenin's Common European Home by proclaiming:

'I think that the idea of a Common European Home, the building of a united Europe, and I would like to underline today, of Great Europe, the building of Great Europe, great, united Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, including all our territory, most probably a European-American space, a united humanitarian space: this project is inevitable. I am sure that we will come to building a united military space, as well. To say more precisely: we will build a united Europe, whose security will be based on the principles of collective security. Precisely, collective security'<sup>25</sup>.

Shevardnadze's prediction is well on the way to being fulfilled. The series of 'evolving convergence initiatives' stemming from that fateful and ill-advised decision taken in May 1997 on the expansion of NATO, couched in an accord which reads like a Soviet document<sup>26</sup>, will ensure the realisation of what the head of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Sergei Rogov<sup>27</sup>, has described as 'the comprehensive security system which has long been discussed in our country as the highest goal of our foreign and defence policy'<sup>28</sup>. The phrase 'long been discussed' was an Aesopian<sup>29</sup> reference to the strategy laid down in the Programme of the Communist International (The Blueprint for World Conquest), adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern on 1st September 1928, to the effect that a paramount Communist strategic objective was 'the voluntary unification and centralisation of the military and economic forces of all nations'<sup>30</sup>. The Leninist meaning of the adjective voluntary is compliant.

It is clear that, considered in this much broader geopolitical context, the European Union is a devious mechanism for procuring the de facto 'convergence' of Western Europe with the half-hidden, but continuing Marxist-Leninist Communism of the East. 'Convergence' was a concept much discussed in the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin<sup>31</sup>. Its intent was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev, in the course of his Nobel Peace Prize speech delivered in Oslo in June 1992, mentioned earlier, in which the former President referred deliberately and provocatively to the Soviet Union, as though it remained in existence (which it does, in the perspective of the GRU,

and therefore of the Leninist strategy collective in Moscow) - notwithstanding that the USSR was supposed to have been abolished in December 1991. This cannot have been a slip of the tongue, since Gorbachev read his speech from a prepared text. In his heavily accented Stavropol Russian, Gorbachev opined that... 'Our vision of the European space from the Atlantic to the Urals is not that of a closed system. Since it includes the Soviet Union, which reaches to the shores of the Pacific, it goes beyond nominal geographical boundaries'. Note the Leninist theme that borders are 'nominal', hence expendable.

Then he spelled out to the uncomprehending audience exactly what the Soviet Communists - now working 'by other means', as Lenin would have said, behind the cover of the fake 'non'-Communist Yeltsin regime, consisting only of Communists - had in mind:

I dare say that the European process has already acquired elements of irreversibility. In such a context, in the process of creating a new Europe... self-determination of sovereign nations will be realised in a completely different manner<sup>32</sup>.

### COLLAPSIBLE COMMUNISM' REPLACED BY THE 'NEW FORM'

According, then, to the top Soviet leaders who had been 'replaced', in accordance with instructions from the strategic centre, by a regime run by covert continuing ('relabelled') Communists whom the West had recklessly assumed were 'no longer' Communists, the sudden 'folding' of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was associated with an underlying, parallel process of European collectivist expansion to the shores of the Pacific. For MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, it was, as he insisted with Marxist-Leninist precision on 19th November 1991, 'inevitable' that 'the building of great Europe... from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' would be consummated. And according to the self-confessed Leninist Gorbachev<sup>33</sup>, 'the European process has already acquired elements of irreversibility'.

The purpose of this book is to throw a spanner into the evil works of this devious Leninist prescription - ahead of the coming consolidation of oppression which will doubtless condemn this Author to arrest and subsequent indefinite imprisonment outside the United Kingdom under the terms of a Pan-European Arrest Warrant for the 'crime' of criticising the European Union. It seeks to unmask the identity of purpose of the European Union Collective with that of the overt and covert continuing international Communists, and their secretly collaborating Pan-German 'competitors' - and to show that this 'common cause' is far from coincidental. It hasn't 'just evolved' autonomously.

For the European Union Collective is nothing less than an instrument for World Revolutionary 'convergence' - a new, sophisticated and deadly weapon or 'New Form' of Leninist coercive instrument which seeks to collectivise every dimension of Europeans' lives. 'There will be no states, no division of the world into countries'; and nor, as should be obvious to believers, will there be any place for God, for the transcendent, in the New World Social Order<sup>34</sup> of which the European Union is one of the primary political components. For perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the EU Collective is that

deadly spiritual barrenness which naturally accompanies all such attempts to elevate Man above God and to turn the natural and divine order upside-down. As King Solomon acknowledged in verse 1 of Psalm 127:

'Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain'.

The Godlessness of the European Union presupposes that at its core, it is an empty, though infested, vessel. Hence its typically vacuous preoccupation with the fostering of dumbed-down (collectivised, 'politically correct') 'European values', its demonic obsession with purporting to protect the captive public from innumerable improbable and remote hazards, and the fanatical determination of its proliferating administrative and policymaking structures with minutely detailed regulatory legalism - which is its primary instrument of coercion and control, and its chosen route towards its true objective: a single, regulated collectivist (i.e., ultimately Communist) political space stretching from the Atlantic to Vladivostok.

In other words, the European Union Collective, manic purveyor of regulatory collectivism, is the enemy of its Member States. The fact that its enmity seems to be 'invisible' to all but a minority, illuminates the wisdom of Charles Beaudelaire and of G. K. Chesterton, both of whom noted that when the Devil makes himself invisible, he is deadly serious. Virtually 'invisible' as well, are the European Union's two evil collaborating powers - the covert Soviet Union and Germany - both of which are engaged in the idolatry of hegemony and, for the time being, 'agree' one with another as they pursue their parallel, but ultimately mutually exclusive, strategies. We will now investigate these geopolitical strategies, and their backgrounds, in detail. ■

#### Notes and references:

1. The Book of Revelation, Chapter 18, verse 4, King James Version of the Holy Bible. All biblical quotations in this work are taken from the King James Version.
2. The Daily Telegraph, London, 24th March 2000, Peterborough Dairy column.
3. See Article 1 of the 'Consolidated Treaty on European Union, Title 1, Common Provisions', which reads, inter alia: 'This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and [as] closely as possible to the citizen'. See Note 4:
4. The dialectic of 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' and of Lenin's dictum that 'separation precedes federation' is summarised in the primary compendium of Marxism-Leninism, 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism', Moscow 1959, per the US Government translation, page 641. The reader should consider the following text very carefully, for it contains the essence of the European Union's purpose and also illuminates what is happening to the main metropolitan powers of the West today:

'Reciprocal respect for sovereignty is a condition for the progress of the evolution of socialism, in one country or another, via forms\* which respect the national peculiarities and traditions of a people. But does not all this hamper rapprochement of peoples, which is an ideal of socialism? Not in the least. Leninism teaches that respect for equality of rights, for the sovereignty of nations, is just what is indispensable in order to secure their rapprochement among themselves. Just such... are the dialectics of the national question. Only when nations are truly free and equal in rights, when no one of them makes any assault on the independence of another - only in this case are they permeated with deep trust in each other, only then do they voluntarily enter upon close liaisons dictated by the interests of the development of economics, defence, foreign policy'.

[\*Note: 'Form' is an Aesopian Leninist word meaning 'a transitional format employed by the World Revolution to further its objectives'. Another such Leninist Aesopian word which, like 'Form', is widely employed into the 'post'-Communist era, is 'Life'. This word means.



- essence, 'annoying ephemeral developments which get in the way of the 'progress' of the World Revolution, but which the Revolution is always resourceful enough to work its way round'. Gorbachev makes extensive use of 'Life'].

5. Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Press Release, London, 17 March 1997.

6. The Gospel of John, Chapter 8, verse 44.

7. Kenneth Clarke's remarkable observation that he had never read the Maastricht Treaty was on the same level as his equally famous comment to a senior Conservative in 1993 that he hoped that the Westminster Parliament would, in the near future, become 'a local Council Chamber in Europe'. As late as the summer of 2001, Clarke continued to deny that he had made any such statement. However this Author had written, on page 23 of his financial journal

International Currency Review [Volume 23, Number 4], published in the autumn of 1996, that Mr Clarke-who still boasts that he has never bothered reading the Maastricht Treaty-is on record as stating that 'I look forward to the day when the Westminster Parliament is just a Council Chamber in Europe'. During the Conservative Party's leadership election in the summer of 2001, which resulted in the election of Mr Ian Duncan-Smith as leader, it was again widely alleged that Mr Clarke had indeed made the statement that he looked forward to the Westminster Parliament becoming 'just a Council Chamber in Europe'. At one or more meetings, Mr Clarke denied what he was claimed to have said. At length, another former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Norman (now Lord) Lamont, telephoned this Author to ask what the source of the report had been. The Author reported that he had seen the report in a newspaper, but could not, without further research, determine which newspaper and on what date the report had appeared. Whereupon, Lord Lamont revealed that Mr Clarke had made the offending remark to him in a private conversation, and that he (Lord Lamont) had been the original source. He was disappointed that the Author could not supply a source, as he had wanted to mention the exchange in an article he was preparing, in the hope of influencing the outcome of the leadership election (in Mr Duncan-Smith's favour), and understandably would have preferred to use a source other than himself, given that he and Mr Clarke were political colleagues and remain good friends. The matter then blew up into a small national controversy, when the Letters Editor of The Daily Telegraph contacted the Author with the same request for an original source. In the end, the Author found the original source for this report, which was an item published in The Daily Telegraph dated 30th May 1993, entitled: 'Clarke's tale'. The relevant paragraph from the newspaper reads as follows: 'Mr Clarke's appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer is said to have irritated the Tory Right. One reason is that, despite a history of 'union-bashing', he is reported to have Left-wing tendencies. His enthusiastic attitude towards European union particularly worries his detractors. He may be even more Europhile than they fear. He recently confessed to a senior Tory that he hoped that Westminster would, in the near future, become "a local Council Chamber in Europe"'. Note that Mr Clarke's espousal of such a revolutionary concept was correctly associated by The Daily Telegraph with 'Leftish tendencies'.

8. Article 1 of the 'Consolidated Treaty on European Union, Title 7, Common Provisions', also states that the the 'task' of the European Union 'shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples'. [Note: 'Solidarity' is a word extensively used in speeches by Leninists and in their literature, and filched from the Soviet Marxist-Leninist lexicon].

9. The late Dr Joseph Retinger. See Part Two of this work.

10. The Comintern's 'Blueprint for World Conquest', adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern on 1st September 1928, published in English by Human Events, Washington and Chicago, 1946, page 90, citing 'The Theses and Statutes of the Communist International', as adopted at the Second World Congress, 17th July to 7th August 1920, Moscow, and as published by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party USA, New York, 1921.

11. V.I. Lenin, 'Collected Works', Volume XVII, page 149.

12. See for example, Dr Stephen Burkitt et al, International Currency Review, Volume 23, Number 3, pages 87-134, Summer 1996.

13. Addressing a Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs held in Moscow on 25th July 1988, MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, who was then a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, confirmed officially that the decolonisation process was actively provoked by the USSR (that is, originally by the Comintern): 'Let us recall the role played by Soviet diplomacy in posing the question of eliminating the colonial system and in resolving this problem'. The Soviets promoted this policy in unrevealed collaboration with the United States, an alliance traceable back to the 1920s-exploiting the Americans' psychological hangover from colonial times. It was also assisted by covert Soviet support for left-wing agitprop operations in Britain

and the Colonies, such as the Movement for Colonial Freedom, and through propaganda directed at British military forces during the Second World War. The United States routinely supports the United Nations Decolonisation Committee, a triumph of Soviet covert planning, even though the US Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa have been targeted.

14. Joel Carmichael, 'A Short History of the Russian Revolution', Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, London, 1964, and Sphere Books, 1966. This is the classic summary of the Bolshevik Revolution by the greatest writer on the subject of the Author's acquaintance, and probably of the 20th Century. At the time of the present work's publication, Joel, formerly the Editor of 'Midstream', a task which he performed in his spare time, was living in retirement at an advanced age, on Long Island. The Author has been unable to obtain a list of the huge number of books Joel Carmichael has written: indeed, Joel may himself have lost count! The Author was greatly honoured when, with typical generosity, Joel handed him his last remaining copy of his great classic biography, Trotsky/[St Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1975].

15. Information provided to the writer by a former Conservative Central Office official.

16. Henry Ashby Turner, 'Thirty Days: Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933', Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, MA and New York, 1996, page 194.

17. Konrad Heiden, 'Der Fuehrer', Boston, 1944, page 579.

18. The authoritative Communist treatise on how the Communists exploit democratic parliaments to procure power is 'How Parliament can play a Revolutionary part in the Transition to Socialism, and the role of the Popular Masses', by Jan Kozak, Member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with a powerful introduction by the late Lord Morrison of Lambeth, published in 12 reprinted editions in 1961, and also in Spanish and Czech; first American Edition by Long House Publishing Company, CT, 1962. This document shows how the Communists leveraged their position within the Czech Parliament so that in 1948, after a comparatively short spell of freedom following the years of Nazi oppression and occupation, Czechoslovakia, generally regarded as the most successful of the Central European parliamentary democracies during the inter-war period, fell under a one-Party Communist dictatorship, supported by the Soviet Union and operating through the overt Cominform. The question of how it had proved possible to overthrow within one week or so a parliamentary regime working with a non-Communist majority based on democratic principles, was raised in the Security Council of the United Nations. Fearing an investigation, the Soviet Union applied the first double veto in UN history, as a result of which the Prague coup remained a mystery until the publication of this boastful document. The feat was achieved by means of the deft use of covert 'pressure from above' and 'pressure from below'.

The treatise itself requires a separate study, to illustrate how the democratic process is routinely used by the Communists in fulfilment of Lenin's dictum: 'The only question can be that of utilising bourgeois state institutions for their destruction' [V. I. Lenin., 'Collected Works', 1923 Edition, Volume XXV, page 149]. Lord Morrison wrote in his Introduction to Kozak's document that 'we now have confirmation in the form of an authentic Communist document that it is... part of the Communist technique to use the normal democratic parliamentary system as the first step on the ladder leading to the revolutionary overthrow of the normal democratic state apparatus based on a non-Communist majority'. The original Czech title of this document was: 'About the Possible Transition to Socialism by means of the Revolutionary Use of Parliament and the Czechoslovak Experience'. It was first brought to the attention of the non-Communist world during the 1957 London Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Jan Kozak wrote the work in his capacity as the official historian of the Czech Communist Party. He wrote: 'Our experience provides notable and practical proof that it is possible to transform parliament from an instrument of the bourgeoisie into an organ of power [and] a direct instrument of power for the peaceful development of the socialist revolution' [code for a revolutionary Communist dictatorship].

19. Rev. Richard Wurmbrand, 'Marx & Satan', Living Sacrifice Book Company, Bartlesville, OK, USA, 1990, page 131.

20. The Comintern's 'Blueprint for World Conquest', adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern on 1st September 1928, published in English by Human Events, Washington and Chicago, 1946, page 90, citing 'The Theses and Statutes of the Communist International', as adopted at the Second World Congress, 17th July to 7th August 1920, Moscow, and as published by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party USA, New York, 1921.

21. V. I. Lenin, 'State and Revolution', International Publishers, New York, 1961, page 68.

22. J. Stalin, 'Marxism and the National Question', International Publishers, New York, 1942, p. 38.

23. The Communist International, 1919-1943: Volume 1:1919-1922', Selected and edited by Jane Degras, Oxford University Press, page 141; derived from Protokoll, ii, p. 224, 28 July 1920. The Author's edition of these Volumes is the set discarded by the UK Ministry of Defence.

24. Leo Trotsky, writing in his journal 'The Bulletin of the Opposition', Number 17-18, November-December 1930, page 53.

25. MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, interviewed live on a Moscow Television programme, 19th November 1991. Shevardnadze's prediction has proved reliable. Under the 'former' Left-wing activist Lord Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, the accelerating pace of NATO's transformation into a collective security regime accommodating Moscow's demands has accelerated towards the point of no return. There has been zero understanding in Western analytical and policymaking circles of the Bolshevik-Leninist reality that Moscow deliberately fostered conflicts in the Caucasus and elsewhere within the sphere of influence it calls its 'near abroad' in order to reinforce the 'need' for the intended collective security structures, which of course it intends to dominate. Anyone who doubts this should consider the meaning of Sergei Rogov's published statement that the 'comprehensive security system which has long been discussed in our country [is] the highest goal of our foreign and defence policy': see Notes 27 and 28.

Since it is the TOP PRIORITY, it follows that fomenting controlled upheavals (by the usual Bolshevik-Leninist means of controlling both sides in such staged conflicts) would certainly be considered a suitable means of accelerating movement towards this key strategic aim. Western analysts have misread this intent, as they have misjudged every other dimension of Leninist World Conquest strategy - naively believing (according, for instance, to a British Foreign Office source) that the West must accommodate Russian nervousness about security as part of the 'post-Cold War settlement'. As indicated, this ignores Moscow's strategic objective.

Following the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on 11th September 2001, Lord Robertson was reported by Reuters to have proclaimed [in Brussels, on 27th September 2001]: 'The Russian response to the terrible attacks on the United States has not only been befitting of a major partner of this alliance but has also been the reaction of a real and genuine friend'.

26. This was Mr Richard Perle's vivid description of the so-called 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation', the 16-page document unveiled in Moscow in May 1997 and signed with almost certainly fatal prospective consequences for the West, in Paris on 27th May. The remark was made by the US expert at a congress of the New Atlantic Initiative held almost contemporaneously, in Phoenix, Arizona.

27. Sergei Rogov (The Horned One), a key strategist, then Head of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada. All such institutes are outgrowths of the KGB-GRU, which established them to serve the Party-intelligence community establishment. Rogov is not this senior Leninist strategist's real name. His KGB code-name, The Horned One, happens to be identical to the meaning underlying the name of the occultist Chaldean ruler Nimrod.

28. International Affairs (published without a break by the Russian Foreign Ministry since 1954), Volume 41, Number 7, 1995. This document is essential reading for all students of contemporary international affairs, since it contains explicit insights into Russian strategy which Western observers and policymakers have been ignoring - with the result that the West has remained recklessly blind to Soviet deception strategy.

29. Aesopian language, or speech, invented by the Russian revolutionaries under Lenin. See Preliminary Note 1, on page XXXIV.

30. Soviet Analyst, Christopher Story, Ed., Volume 23, Number 8, World Reports Limited, London and New York, February-March 1996, page 1.

31. See especially Anatoly Golitsyn, 'New Lies for Old', Dodd, Mead, New York, 1984; and 'The Perestroika Deception', Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 and 1998.

32. Gorbachev's observations in the course of his Nobel Peace Prize speech contained the essence of the carefully prepared long-range plan for 'convergence' between Western European countries and the 'former' Soviet Bloc. Although the writer drew extensive attention to the importance of this speech in Soviet Analyst, International Currency Review and other published materials for which he is responsible, he is not aware that any significance was attached in Western official circles to this crucially important statement which, inter alia, confirmed that Gorbachev was speaking for the Yeltsin regime. The speech laid out the 'former' Soviet Union's Leninist 'convergence' agenda for Eurasia.

33. Gorbachev explained with great care in 'his' book 'Perestroika' that the Soviet strategists had revisited Lenin and had remodelled their strategy in accordance with Lenin's flexible revolutionary blueprint, preparing the ground for the discarding, for the time being, of the Stalinist model of control reliant wholly upon repression.

34. The New World Social Order is the correct phrase, not the abbreviated 'New World Order' as used by Dr Henry Kissinger, President George Bush Sr. and other Western figures, who discarded the adjective 'social'. The full phrase was first used by William Z. Foster, the leader of the Communist Party USA, in his book 'Toward Soviet America', reprinted by Elgin Publications, Balboa Island, California, 1961, first published in 1932.

'During the 1990s, the neo-liberal economic model has been implemented on a global scale. As a result, the IMF and the World Bank have begun to play approximately the same role on a global scale as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union once [sic!] played for the Communist Bloc. IMF and World Bank experts decide what to do with the coal industry in Russia, how to reorganise companies in South Korea and how to manage entrepreneurs in Mexico. Despite all that is said about the free market, world practice has never before known such centralisation. Even Western Governments are forced to reckon with this parallel authority'.

Boris Kagarlitsky, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Comparative Political Studies of the Russian Academy of [Leninist] Sciences, writing in 'Socialism and Democracy', Volume 12, Numbers 1-2, 1998, published by The Committees of Correspondence, which 'split' from the Communist Party USA in the early 1990s. The office of The Committees of Correspondence is located at 10th Floor, 122 W. 27th Street, New York, NY 10001-6281, which is also the office of the far-left Gramsci operation calling itself the Brecht Forum, and the New York Marxist School.

Boris Kagarlitsky's riveting writings include such Marxist-Leninist titles as 'The Dialectic of Change', 'Disintegration of the Monolith', 'De-revising Marx', 'Restoration in Russia', 'Why Capitalism Failed' and 'The Mirage of Modernisation'.

# LENINIST AESOPIAN SPEECH

## WHY RECOGNISING AND UNDERSTANDING IT IS SO IMPORTANT

Lenin was most exacting of the language and style of agitation and propaganda. He demanded that the language of articles and books should be impeccable.... Before him, history had not known a politician who made such effective use of the spoken word in the interests of the revolutionary transformation of society' [from 'Lenin on Language', Raduga Publishers, Moscow, 1983]. However, typically, Lenin did not encourage such exactitude in order to clarify matters: on the contrary, he was exacting in his use of language in order to obfuscate - and to create a means of communicating with those whom he called 'the interested' (the revolutionaries), while

still using ordinary, everyday language, to which the Tsarist censors could hardly object. By the use of this dialectical means of communication, which contained hidden meanings, the 'enemy' could be charmed, deluded, misled and lied to, while the interested' could simultaneously be instructed as required by the strategists.

Among vehicles used for the issuance of Kremlin directives, one of the most widely employed outside the 'former' Soviet Bloc has been 'World Marxist Review', in which language is used with Leninist care. Another crucial source of information on the continuing Revolution is the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal 'International

Affairs', also written in Lenin's 'two-faced' language, which provides detailed continuing insights into Soviet revolutionary policy, tactics, strategy and intentions: if Western analysts were aware of Lenin's 'special way of writing', and were prepared to spend the necessary time reading and analysing 'International Affairs', they would be able to acquire Golitsyn-like expertise in interpreting events and predicting the likely course of Soviet tactics or strategy. One reason for Western blindness is ignorance about Lenin's 'Aesopian language'.

So the Leninists' 'Aesopian language', alluded to in this work, requires some brief explanation. In the Preface to the Russian Edition of 'Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism' [26th April 1917], Lenin wrote: 'I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an exclusively theoretical, mainly economic analysis of facts, but to formulate a few necessary observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in that Aesopian language - in that cursed Aesopian language - to which Tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a "legal" work' [i.e., a work which would not be censored or banned by the Tsarist authorities as illegal -Ed.]. Following this passage, Lenin appended a Note, which reads as follows: "Aesopian", after the Greek fable writer, Aesop, was the term applied to the allusive and roundabout style adopted in "legal" publications by revolutionaries in order to evade the censorship'.

That this method of communication has been used by the Leninists ever since is obvious from the language of double-meanings used by Gorbachev, Kozyrev and other contemporary Leninists - 'perestroika' being the most conspicuous case in point. The Soviets encouraged the West to believe that 'perestroika' meant 'restructuring', as in 'restructuring of the economy'; which it did. But 'perestroika' also meant something entirely different to 'the interested'; and its second meaning was quite legitimate: to Gorbachev's 'interested', 'perestroika' meant 're-formation', as in 'military formation': so that its hidden meaning was 'we are 're-forming'', in order more effectively to prevail over all who are opposed to Communism. That this was the case was made clear by Carl Bloice, the Kremlin correspondent of the CPUSA's 'People's Weekly World' [see page 62]. Citing Lenin, he wrote in May 1991 that the Soviet Leninists were engaged in 'drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive'. ■

# THE SUPREMACY OF THE KGB-GRU

## DRIVING THE STRATEGY, THE KGB-GRU IS IN OVERALL CONTROL

Under the post-Stalin plan for revitalising and upgrading the long-range revolutionary deception strategy discussed in Part One, the KGB was put in charge of mobilising the full potential of the strategic assets of the Revolution. Therefore, it is the KGB that has hitherto made and broken Party careers. With the installation by the covert Soviet strategy and policy collective of the intelligence officer Vladimir Putin as President, to front for the Leninist World Revolution strategists, it has become increasingly obvious that, in line with the logic of the structure of the covert Soviet intelligence organs, the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) - the Main Intelligence Directorate - is calling the shots. Indeed, according to French intelligence sources, Putin, a product of the 'Andropov stream', was, in 2001, engaged in imposing GRU officers in key positions throughout the continuing covert Soviet control structure.

Since the KGB, under Yuriy Andropov, who had been appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee [KGB] in 1967, was in charge of all dimensions of formulating and perfecting the long-range strategy, the KGB Chief waxed increasingly powerful as Leonid Brezhnev began his long physical decline, coinciding with 'the period of stagnation' - exacerbated by the fact that the strategy, already constrained by having to wait for the end of the 40-year period during which Germany was to be occupied by the wartime allies [see Part Two], could not be fully consummated. But as Andropov's power became total, he grew impatient for Brezhnev to leave the scene.

Brezhnev, who never trusted Andropov, had appointed General Semyon Tsvigun, married to the sister of Brezhnev's wife, to be Andropov's first deputy. But his real job was to keep Brezhnev informed of Andropov's activities. On 19th January 1982, Tsvigun was found dead in his office at the notorious KGB building located on Dzerzhinskiy Square. By May 1982, after sweeping the Kremlin of many Brezhnevites - 'having had some of them killed, others arrested, still others fired, and having frightened all the rest', according to the US-based Russian journalists, Vladimir Solovyov and his wife, Elena Klepikova [*Inside the Kremlin*, W H Allen, London, 1987], Yuriy Andropov named himself Secretary of the Central Committee, assuming the functions previously performed by Mikhail Suslov, who had died early in 1982, and by Andrei Kirilenko, Brezhnev's Party deputy and trusted comrade, whom Andropov had smeared to the point that he was forbidden to attend sessions of the Politburo'.

Although he had acquired supreme power in practice many months before Brezhnev was murdered (see below), Andropov, with leverage from the obedient KGB cadres, appointed himself General Secretary as soon as Brezhnev was at last out of the way, thus bypassing Brezhnev's heir, Konstantin Chernenko - the former deputy personnel gauleiter of the Dnepropetrovsk NKVD in the late thirties (where, according to the Russian (US) journalists, citing a booklet about the Dnepropetrovsk terror, he was directly involved in nightly mass shootings by fellow NKVD officers who were 'either dead drunk or high on cocaine'). To rid himself of the lingering Brezhnev, Andropov had arranged a punishing schedule of official visits and engagements, which the ailing Brezhnev, who had suffered several strokes and whose legs were wobbly, fulfilled, to Andropov's reported annoyance; and when that ruse failed, he arranged for a catwalk to crash down on top of Brezhnev while the leader was visiting a tractor plant in Tashkent, Central Asia. The injured Brezhnev was flown in a special plane to Moscow, but, to Andropov's dismay, recovered. Finally, Andropov had placed his hopes on the pompous ceremonies celebrating the 65th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on 7th November 1982. But when, after standing in the freezing cold for hours, Leonid Brezhnev failed to expire on cue, Andropov appears to have lost patience altogether.

Using 'special' information allegedly from inside the Soviet structures, the two Russian-American journalists reported that on 10th November 1982, having breakfasted and read Pravda, Brezhnev went to his bedroom, followed by bodyguards assigned to him

by Andropov. Only a few minutes later, the bodyguards returned to the living room and told Victoria Petrovna Brezhneva that her husband had died suddenly. 'She leapt up from her chair and rushed towards the bedroom, but the bodyguards barred her way.... Then Victoria Brezhneva was led away'.

Gorbachev's own account of the way Brezhnev met his death, on pages 136-137 of his enormous book 'Memoirs' [Doubleday, New York, 1995] diverges 100% from that account and is suspiciously bland but typically self-oriented - providing a smooth summary of how Andropov called for Gorbachev urgently, having received a message from Brezhnev's wife that the leader had suddenly expired:

'Leonid Brezhnev died unexpectedly.... On 10th November [1992], I received a Slovak delegation. We were engaged in animated talk when we were interrupted by an assistant bringing me a message from the Secretariat: "Andropov wants you urgently. He knows that you are busy with a delegation, but please apologise to them, suggest a break and go to his office right away". I understood that something serious must have happened. When I entered Andropov's office, his face betrayed no emotion whatsoever, but his calm countenance belied his tremendous inner tension [sic]. He seemed unruffled when he told me that Victoria Petrovna, Brezhnev's wife, had sent him an urgent message announcing her husband's death and asking him to come to the dacha in Zareche. He was the only person she wanted to see. Andropov had already been there and had talked to Dr Chazov and members of the bodyguard. Brezhnev had died in his sleep several hours before the ambulance arrived'.

The account by the Russian husband-and-wife team of investigative journalists, which is based upon information provided through their extensive network of informants, is considerably more credible than the smooth KGB-copy offered by the official ghost-writers of 'Gorbachev's' massive 730-page tome. The journalists, who left Russia in the late 1970s 'under threat of arrest' and went to live in New York - appear to have entertained no obviously devious motive for publishing the dangerous material which appeared in 'Inside the Kremlin' - unless they were 'licensed' to do so by Soviet officials, in order to reinforce preparations for the intended 'Break with the Past'.

As stated elsewhere, it seems highly unlikely that Mikhail Gorbachev could have found the time to write 'his' huge volume, and the many books which have appeared in English and other languages under his name. At all events, Gorbachev's elaborate account of Brezhnev's death in 'Memoirs' is apparently false - as is so much else in that volume, designed to 'rewrite history' in general, to obfuscate, and to provide alternative accounts of episodes such as the brutal murder by the KGB of Brezhnev (on Andropov's orders), in particular. (Another lie with which Gorbachev evidently felt comfortable is summarised

in Note 3 to the Introduction to the present work [page 21]: a detailed study of 'Memoirs' would expose a multitude of further lies). It is surely a disgrace that the many 'post'-Soviet books, packed with lies, generated by the apparat since the fake 'changes' of 1989-91, have remained critically unscrutinised and unchallenged.

Formally installed as General Secretary, Andropov intensified his purges - arranging for the KGB to decapitate the Party and state bureaucracies. According to Solovyov and Klepikova: 'He drove more than a third of the high officials out of the places that they had made cosy and warm by sitting in them for so long, and replaced them with reliable KGB cadres. At the same time, he shook up the provincial foundations of the Soviet power structure: out of 150 provincial Party bosses (actually, local satraps), 47 - again, almost a third - were dismissed.... In Moscow itself, there were rumours about a secret Andropov circular ordering a substantial reduction in the bureaucratic staff in general. The Lubyanka, the Moscow political prison through which Stalin had sent hundreds of thousands of 'enemies of the people' to the other world, was now crowded with Brezhnev's minions, accused of bribe-taking and other kinds of corruption. To the obvious satisfaction of a public longing for spectacle, Andropov had several of them shot. The victims included Brezhnev's bosom buddy, Yuri Smelyakov, Chairman of the Technology and Industrial Export Agency,

and Yuriy Sokolov, manager of the Eliseyev Delicatessen Emporium and supplier of scarce victuals to the Brezhnev household'.

Shortly after Brezhnev's murder, Andropov's enemy, Nikolai Shchelokov, was removed from his post as Minister of Internal Affairs, expelled from the Central Committee and then from the Party, stripped of his General's rank, reduced to enlisted status, and finally arrested. His son was sent to the GULAG as a parasite. But the carefully planned show trial of Shchelokov did not occur because he committed suicide, and further because in March 1983, Madame Shchelokova, left alone in despair in her apartment on Kutuzov Prospekt, where Andropov also lived, took her husband's pistol and fired at him [Andropov] several times on the stairway as he returned home late one night - before she was killed by Andropov's bodyguards. When the wounded Andropov reappeared in public two weeks later, he walked unsteadily, his hands trembled, and he could not manage without assistance. In the autumn of 1983, after he had ordered the shooting down of a Korean airliner with 269 people on board on the night of 1st September 1983, Andropov vanished to a hospital in Kuntsevo, a residential community near Moscow, where he died only 15 months after seizing power.

During the brief Chernenko interregnum, two sparring Politburo 'young Turks', Mikhail Gorbachev and Grigory Romanov, sought the throne; but after a KGB smear campaign labelling Romanov as a drunkard, Gorbachev's rival was framed and confined to a hospital for alcoholics. Gorbachev, whom the KGB favoured to take over the leading role for the strategy collective - in part because of his sexual charisma [see page 58] - was hastily declared General Secretary only four hours after Chernenko's death, the result of a 'palace coup' fronted by Andrei Gromyko, the veteran Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the help of the KGB in preparing the way.

These Kremlin power struggles represented a throw-back to Stalin-era strife at the highest level, threatening to undermine the collective resolve, reached after Stalin's death, that power must, both in substance and in the general perception, reside with the Leninist strategy collective - so that, apart from anything else, the boodbaths ['perestrelka'] that had the potential to accompany Bolshevik transfers of power would be permanently relegated to the past. Following the appointment as General Secretary of Mikhail Gorbachev - who was himself believed to have the blood of several earlier rivals on his hands - the 'collectivisation of power' decision taken after Stalin's death was 'reaffirmed'. In any case, the logic of Leninist revolutionary collectivism and strategy necessitated nothing less.

The Politburo over which Gorbachev presided included, at the beginning, three KGB Generals in civilian clothes - the KGB Chairman, Victor Chebrikov, the First Deputy Premier Gaidar Aliyev, and the Foreign Minister, MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze. Having been head of the Administrative Organs Department, the most powerful of all the Communist Party structures, Gorbachev, a protege of Yuriy Andropov, had been de facto in charge of the KGB, the MVD and the Red Army. Solovyov and Klepikova wrote that 'even under Stalin, there were fewer representatives of the secret police' in [that] body'. And they added that 'thus, the KGB' had now 'taken over the Council of Ministers and the Foreign Ministry, not to mention the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose upper echelon includes many Generals from the Committee of State Security, and the Armed Forces which are completely controlled by the secret police. All the newcomers to the Kremlin are, like Gorbachev himself, Andropov's people'. Thus the KGB, which the Party placed in charge of the long-range Leninist strategy in the late 1950s, and which enjoys a commanding position inside the Party's structures (having been ordered in 1959 to interpenetrate them and vice versa), not only invaded the CPSU Politburo but also preferred to hold even the Presidency in its own hands. But with the catapulting of Vladimir Putin, who began his career in the GRU, to the Presidency, Soviet Military Intelligence assumed direct, overt control on behalf of the 'General Staff' of the World Revolution, for the first time in history - an ominous development indeed. ■



# INTRODUCTION

## THE DIALECTIC OF THE DECEPTION

The common presumption in the West is that Communism collapsed in 1989-91, and that this process culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. The West rejoiced, and rushed to accept these perceptions as genuine. Only a handful of sceptical observers realised, at the time, that it was wholly out of character for Leninist revolutionaries to abandon their objectives, especially as they had never shown any such inclination in the past. A few specialists, who had correctly analysed Soviet strategic deception operations and who ought to have known better, reassured themselves that a true 'Break with the Past' was indeed taking place, on the ground that the Soviets had 'abandoned' their ideology (which is not true).

Hardly anyone - least of all among the political and policymaking classes, and in the media - thought it was at all odd that 'the changes' occurred in such an orderly fashion, and that the successive 'collapses of Communism' in Eastern Europe took place at measured intervals, rather than in a typically confused manner (as would be liable to be the case if the upheavals had been spontaneous), enabling Western TV journalists to move from 'revolution' to 'revolution', ending up in Romania at Christmastime in 1989, to witness the staged guillotining of the odious Ceausescu. Still fewer bothered to ask themselves why it was that, when the very foundations of Stalinist states were supposed to be in the process of being destroyed, communications facilities for the Western media remained in impeccable order - a question which applied particularly to the events in Moscow during the 'August coup' provocation. Rather, almost everyone found it more congenial (and far less taxing) to accept the received view - that these curiously sudden, phased upheavals were genuine, and that all evidence to the contrary represented the fantasies of deranged minds.

But if you are reading this book, you are among millions who do not, and probably never did, believe these egregious lies - or who have been troubled that Western Governments accepted them at face value without a moment's hesitation. And you are right: for the Soviet Leninist mirage of 'collapsible Communism' represents the greatest hoax ever perpetrated. And upon the single lie of 'collapsible Communism', the covert Soviet strategic deceivers have continued to erect further lies, since all lies breed like rabbits. Yet even though the original generation of lies, and many subsequent generations of them, have become threadbare, the Western official attitude has been that we should not be like Lof's wife: what is the point of looking back? Whoever wants to revert back to the 'bad old days' of East-West confrontation? To concur with this view is to give in to lies and blackmail.

The 'changes' were classically Leninist - dialectical and deceptive - in both content and intent, being designed to exploit the dialectical antithesis of the Stalinist confrontation between East and West, which the Soviets were finally able to suspend following the expiry of a pre-arranged 40-year span during which Germany was required to be occupied by the wartime Allies,

under an agreement reached between the Soviets and the Western powers (as explained in Part Two). This 40-year period came to an end in 1989, the bicentenary of the French Revolution, facilitating the removal of the main symbol of the confrontation: the Berlin Wall.

The dialectical antithesis of the 40-year stand-off between East and West was of course the opposite - namely, 'peace' (the apparent absence of confrontation). The West missed this simplest of all Leninist dialectical ploys, which can be summarised as follows:

**Thesis:** The perception of institutionalised East-West confrontation, with the threat of nuclear annihilation and indifference towards the environment.

**Antithesis:** Sudden termination of the perception of East-West confrontation (destruction of 'the image' of the enemy) with the apparent (but unspoken, provisional, reversible and thus false) renunciation of the threat of nuclear annihilation, and a sudden, unfamiliar global emphasis on the environment.

**Synthesis:** The construction of a New World Collective Social Order exclusively along the lines specified (in threatening tones) by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Fulton, Missouri, speech on 6th May 1992 and in his Oslo Nobel Peace Prize in June 1992<sup>1</sup>.

A dialectical equation - of which this is a particularly straightforward, as well as a crucial, example - contains within itself a ruse, associated with the fact that the antithesis is not spontaneous, but rather contrived. Its purpose is to bring about the intended synthesis. If the synthesis that materialises does not match the envisaged outcome, the strategists have the capability of triggering or procuring a new dialectical cycle (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) aimed at securing the intended result, as required by the strategy (known as 'the General Line' or 'the Line'). In the case in point, the dialectical cycle would be more or less self-actuated if the West were to come to its senses, to recognise that it has been duped and caught off-guard, and to take the overdue urgent steps necessary to re-establish its security and to arrest the subtle, accelerating contemporary slide towards global collectivism. So an added problem for the West is that, once it dawns that we have indeed been duped (if that ever happens), those who do know the truth are liable to be drowned out by advisers insisting that 'there's no point in looking back: we have to deal with the situation as it has evolved'.

No wonder President Vladimir Putin, answering questions on a call-in TV show on 25th December 2001, expressed delight at the 'progress' Russia had made during 2001 towards the achievement of its objectives. 'Despite many problems and living standards remaining very low, the dynamics are very positive', Mr Putin proclaimed, according to Andrei Zolotov 'Jr.', writing in Moscow Times. 'One can say today that the departing year 2001 was a good year for Russia'. But the Communists have never cared in the slightest about the living standards of the people: their sole purpose is the pursuit and consummation of the strategy of the Revolution. So what did Putin mean by

his reference to 'very positive dynamics'? He was referring, of course, to the stupendous and relentless progress made by covert Soviet revolutionary strategy as it cruises towards the realisation of the objectives laid down by the Comintern in the 1920s, aided by the reliable stupidity and credulity of Western policymakers. When the Author asked the so-called 'GRU defector', Viktor Suvorov (not his real name) who lives in Britain, why the British intelligence services had accepted the false, Leninist 'changes' of 1989-91 as genuine, he responded abruptly: 'Because they're stupid'<sup>2</sup>. They must be: it is reliably understood that MI6 now has, according to one knowledgeable UK source, 'hardly anyone monitoring the former Soviet Union'.

The dialectic of the original master deception of so-called 'collapsible Communism' was carefully masked by Soviet apologists at the time (notably Eduard Shevardnadze), led by the liar Mikhail Gorbachev<sup>3</sup> - or rather, by his apparat copywriters, since it will have been impossible for this peripatetic Leninist operative to find time amid his global travels to author personally all the works which have appeared under his name, such as the 730-page 'Memoirs' [Doubleday, New York, 1995] which surfaced in German (1995) and English (1996). The Soviet strategists had spent a generation studying the Western pragmatic mentality, which diverges sharply from their own Mongol mindset; and as a consequence, the entire propaganda output of the apparat since the late 1980s has fed entirely plausible, pragmatic explanations for Soviet behaviour into the receptive minds of eager Western analysts. Thus, Western policymakers were told by Mr Gorbachev himself in 'his' book 'Gorbachev on My Country and the World' that 'the race for military supremacy relative to any possible opponent... resulted in military spending that in some years reached 25-30 percent of our Gross National Product'<sup>4</sup>. This spending was allegedly five or six times greater than analogous military

expenditure by the United States, Canada and the European NATO countries. 'Obviously this course could not continue', wrote Gorbachev. 'The rush toward the abyss had to end. The need to pay serious attention to questions of foreign policy had (all of a sudden! - Ed.) become urgent'<sup>5</sup>.

So a thorough, pragmatic overhaul of Soviet foreign policy priorities 'became necessary'. 'The problem', Gorbachev explained, 'was not so much Soviet foreign policy itself, or the actions of Soviet diplomats, as it was the concepts on which they were based. These concepts rested on a dogmatic world outlook, not on reality, not on a sober analysis of the situation nor on meeting the real and vital interests of our country and our people'<sup>6</sup>. 'Rather', Gorbachev continued, 'our foreign policy was oriented towards harsh confrontation with the outside world (not including, of course, those we regarded as allies, although they occupied a rather subordinate position in our overall political doctrine)'.

'Such was the foreign policy legacy of totalitarianism', Gorbachev or his KGB-GRU-Foreign Ministry copywriting apparatchiks continued. 'By its very nature... totalitarianism cannot exist without a harsh ideological and political system, a set of stereotypes that distort reality and have only one purpose - to serve the interests of the regime [and] to create conditions for its further entrenchment'. [So...] The first stimulus of the New Thinking

was a dispassionate, even remorseless analysis of our own foreign policy concepts and the practices they inspired'.

This was how the pretext for the abrupt dialectical switch from thesis to antithesis was presented and expressed - in straightforward yet deceptive terms calculated specifically and deliberately to appeal to the Western pragmatic mentality, which the Soviets had spent the years since the beginning of the 1960s studying. These studies were carried out by the organisations of the Soviet General Staff, and by the Academy of [Leninist] Sciences' many specialised institutes - in particular the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, headed by Gorbachev's most important adviser, Georgiy Arbatov, 'known to have connections with the General Staff'<sup>7</sup>. Other Soviet Institutes engaged in studying Western responses and attitudes to hypothetical Soviet strategic initiatives during the years following the crucial Eighty-One-Party Congress in December 1960, at which the long-range deception strategy was ratified<sup>8</sup>, included the Institute of Europe, the Institute of General History and the Institute for World Economy and International Relations. The task of these institutes was to develop and refine the scope and detail of the intended relaunch of Lenin's World Revolution, which was to follow the dismantling of the Stalinist model of Communist control at the conclusion of the 40-year period of Germany's occupation.

## THE DRAMATIC PRESENTATION

The 'changes' were, furthermore, presented for international public consumption in the most dramatic fashion - the Soviets being particularly adept at the exploitation of symbology. The symbol of Soviet oppression - the Berlin Wall - was dismantled before the world's television cameras; and the East European regimes were terminated, as mentioned, not simultaneously, but one by one, in orchestrated succession - to enable TV camera crews to be present at each demolition operation, culminating in the sacrifice of the Ceausescus. This theatre locked permanently into the Western psyche the perception that Communism had 'collapsed', a perception reinforced by some further theatre beginning with the mysterious 'August coup' provocation and concluding, in December 1991, with the corollary that 'the Soviet Union is no more'. That spectacle was unveiled in three rapid-fire stages.

First, 'behind Gorbachev's back' and in 'secret' collaboration with the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia - Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk, and Stanislav Shushkevich, Chairman of the Byelorussian Supreme Soviet - met at a dacha in Belovezh Forest, near Minsk, on 8th December 1991 and issued the following declaration: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an entity under international law and a geopolitical reality has ceased to exist'. At the same time, they signed an agreement to establish the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which has never, to this day, acquired recognised legal status in international law.

Secondly, on 13th December 1991, the leaders of the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan met in Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, approved the invention of the CIS, and 'agreed' that a further conference

of 11 Republics, which had all now unilaterally 'declared' their own independence, should take place on 21st December. When this conference met in Alma-Ata on that date, the third and final stage of orchestrated 'collapsible Communism'- a declaration in support of the Belovezh accord, was effected. It asserted in terse prose: 'With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist'. The way had been paved for these theatrical events on 24th August 1991 when, following the fake 'August coup' which had provided the pretext for 'collapsible Communism', the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine had unilaterally followed the earlier examples set, on instructions from the centre, by many of the smaller Republics, and had declared itself to be an independent state - abruptly announcing that from that date onwards, only the constitution, laws and decrees of the Ukraine Government and other legislative acts of the Ukrainian Republic, would be valid on the Republic's territory. The decree had stated that this step had been taken because of 'the mortal danger threatening Ukraine in connection with the coup d'etat in the USSR of August 10,1991', despite the fact that the putsch (a carefully orchestrated KGB provocation) had been reversed so that the 'mortal danger' had 'evaporated'.

### 'COLLAPSE' FROM THE TOP

None of these events could possibly have taken place, given the immense repressive power and potential of the KGB/GRU, the Ministry of Interior and the Red Army, as well as of many other military formations\*, had they not been sanctioned and ordered from the top. To believe that the 'collapse'

\*SPECIAL NOTE: The estimated strengths of the 14-15 different armies in Russia alone (excluding all the armed forces of the 'independent former' Soviet Republics) were estimated in late 2001 to be as follows: The Russian Armed Forces, with 1.2 million actives, are commanded by the Minister of Defence and the General Staff, and consist of the Ground Forces, the Navy, Strategic Missile Forces, Airborne Troops and Central Command Units. The Interior Ministry has its own Army of 200,000 Internal Troops, plus several special-assignment units such as the Vityaz Regiment and the Rus, Rosich and Skif detachments. Other Interior Ministry units include OMON special-assignment commandos and SOBR rapid-response detachments, consisting of several thousand men. Troops belonging to the Federal Border Guards number almost 200,000 servicemen. The Emergencies Ministry has a separate Army consisting of some 30,000

Civilian Defence Troops, plus a number of special-assignment detachments. With the addition of Railway Troops, these smaller Armies number about 50,000 altogether. In addition, the following further Armies have come to light: (1) The Federal Service of Special Construction, established in 1997, consists of the Main Military Directorate of Exploitation and Restoration of the Ministry of Communications, the Central Directorate of Military Construction Units of the Nuclear Energy Ministry, and the Federal Road-Building Service; (2) The Federal Special Construction Service (14,000 men); (3) The Main Directorate of the Special Programs of the President (20,000 men); (4) The Federal Protection Service, of which the intensively-trained

Presidential Regiment is the nucleus (3,000 men); (5) The special-assignment Centre of the Counter-Terrorist Department of the Federal Security Service, incorporating the elite Alpha and Vypel formations (between 1,500 and 2,000 troops: the Alpha troops, directly controlled by the KGB, were deployed during the fake 'August coup' in 1991; (6) The Foreign Intelligence Service has its own special forces unit, Zaslou, consisting of between 300 and 500 servicemen; (7) The Main Penitentiary Directorate of the Justice Ministry has special forces which are used for the suppression of prison riots - actually, for maintaining order in the continuing GULAG-and also in Chechnya; (8) Special 'physical protection' detachments are maintained by the Federal Tax Police and by the State Customs Committee, equipped with light arms, and consisting of some 10,000 men; (9) In his call-in TV programme broadcast on 25th December and reported by Moscow Times, President

Putin said that 'a special drug police force may be established', while the powers of existing law enforcement bodies' were to be strengthened. Thus the Leninist model in Russia today is in fact sustained by the Stalinist force model. In other words, the switch to the Leninist model is mainly for international public consumption, because in practice the loose Leninist system needs to be supported by brute Stalinist force. In the 'former' Soviet Republics (with the partial exception of the Baltic States) there is no pretence at all that the Stalinist model has been abandoned. But then Western media are not usually invited to the capitals of the Republics. For Leninist lies to be sustained, external media reports have to be routed and cleared through Moscow. ■

was spontaneous would presuppose that the colossal apparatus of Stalinist repression had suddenly ceased to function, which was simply never the case

- persistent yet imprecise propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding. For several years, Soviet organs of repression had been running riot all over the 'near abroad', with devastating localised consequences. Therefore, the impression of spontaneity contrived by the Soviet propaganda apparatus was entirely false - even though, as the strategists had correctly anticipated, it was quite sufficient to convince the British Foreign Office, the US State Department and the other centres of Western foreign policy that the collapse of the Soviet Union was indeed genuine, thus fulfilling Lenin's prophecy that it would always pay the revolutionaries to 'tell them [the bourgeoisie abroad] what they want to believe'. However it is quite apparent that the Soviet/Russian propaganda apparatus has had to work overtime ever since these events, in order to buttress the lie that the 'collapse' was not contrived; and among the multiple means adopted for this purpose must be listed Gorbachev's elaborate 'Memoirs' - a volume which deploys an extraordinarily complex 'ducking and weaving' prose style designed to reinforce the illusion that all these 'dramatic events' were entirely free-standing, and to obliterate any residual Western suspicions that they must have been preplanned and orchestrated from the top, throughout.

Another tome which serves this purpose is 'Gorbachev: On My Country and the World, translated from the Russian by George Shriver [Columbia University Press, New York, 2000: see also Note 4], which elaborates Mikhail Gorbachev's 'stance' in opposition to Boris Yeltsin - who was the former First Secretary of the Moscow City Communist Party Commission, no less! - during the 'dramatic events' of 1991. These are but two of the innumerable literary and other propaganda devices deployed by the strategists' frenetic revolutionary agitprop apparatus to ensure that the scaffolding supporting the vast inverted pyramid of lies upon which the New World Collective Order is being constructed (see below) remains intact.

For upon the single combined lie that 'the Soviet Union is no more' and that 'Communism and the USSR collapsed' was constructed the next lie

- that the threat derived from the imperative of Communist aggression and expansion had vanished, even though, as will be shown in Part One, Georgiy Arbatov had taken special Leninist care to explain that it was just the 'image' of the enemy that was being destroyed, rather than the enemy itself. But lies, like plutonium, decay over time; and as more and more lies have been piled upon this fragile base, the upward-expanding inverted pyramid of lies has become increasingly unstable - necessitating the support of scaffolding, as its sheer weight has required ever more elaborate buttressing. Yet even though evidence of Russian deception proliferates daily, and even though the West must know by now that it has been deceived at every turn, the unstable structure remains in place. Among reasons for this state of affairs are the following:

First, Lenin taught the revolutionaries to lie incessantly for the Revolution, and that whatever furthered the Revolution's interests and prospects was moral. 'A Communist', he wrote, 'must be prepared to make every sacrifice and, if necessary, even resort to all sorts of schemes and stratagems,

employ illegitimate methods, conceal the truth, in order to conduct revolutionary work<sup>9</sup>. A truly successful liar entices others to lie with him. Those people who have been lied to - or the lies - then readily become co-liars and co-conspirators<sup>10</sup>, who, by accepting the original lies as genuine, end up enthusiastically furthering the interests of the liar, deceiving themselves in the process, and independently piling fresh lies upon old, ad infinitum.

Moreover, the Leninists' studies of human psychology had convinced them that lies would not readily disown their own lies - since they would be prevented from doing so by their own pride, by career considerations, and by the human propensity to seek protection against humiliation. At the same time, the liar knows that there is always the likelihood of his lies being exposed, since 'nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest; neither any thing hid, that shall not be known and come abroad'<sup>11</sup>. So he is driven by an imperative, if he remains unrepentant, to pile more lies upon former lies, and to reinforce the scaffolding propping up the unstable inverted pyramid. Secondly, the Leninist revolutionaries, being insufferably arrogant<sup>12</sup>, have shown themselves to be largely - although not entirely (see below) - unconcerned when individual lies are exposed, as frequently occurs. The reason for their super-confidence is precisely that they know that the lies are prisoners of both the Soviet lies and of their own derivative lies and self-deception. This provides the Leninist World Revolution, which is based upon lies, with a protective mantle - even though Mikhail Gorbachev himself revealed, in a telling remark at a joint press conference given in Paris with the late President Mitterrand on 6th May 1991, that the strategists remained concerned at the slight possibility that their lies might be exposed. The dangers lie', President Gorbachev commented, 'in the fact that someone, analysing at some private moment or other, this or that instance or episode, or even event, including a dramatic event [= a prediction not least of the August 'coup' - Ed.], should not make hasty conclusions and cast doubt on all that has been acquired and [on] what we have created in putting international relations onto new channels, onto new rails, entering, as all of us have said, a period of peaceful development'<sup>13</sup>.

## STALINIST MODEL REPLACED BY THE LENINIST MODEL

in dramatising the apparent 'collapse' of Communism, the Soviet strategists masked the truth of the matter - which was not that Communism had 'collapsed', but rather that the Soviets had dismantled the Stalinist model and had restored in its place a long-planned, updated, regorganised, Leninist World Revolutionary model. Gorbachev, a favoured representative of the collective elite since his status was first recognised when he was sent as a delegate from Stavropol to the 22nd Party Congress in 1961<sup>14</sup>, was selected by the strategy collective in part to prepare the ground for the relaunching of the pure Leninist model, by presiding over the dismantling of the Stalinist model - the shift from thesis to antithesis.

Brushing aside the anomalous fact that, following the 'changes' of 1989-91, Stalinist-style Communist regimes nevertheless remained in place in Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam, and the lack of any political (as opposed

to economic) discontinuity in Communist China, the West, caught off-guard, jumped to the unwarranted conclusion that because the Cold War had been declared to be 'over' when the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries signed the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States and the Charter of Paris on 19th November 1990, the Communist menace had indeed evaporated overnight. This careless assumption ignored the clear warnings of top Soviet strategists such as Georgiy Arbatov, who had repeatedly stressed, since at least 1988, that it was the 'image' of the enemy (unspoken: rather than the enemy itself) that was being destroyed<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore, the West misconstrued the Leninist word 'perestroika', assuming that it meant 'restructuring' (as many Soviet spokesmen, including Gorbachev, had themselves misleadingly implied) of the Soviet economy and system - whereas the Aesopian meaning of what the Leninists secretly meant by 'perestroika' was 're-formation', as in military formation. This was not the end of Communism, but the beginning of the resumption of Lenin's World Revolution<sup>16</sup> - and on a truly global scale.

The difference between the Stalinist and Leninist models (between the thesis and, for external consumption purposes, the antithesis) is striking. Under the Stalinist model, control is achieved by repression; and territorial boundaries are rigidly determined (unless Stalin decided to annex a territory, in which case they became flexible). (As the Special Note on page 5 confirms, implementation of the Leninist model on the territory of Russia itself has been accompanied by a massive expansion of diverse armed formations - implying that the strategists have, in practice, not dared to abandon the Stalinist repression model in Russia, but have tried to disguise it through 'splintering'). But under the Leninist model, all territorial boundaries are transitional, temporary, removable, transitory, impermanent and ultimately expendable and of no relevance: hence the casual 'dismantling' of the Soviet Union in December 1991, by just three of the leaders of its constituent Republics. Since the final Leninist objective is the abolition of all borders, it was entirely consistent with this model that President Putin told listeners to the call-in television programme, as reported by Moscow Times on 25th December 2001 [see pages 2-3] that 'Russia has de facto become a country without borders, especially in the south'. Equally transitory and impermanent in the Leninist model are all institutions, structures, positions, titles, agreements, preconceived ideas, values (other than the Revolution itself), norms, religions and morality. The reason for this is that under the Leninist disposition, there is only one value - the World Revolution. Morality is whatever furthers the World Revolution. 'Morality', wrote Lenin [in his 'Collected Works', Volume XVII, pages 321-323] 'is that which serves [to create] a new Communist society'. Beside the World Revolution, all values, institutions and structures are ephemeral and expendable, and are in any case destined either for transformation from within, or for liquidation. As discussed earlier, the literal meaning of revolution is 'going round and round in circles', which is demonic. As one observer has said, 'the Communist leaders are not in their right mind; they are all in Marx's mind'<sup>17</sup>, although this might be better put: 'They are in Lenin's mind'. And Lenin knew the occult, having attended a satanic event on the island of Capri, to which he had travelled one year to visit and play chess with the radical, Maxim Gorky.



## THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY IMPERATIVE

One of Gorbachev's most insistent stipulations was that the 'New World' was to be built on the basis of 'New Thinking'. Translated from the Soviet Leninist Aesopian double-speak, this meant that Western geopolitical policy, to the extent that it was coherent at all, had to be reoriented and remodelled to coincide wholly and without variation with the collectivist 'norms' laid down in dogmatic language by Gorbachev, both at Fulton and his in Oslo Nobel Peace Prize speech, and earlier in Soviet discussions with Western leaders. The most important dimension and objective of 'New Thinking' was to be a regime of collective security - the primary objective of the Soviets since the Executive Committee of the World Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) [E.C.C.I.] had ratified this strategy in 1928.

Agitation for collective security has remained a constant theme of overt and covert Communist rhetoric and propaganda, even cropping up in the speeches of obscure Communist officials - such as that delivered by the Chairman of the Communist Party of Belgium, Marc Drumaux, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow between 5th and 17th June 1969, at which the progress of the long-range strategy unveiled in 1959-61 to dismantle the Stalinist model at the end of the 40-year period of Germany's occupation and to re-launch the pure Leninist model world-wide [see Part One], was evaluated. Drumaux said: 'Our Party proposes an independent foreign policy of active neutrality, which is a special form of struggle... for the dissolution of opposed military blocs and for a collective security pact in Europe'.

Likewise, as stressed throughout this work, the Director of the Russian Academy of [Leninist] Sciences' Institute of the United States and Canada, Sergei Rogov, writing in the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal 'International Affairs' [Volume 41, Number 7, 1995, page 6], proclaimed Moscow's firm

expectation that 'it will become possible to create a Euroatlantic security area or, in other words, the comprehensive collective security system which has long been discussed in our country as the highest goal of our foreign and defence policy'. The phrase 'long been discussed in our country' is an Aesopian reference to the Comintern's directive, dating from the 1920s, that the supreme purpose of Soviet strategy was to collectivise the military power of the West - a development which would, of course, necessarily leave Western Europe permanently at the mercy of continuing overt and covert Soviet power.

This theme was heavily sold at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] held in 1986, and it was further addressed by Gorbachev in an article published in Pravda in 1987, in which he promoted 'the idea advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress - a comprehensive system of international security', failing to reveal that this has all along been the Soviets' primary strategic objective<sup>18</sup>. The Soviets are now far advanced, as discussed in Part One, towards the realisation of this long-established aim - the collectivisation of military power. They have succeeded in leveraging their gargantuan strategic deception, centred on the unification of Germany, to procure the 'perestroika' (restructuring, here) of NATO. Not only have Western Governments failed to comprehend the Leninist

dialectical thrust behind the 'changes' of 1989-91, but there has also been an equivalent failure by the West, and especially by the slothful Europeans, to understand that the covert Soviet-Chinese Communist objective is universal collectivisation. The promotion of global issues facilitates this process. A 'global' issue in the Leninist mindset is an issue which is 'too big and complex' for the redundant nation state - further marginalising the nation state which, since sovereignty is to be collectivised, is to be abolished. The state is to wither away: as Lenin wrote, 'We set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state'<sup>19</sup>.

#### THE EUROPEAN UNION COLLECTIVE AS 'THE NEW EUROPEAN SOVIET'

On 23rd March 2000, Gorbachev, who was briefly visiting London, confirmed amid cynical laughter that the European Union is 'the new European Soviet' [see The Daily Telegraph, Peterborough column, 24th March 2000]. With this single revealing remark, Gorbachev has himself confirmed this book's central thesis - and also that, while engaged in presiding over the dismantling of the Stalinist model of control in the Soviet Bloc, he was nevertheless also furthering the realisation of Stalin's blueprint, set out in a treatise published in 1942:

'Divide the world into regional groups as a transitional stage of world government. Populations will more readily abandon their national loyalties to a vague regional loyalty than they will for a world authority. Later, the regions can be brought together all the way into a single world dictatorship'<sup>20</sup>.

The Russian word for collective - *kollektiv* - refers to the peer group: but a peer group which operates in a manner with which few Westerners will be familiar. One analyst who, many years ago, properly understood the role of the *kollektiv*, was Allen Kassof. He wrote [this Author's italics]:

'The peer group - or, to use the Soviet term, the collective - is the setting for group pressure.... The task of the collective is to instil... habits of collectivism - that is, to discourage "egoistic striving" and to foster an acceptance of group control over values, attitudes and behaviour, not only during the formative years, but throughout adult life as well'<sup>21</sup>.

This is precisely the primary function of the European Union Collective vis-a-vis its constituent states and governments - which it routinely coerces, pressurises, harasses and intimidates as it plots to impose its collectivist-federalist agenda on them. Far from being a benevolent power, it is in fact the permanent enemy of its members - a Fifth Column in their midst, which is dedicated to the destruction of their sovereignty.

And the European Union is profoundly Leninist in another way, too: Lenin duplicated all the main sources of state power. The European Union Collective's structures duplicate national power on exactly the same Leninist model. Nor is it accidental that, almost without exception, all the leaders of the European Union *kollektiv*, beginning with the President of the European Commission (at the time of writing), Sig. Romano Prodi, are from the Left and the Far-Left. On 9th February 2000, Sig. Prodi released a document entitled 'Strategic Objectives 2000-2005: "Shaping the New Europe"' which contained so much collectivist double-speak that 'Soviet Analyst' referred to it as 'The Neo-Communist Manifesto of the new European Commission'<sup>22</sup>.

Bearing in mind the Comintern's Thesis Number 7 of 28th July 1920 that 'Federation is a transitional form towards the complete union... of all nations'<sup>23</sup>, 'Prodi's Manifesto' outlines how this Comintern objective is to be procured. Here are a few revealing excerpts:

'We have achieved integration in Europe by putting in place, though the Treaties, unique and innovative structures that transcend traditional international co-operation'.

'Over the next decade we will complete our economic integration and, even more importantly, give shape to a new, political Europe. The next five years will be decisive'.

'We are already pushing forward with political integration by establishing an area of freedom, security and justice, and by developing common foreign, security and defence policies. Our common interests and objectives are best served by a common approach and common means'. ['Common' is a key collectivist/ Communist buzz-word - like 'change' 'single', 'joint', 'harmonisation', 'solidarity', 'shared', 'non-discrimination', 'community', 'integration', 'collective', etc., and their derivatives -Ed.].

'Political integration will become a reality as political leaders and citizens come to realise that their shared values of liberty, peace and stability, democracy, human rights, tolerance'<sup>24</sup>, gender equality, solidarity and non-discrimination can best be promoted through shared policies and institutions. Political integration must be pursued.

'Globalisation is dissolving national boundaries'.

'Global issues increasingly demand global responses'.

'These [unspecified - Ed.] challenges are too large and too complex for any country to tackle single-handed, and the need for a collective European response has never been greater'.

'What we are aiming for, therefore, is a new kind of global governance to manage the global economy and environment'.

'The truth is that "Brussels" is all of us' [ a new rendering of the formerly familiar German refrain 'Ein Volk, ein Reich'].

'We must sustain the pace of change to the very fabric of the European Union itself ['change', as noted above, is a revolutionary key-word: indeed, whenever 'change' is used in isolation - without any answer to the question: 'change to what?' - it is being employed in furtherance of revolutionary objectives, which the perpetrators dare not acknowledge publicly - Ed.].

'It will need further integration backed by a systematic policy of reform, transforming both our economy and our social systems'.

Sig. Prodi's document did not elucidate what was meant by the intended 'transformation' of European 'social systems'. But, given the unremittingly collectivist-Communist orientation of the circular, and of the development of the European Union itself, there can be no doubt that the nature of the transformation the European Commission has in mind is towards ever-expanding collectivism. Thus, the intended political integration is not an end in itself, its actual purpose is to transform the EU states' social systems - or, in other words, to act as the transmission mechanism for the de facto introduction of the 'New Form' of Communism. This

means that all those Euro-ideologues who are clamouring for the realisation of a European federation are in fact agitating for full-blown Communism. These people, therefore, need to be exposed for the 'useful idiots' (to quote Lenin) or the international socialists/Marxist-Leninist Communists that they really are. To differentiate international socialism from Communism is to waste time splitting hairs: the intended revolutionary outcome, as with Fabian socialism, is identical: de facto Communism, albeit imposed in a 'New Form'.

'Prodi's Neo-Communist Manifesto' added that [the overriding priority of this Commission will be] 'to advance the process of enlargement so as to stabilise our Continent and secure peace, democracy and respect for human rights throughout Europe'.

But the 'process of enlargement' is an imperative which has no logical or practical rationale at all - and which the advocates of European integration accordingly forbear to justify other than when they are openly espousing Soviet strategy - as was the case in a speech by Manfred Woerner, a former Secretary-General of NATO, who, addressing the Conference on the Future of European Security organised by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs held at the Cenin Palace on 25-26th April 1991, declared, as though he was acquainted with, and supported, the Soviet collective security objective:

'The challenge for us Europeans is to draw the Soviet Union into our common endeavour, to dispel any temptations to isolate it... From the viewpoint of security policy, our reference system reaches from the shores of the Pacific to Vladivostok'.

With the exception of such Western outbursts of support for Soviet strategy, apologists for EU expansion do not bother to explain why either NATO or EU enlargement is at all 'necessary'. In the case of the eastwards expansion of the European Union, their relative silence on this crucial issue reflects the reality that such expansion cannot be justified on economic, financial, social, pragmatic or any basis other than as a Leninist geopolitical imperative for hastening the demise of European nation states so as to accelerate the realisation of the 'single political space' called 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'. By 2004, the EU's 11 official languages - English, French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Danish, Swedish, Finnish, Greek and Portuguese - will have been augmented with a further ten official languages: Estonian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak and Slovenian.

#### 'SEPARATION PRECEDES FEDERATION'

This illuminates the Leninist rationale behind the 'break-up' of the Soviet Union. Since, according to the Leninist model, all territorial boundaries are transitional, temporary and expendable, the controlled 'break-up' of the Soviet Union for international public consumption facilitates the evolution of 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'. One of Lenin's most problematical (for Western minds) principles was that 'separation precedes federation'. It is clear that the grand strategic objective of the controlled 'break-up' of the USSR is to facilitate the piecemeal adherence of various 'bits and pieces' of the 'former' Soviet Union - along with all the European members of the 'former' Soviet Bloc - to the expanding European Union Collective, which

Gorbachev has accurately described as 'the new European Soviet'. Boris Yeltsin, that devoted disciple of Lenin<sup>25</sup>, declared on several occasions - for instance, in Helsinki at the end of a two-day Summit Meeting with President Clinton on 22nd March 1997 - that Russia itself should join the European Union 'in order to end its Cold War-era isolation for good'. Russia needed to be recognised, at last, as a 'full European state.... We are also prepared to join the European Union'<sup>26</sup>.

This was nothing new: had not the British Prime Minister at the time, John Major, stated on New Year's Day 1992 that 'I look forward to the day when Russia is a fully-fledged member of the European Community'<sup>27</sup>. In the security sphere, Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, a protege of that pro-Soviet Pan-German Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who preceded him as Foreign Minister, insisted in May 1996 that 'it is very important that Russia is integrated into a new European security architecture'.

But notoriously, on Lenin's own instructions, the Bolsheviks regard all agreements reached with 'the bourgeoisie' with the same revolutionary perspective as their attitude to all institutions, structures, positions, titles, agreements, preconceived ideas, values, norms, religions and morality: that is to say, they routinely renege on them at a time to suit the interests of the Revolution. Therefore, no undertaking by these people is ever worth the paper it is written on, and never will be.

Naive Western policymakers and diplomats never dare understand this, because the corollary to such understanding is that negotiating with Bolsheviks is not merely a waste of time: it is invariably counter-productive. In order to avoid having to face up to this uncomfortable truth, they either support the Leninists' objectives, or else delude themselves by maintaining that these people have 'become like us', because they bear Western-style political labels which provide them with a veneer of observable 'equivalence' - whereas the truth is that they have simply adopted 'the Third Way' towards the final consummation of Lenin's World Revolution: disguising their Leninist-Bolshevik provenance and intentions by the use of false political labels. They preach 'peace, peace, when there is no peace'<sup>28</sup>; and, as indicated, their hidden purpose in seeking integration with the inexplicably eastwards-expanding European Union Collective is to hasten the realisation and completion of 'the new European Soviet' which, they intend, will indeed stretch one day from the Atlantic to Vladivostok.

#### DISREGARD OF GORBACHEV'S DISCIPLESHIP OF LENIN

In addition to the innumerable clues to Moscow's motives which have been missed by the somnolent, self-indulgent West in general, and by the blind European ideologues in particular, there has been a disgraceful failure by Western analysts and policymakers generally to read and understand what Gorbachev has himself repeatedly said about his continued adherence to Leninist revolutionary principles. At every opportunity, Gorbachev has quite openly acknowledged his debt to Lenin. There is accordingly no excuse whatsoever for the West's blindness - since, like Hitler in 'Mein Kampf', the Soviet leader laid Moscow's intentions bare. As late as 1988, Gorbachev sought to

dispel any notion in the West that he and the strategists had 'abandoned Marxism-Leninism' - a theme repeated in 'his' books and in many speeches:

'We see that confusion has arisen in some people's minds: aren't we retreating from the positions of socialism, especially when we introduce new and unaccustomed forms of economic management and public life, and aren't we subjecting the Marxist-Leninist teaching itself to revision?... No, we are not retreating a single step from socialism, from Marxism-Leninism...'<sup>29</sup>.

In 'his' book 'Perestroika: New Thinking for My Country and the World' [Harper & Row, New York, 1987; Perennial Library edition, 1988, pages 11-12], Gorbachev likewise wrote [see also page 38 et seq.]:

'The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity.... Turning to Lenin has greatly stimulated the Party and society in their search to find explanations and answers to the questions that have arisen.... The Leninist period is indeed very important. It is instructive that it proved the strength of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, the conclusions of which are based on an analysis of the actual historical situation. Many of us realised even long before the [1985] Plenary Meeting that everything pertaining to the economy, culture, democracy, foreign policy - all spheres - had to be reappraised'.

In 'Perestroika', too, Gorbachev plainly admitted: 'We are not going to change Soviet power, of course, or abandon its fundamental principles, but we acknowledge the need for changes that will strengthen socialism.... The essence of 'perestroika' is that it... revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice'.

Addressing a large group of Russian students on 15th November 1989, Gorbachev exclaimed:

'We are for a Lenin who is alive! In building our future we are basing ourselves upon the gigantic intellectual and moral potential of the socialist idea linked with the theory of Marxism-Leninism. We see no rational grounds to give up the spiritual [sic] richness contained in Marxism. Through restructuring, we want to give socialism a second wind and unveil in all its plenitude [to the whole world - Ed.] the vast humanist potential of the socialist system'.

'In order to achieve this, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union returns to the origins and principles of the Bolshevik Revolution, to the Leninist ideas about the construction of a new society.... Our Party was and remains the Party of Lenin.... In short, we are for a Lenin who is alive'.

'We must seek these answers guided by the spirit of Leninism, the style of Lenin's thinking, and the method of dialectical cognition'.

In Part One, it will be shown that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains in existence, and indeed controls all the Moscow political factions - that is, the 'relabelled' political groups that the secret continuing Communists have been using, in accordance with instructions confirmed by both President Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin at the 28th CPSU Congress held in July 1990, in order to hoodwink the West.

## GORBACHEV'S INSISTENT CONFESSION OF HIS COMMUNISM

It was late as 1989, too, that Mikhail Gorbachev specifically declared: 'I am a Communist, a committed Communist. For some, that may be a fantasy. But for me, it is my own goal'. And in 1990, even as he was being senselessly feted all over the world as 'the man who ended Communism', Gorbachev was careful to insist that 'I am now, just as I have always been, a committed Communist'.

To have deceived the world to such an exaggerated extent that he was being feted everywhere for 'ending Communism' while simultaneously affirming in the most explicit terms at every public opportunity that he remained 'a committed Communist', will no doubt have appealed to this Bolshevik's typically black sense of cynical humour - not least since all Bolshevik-Leninists, like Viktor Suvorov, consider Westerners to be 'stupid': and, on the evidence considered here, with good reason.

Even so, there can be no possible excuse for the West's naive and hasty conclusion that 'Communism is dead'. All sorts of excuses are routinely made for such blindness - one familiar alibi being that 'you have to let these people come to realise the truth in their own time'. Well, by 2002, Western analysts who should have come to their senses many years ago had already been 'sitting on their brains' for a dozen years or more: is that not good time enough to reach a certain level of understanding?

Yet those few observers who pointed out that the Leninists were deceiving the West, after their normal fashion, at the time of the false 'changes', and have been doing so ever since, have been systematically disregarded by policymakers - and have even at times suffered antagonism from experts and officials who ought to have known better, 'got it wrong', and have simply been too proud and obtuse to admit it. And some analysts who do know the truth, nevertheless persist to this day with the bad habit of couching their references to Communism and the Soviets in the past tense, failing to qualify the adjective 'former' (as in 'former Soviet Union') with the necessary parentheses, and falling routinely into all the terminological traps set for them by the Leninists ('end of the Cold War', 'collapse of the Soviet Union/Communism', etc) which serve to buttress those lies autonomously. Since Gorbachev repeatedly went out of his way to remind the West at every opportunity that he and his colleagues were not, and never had any intention of, renouncing Marxism-Leninism, why did the West jump to the absurd conclusion that they had done so - accepting at face value the lie that Communism had 'collapsed' and, as lies, becoming willing co-liars with the Bolshevik-Leninists by ignoring their Leninist pedigrees?

Has such a scam ever been perpetrated on such a scale in the history of humanity? Has ignorance of the enemy ever reached such disastrous proportions? Why did the West - including some of its most proficient observers,

whose record of accurate Soviet analysis had been impeccable to date<sup>30</sup> - fall for the fantastic proposition that, all of a sudden, after metaphorically brushing their teeth, putting on clean suits and abandoning much of their irksome revolutionary rhetoric, these veteran deceivers had miraculously turned over a new leaf? Why did the West forget Lenin's advice to Felix Dzerzhinskiy, his

Cheka chief: 'Tell them what they want to believe'?

The trap into which the West was about to fall, and had already partially fallen, was succinctly summarised ahead of the 'changes' in 1987, by Dr Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., in an essay entitled 'Soviet Strategic Deception'<sup>31</sup>:

'Perhaps the most important continuing Soviet deception is the notion that the Soviet Union is not a lethal threat. This deception has many components, such as the notion that the Soviet Union's stance is only defensive. .. and only wants peace. The historical record completely disproves these basic themes, and Soviet actions themselves continue to demonstrate how false the themes are. But one very special component of this deception serves to rewrite or negate this history and enables people [in the West - Ed.] to continue to swallow the basic deception, that the Soviet Union is not a lethal threat. [This is] the idea that the Soviet Union is changing, especially now, under Gorbachev's new policies of 'openness'.

'Do not concern yourselves with the past, the Soviet Union is changing, we are told. Their ideology is dead. Nobody believes [the ideology] any more. The system is merely driven by bureaucratic momentum. As soon as the old leadership dies off, a new moderate element will take power. It is important for the United States to play to these moderates and not to be too tough. Give their new policies and desires for peace a chance to take root and grow. Their economy is a disaster, and the Government is rotten with nepotism. The younger moderates know this, and their first priority is to implement changes. The West should see to it that internal pressures make reform inescapable, and it should encourage its implementation by providing a fertile climate for change [sic] - relaxation of tension and an increase in trade - in which moderating influences can grow'.

'This sounds eminently logical, precisely what we would like to believe is the case. [There is] only one problem: it is totally wrong. It is a very effective Soviet strategic deception, one that dates back many years - well over half a century'.

Dr Douglass was tackling a common Western misperception: the notion that some Communists are 'less extreme' than others, which had encouraged the dangerous subsidiary view that some had ceased to be Communists at all. Such loose Western notions thrived upon ignorance of the Bolshevik mentality and revolutionary training. In the first place, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a 'moderate Leninist' or a 'moderate Bolshevik'. For no Bolshevik can be moderate: all are diehard, dedicated, ruthless, lying revolutionaries. The notion that many have undergone a transformation is covert Soviet disinformation: and prior to the 'changes', it was 'overt' Soviet diversion.

When Westerners speak about Russian 'moderates' and 'hardliners', they are uttering gibberish - applying inappropriate Western standards and perceptions to the totally divergent environment in which contemporary continuing Bolshevism functions. A parallel to this error is the widely-used phrase 'born-again Christian': anyone familiar with the New Testament of Jesus Christ will come to understand that one cannot be a Christian until one has been 'born again' in the Spirit. Likewise, a Communist cannot be



other than a 'hardliner': so all references to 'hardliners' and 'moderates' prior to the adoption of 'Third Way' false political labelling in 1989-91 were derived from Soviet 'active measures' (disinformation) activity. As Dr Douglass elaborated back in 1987: 'The need for the West to support moderate elements is another deception that furthers the notion of change in the Soviet Union, that has been around for many years. The problem is, there are no moderates. There is little disagreement, if any, among the leadership regarding objectives. Debates are about how best to achieve the main objective, world domination. To suggest that there are hawks and doves in the Soviet leadership, as one finds in the West, is false mirror-imaging. Doves and moderates do not survive in the Communist system. There are only hawks, with varying types of deceptive colorations applied from time to time'. 'Stalin referred to himself as a moderate in seeking concessions from the West to pacify the "hawks" in the Supreme Soviet with whom he had to contend. [Later] an equally absurd ploy, and one readily picked up by the Western news media, was to characterise Andropov as a "closet liberal" just a few months before his predecessor, Brezhnev, died. And illustrating how the West never learns, Gorbachev, the instant [that] the Chernenko death watch began, travelled to London, sipped tea politely, and was at once accorded by the press the image of the "Gucci kid", a gentleman with whom Margaret Thatcher believed she could work in harmony'.

GORBACHEV REVEALS HIMSELF TO THE BRITISH AS A THUG  
That Mrs Thatcher reached this recklessly hasty conclusion on the basis of Gorbachev's initial visit to London in late 1984 was quite extraordinary in the light of the following episode, related to us by a British Member of Parliament who had been delegated to conduct Gorbachev around the Palace of Westminster and generally to be on hand to facilitate the future Soviet leader's visit. In case anyone chooses to doubt the accuracy of what follows, the episode is twice described in great detail by the former MP concerned, on tapes which the Author holds in his possession. In the course of the visit, assorted members of the class the British call 'the Great and the Good' were invited to attend a reception at Westminster to meet Mikhail Gorbachev, amid guarded hints that he was expected to emerge as the next leader of the Soviet Union. Now these Bolsheviks often like to pretend that they do not understand a word of English; and Mikhail Gorbachev is no exception (indeed, on one occasion while lecturing in the United States after leaving office, Gorbachev was observed to reply immediately to a complicated question put to him in English, without waiting for the services of his moustachioed translator). As Gorbachev proceeded along the line of UK dignitaries, who greeted him in accordance with protocol each one in turn, he overheard one of the 'Great and the Good' make a certain remark (in English) to which he (Gorbachev) took strong exception. Moving up to the offending dignitary, Gorbachev proceeded to punch him hard in the stomach, so that the guest was badly winded. Most of those present observed this horrifying incident, as did the Member of Parliament who was acting as Gorbachev's guide. Not a word about the incident ever appeared in the usually vigilant

British press. In Britain, there is a system of press censorship known as the 'D-Notice' system; if the authorities issue such a notice, the matter covered by it cannot be reported in the press; and it was not.

One would have thought that the British Prime Minister of the day should have been advised that in the light of this uncouth, barbaric behaviour alone, any suggestion that Gorbachev was 'someone I can do business with', as Mrs Thatcher insisted on the record, would have been out of the question. Further, one would have thought that the British Foreign Office would have seen fit to her advise Ministers - on the evidence of this single incident, let alone Gorbachev's self-trumpeted Leninist pedigree - that suggestions that Gorbachev was anything other than a Bolshevik thug and a disciple of Lenin, were less than credible: instead of which, the episode was hushed up and 'expunged from the record'.

That this abomination took place, in full view of a large number of eminent personages, raises the obvious unanswered question: WHY was this matter suppressed? What diplomatic reason of state could possibly have overridden the objective truth about this Bolshevik, which he himself had chosen to place on display before the British elite? What could have justified the British authorities' failure to arrange for the exposure of this man's thuggish behaviour - as a consequence of which the Soviet strategists might have been obliged to withdraw him from public view, and to substitute an alternative front man for the strategy? The nagging question remains unanswered: did the Foreign Office have an agenda which would have been jeopardised by exposing Gorbachev for the thug he was, and indeed remains? Was the Thatcher Foreign Office under constraints similar to those hobbling the American bureaucracy, after Dr Henry Kissinger had issued instructions to all US Government agencies, like Voice of America, to the effect that no criticism of the Soviet Union would be tolerated<sup>32?</sup>

That Gorbachev remains as much of a thug today as he was when he punched a British guest in the stomach in full view of other distinguished dignitaries shortly before Christmas 1984, was brought home to the Author when he observed Gorbachev, who served annually as 'Convening Chair', deliver his opening speech before the Gorbachev Foundation/USA's 'State of the World Forum' conference held at the New York Hilton and Towers on 5th September 2000. On that occasion (as, according to separate reports by other observers, on other such occasions), Gorbachev's verbiage in his harsh Stavropol Russian accent spilled out with hardly a break, his voice becoming ever louder and angrier, until the peroration had acquired the characteristics of an unending rant (at the West's failure to meet the expectations released by his 'termination of the Cold War', this theme being Gorbachev's preferred complaint). Above this din, Gorbachev's faithful KGB English interpreter (the tall, thin minder with that black moustache) was compelled to shout even louder than his 'master', so as to convey Gorbachev's convoluted meaning to the bewildered audience. Gorbachev's speeches at such conferences in the West have been described to the Author by several reliable observers as weird and almost demonic: and the prolonged speech he delivered in the Author's presence on 5th September 2000 certainly met that description.

In any case, as we have seen, Gorbachev was never squeamish about openly identifying himself with Bolshevism. In his closing address to the 27th CPSU Congress on 6th March 1986, Gorbachev proclaimed: 'Already today we can say: the Congress has been held in an atmosphere of Party fidelity to principle, in a spirit of unity, exactingness, and Bolshevik truth'. Invoking Lenin, as usual, he concluded: 'It is in this way, in Lenin's way, that we have acted here at our Congress. And that is the way we shall continue to act!... Comrades, our Congress has shown that at the present stage, which is a turning point in our country's social development, the

Leninist Party is equal to its historic tasks<sup>33</sup>. The final Resolution on the Political Report of the Central Committee stated that 'the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union notes that our Leninist party has come to its Congress enriched.... At the present turning point, in a qualitatively new situation inside the country and on the world scene, the Party has again shown its loyalty to Marxism-Leninism<sup>34</sup>.

Gorbachev has never deviated from Leninism, contrary to the unfortunate opinion of Lady Thatcher, who exclaimed to the Author in July 1991 that 'he isn't a Leninist any more.... I don't think we have been deceived - at least, I hope we haven't' - thereby revealing a niggling residual fear that she might have been. But in November 1987, Gorbachev had said: 'We are moving towards a new world, the world of Communism. We shall never turn off that road'. And interviewed on the 'Larry King Live' TV show in the United States on 6th November 1993, Gorbachev replied to a questioner from the audience as follows: 'I'm not hiding in the woodwork. I'm involved in a different political role.... I have not abandoned links with the past<sup>35</sup>. The Western perception that Leninist revolutionaries, like leopards, can change their spots, is seen as pathetic by those with lifelong experience of Bolshevism. Thus the wife of the late (controlled) dissident, Andrei Sakharov, who died suddenly and mysteriously shortly after he had criticised Gorbachev in the Supreme Soviet, has explained: 'The point is that the Communist goal is fixed and changeless - it never varies one iota from their objective of world domination, but if we judge them only by the direction in which they seem to be going, we shall be deceived'.

The point is, too, that the Leninists know that there is no place for them in the world over the longer run unless they are in charge. 'Peaceful coexistence' is another Soviet lie: Bolsheviks cannot coexist, peacefully or otherwise, in the medium to long run, with people who disagree with them. Ultimately, those who oppose the 'universal' thought process which is to be imposed upon the whole world (starting with the mind-control offensive called 'political correctness', a concept developed by the Soviets), will

\* Political correctness (the creation of a 'common mind') is a Soviet concept: 'Political correctness' means the exact reverse of what it says: it means that lies, or an 'imposed truth', supplant the objective truth. 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' states, in an essay entitled 'Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophy and a World Outlook', that '... in deciding other affairs [sic], methods of public influence, the influence of public opinion, will be utilised'. In a collectivised society, 'the Communist man... [is] distinguished by conscious collectivism and deep concern for the common good'; but the issues which preoccupy him are those imposed upon his controlled and easily manipulated mind by 'political correctness'. In his closing remarks to the 28th CPSU Congress on 13th July 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the 'restructured' CPSU would become 'a truly vanguard party whose power lies not in giving orders but in influencing people's minds'.

have to be liquidated: 'The socialist society will be forced to apply the most resolute measures for a long time (including the liquidation of people who are especially dangerous to the socialist system) against people who are harmful and deliberately destructive... i.e., those who seek to undermine the socialist state and to re-establish the capitalist system'<sup>36</sup>.

In answer to any complaint that this Stalinist edict dates from the 1930's, and that 'things are different now', the reader must be reminded that the Stalinist thesis has been followed by the pure Leninist antithesis; and that the third element of the dialectic, the synthesis, will reincorporate the thesis.

There will be no place for anti-Communists when the 'synthesis' has been achieved in accordance with Leninist theory, since the 'completion of Communism' will be a World Dictatorship, as Stalin anticipated [page 10]. That outcome is self-evident anyway, since once the World is controlled by One Power, dissent will be prohibited and there will be no alternative high authority to challenge the Single Power when it begins, as it will immediately do, to abuse the power it has seized and accrued.

To whom should one appeal when in dispute with the One World Government, the Man in the Moon? The folly of people who perversely promote One World Governance is thus easily to demonstrate. All those who are engaged in promoting regional governance, as in the European Union context, are assisting and accelerating the headlong rush towards Stalin's One World Collectivist Dictatorship.

In the meantime, thesis, antithesis and synthesis form the trinity of overt and covert Communist thought and action<sup>37</sup>. 'The thing that exists [thesis], the opposite that grows out of it [antithesis], and the higher stage that develops from their interaction or conflict [synthesis], govern all correct thinking and the proper interpretation of life and society.... That which retards socialism is "reactionary" and is to be destroyed. That which advances socialism is "progressive" and "liberating" and is to be encouraged and forwarded'<sup>38</sup>.

In 1939, Stalin, a consummate student of Lenin although he imposed his own territorial variant of Leninism, declared that 'the withering away of the state, the precondition for the classless society, could not be entertained as a possibility until the encirclement of socialism by capitalism had been changed to the encirclement of capitalism by socialism. That is to say, until those conditions had been established which would assure world-wide Soviet domination'<sup>39</sup>. 'Morality is what brings about... a new society of Communists. Communist morality is that which serves this struggle.... At the base of Communist morality lies the struggle for the strengthening and completion of Communism'<sup>40</sup>. For Communism cannot be 'complete' until all opposition to it has been eliminated - which is the Leninist-Aesopian meaning of 'peace': the cessation and absence of all opposition to Lenin's World Communist Revolution<sup>41</sup>.

Since the manifest orientation of the European Union is collectivist, its leading political figures are invariably of the political Left, and under Sig. Romano Prodi, no attempt is even made to hide the European Commission's identity of purpose with Marx's Communist Manifesto, it is axiomatic that all criticism of this political monstrosity, such as this book, will be criminalised. ■

## Notes and references:

1. In his June 1992 Oslo Nobel Peace Prize speech, Gorbachev took care to refer to the Soviet Union in the present tense, despite its 'abolition' in December 1991.

2. Conversation between the Author and 'Viktor Suvorov', a 'defector' from Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU defector), in England in November 1999.

3. In the following Note, a specific lie by Gorbachev will be exposed. Gorbachev delivered his Nobel Lecture in Oslo on 6th June 1992. In 'his' book 'Memoirs' he affected a casual approach to the prestigious honour. Given that his remarks were of exceptional importance in laying down the terms which the Leninists intended should characterise 'convergence', Gorbachev's display of nonchalance here suggests an attempt by the ghost-writing apparat to play down the fact that Gorbachev used this occasion to dictate terms to the West. In simple terms, the West was to 'converge' substantively towards the East, whereas Soviet 'convergence' towards Western norms was to be essentially cosmetic only - as the West subsequently discovered to its immense cost but apparently without triggering any review of Western policy towards the 'former' Soviet Bloc. 'Gorbachev' writes on pages 549-560 of 'Memoirs': 'It was the custom for the Nobel laureate to deliver the traditional lecture either at the award ceremony or within six months of the presentation. I was invited to give a lecture in early May 1991. However the political situation in our country had meanwhile become more critical, particularly after the January events in Vilnius and Riga'. [Armed troops had stormed the TV tower in Vilnius in January 1991, leaving 15 dead; and there was also violence in Riga. Gorbachev had presided over both these atrocities, just as while on a visit to London he had personally ordered the attack on innocent demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989 (information given to the author personally by a well-informed British Conservative Member of Parliament - Ed.)]. 'I was under fire both at home and abroad, with some people going so far as to declare that to award me the Nobel Peace Prize had been a mistake and that the Committee should reconsider its position. In this situation, I repeatedly postponed the decision to go to Oslo. I thought of going there in early May, but had to cancel the trip. I must admit that to this day I feel somewhat embarrassed, since my hesitation could perhaps have been perceived as a lack of respect towards the Nobel Committee. However, in the end I decided to use this international forum to restate my creed about the role of perestroika and the New Thinking for us and for mankind'. [Thus the false impression was given that the menu that Gorbachev dictated to the West in Oslo (and at Fulton, MO) was the product of a personal whim on Gorbachev's part - whereas what Gorbachev said on that occasion, in Russian, was of crucial importance, as he laid down the Soviets' terms for 'convergence' and 'cooperation', as indicated -Ed.]. 'I delivered my Nobel Prize lecture in Oslo on 5th June 1992. I naturally apologized for the delay'.

Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the St Louis Post-Dispatch of 23rd April 1992 published, on page 1-A, a lead story by Phillip Dine under the headline: 'FULTON, MO., COLLEGE BRACES FOR THOUSANDS AT [Gorbachev] SPEECH': 'Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, 61, former leader of a former country, is coming to Fulton, Mo., May 6 - and the public response has the organizers

of the historic event reeling. "With the crowd estimates, we're starting to get - I won't say scared - but they're exceeding what we originally thought. It's approaching 15,000", said Bruce Hackmann, spokesman for Westminster College, where Gorbachev will speak.... Over 1,500 reserved seats are being provided for the speech, which will be at 3 p.m. outdoors; most of the seats will go to those with ties to the college. That leaves standing-room for the public on a first-come-first-served basis, Hackmann said'.

In view of this information, the elaborate reasons given in 'Memoirs' for Gorbachev not going to Oslo in early May 1992, and cancelling that trip, were spurious. He could not be in Oslo because he was double-booked to appear and deliver his 'end of the Cold War' speech at Fulton, Missouri - to take advantage of the symbolism provided by that location, from where Winston Churchill had famously invented the phrase 'Iron Curtain'. This is an example of how careless the Leninist apparat is liable to be over facts. Since their stock-in-trade is lying and deception, it is perennially hard for them to keep track of previous lies, and they are constantly having to trim public statements to accommodate earlier lies and disinformation. At the same time, since they understand very well that the West is confused, laid-back, lazy and reactive, and they have long since ensured that the Western media is dominated by their own sympathisers and agents of influence, they can afford to take a relatively relaxed view, when it turns out that previous lies conflict with new lies, since (a) this is in any case provided for by the dialectical method and (b) they need not fear exposure from the ignorant and often

fellow-travelling Western 'mainstream' media. Correspondents posted to Moscow usually reproduce the official 'line', as numerous readers of The New York Times are aware.

4. 'Gorbachev On My Country and the World', Mikhail Gorbachev. Translated from the Russian by George Shriver, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, pages 171-172. Gorbachev

made this statement even though the Soviets never employed Gross National Product as an economic measurement: their preferred measure of national output was Gross Material Product, an altogether different compilation. This is an example of the free-and-easy carelessness which typically characterises Soviet lies. The 'error' was ignored by Western analysts.

5. *Ibid*, page 172.

6. *Ibid*, page 172. However the Soviet Communists have never, at any stage since 1917, been concerned with 'the real and vital interests of our country and our people', since they have been concerned exclusively with amassing, consolidating and spreading their own global power worldwide, at the expense precisely of the Russian people and of those other peoples they have by various means subjugated. Since Gorbachev, by his own repeated admission remains a Leninist, this alibi is false: the rationale that, all of a sudden, the Soviet Communists were concerned about the welfare of the Russian people is jaded misinformation.

7. According to 'Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy', House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs: A Study Prepared by the Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Volume 1, 1989, pages 418-420.

8. The 'Eighty-One Party Congress' was the second of two conferences of the ruling Parties of the Communist Bloc including the Chinese, held in Moscow in November 1957 and during November-December 1960, which discussed, formulated and adopted the long-range deception strategy to prepare for the dismantling of the Stalinist model of control following the termination of the pre-arranged 40-year period during which the Western allies and the Soviet Union had agreed to occupy Germany [see Part Two]. This was to be followed by the re-launch of an upgraded and thoroughly researched global Leninist model of the Revolution (which is the period through which we are living today). The Manifesto of the 'Eighty-One Party Congress' issued on 6th December 1960, and Nikita Khrushchev's speech of 6th January 1961, confirmed the adoption of the long-range strategy and defined its objectives as consolidation of the socialist states and world Communist victory. See also Anatoliy Golitsyn, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 129 [Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 and 1998]. The exceptional importance of the 'Eighty-One Party Congress' of November-December 1960 was reconfirmed in various speeches delivered at the successor meeting of Communist Parties held in Moscow in 1969 (the third of that series). For instance, Khaled Bagdash, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party, proclaimed on that occasion:

'Comrades, important changes have taken place since the last International Meeting of Communist Parties in 1960. They testify to a serious deepening and growth of the revolutionary movement. The Communist movement has gained in strength and scope', [ 'International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties', Moscow, 1969, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague, 1969, page 571].

9. Vladimir I. Lenin, 'Collected Works', Volume XVII, pages 142-145.

10. As discussed in Part One and elsewhere, the pragmatic Western mind rejects the notion of conspiracy - despite the fact that Lenin specifically insisted that the Revolution was a conspiracy. Writing in 'What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement', Lenin confirmed, with his usual pedantic playfulness with language, that 'in form, such a strong revolutionary organisation may also be described as a "conspiratorial organisation", because the French word 'conspiration' is the equivalent of the Russian word 'zagovor' ('conspiracy'), and such an organisation must have the utmost secrecy'.

11. Gospel of Mark, Chapter 4, verses 21-22: 'And he said unto them, Is a candle brought to be put under a bushel, or under a bed? and not to be set on a candlestick? For there is nothing hid, which shall not be manifested; neither was any thing kept secret, but that it should come abroad'. And Gospel of Luke, Chapter 8, verses 16-17: 'No man, when he hath lighted a candle, covereth it with a vessel or putteth it under a bed; but setteth it on a candlestick, that they which enter may see the light. For nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest; neither any thing hid, that shall not be known and come abroad'.

12. Gorbachev's extreme arrogance and impatience with any overview of global developments other than 'his' own, was vividly on display when he addressed the Gorbachev Foundation/USA's 'State of the World Forum' event as 'Convening Chair' at the New York Hilton and Towers on 5th September 2000.

13. At the press conference held with the late President Francois Mitterrand in Paris on 6th May 1991, Gorbachev made the following extremely significant remarks, couched as usual in Leninist Aesopian (double-meaning) language. As indicated, he said: 'The dangers lie in the fact that someone, analysing at some private moment or other, this or that instance or episode, or even event, including a dramatic event, should not make hasty conclusions and cast doubt on all that has been acquired and what we have created in putting international relations onto new

channels, onto new rails, entering, as all of us have said, a period of peaceful development'. These observations, though reported in the Western press, were never construed by 'mainstream' observers. They contain three elements: first, an expression of Soviet anxiety at the continuing possibility that the devious strategy of 'convergence' with the West on Communist terms, facilitated by the false Bolshevik 'Break with the Past', might be exposed by someone in the West who had done his homework on Soviet strategic deception operations; secondly, a prediction of the 'August coup', a KGB-managed provocation ('a dramatic event') and of subsequent 'dramatic events' that year; and, thirdly, an arrogant affirmation of Moscow's success in altering Western perceptions to such an extent that Western Governments now unwittingly accepted as genuine the Leninist view of the world ('putting international relations onto... new rails'). The point Gorbachev made here was that a train travelling along a railway line can proceed in one direction only - the direction intended by the Leninist strategists, which is towards the abolition of nation states and their piecemeal incorporation into regional blocs en route to World Collectivist Government (dictatorship). Gorbachev could have said

'onto a new road', as he had done on other occasions, but chose, instead, to use the word 'rails' precisely because there can be no deviation from the straight line (conforming with the unchanging requirements of the 'General Line', or strategy). This was, then, a truly classic example of the careful, Aesopian use of language employed by seasoned Leninists ever since Lenin taught them how to use language in the interests of the Revolution: see page XXXIX. 14. Martin Walker, 'The Waking Giant: The Soviet Union under Gorbachev', Sphere Books Limited (Abacus), 1987, London, page 10.

15. The campaign for the abolition of the 'image of the enemy' was spearheaded by Georgiy Arbatov, a close strategic adviser to President Gorbachev and a member of his Politburo. Writing in 'Kommunist' in June 1988, Arbatov proclaimed that 'the image of the enemy that is being eroded has been... absolutely vital for the foreign and military policy of the United States and its allies. The destruction of this stereotype... is Gorbachev's weapon.... Neither the arms race, nor power politics in the Third World, nor the military blocs, are thinkable without "the enemy", and without the "Soviet threat"'. In the same article, Arbatov pointed out that the United States would not be slow to acquiesce in this rapid erosion of the threatening 'image' of the Soviet Union, when he noted that 'of course, this weapon is not secret, but it does have tremendous power'. The strategy of eliminating 'the image' of the enemy would mesmerise the West (as Stalin's top adviser, Dimitri Manuilski had predicted), which could be relied upon to confuse the 'image' with the substance; the enemy itself would remain wholly intact, and would be strengthened as a consequence of the resulting transfer of Western technology and finance, and Western disarmament. This information is repeated and elaborated in Part One.

16. This is not to say that Stalin was not a Leninist: on the contrary, he was a most attentive disciple and implementer of Lenin's blueprint. However the Stalinist variant (thesis) impeded the full flowering of the antithesis - the global Leninist 'way' ('put', which means 'way', as in Putin).

17. P. Wiles, 1964, 'The Political Economy of Communism', Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, page 356.

18. M. Gorbachev, 'Underpinning a Secure World', Pravda, 17th September 1987.

19. Vladimir I. Lenin, 'State and Revolution', International Publishers, New York, 1961 Ed., p. 68.

20. Joseph Stalin (Djugashvili), 'Marxism and the National Question', 1942.

21. Kassof, Allen, 1965, 'The Soviet Youth Program', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, page 45; cited in 'Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction', Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1978-91.

22. 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 26, Number 3, March 2000.

23. Theses on the National and Colonial Question adopted by the Second Comintern Congress, 28th July 1920 [Protokoll, ii, page 224], cited for instance in 'The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents': Volume 1, 1919-1922, selected and edited by Jane Degras, Oxford University Press, 1956. The set of three volumes of this work in this Author's possession was obtained from a second-hand bookstore in Bloomsbury, London; each volume is stamped as follows on the front fly-sheet: 'MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LIBRARY SERVICES: WITHDRAWN'.

24. The introduction to 'Prodi's Neo-Communist Manifesto' includes the following paragraph: 'Political integration will become a reality as political leaders and citizens come to realise that their shared values of liberty, peace and stability, democracy, human rights, tolerance, gender equality, solidarity and non-discrimination [i.e., the attitude 'distinguished by conscious collectivism and deep concern for the common good' specified in the Soviet tome 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism'] can best be promoted through shared policies and institutions'. However when the Austrian electorate voted a non-leftist Government led by Georg Haidar into power, the European Union immediately isolated Austria and imposed sanctions upon it for having had the temerity to elect a Government not overtly enamoured of the EU's collectivist-federalist

agenda. The exclusion of Austria was masked by a fog of allegations that Haidar represented an insupportable neo-Nazi tendency which could not possibly be tolerated in the 'liberal' European Union. So much for the value of 'tolerance' invoked by 'Prodi's Neo-Communist Manifesto' distributed within the EU structures in February 2000.

25. In 1981, at the age of 50, Boris Yeltsin was appointed to the Praesidium of the 26th CPSU Congress [Pravda, 24th February 1981], a position which of course he could not have attained had he not been a lifelong Communist hack. In recognition of his devotion to dialectical materialism and Communist control, and of his faithful service to the Party (the Revolution), he was awarded the Order of Lenin [Pravda, 1st February 1981], indicating that he was marked out for very elevated status and position, at the summit of the Communist hierarchy. Thereafter, Yeltsin embarked upon a rapid rise under Brezhnev (to 1982), Andropov (1982-84), Chernenko (1984-85) and Gorbachev (1985-91). Such advancement could only have been available to a well trusted Leninist who could be thoroughly relied upon to do the Party's bidding and who was held in the highest regard by his cynical colleagues. Yeltsin was appointed to the Central Committee of the CPSU [Izvestia, 4th March 1981], was 'elected' a Supreme Soviet Deputy from Serov [Pravda, 7th March 1981], was yet further 'elected' to the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet [Pravda, 12th April 1981], was named Secretary of the Central Committee [Pravda, 3rd July 1985], was 'elected' First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Commission [Pravda, 25th December 1985], and was then made a member of Gorbachev's Politburo [Izvestia, 19th February 1986]. During this period and subsequently, Yeltsin's speeches rigidly followed the Party line. For instance, according to Izvestia [26th February 1981], Yeltsin 'fully approve[d] the measures that the CPSU Central Committee ha[d] taken to enhance the role and restructure the work of the USSR State Planning Commission...'; he presented the Party line 'to prolonged applause' [Izvestia, 11th December 1984]; and he expounded for 10,500 words on his determination to 'carry out the proper psychological restructuring of the Party and other cadres' [Moskovskaya pravda, 25th January 1986], meaning that Boris Yeltsin was intimately involved with the retraining of Komsomol and Communist cadres ready for the dismantling of the Stalinist model and for the re-launch of the purer Leninist model which would necessitate the retraining of revolutionary actives for the conscious implementation of the Party's new covert role as the 'General Staff' of Lenin's World Revolution.

In 1987, we find Yeltsin in Nicaragua. A photograph appeared in *Diario las Americas* on 13th March 1987, showing Yeltsin holding aloft the hands of those two world-famous democrats, Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Jaime Wheelock Roman, members of the nine-member Nicaraguan Communist Politburo. The sudden presentation of Yeltsin to the world as a newly 'moderate' democrat - like the abrupt remodelling of MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, the oppressor of Georgia and its 'former' Communist Party Chief, as the enlightened co-terminator of the Cold War with Gorbachev, and of Gorbachev himself (Andropov's sidekick in Budapest during the Soviet invasion of Hungary) as a man worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize - reflects the ease with which Moscow has been able to bamboozle Western journalists into imposing its doctored images upon an uncomprehending and thoroughly confused Western public opinion.

A glance at Yeltsin's record thus reveals the stark Leninist truth about his political pedigree. The behaviour of Yeltsin in office was fully consistent with that of a Stalinist dictator, operating on the basis of arbitrary decrees, diktats and the mediaeval ukase. Yeltsin's Leninism can best be summarised by recalling part of his speech as First Secretary of the Moscow City Communist Party Committee, as reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* of 27th February 1986:

'Comrades! At a Party Congress at which many frank reports were delivered and sharp discussions held, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, in defiance of the sceptics, exclaimed enthusiastically: "Now this is something I really understand! This is life!" Many years have gone by since then. One can note with satisfaction that the atmosphere at our Congress is again marked by that Bolshevik spirit, that Leninist optimism, that call to struggle against the old and outmoded in the name of the new [APPLAUSE]. The 26th City Party report-and-election conference showed that Moscow Communists believe in the feasibility of the tasks that have been set and in the Tightness of the changes that are taking place in the Party... and that they fully support this line'. The 'changes' in question were of course the preparations for the 'changes' of 1989-91. Note Yeltsin's invocation of Bolshevism, and compare this with Gorbachev's identical invocation [see, for instance, page 14].

26. 'Yeltsin wants Russia in EU', *The Daily Telegraph*, London, 23rd March 1997.

27. John Major in his 1992 New Year's Day broadcast on BBC Radio 4.

28. Jeremiah, Chapter 8, verse 11.

29. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 40, Number 7, 1988, pages 3-4.

30. A case in point is that of the analyst John Lenczowski, founder and director of the Institute of World Politics, based at 1521 16th Street, NW, Washington DC (previously the office of the



Soviet Trade Mission), formerly Director of European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council, 1981-87. While in that position, Lenczowski wrote a superb expose of certain themes of Soviet strategic deception and disinformation which was published in 'Soviet Strategic Deception', edited by Professors Brain D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker [Lexington Books, Lexington MA, 1987]. The paper formed part of the proceedings of a conference on Soviet strategic deception held at the US Naval Postgraduate School on 26th-28th September 1985. On 14th March 1985, this Author made a presentation on themes arising from his editorship of Anatoly Golitsyn's work 'The Perestroika Deception', at Lenczowski's Institute in Washington. The Author was on his feet for three hours. However in the middle of the presentation, John Lenczowski suddenly interrupted and criticised the information and interpretations provided by this Author. His thesis was that there could have been no continuity of Soviet strategy because the Soviets had abandoned their ideology. This event is discussed on pages 75 et seq. On 4th November 1992, Lenczowski wrote to a correspondent that 'we have witnessed the collapse of both the Soviet empire and, perhaps more importantly, the CPSU's ideological power.... I believe that Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze and others indeed did harbor a plan, on the outlines of which we both probably agree. I believe today, however, that this plan (both to revive socialism through a Western bailout and to disarm the West intellectually and physically) proved to be both overly optimistic and too clever by half, because it wrecked the Party's ideological cohesion and unleashed forces of civil society which were not willing to endure even socialism "with a human face". So today, even though most of the nomenklatura are still in place, they must operate without the two most potent weapons of totalitarianism they used to have at their disposal - the ideology as an instrument of enforcing conformity, and the organizational weapon, the Party, which is completely splintered due to the absence of a Party line. This is truly a victory to celebrate, even though there remains much to be done, particularly ridding the ruling structures of entrenched apparatchiks so that markets and non-totalitarian political structures can eventually arise'.

This shows that even the most sophisticated, and previously generally sound, analyst of Soviet developments was bamboozled into 'thinking what he wants to believe', in accordance with Lenin's advice: 'Tell them what they want to believe'. Moreover, Lenczowski's analysis contains serious material errors: for instance, while the statement that 'the Party is completely splintered' was superficially correct, it failed to take into account the Leninist fact that this splintering was contrived, directed and controlled by the continuing Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as discussed in Part One. Specifically, Comrades were invited to adopt whatever political label took their fancy, as those selected for the purpose embarked upon the Leninist game called 'democratism' - the creation and maintenance, for international public consumption purposes, of the illusion of democracy. It is astonishing to the author that this sophisticated American analyst, whose understanding of Soviet strategic deception techniques had been so complete shortly before the Bolsheviks pulled off the greatest strategic deception in world history, should himself have succumbed to the Leninists' lies and thus discarded all he presumably knew about their revolutionary modus operandi. As for Lenczowski's assertion that there had ceased to be a 'Party line', this indicates a total failure on his part to discern that the Leninists had shifted gear to the dialectical antithesis of their previous Stalinist thesis - to a 'qualitatively new' level of Leninist revolutionary activity, and that they were now, to cite Lenin, 'working by other means'. For with the dismantling of the Stalinist model, the ideology ceased to be 'necessary' as an overt binding mechanism, or 'glue', to enforce conformity - since the game now being played was controlled Leninist nonconformity. The Leninist model permits 'a thousand flowers to bloom' under the covert control of the continuing Communist Party (i.e., only by 'licence'). In reality, Marxist-Leninist ideology remains intact and broadly unchanged, as Gorbachev's repeated invocations of Lenin make clear with the 'Party line' having been adapted to match the requirements of the Leninist 'antithesis' mode. Note, finally, how conscientiously John Lenczowski fulfilled Lenin's cynical prediction: 'Tell them what they want to believe'. He prefaced his remarks to his correspondent with 'I believe'.

31. 'Soviet Strategic Deception', essay by Dr Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., in a volume of essays entitled 'Mesmerized by the Bear', edited by Raymond S. Sleeper, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, pages 213 et seq. Dr Douglass is also the author of 'Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and the West', published in 1999 by Edward Harle Limited, London and New York.

32. The information that Dr Kissinger, when Secretary of State, instructed the Voice of America to refrain from all criticism of the Soviet Union, was given to the Author by a former career employee with Voice of America, in December 2001. The instruction was received with disdain by many VOA experts and broadcasters, who sidestepped Kissinger's restriction by redoubling criticism of Communism and the USSR in their broadcasts to Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and other Communist Bloc countries.

33. Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the closing of the 27th CPSU Congress, 6th March 1986, 'Information Bulletin: XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Documents of the Communist and Workers' Parties, Articles and Speeches', 9/1986, Volume 24, Peace and Socialism International Publishers, Prague, 1986, pages 125-130.

34. *Ibid.*, page 133.

35. Mikhail Gorbachev, interviewed on the 'Larry King Live' television show on the evening of 6th November 1993.

36. M. Rezunov, 'Socialism or State Capitalism in the Soviet Union', 'Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Sotsialisticheskoe Obshchestvo' [The Soviet State and Socialist Society], Leningrad, 1934, pages 12-18.

37. In addition to keeping the dialectical method firmly in mind, the Author finds it helpful to think of overt Communism and overt Communists, and of covert Communism and covert Communists. Following the dismantling of the Stalinist model of overt Communism, the prevailing Leninist norm is covert Communism (except in societies such as Cuba, at the time of writing, where, for special geostrategic reasons, the Soviets have maintained overt Communist regimes in power).

38. Louis F. Budenz, 'The Techniques of Communism', Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1954, pages 7-8. On page 116, Budenz, describing the National (Communist) Training School in the United States, notes that students 'were indoctrinated in the Leninist morality that any means can be adopted to advance the cause. They were trained in the techniques of deception and concealment, and in how to impart this method of procedure to others so that it could be used in the courtroom, in the penetration of trade unions, and in the infiltration of other mass organizations'. At the end of this classic work, which teaches us impeccably how both overt and covert Communists operate, and their methods of concealment, this brave former prominent US Communist wrote: 'The fundamental philosophy of Communism can be answered only by a firm and enlightened belief in God. Nothing will give more strength to the hand-to-hand combat against the conspiracy, made possible by a knowledge of its techniques, than a great Credo from the hearts and minds of the American people. Those who are educated and among whom the ravages of unbelief have particularly paved the way for an acceptance of the doctrines of Red slavery, have a peculiar obligation to assert: "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth". That humble expression of faith is the beginning of wisdom in the battle against Communism'.

39. Joseph Stalin, Report to the 18th Party Congress, CPSU, 10th March 1939, published in Communist International Magazine, special issue, XIV, 520 ff, 1939; cited by Louis F. Budenz, *ibid.*, page 12.

40. Sochineniya, 4th Edition, Moscow, Volume 31, 1950, pp. 266, 268, 269, 270.

41. 'Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma', 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' [also variously entitled 'The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism' and 'The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy', Moscow, 1959-74]. The copy of this crucial work consulted by the Author is a US Government translation, reproduced by Research and Microfilm Publications, CCM Information Corporation, available in the Mid-Town Library, New York City. This document contains the entire body of global revolutionary theory elaborated by the strategic apparatus following the death of Stalin. It was intended for worldwide use by Communists during the long period of preparation which led up to the termination of the 40-year period during which Germany was to be occupied by the World War II allies. In practice, this huge compendium was regularly updated from the Stalin era to the Gorbachev period.

SPECIAL NOTE: Perpetuation of the Stalinist model to support the Leninist model

The information contained in the Special Note on page 5 illuminates a point which has escaped everyone, but which on reflection should cause no surprise. As indicated in the Introduction, Gorbachev presided over the dismantling of the Stalinist model, and preparations for the relaunch (for want of a better word) of the Leninist World Revolutionary model. The literature generated by the 27th Congress of the CPSU, over which Gorbachev presided, is heavily pregnant with Gorbachev's indebtedness to Lenin and Bolshevism. But, when it came to 'relaunching' the Leninist model in Russia itself, it proved necessary not merely to refrain from dismantling the Stalinist repression apparatus, but to expand the repression complex exponentially. This paradox illuminates two considerations: (1) The Soviet Stalinist model has remained intact, but is hidden for the time being behind the Leninist model; and: (2) The substitution of the Leninist for the Stalinist model is itself a dialectical ploy, driven by its own deception. ■


# PART ONE

## EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO VLADIVOSTOK

THE PURSUIT OF EUROPEAN  
HEGEMONY 'BY OTHER MEANS'

Europe's slide towards  
Lenin's 'Common European Home'

THE COVERT SOVIET AGENDA

**LENIN: AN OFFICIAL SOVIET PORTRAIT**

**AN OFFICIAL PORTRAIT OF LENIN:** This portrait of Lenin, which appeared in Soviet newspapers, represented a deliberate attempt by the Soviet structures to incorporate features commonly attributed - by the whole of mankind - to the Devil. It is a mysterious truth that we all appear to know what the Devil looks like - as can be seen from his frequent appearance these days in images promoted by Satanic popular 'culture', a primary 'transmission belt' used by the Leninist Revolution to fashion a devilish 'common mind' for the whole world. According to 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism', Moscow, 1973, page 735, 'under Communism, public opinion will become a mighty force, capable of bringing to reason those individuals who might not want to follow Communist customs and rules of behaviour in the community'. Thus there will be no room for dissent.

# THE CONTINUITY OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION

## THE LENINISTS' AGENDA FOR EUROPE IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Commenting on the launch of the 'retail Euro' on 2nd January 2002, Sig. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, insisted that imposition of the new Collective Currency specie was not 'economic... This is a purely political process'. with previously unremarked honesty, Sig. Prodi thereby destroyed with that single comment all the myriad spurious economic and monetary pretensions that had accompanied the prolonged gestation of the Euro - making retrospective fools of finance and economy ministers, central bank governors, Prime Ministers, Presidents and others who had contended publicly that the introduction of the Euro was 'necessary' in order to make it easier for tourists and businessmen to conduct trans-European transactions. Here was a perfect example of the EU Collective's past lies being cynically consigned to oblivion, once they had outlived their usefulness.

The President of the European Commission had finally acknowledged what the documentary and historical record conclusively shows - that the European Economic Community which converted itself into the European Union was always intended as a grandiose geopolitical engine of (collectivist) federalism. Grandiose political projects are sustained by political ideas and ideology; so evaluation of such a phenomenon presupposes a proper grasp of the ideas and ideology that form its substructure. All the evidence confirms that the orientation of the ideology that drives the European Union is unfettered collectivism, carefully masked by a well-established incremental economic and monetary focus - which the President of the European Commission chose to discard with the launch of the 'retail Euro'.

Although deception remains the European Union's familiar *modus operandi* - nothing will ever change that - it has recently become fashionable for senior Euro-ideologues to throw caution to the winds and to reveal what was previously hidden from the captive populations of the EU Member States by their leaders. Within days of Sig. Prodi's admission, Hans Eichel, the German Finance Minister, told *The Daily Telegraph* [17th January 2002, page 8] that post-war Germany had never believed in the nation state at all, and has been working for a European federation all along. That this is the case, is confirmed by the evidence assembled in Part Two: but for a senior German ideologue to admit this openly in 2002, suggests that Berlin has concluded that the Leninist attack on the nation state, which Herr Eichel confirms that it is pursuing in tandem with Moscow, has progressed so far in Europe that the true purpose of the EU Collective need no longer be withheld. It is now acceptable to speak openly in Europe about the redundancy of the nation state - the revolutionary expectation being that, given the Revolution's triumph in the cultural war that has been waged since the 1960s to undermine loyalties and respect for all institutions, the nation state means nothing to the younger generation. Specifically, Herr Eichel said that 'since the end of the Second World War, the official *raison d'être* of the state in West Germany was that the nation state was not the future.... The new thinking was that united Europe was the future'. This statement contains at least one lie: the thinking was not 'new' at all. On the contrary, the Pan-German tradition has always

sought the subjugation of the whole of the European Continent to Germany.

Historically, British antagonists with reservations about Britain's membership of the EU regional political collective have suffered from the illusion that this geopolitical monstrosity is in some way capable of being satisfactorily 'reformed', so that an honourable compromise can be concocted with Euro-ideologues like Herr Eichel which would alleviate their anxieties about the collective's federalist momentum (even if they never manage to recognise that the EU is collectivist). That was the stance adopted in February 1995, for instance, by the European Research Group, as publicised in a report entitled 'A Europe of Nations', which influenced the weak approach of the Conservative Government of the day to the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the quadrennial revision of the European Union's collective Treaty, culminating in the Treaty of Amsterdam [June 1997]. In an Introduction to that report, Sir Michael Spicer MP stated that 'Europe' faced the challenge of 'how to integrate the historic nations of Eastern Europe'. In other words, the unexplained eastwards-expansion 'imperative' of the European Union was apparently accepted, without question, as valid - whereas, as discussed in this work, it makes no sense at all other than through the eyes of the managers of the continuing Leninist World Revolution. The report 'outlines the changes which must be made if the centralising momentum of the European Union is to be reversed' and further 'describes how these changes could translate into concrete amendments to the Treaties'.

By thus working within the European Union's framework, this assiduous group of parliamentarians and officials from European Centre-Right parties, had allowed themselves to be trapped by the EU's federalist-collectivist agenda from the outset - thereby depriving themselves of any opportunity to stand back from the Tower of Babel in order to consider the fundamental question of whether they wished to continue helping to build it. Thus theirs was a defeatist, and hence a fundamentally pointless, exercise. They found themselves wittingly or unwittingly caught like flies in the federalist-collectivist spider's web, without any realistic hope of extrication. For all who participate in, and seek to influence, the affairs of the European Union Collective by working within its framework, necessarily accept as legitimate its fundamentally illegitimate overriding objective - which is to supplant its constituent nation states and to substitute its own undemocratic, collectivist structures in their place. Already diverted, they thus ignore the central truth - that membership of this political collective is by definition incompatible with the long-term survival of its constituent members as sovereign nations.

In adopting this typically pragmatic approach, the assumption, presumably, has been that since the 'European project' has been allowed to reach such an advanced stage of realisation, there can be no 'turning back'; so the supporters of the 'Europe of nation states' format wind up indulging in daydreaming and wishful-thinking about European nations somehow cohabiting for all eternity with a European Union which exists precisely to displace them (the Maastricht Treaty having, for example, required the irrevocable merging and thus obliteration of national currencies, the primary distinguishing indicators of nationhood). Moreover, as practical, pragmatic politicians and 'Eurosceptic' activists, such well-meaning policymakers must surely be aware that the achievement of any requested amendments and reforms of the European Union would be out of the question, with only a few modest alterations ever likely to see the light of day in the highly improbable event of the EU Collective ever allowing reneg-

otiation to take place. After all, the quadrennial Intergovernmental Conferences are not called for the purposes of renegotiation: their function is to maintain the relentless pressure for the 'completion' of the revolutionary European Union Collective (masked by the Marxist-Leninist quest for 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe') which cannot, by definition, tolerate the existence of any dimension of 'life' within its ever-expanding jurisdiction that has not yet been 'harmonised' and collectivised.

#### AN 'AGENT OF CHANGE' - THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CPSU, IN EFFECT

Thus the European Union Collective is an organisational 'agency of change' serving the interests of Lenin's World Collectivist Revolution, and in fact performing exactly the same functions in the European theatre as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) performs in the Soviet context. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 'European project' was always the central focus of the Soviet strategists' openly acknowledged 'peace offensive' [see page 34], as was confirmed in the Soviet literature during the Gorbachev era - for instance, on page 97 of 'From Geneva to Reykjavik', by the Leninist polemicist Fyodor Burlatsky [Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987]:

'The new Soviet initiatives are in large part centred on Europe - which, should a sharp turn toward a policy of peace be achieved, would have a special role to play as the building site of detente'. But the Leninist Aesopian meaning of 'peace' is 'the cessation of all opposition to collectivism and Communism'. For the Leninists, detente always means 'a Western strategic retreat'.

By responding to their overtures, especially during the Gorbachev era, as the Leninist strategists had anticipated, the Left-oriented Marxists and fellow-travellers who had become entrenched within the 'European project's' structures, and the (Marxist) officials from the participating national governments who were in charge of pushing for increased European integration, fell seamlessly into line with the Soviet agenda for Europe and, whether wittingly or as simple 'useful idiots' (liees), became active participants in furthering the realisation of Soviet strategy to establish, via the 'European project' itself, the Leninists' intended de facto strategic security and political hegemony 'from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'.

But none of this ever seems to have been understood in British domestic political circles, except among the agents and agents of influence who have been working overtime to undermine British sovereignty and power. This blindness has entailed ignorance of the reality that negotiation with the heirs of Lenin, and thus with all who are in practice allied with them and employ Leninist methods in pursuit of geopolitical objectives, is always a waste of time - as such operatives are taught to deceive, double-cross and renege on all their agreements, whenever the overriding interests of the Revolution so demand. Hence renegotiating Britain's membership of the European Union is not merely precluded by the Collective itself: it would be a counterproductive exercise, as any hypothetical compromise would inevitably be booby-trapped. So the idea is absurd.

And British Governments have, in any case, been well aware, all along, that the European Union is revolutionary. For Cabinet papers released by the Public Records Office under the 30-year rule on 1st January 2001 showed that so-called 'Conservative' Ministers in the Heath Government knowingly kept UK voters in the dark about long-term proposals to abolish the pound sterling and to abandon monetary sovereignty (as 11 EU 'countries' had done by 1st January 2002), because

they feared public opinion. A Foreign Office document dated 9th November 1970 warned that 'the plan for economic and monetary union has revolutionary long-term political implications, both economic and political. It could imply the creation of a European federal state, with a single currency... It will arouse strong feelings about sovereignty'. It is clear from this damning revelation that all British Governments since the Heath Government have been fully aware that by allowing Britain to become entangled with the 'European project' they were in fact knowingly participating in a revolutionary conspiracy to undermine the ancient sovereignty of their country, and that they were doing this secretly so to speak, without informing the British people of their intentions. To the extent that official excuses were ever made for this fatal entanglement, Ministers and apologists have dishonestly sought to imply that it was Britain's intention to try to influence the evolution of the 'European project' along lines which would conform to British preferences.

But all attempts to influence or 'reform' the European Union from within, so as to make it compatible with preferred non-collectivist models thus facilitating the continued existence of its constituent nation states, and to restrain its federalist and collectivist tendencies, are doomed to failure. This reflects both the structure and the anti-nation state (Leninist) political orientation of the European Union Collective, and the fact that it is driven in parallel by Pan-German strategy, co-administered by the co-opted French and remoulded by Soviet-Russian strategists in the closest collaboration with Bonn and Paris within the forum of the Trilateral Russian-German-French Commission presided over by Jacques Chirac, until he was elected President of France<sup>1</sup>. Underpinning this trilateral geopolitical relationship, which dominates the EU Collective, is a network of bilateral treaties<sup>2</sup> - the outcome of a 'treaty offensive' fronted first by President Gorbachev and later seamlessly by President Yeltsin. Finally, France is bound to Germany by the Franco-German Treaty of 22nd January 1963<sup>3</sup>, which effectively ensures the partial rigging of the Collective's decisionmaking in favour of the German-French-Russian agenda.

Cooperation in the European Union context condemns the parties concerned to 'building' socialist collectivisation. Since the false 'demise' of Communism, the fundamentally collectivist character of the European Union - the 'new European Soviet', in Gorbachev's own words - has become more and more apparent. Yet for anyone unfamiliar with the continuing Soviet Marxist-Leninist agenda of 'convergence' aimed at the elimination of national sovereignty, this tendency is obfuscated by the European Union's manic preoccupation with mundane practical issues. Why is the European Union frenetically preoccupied with such trivia? The answer is that, as indicated earlier, every dimension of Europeans' lives is intended to be collectivised over time: agriculture, fisheries, transportation, health care, foreign policy, military and defence policy, monetary policy, currencies, fiscal policy, taxation policy, and, via the European Legal Area Project, which has spawned Corpus Juris, the legal system - since, clearly, the coexistence of English Common Law with the developing system of 'European law' would be incompatible with collectivisation.

So there is a 'common' reason why the European Union involves its hyperactive self in every mundane issue under the sun - from the necessity for cucumbers to be straight, to the suitability of boots for various activities and the issue of whether bananas may be sold by the pound. This 'common' reason has already been stated: it is that the European Union Collective cannot tolerate the persistence of any dimension of



'life' remaining uncollectivised. If those conscientious antagonists who tear their hair out every day over the interminably nit-picking behaviour of the 'mad officials' in Brussels understood this simple explanation, their understandably outraged frustrations concerning the minutiae of each successive example of Eurocratic dementia might be alleviated: for the underlying explanation for the EU's obsession with such trivia as regulating the dimensions and shape of cucumbers is the same as the reason the European Commission, with its 'general powers', seeks to harmonise and collectivise European trade, currency, monetary, fiscal, legal, military, security, agricultural, fisheries, health and safety, social policy, pensions - indeed, every single dimension of human life itself. For since, according to the 'builders of Europe', God does not exist, Man is called upon instead to impose a coercive system of order upon our existence - the constituent nation states being for some reason inadequate for the task.

The blueprint of the socialist European Union Collective is thus qualitatively indistinguishable from the vision described in that perennial bible of Communism, 'The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy', or 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism'<sup>4</sup> [Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma', 1960], which asserts that: 'The victory of Communism on the world scale will provide the necessary material and intellectual preconditions for the merging of [all] nations. A Communist economic integration never known before will gradually be formed throughout the world. There will emerge a common moral code which will absorb all that is best in the character of each nation. Mankind will become one united, fraternal community completely free of antagonism'<sup>5</sup>.

Some observers of 'collapsible Communism', who understand perfectly well that the events of 1989-91 in the 'former' Soviet Bloc were not 'as advertised', have consoled themselves in recent years with the notion that what has emerged in the 'former' Soviet Union is essentially 'socialism'. The strong temptation to extend this (inaccurate) perception to the objectively socialistic European Union is liable to obscure the reality that the Leninist World Revolution aims at the establishment of global collectivism (Communism). To dispose of this problem now, attention is drawn

to an important passage in 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' which makes it abundantly clear that, so far as the Leninists are concerned, socialism is simply a stage on the road towards the objective - revolutionary Communism.

It is helpful to recall this whenever voluble Russians, in particular, profess to being socialists, thereby implying that they are not Communists. They are lying; and those, such as the British Fabians, with their 'tortoise' symbol, who share the same objectives as Lenin but who proceed towards this objective, like the European Union's strategists, by stealth, are similarly deceivers when they claim to be just 'international socialists'. The confusion is starkly cleared up by the Soviet document:

'There is no wall between socialism and Communism. These are not two divergent types of society, but merely two phases of one and the same social formation, distinguished the one from the other by the degree of their maturity. The transition from socialism to Communism consequently constitutes a gradual process. Communism grows up out of socialism as its direct prolongation. In the very bosom of socialist society its germs and roots spring up. These shoots of the future, developing on socialist soil, will lead... to a consolidation of Communism. Naturally, the entry into a higher phase of the new society cannot be pinned down to a specific calendar date, but it will be accomplished without abrupt change'. 'From the fact that the transition from socialism to Communism will take

place by degrees, it does not follow that this is a slow process. On the contrary, the transition is distinguished by a particularly high rate of development in all areas of social life... ending with the uplift of the culture and the conscious awareness of people'. [Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism', *ibid.*, page 656].

Thus the 'completion' of Lenin's World Revolution presupposes the prior creation of the 'common mind' - which is what the Soviet-derived mind-control concept of 'political correctness' is intended to achieve. By 'culture', the Leninist strategists mean the new 'garbage mentality' ingredient of the 'New Thinking' mode, much promoted by Gorbachev, which will have materialised as a result of the worldwide establishment of a 'new hegemony of values' in accordance with the formula for destroying traditional norms and culture, and substituting anti-state revolutionary 'values' in their place, as outlined in the writings of the founder of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci - a 'line' adopted by the Soviets as a key component for the 'relaunch' of their global Leninist revolutionary offensive. This dimension of the World Revolution requires a separate study. But the crucial importance of the Gramscian creation of the new revolutionary global 'culture' which was being spread through drugs, the satanisation of popular music, the degradation of all other art forms, the sexualisation of childhood, and (crucially) the corruption of the teaching profession, was at all times stressed in the literature supporting the 'perestroika' preparations for the 'changes' over which Gorbachev presided.

These were enunciated at the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986, at which the 'Gramsci dimension' of the Revolution was heavily emphasised, as the related Soviet literature confirms. For instance, the 27th Congress yielded the following statement on page 24 of 'The Ideology of Renewal for Revolutionary Restructuring', an Aesopian document based on the results of the 27th Congress, issued by Novosti Press in 1988: 'The questions of culture are being posed in a new manner by the present phase of the development of socialism. It is clear today that its renovation is restoring the appeal of socialist values all over the world - a world of day-to-day and sharp confrontation, but also one of mutual enrichment with progressive general human [which means Man-centred, rather than God-centred - Ed.] values'. - This Novosti document is among innumerable Soviet publications that individually and collectively prove that 'perestroika' and its aftermath were not the desperate expediency measures abruptly embarked upon by a Soviet leadership with its back to the wall, as Western fairytale has it, but the culmination of the most meticulous preparations based upon Leninist criteria - as Gorbachev himself, and the supporting official literature, repeatedly acknowledged.

Note that the title of the Novosti document includes the Leninist phrase 'revolutionary restructuring', making it evident that 'perestroika' was indeed, as its Aesopian meaning makes clear, a controlled Leninist process - a 're-formation (as in military formation) of the Revolution itself, not a spontaneous 'restructuring of the Soviet economy' as all Western Governments erroneously assumed. Such economic restructuring as appears to have actually taken place, turns out largely to comprise elements of a 'New Form' of Leninist 'state-controlled capitalism', as Gorbachev himself tried to make clear. In the Novosti document, too, the Soviet authors openly admitted that Gorbachev's 'peace offensive' was precisely that: a device motivated by strategic Leninist revolutionary considerations, since the official language quite unblushingly mentions 'the scope and extraordinary nature of our peace offensive'.

To dismiss such explicit affirmations of Communist long-term strategy and tactics, taken from the official Soviet literature and from the speeches of leading Leninists, as redundant and discredited wishful-thinking, is to commit a fatal error and to overlook the plentiful concrete evidence that Leninist World Revolutionary strategy remains unchanged, and is in the process of being implemented under our noses while 'the bourgeoisie' remains fast asleep - as Dimitri Manuilski, Stalin's close ideology aide, predicted as long ago as 1930, when he told students at the Lenin School: 'The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard-of concessions. The West, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. As soon as their guard is down, we will smash them with our clenched fist'. This echoed Lenin's own comment that when the enemy is put to a disorderly retreat, 'the command to fire is normally given'.

Lenin notoriously and cynically referred to all who unwittingly cooperate in furthering the Revolution, as 'useful idiots'. All Western policymakers, businessmen, media people, propagandists and collaborators of one kind or another who unwittingly agitate for and support the European Union Collective, qualify to be called 'useful idiots'. Europhiles who promote the European Union Collective knowing it to be a dimension of the World Revolution, are far fewer in number, of course: they include agents, agents of influence (secretly paid propagandists) and moles buried deep inside the national institutions, the churches, the political parties and the bureaucratic establishments. Both categories of internal 'enemy' of the constituent

nation states are guilty of treachery. These people all justify their support for the European Union - their treachery, in effect - with woolly allusions to 'cooperation'.

In reality, collectivisation spawns, and is inseparable from, coercion. Hence it follows that coercive, unnatural 'cooperation' - falsely 'legitimised' in part by national referenda in which electorates have been lied to and from which crucial information has typically been withheld, and in part by the undemocratic rubber-stamp European Parliament - is contrary to the interests of what remains of the constituent European nations. 'Cooperation' in the European Union context is a lie - a typically Leninist, Aesopian word which masks the reality of falsely legitimised coercion.

This takes many forms - not least psychological. For once captive within the EU political collective's structures, a country's affairs soon come to be dominated by the unmanageable initiatives, objectives and offensives of the collective's hyperac-

tive apparat. This state of affairs generates the necessary environment of 'psychological change', within which all aspirations to reverse the collectivisation tide soon come to appear futile. Another Soviet work published during the Gorbachev era (also in 1988), entitled *Leninist Theory of Revolution and Social Psychology*<sup>6</sup>, noted that 'Lenin invariably attached importance to psychology.... To bring about psychological change is, from the viewpoint of social psychology, the dual task of the Party in guiding the masses, in attaining the goals of the Revolution in building socialism'.

The role of the Party in the contemporary European revolutionary context is being played by the European Union Collective itself. Indeed, seen in this light, the European Union Collective is conspicuously a 'New Form' (to cite Lenin) of ongoing Leninist revolutionary mechanism. For a fundamental feature of Leninism is, as Gorbachev stressed, its inherent 'creativity'. This means that the disciples and imitators of Lenin, who are 'in Lenin's mind', are always striving to 'go beyond' what went before.

## PREDICTING AND UNDERSTANDING LENINIST STRATEGY

It is now appropriate to unveil past and continuing Soviet strategic deception activity, and its evolution, in greater detail, in order to illuminate the ongoing Bolshevik-Leninist agenda for Europe and how the European Union Collective represents part of the realisation of that agenda. This will necessitate focusing temporarily upon what may appear to be (but are not) exclusively Soviet-oriented issues.

Writing in a Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency composed in March 1989, published in his book 'The Perestroika Deception' [1995]<sup>7</sup>, the genuine Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn, explains the predictive power which the informed analyst can derive from gaining a thorough understanding of Leninist global revolutionary deception strategy. The defector had worked within the 'Inner KGB' where the planning of deception strategy in response to the Soviet Communist Party's instructions took place, and today lives under cover in the United States having been condemned to death by the Soviet authorities not least because he had revealed the essence of the long-range deception strategy against the West. Golitsyn explained:

'Correct understanding of the strategy and the application of that understanding to the analysis of events enables one to predict otherwise surprising Soviet actions. Since the strategy is long-range, it has several phases. The strategists plan their actions in the early phases in preparation for the final phase. They conceive Soviet reforms in the initial phase, they rehearse them in the preparatory phase and they introduce them in the final phase. Because of this planning framework, the strategy has its own dialectic. It has its thesis - the Stalinist regime; its antithesis - criticism and rejection of the Stalinist regime; and its synthesis - a new, reformed model which 'perestroika' is designed to create, and which will be the product of 'convergence' (the joining of two opposites). Understanding the dialectic and logic of the strategy is crucial for prediction: it enables one to see how the situation in one phase will develop in the next phase'.

Specifically, as we have seen, the Stalinist content of the revolutionary control system - the Stalinist model - was to be decisively discarded. The decision to proceed along these lines was actually taken in 1959-60, when the Soviet long-range revolutionary strategy was refurbished and reformulated along deepened Leninist lines. Writing in his first work 'New Lies for Old' [published in 1984, completed in 1980]<sup>8</sup>, Anatoliy Golitsyn summarised the abandonment of the Stalinist model, as follows:

The dialectic of this offensive consists of a calculated shift from the old, discredited Soviet practice [the Stalinist model - Ed.] to a new "liberalised" model, with a social democratic facade, to realise the Communist planners' strategy for establishing a United Europe. At the beginning, they introduced a variation of the 1968 Czechoslovakian "democratisation". At a later stage they will shift to a variation of the Czechoslovakian takeover of 1948'.

That the abandonment, for the time being, of the Stalinist model of revolutionary control was the true underlying meaning of 'perestroika', is made clear in the literature. For instance, in the August 1990 issue of the official Soviet journal 'Sputnik', Digest of the Soviet Press, an English language publication modelled in format and style upon Readers' Digest, Professor Vladimir Shastitko, Director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, began an article with the following statement<sup>9</sup>: 'Stalinist socialism, which our country developed for many years, has shown itself to be fully bankrupt, having exhausted its resources for growth'.

Translated from the standard Leninist Aesopian language used here, this meant that the Stalinist model of socialism (= Communism, whenever the word socialism is employed by Soviets and their successors) had outlived its usefulness for the present. However socialism (= Communism) itself was not bankrupt. A different (i.e. a purely Leninist) model of socialism would replace the Stalinist model, which the Gorbachev team was engaged in closing down on behalf of the strategy collective. And to make sure that no-one would be liable to run away with the idea that the Soviets were in the process of abandoning socialism (= Communism) altogether - which was the premature knee-jerk conclusion reached by policymakers in all Western capitals, influenced by agents of influence and agents-in-place - Gorbachev stated unequivocally that the collective of revolutionaries would never abandon Communism. Indeed, he made this point at every suitable opportunity - for instance, in that speech in November 1987, when he had asserted that 'we are moving towards a new world, the world of Communism. We shall never turn off that road'. And he had reiterated it with greater clarity and emphasis than ever in 'his' book *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*<sup>10</sup>: 'They tell us that nothing will come of perestroika within the framework of our system. They say we should change the system and borrow from the experience of another socio-political system. To this they add that, if the Soviet Union takes this path and gives up its socialist choice, close links with the West will supposedly become possible. They go so far as to claim that the October 1917 Revolution was a mistake which almost certainly cut off our country from world social progress'. 'To put an end to all the rumours and speculations that abound in the West about this, I would like to point out once again that we are conducting all our reforms in accordance with the socialist choice. We are looking within socialism [that is, within Communism - Ed.], rather than outside it, for the answers to all the questions that arise. We assess our successes and errors alike by socialist standards. Those who hope that we shall move away from the socialist path will be greatly disappointed. Every part of our programme of 'perestroika'- and the programme as a whole, for that matter - is fully based on the principle of more socialism and more democracy' - which confirmed once and for all that the 'changes' over which Gorbachev presided and for which his Politburo prepared the way, were not spontaneous, but represented rather the outcome of elaborate planning based on Leninist studies over many years.

'More socialism means a more dynamic pace and creative endeavour' (by which was meant the creative application of Leninist methods: this is what creative always means when used by Communist strategists, and in their literature). For instance, as was explained on page 53 of *The Ideology of Renewal for Revolutionary Restructuring* (Moscow, 1988), the application of Leninist methods meant, inter alia, that 'normal business relations with states of opposing systems are among other things a blow to anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism, thus weakening the reactionaries' pressure on democratic gains and aspirations'; the Leninist Aesopian translation of 'democratic' being that decisions are reached 'collectively', as in the European Union context - which means, in both the overt Soviet Union and in the 'new European Soviet', that decisions are in practice taken by a controlling clique, in accordance with the priorities of collectivisation strategy.

Gorbachev also stressed in *Perestroika* that 'we are not going to change Soviet power, of course, or abandon its fundamental principles, but we acknowledge the

need for changes that will strengthen socialism. The essence of 'perestroika' is that it revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction in both theory and practice'.

And less than two years before Mrs Thatcher told this Author in the Palace of Westminster that she thought that Gorbachev 'isn't a Leninist any more', Gorbachev had explicitly handed the entire credit for 'perestroika' and its objectives to his idol, Lenin. As mentioned on page 14, he had told Russian students [i.e., cadres] on 15th November 1989: 'We are for a Lenin who is alive! In building our future we are basing ourselves upon... Marxism-Leninism.... Through restructuring ['perestroika' - 're-formation'] we want to give socialism a second wind and unveil in all its plenitude the vast humanist potential of the socialist system. To achieve this, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union returns to the origins and principles of the Bolshevik Revolution, to the Leninist ideas about the construction of a new society. Our Party was and remains the Party of Lenin.... In short, we are for a Lenin who is alive.... We must seek these answers guided by the spirit of Leninism, the style of Lenin's thinking, and the method of dialectical cognition'.

'The method of dialectical cognition' is the method used by Golitsyn which, as the genuine Soviet defector explains, yields 'correct understanding of the strategy' and facilitates 'the application of that understanding to the analysis of events', enabling one 'to predict otherwise surprising Soviet actions'.

The remarkably consistent failure of Western policymakers and their advisers to make any apparent effort to develop 'the method of dialectical cognition' that is necessary as a prerequisite for understanding what is happening in a world in which the continuing revolutionaries are 'running rings round them', has left them dazed, confused and floundering. One often comes across articles on 'post'-Soviet affairs which reveal that the writers can see that things are far from being as they seem, and do not conform to fashionable Western images and preconceptions - yet have been unable to make sense of events, due to the absence of any grasp of Soviet deception theory, practice and strategy. Such commentators accordingly end up being no better informed than 'the great majority of mankind' cited by Machiavelli in 'The Prince' who 'are satisfied with appearances as though they were realities... and are often more influenced by things that seem than by those that are'.

This catastrophic failure greatly bothered Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn - about whose probable role as a 'licensed' critic authorised by Moscow to accentuate the process of debunking the Stalinist system, the Author has certain reservations:

'I would never have imagined', he has written, 'the extreme degree to which the West actually desired to blind itself to the world situation, the extreme degree to which the West had already become a world without a will, a world gradually petrifying in the face of the danger confronting it, a world oppressed above all by the need to defend its freedom. There is a German proverb which runs 'Mut verloren - alles verloren': When courage is lost, all is lost. There is another, Latin one, according to which loss of reason is the true harbinger of destruction. But what happens to a society in which both these losses - the loss of courage and the loss of reason - intersect?'<sup>11</sup>

The answer, in the European Union context, is that society is being led by its deluded, blind, ideologically-driven or perverse political leaders to fulfil the prediction of the Soviet collective authors of 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' that 'only then do they voluntarily enter upon close liaisons' that are intended to annihilate the state itself. Ignorance of this Leninist background is both inexcusable and all but terminal.

## UNBROKEN LENINIST CONTINUITY WITH THE PAST

It is no surprise, therefore, that Gorbachev's emphatic, insistent and reiterated invocation of Lenin as the central source of Soviet and 'post'-Soviet strategic inspiration, exhibits no qualitative differentiation whatsoever from the definitive invocations of Lenin proclaimed at earlier meetings of Communist Parties and CPSU Congresses. For instance, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow from 5th to 17th June 1969 - a follow-up meeting to the Eighty-One-Party Meeting held in Moscow in December 1960 at which the revised and updated long-range Leninist deception strategy was 'ratified' - Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev stated:

Lenin's inestimable service consists in that he furnished answers to the most acute questions raised by Life [see Note 21] and indicated the most efficacious forms of struggle... for the victory of the socialist revolution and the triumph of Communism. To apply a consistent class line, firmly adhere to principles, be flexible in tactics, consider the concrete conditions from every angle, to undertake bold and at the same time well-conceived actions... this is what Lenin taught us, and what we learn from Lenin. His contribution to revolutionary theory was a major stage in the development of Marxist thought<sup>12</sup>.

The element of flexibility in the creative application of the Leninist dialectical political method reflects one of the lessons the Soviets had learned from mandatory study, following the Chinese Communists' victory in 1949, of 'The Art of War' - the treatise on strategic deception by the school of the ancient Chinese military strategist, Sun-Tzu [see page 56 ] - namely that 'in the art of war there are no fixed rules. These can only be worked out according to circumstances'<sup>13</sup>.

In a commemoration at the same meeting of the centenary of the birth of Lenin on 17th June 1969, Brezhnev proclaimed - in the exact style of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, years later - that 'Communists will always be true to the creative spirit of Leninism.... Study Lenin's works! There you will find an inexhaustible fund of inspiration for struggle against reaction and oppression, for socialism and peace. Acquaintance with Lenin's works will help the rising generation to see more clearly the revolutionary prospects of our era. Spread more widely the knowledge of the achievements of Leninism! Let us raise higher the banner of Leninism in the struggle for the revolutionary renewal of the world! Long live Leninism!'<sup>14</sup>.

That was Leonid Brezhnev speaking, not Gorbachev. Compare these observations with those remarks by Gorbachev noted on page 14 from 'Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World' [pages 11-12 in the PERENNIAL LIBRARY edition, 1988]:

The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity.... Turning to Lenin has greatly stimulated the Party and society in their search to find explanations and answers to the questions that have arisen.... The Leninist period is indeed very important<sup>15</sup>.

If these statements were taken out of context, they could be attributed as interchangeably to Brezhnev as to Gorbachev - providing impressive documentary proof of the absolute lack of any discontinuity of revolutionary method or in the way of thinking between the two leaderships: a conclusion yet further reinforced by the closing remarks of the official record of the proceedings of the 27th CPSU Congress held in Moscow between 25th February and 6th March 1986, chaired by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev:

'Adopting a bold, realistic, mobilising and inspiring strategy, one that is Leninist in spirit, the struggle for the triumph of Communist ideals, of peace and progress, the 27th Congress of the CPSU expresses the Party's firm determination to honourably follow our great road, and open up new vistas for the creative energy and revolutionary initiative of the... people's intelligentsia. The Congress calls on all Soviet people to dedicate all their strength, knowledge, ability, and creative enthusiasm to the great goals of Communist construction, and to worthily continue Lenin's victorious revolutionary cause, the cause of the October Revolution!'<sup>16</sup>.

And as late as 1989, Gorbachev declared: I am a Communist, a committed Communist. For some, that may be a fantasy. But for me, it is my own goal'. The following year, even as he was being feted internationally as 'the man who ended Communism', Gorbachev insisted publicly that 'I am now, just as I have always been, a convinced Communist'. And, eliminating all doubt that his renunciation of Communism following the August coup' had been a Leninist deception, Gorbachev pronounced on the 'Larry King Live' TV show on 6th November 1993, in answer to a naive question from a member of the audience whether he would 'return to politics':

'I'm not hiding in the woodwork. I'm involved in a different political role.... I have not abandoned links with the past'. When asked 'What are you doing now?' Gorbachev replied: 'I'm working on the same problems as before - on New Thinking and international relations'<sup>17,18</sup>.

In 'The Perestroika Deception', Golitsyn described Gorbachev as '... a Leninist, chosen and trained by the Soviet strategists to engineer the defeat of the United States and the West generally through the use of false, controlled democracy and a specious capitalism'<sup>19</sup> - Lenin's proven formula of 'state-controlled capitalism'.

But although Gorbachev left no room for doubt concerning the strategists' Leninist inspiration and intentions, the West was caught off-guard by the abrupt, coordinated 'liberalisation' of the East European countries, by the orchestrated, provisional and retractable 'independence' of the Soviet Republics, and by the contrived August coup' of 1991, which provided the pretext for Gorbachev, Yeltsin and others to 'renounce' Communism amid dramatic gestures (although Yevgeniy Primakov, the intelligence chief, top strategist and later Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, couldn't be bothered with such trifling deceptions). This paved the way for the false 'banning' of Communism (leaving, as will be confirmed later, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continuing in the driving seat), and for the 'replacement' of the Gorbachev regime in Russia itself by a fake 'non'-Communist regime fronted by the leading Politburo Communist, Comrade Boris N. Yeltsin. At the 27th CPSU Congress held in February 1986 Yeltsin, who had then occupied the key strategic position of First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, was reported by 'Pravda' and 'Izvestia'<sup>20</sup> to have invoked Lenin in the following enthusiastic terms:

At a Party Congress at which frank reports were delivered and sharp discussions held, after which the delegates expressed support for unity, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, in defiance of sceptics, exclaimed enthusiastically:

"Now this is something I really understand! This is Life!"<sup>21</sup>. Many years have gone by since then. One can note with satisfaction that the atmosphere at our Congress is again marked by that Bolshevik spirit, that Leninist optimism, that call to struggle against the old and outmoded in the name of the new' [APPLAUSE]. Hence Yeltsin, who was the first prominent figure to 'renounce' Communism



in preparation for the 'changes', could not have been anything but a dedicated lifelong servant of the Leninist Communist Revolution; indeed, since the crucial position of First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party Commission is/was one of the top positions in the hierarchy - it was the Moscow CPSU Central Committee that continued coordinating tactical and strategic political developments under Yeltsin's 'non-Communist Presidency' - Yeltsin remained throughout his decade as the strategy collective's 'front man', a Communist of the most senior rank. Yeltsin's 'conversion' to 'non-Communism' was always hard to swallow. According to Pravda [24th February 1981] he was a delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, when serving as First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Provincial Party Committee [Izvestia, 26th February 1981], having, according to Pravda [1st February 1981] just been awarded the Order of Lenin in recognition of his lifelong service to the CPSU. Yeltsin's rise after 1981 was meteoric and could only have taken place because of his excellent standing in the Party's structures, and his services to Brezhnev (to 1982), to Andropov (1982-84), to Chernenko (1984-85) and of course to Gorbachev, with whom he 'worked' 'perestroika' dialectically (1985-91). Yeltsin was appointed to the Central Committee of the CPSU [Izvestia, 4th March 1981], 'elected' a Supreme Soviet Deputy from Serov [Pravda, 2nd March 1981], 'elected' to the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet [Pravda, 12th April 1981], named Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee [Pravda, 3rd July 1985 - well after Gorbachev had become General Secretary], 'elected' First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Commission [Pravda, 25th December 1985], providing him with the 'separate' base that would be needed later, and made a member of Gorbachev's Politburo [Izvestia, 19th February, 1986]. In every speech and statement he delivered, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin was 'politically correct' to perfection - as, for instance, could be gauged from studying his 10,500 words as reported in Moskovskaya pravda on 15th January 1986. In mid-March 1987, Yeltsin was pictured during a visit to Managua, Nicaragua, holding aloft the hands of those two well-known 'fellow-democrats', Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Jaime Wheelock Roman, key members of the Nicaraguan Communist (Sandinista) Politburo [see also page 24].

Like Yeltsin did, all the key figures on the 'post'-Soviet stage participate, as members of the top Bolshevik collective, in implementing the deception strategy - a point which Golitsyn explained repeatedly, and never with such pinpoint precision as in March 1989, when he told Washington that 'because Gorbachev was chosen for the execution of the final phase of the strategy, one should not exclude the possibility of his being replaced by another leader' [perhaps] 'a "liberal" of Yeltsin's type.... Gorbachev's replacement or "fall" could well be a calculated move. If circumstances changed, he might be returned to power again'.

When that advice proved to be correct, two and a half years ahead of the event, nobody in Western policymaking structures drew the appropriate conclusions - indeed, any conclusions at all - from the fact that Mr Golitsyn had predicted that Gorbachev would be 'removed' and replaced by Boris Yeltsin. If intelligence analysts had been doing their jobs properly, they should at once have reviewed the methodology Anatoliy Golitsyn had employed in order to reach that accurate conclusion. It appears instead that their minds were closed tight shut - corroded by 'groupthink' and by the fashionable misconceptions of the day which were, and remain, constructed upon the lies spawned by an expanding flood of strategic deception. As explained in the Introduction, Western policymakers had allowed themselves to become co-liars

with the Leninists - thereby reinforcing the revolutionaries' 'inverted pyramid' of lies.

That the Stalinist model was being prepared for the interim (i.e. reversible) junk heap of history so far as the theatrics mounted for Western public consumption in Moscow itself were concerned (the 'changes' were to be geographically selective: Georgia, for instance, subsequently suffered terribly under the brutal 'Yeltsin era' neo-Stalinist dictatorship of MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze), was made clear in many statements by Gorbachev - and by the Soviet Foreign Minister, E. Shevardnadze himself, in the course of a crucial address delivered on 25th July 1988 before the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, in a passage entitled 'The Party's Thought and Will geared to Perestroika', part of which contained the following statement<sup>22</sup>:

The "image of the enemy"<sup>23</sup> which we are expending so much effort on debunking today emerged as a counterbalance to the real image of the Soviet people, contrary to its friendliness, valour, wisdom and self-sacrifice<sup>24</sup>. On 15th July 1990, 'Pravda' published the complete text of the Statement of the 28th CPSU Congress of July 1990<sup>25</sup>. It contained the following further passage confirming the abandonment of the Stalinist model and its replacement by a reinvigorated, dynamic, revitalised creative Leninist world revolutionary model:

"The 28th CPSU Congress attaches fundamental importance to defining the principles of the Party's policy at the present stage, with a view to... renewing those principles [i.e., the Leninist principles proclaimed at each successive CPSU Congress] and making progress towards a humane, democratic socialism. Distortions of the principles of socialism from the 1930s into the 1950s [that is to say, of course, during the Stalin period - Ed.] engendered complicated problems...".

But the closing down of the Stalinist model for international public consumption would not entail the slightest deviation from Leninist Bolshevism. On the contrary, as Gorbachev put it at the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986 (as reproduced in the 1988 Party document entitled 'The Ideology of Renewal for Revolutionary Restructuring', on pages 60-61), the Party had made 'specific decisions on how to update our political system' [a reference to the false system of CPSU-controlled political 'democratism' to follow - Ed.]. Thus we shall give a fresh impetus to our revolutionary restructuring. We shall maintain our quiet [Leninist] creativity and daring in an efficient and responsible fashion in a Leninist Bolshevik manner'.

The 'peace offensive' formed an integral element of the Soviets' assault on European minds, which led directly to the 'restructuring' of NATO in conformity with the Soviet strategic collective security objective. Thus on page 159 of 'From Geneva to Reykjavik', Fyodor Burlatsky boasted that '... some progress, in fact considerable progress, has been made in Europe towards detente and in New Thinking'. Moscow's 'peace offensive', too, was openly acknowledged to be based upon Sun-Tzu's teaching that the highest manifestation of the art of war was to 'win the war without fighting'. As Burlatsky noted on page 155 of his Leninist polemic: 'Our philosophy of peace [the Aesopian meaning of which, as indicated, is 'the cessation of all hostility towards Communism' - Ed.] is frankly based on the conviction that socialism can win without war, without military competition'. At the same time, Fyodor Burlatsky made it dialectically evident that the strategists 'under' Gorbachev still viewed non-Communists as enemies. Thesis: 'We are not enemies'. [Dialectical antithesis laced with blackmail:] 'We cannot have no right to regard one another as enemies, unless we want to vanish from the face of the earth' [Burlatsky, page 149].

## OVERT AIMS OF 'PERESTROIKA' FOR THE USSR AND WESTERN EUROPE

In a Memorandum addressed to the Central Intelligence Agency in March 1989, published in 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn explained that 'perestroika' as applied to the Soviet Union did - behind its Aesopian meaning of re-formation - also imply the 'restructuring' and revitalisation of the Soviet socialist economy through the incorporation of some elements of the market economy, with the objective of establishing a 'New Form' of Leninist 'state-controlled capitalism'. Western Governments, having no concept of Leninist deception theory and practice, forgot the lesson of Lenin's false 'New Economic Policy' of the 1920s and assumed that 'perestroika' meant effectively that the Soviets were in the process of abandoning Communism altogether, even though Gorbachev never ceased to reiterate that this was NOT the case. Golitsyn also pointed out that Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the 'restructuring' of the Stalinist regime into a form of 'Communist democracy with the appearance of political pluralism' [= the essence of 'democratism', meaning the creation and maintenance of the illusion of democracy, mainly for Western public consumption - Ed.]; and that he was engaged in 'reconstructing a repressive regime with a brutal (Stalinist) face into an attractive socialist model with a (Leninist) human facade and a seeming similarity to the Swedish social democratic system'.

For Western Europe, Golitsyn wrote that dimensions of 'perestroika' included:

(a) 'Bringing about a new political alliance between the pseudo-social democratic regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the Euro-Communist parties and genuine social democratic parties in Western Europe'. For many years now, this has been taking place on a grand scale, as parliamentary delegations and nonal parliamentarians from European Union Member States and from 'former' Soviet Bloc countries who maintain their Leninist loyalties behind a facade of West-

ern-style political labels, interface with 'colleagues' from other EU countries at both national and European Union level - dancing to the European Union's collectivist agenda, with even the 'Euroseptic' movements penetrated by leftists and accepting funds from the European Union, which thereby controls or establishes parameters around their activities.

(b) 'Restructuring' political and military Blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - and the creation of a single 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' incorporating a united Germany<sup>26</sup>.

Every dimension of these and of Mr Golitsyn's related predictions has either been fulfilled or is in the process of realisation. This is no surprise, since Golitsyn's predictive record - achieved by applying the 'the method of dialectical cognition' provided by Leninist dialectics as an interpretative and predictive tool for 'reading the revolutionary mind', is, as already noted, unmatched by any other analyst, let alone by any Western intelligence organisation. In his study, published in 1994, entitled 'Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA [Alfred Knopf, New York], Mark Riebling stated that an analysis of Anatoliy Golitsyn's predictions in 'New Lies for Old' had revealed that 'of Golitsyn's falsifiable predictions, 139 out of 148 were fulfilled by the end of 1993 - an accuracy rate of nearly 94 percent'<sup>27</sup>. But with no disrespect to this brilliant analyst, anyone who had taken the trouble to study Lenin and to read the Soviet literature and the speeches of Soviet officials, from Gorbachev and his predecessors downwards, could have achieved an understanding of the 'New Thinking' facilitating comparably accurate predictions of Soviet behaviour.

## NO FUNDAMENTAL DEVIATION FROM COMMUNISM EVER INTENDED

Gorbachev is on record as having told the Politburo early in his tenure, as the final preparations were being made for 'perestroika':

'Gentlemen, Comrades, do not be concerned about all that you hear about 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' and democracy in the coming years. These are primarily for outward consumption. There will be no significant change within the Soviet Union, other than for cosmetic purposes. Our purpose is to disarm the Americans, and to let them fall asleep'<sup>28</sup>.

In other words, 'perestroika' was indeed a deceptive, Leninist device to mask the facts that there was to be no fundamental deviation from Communism and that the Leninist World Revolution would continue until global Communism had been achieved. The Soviets openly proclaimed the message that 'there will be no significant change within the Soviet Union, other than for cosmetic purposes', knowing from long experience - and from the results of their detailed studies of Western psychology carried out since the early 1960s by the Academy of [Leninist] Sciences' specialist institutes for the KGB, which spearheads the strategy for the strategists and the Party - that the West would ignore the message. It is this fully justified and typically Leninist-Bolshevik confidence that the West isn't paying attention, which has enabled the continuing covert Communists to restock all the East and Central European Governments, at all levels, with known Communists, and to retain Soviet symbols in place - such as statues of Lenin, the widespread use of the name 'Soviet', pictures and busts of Lenin, red flags, the hammer and sickle, and other symbols of continuing Soviet power, such as newspapers like 'Sovetskaya Rossiya' (Soviet Russia), shown below, and 'Sovetstkiy Sport' ('Soviet Sport'), shown on page 77. Since 1st October 2001, Internet users anywhere in the 'former' USSR may register with the domain .su. Previously the only domain available for Russia itself was .ru. Aircraft flown by Aeroflot, as observed in the late 1990s, carried the Russian Federation's livery on the tail fin assembly, and the hammer and sickle motif on the front of the aircraft just below the flight deck on the right-hand side of the fuselage.



'SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA' [Soviet Russia]: The masthead page of 'Soviet Russia', dated 4th January 2001, which can be obtained on subscription or bought at Moscow newsstands. Many other newspapers and publications also retain the name 'Soviet' in their titles-such as 'Soviet Sport'[see facsimile, page 77], or 'Soviet Chuvashia', 'Soviet Agygeyo' etc. No attempt is made to hide the continued existence of the Soviet Union. It is only in the West, among policymakers and the media, that the myth of its collapse persists.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's official journal 'International Affairs' - established in 1954 allowing the death of Stalin - which discusses and elaborates elements of the continuing deception strategy, has stated explicitly for many years in each successive issue that it is delivered to Number 10 Downing Street, to the White House, and to the 'head offices' of the other leading Western Governments. The advisory board of this official publication is invariably headed by the Foreign Minister of the day. Apart from a lesser official who occupied that position when the publication was founded in 1954, there had, by 2002, been precisely four Editors-in-Chief - the four Soviet and then Russian Foreign Ministers, namely Andrei Gromyko [Izaak Katz], Andrei Kozyrev (the son of one of the diplomats kicked out of London for espionage by the Conservative Government led by Edward Heath), Yevgeniy Primakov, and Igor Ivanov, the current Foreign Minister and Editor-in-Chief.

'International Affairs' carelessly carried an advertisement as late as 1996 which contained the following rubric soliciting subscriptions to the journal: 'YES! I WANT TO KEEP INFORMED OF CRITICAL SOVIET FOREIGN, MILITARY AND SECURITY POLICY ISSUES!' Hence this official Russian policy journal, which explains and elaborates elements of continuing Leninist strategy, was using the adjective Soviet five years after the alleged abolition of the Soviet Union, in a subscription advertisement boasting that copies are sent to the Heads of Government of the main Western powers. After 'Soviet Analyst', which retains the name 'Soviet' in its title in order to emphasise the lack of any strategic discontinuity, had pointed out that 'International Affairs' was continuing to use 'Soviet' in its advertisement, the publishers belatedly changed the text of the promotion. Volume 43 [Number 5] of 1997 suddenly dropped the use of the name 'Soviet', yet reaffirmed the unbroken continuity of 'International Affairs' and its Communist pedigree by stating as follows in a revised subscription advertisement: 'Since 1954 this authoritative Russian foreign policy journal provides interesting, well-documented essays in international politics and diplomacy'. In reality, this journal has, since 1954, meticulously elaborated Soviet strat-

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, MARCH-APRIL 1994

Keep Your Finger On the Pulse of a Nation

close to Islam. But the Islamic world is making to be based on a mix of diverse included.

Muslim ideals of social system is due to justice. Unlike, say, democracy, majority by the majority, the coexistence of other Eastern communities rests mechanical majority.

...differently universal values such as Allah ("God's slave"), for one, ... complete freedom from ... principles of ... worlds.

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FORMER USSR FOREIGN MINISTER

An advertisement which appeared in the March-April 1994 issue of the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal 'Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' ('International Affairs'), soliciting subscriptions with the slogan: 'YES! I WANT TO KEEP INFORMED OF CRITICAL SOVIET FOREIGN, MILITARY AND SECURITY POLICY ISSUES'. This subscription advertisement remained unchanged until 1996. The name 'Soviet' is in widespread use domestically, as shown for instance on page 44, but its continued use abroad was unusual, since it has been disallowed for external use.

egy, usually couched in Leninist Aesopian language, for the instruction of Western Governments and for the simultaneous benefit of those whom Lenin called 'the interested' (the World Revolutionary community). One would have thought that some Western official, somewhere in the bureaucracies, would have spotted these connections and drawn them to the attention of the highest levels of government. But no, the West has remained in a comatose state - as Gorbachev and Manuïlski, and the entire continuing Leninist revolutionary collective, had correctly anticipated.

#### REPACKAGING OLD LIES TO SUSTAIN THE VULNERABLE DECEPTION

So deep is the West's slumber, that Western observers routinely miss all the cues fed to them by the strategists to gauge whether we are likely to wake up. Indeed, so many examples have come to the Author's attention that this book could easily have consisted of nothing but concrete, documented evidence - independent of the careful analysis provided by Anatoliy Golitsyn - that 'perestroika' was a Leninist strategic deception designed to prepare the world for the dismantling of the Stalinist model.

Even so, every pack of lies degrades, and thus has a limited life expectancy (as an approximation, no Leninist lie can be guaranteed to survive for more than about seven years) - a fact of deception 'Life' of which the Leninists are always uncomfortably aware. Accordingly, their lies are encumbered about with elaborate precautionary measures, as well as reinforcements - a dramatic case in point being the controlled unrest which culminated with the televised shelling of the 'White House' in the autumn of 1993, when Western TV crews who were corralled into a single hotel found that because they were so confined, they could only shoot film from a single position in front of the building - which was the visual angle from which the Russian authorities wished the global television reportage to be covered.

That theatrical upheaval provided cover inter alia for the subsequent emergence of a packed 'non'-Communist (= covert Communist) Duma which today rubber-stamps presidential decisions - while perpetrating the spectacle of a Western-supported 'democratic' Russian President subjecting the 'parliament' building (formerly the Communist Party HQ) to shell-fire, with probably heavy loss of life, leaving the West more confused and dazed than ever, but nevertheless still eager to continue buttressing this monstrous regime - for fear of 'worse instability to come'.

In the event, the strategists achieved much more than this - namely, openly expressed Western support for Yeltsin's cynical, barbaric, repressive, Stalinist provocation. For, during the televised bombardment of the 'Black and White House', as Moscow wags immediately called the Moscow White House (so named to mimic the White House in Washington, a symbol of the appearance of 'equivalence' with the United States, a theme that the Leninists have systematically promoted), the ill-advised British Prime Minister, John Major, emerged out of Number 10 Downing Street almost arm-in-arm with the then Russian Ambassador to London, the Bolshevik and KGB officer Boris Pankin, to confirm his complete support for the brutal measures Yeltsin was 'having to take'. On seeing that spectacle on their TV screens, the Moscow strategists must have reached the conclusion that no circumstances, short of outright war against the West, could ever be envisaged which would be liable to curtail Western support for any tactical policy the Leninists chose to adopt, given that the British Prime Minister was prepared to appear on television to tell the whole world that he was all in favour of bombarding parliamentary buildings with tank fire. The

subsequent absence of British domestic, or international, criticism of Mr Major's wholly disgraceful public statement would have provided yet further validation of the strategists' assessment that they 'just couldn't go wrong' with their strategy. On 3rd January 1998, a two-part series entitled 'Tsar Boris: The Yeltsin Years' began on BBC2 Television. It repackaged official Russian disinformation about the Yeltsin period to date, for Western public consumption - making it all the harder for the truth to emerge, since film lies are so much more easily absorbed than unpalatable truths. The first programme in this series purported to reconstruct the 'power struggle' between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and showed the apparently confused but controlled and always carefully televised events culminating in the shelling of the 'White House'. Relying exclusively on (tainted) sources in Moscow, with no objective counter-intelligence to offset the lies spouted on-camera by a succession of KGB and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) officers, the BBC programme-makers evidently thought nothing of the curious irony of General Aleksandr Rutskoi, Ruslan Khasbulatov and a parade of dismissed' or 'disgraced' officials including Boris Yeltsin's former chief bodyguard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, relating the gory details of these events from the comfort of their armchairs - when they had supposedly been imprisoned, dismissed, disgraced, or what have you by the regime they were now discussing so dispassionately. The BBC did not, evidently, see fit to question the veracity of on-camera statements by top Russian Security Council officials like Filatov, or by any of the KGB and GRU officials interviewed. President George Bush Sr. was shown on-camera in the BBC film ruminating that he had formed the impression that personal relations between Gorbachev and Yeltsin had been strained; while his former Secretary of State, James Baker - when asked what his reaction had been to the 'Kiev' accord signed 'secretly' at an official dacha in Belovezh Forest, near Minsk, on 8th December 1991, by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia under which the Soviet Union had been 'abolished' on the say-so of three signatures scrawled on a piece of paper - told the BBC: 'We were surprised. But we were even more surprised when we found out that Gorbachev knew nothing about it!' Mr Baker had still, as late as 1998, not understood that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were working together throughout, to deceive the West, and that he, Baker, had been the main deceiver.

The further spectacle of Gorbachev's simulated anger before the TV cameras at having been told by President Bush about the 'Kiev' agreement before he had learned about it from the signatories themselves, was the least convincing of all the elaborately staged, KGB-directed theatre repackaged in this BBC television programme - which will nevertheless have reinforced the lie that the Leninist 'changes' and their after-

math, were genuine. Yet the viewer was required to believe that the President of the Soviet Union, who commanded the most powerful land forces in the world, was powerless to decree a piece of paper signed by three Soviet Republic leaders invalid, or to take reprisals. Members of the BBC's team were, apparently, unable to grasp the obvious - namely, that Gorbachev's acquiescence in the 'Kiev' accord was simply never credible.

The entire 1991-93 series of charades and provocations, ending, in the first TV episode, with the shelling of the 'White House', had been repackaged for international public re-consumption - complete with 'first-hand' commentaries by the officials and KGB or GRU intelligence officers who organised and implemented the provocations in the first place - to sustain the vulnerable inverted pyramid of lies perched upon the base deception: the Leninist myth of a genuine 'Break with the Past'.

## A FALSE IMAGE TO HOODWINK THE WEST

In the face of this open-ended barrage and reiteration of Leninist lies, distortions, provocations, fabrications and diversions, Western observers even missed the blatant hints dropped by Gorbachev himself that the strategists were nervous about the possibility that their elaborate edifice of ruses and charades might be exposed before it had become 'irrevocably' embedded in the Western psyche.

For instance, on 17th May 1990, President Gorbachev declared himself to be 'an incorrigible [Leninist] optimist', anticipating what the controlled dissident Andrei Sakharov thought would be 'the most optimistic unrolling of events'<sup>29</sup> (that is to say, that the deception strategy could well succeed beyond the strategists' wildest dreams). Gorbachev added that 'even when people all around me are shouting "chaos, chaos, chaos", and "collapse, collapse", I believe, as Lenin said, that this revolutionary chaos may yet crystallise into new forms of life..'. 'We have started on the last lap'<sup>30</sup>.

What 'last lap'? Obviously, the 'last lap' of the 'perestroika' 'deception' - the preparatory phase for the fake 'folding' of the USSR and Communism, the purpose of which was to catch the West off-guard, to hijack Western perceptions so that it was immediately and universally taken for granted that the 'enemy' (rather than merely his image) had dissolved, and that Communism was passe - thereby opening the way for the central tactical objective of the strategy: 'convergence' [the synthesis].

However, the Leninists' definition of 'convergence' differs from the Western perception: they define 'convergence' as the movement of the West towards their model, and on their terms, with only cosmetic movement on their part towards the Western model. Pending the complete achievement of this objective, through the 'creative' application of an elaboration of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' model of 1921, they installed fake 'social democratic' regimes in Russia, the East European countries, and a few selected 'former' Soviet Republics which are being used for specific strategic purposes such as Azerbaijan. These regimes present a pseudo-democratic facade to the West, yet preside over a 'New Form' of Lenin's 'state-controlled capitalism' model - capitalism and 'criminalism' controlled by the intelligence services. ['Criminalism' is a word invented by the Author, to mean 'the exploitation by the security services of controlled organised criminal operations in the furtherance of strategic objectives' [see page 63]. Its most comprehensive and well-established manifestation is Moscow's ultimate control over, and involvement in, global drug trafficking, and the associated money-laundering activities arising from it - as exposed in 'Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and The West', by Dr Joseph D. Douglass [Edward Harle Limited, 1999].

The situation in Azerbaijan is particularly interesting: given the extensive presence there of Western oil firms, a top KGB General and Brezhnev Politburo veteran, Gaidar Aliyev, was delegated by the strategists to establish, after displacing the controlled second echelon 'non-Communist' leadership, a special form of 'free' criminalist regime, while in practice exercising control by old-style, neo-Stalinist methods. In Georgia, likewise, MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze - one of the three known secret policemen in Gorbachev's Politburo (the other two being Victor Chebrikov and Gaidar Aliyev), returned to Georgia on 7th March 1992, after the GRU had engineered the overthrow of the second echelon regime led Zviad Gamsakhurdia, son of the Georgian national hero and writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia. After wandering in Western Georgia for more than 18 months, Zviad was murdered and his body was



found in a shallow grave in Western Georgia: he had been poisoned and shot at close range, according to taped information held by this Author based on an extended interview with Bessarion Gugushvili, his Prime Minister, who was the last person known to have been with Gamsakhurdia after he had been compelled to flee Tbilisi in fear of his life, but the finger of suspicion has been pointed by knowledgeable Georgians at Shevardnadze - Georgia's former Communist Party Chieftain and Interior Minister - who is known among Georgians as 'Stalin II'.

During his period as head of the Georgian Interior Ministry and later as Party head in the Republic, Shevardnadze is alleged to have presided over many waves of brutal repression masked by anti-corruption drives and contrived 'reforms'. Even authors who have been beguiled by this evil man, such as the CIA apologist for the Georgian ruler, Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, co-author (with Melvin A. Goodman, of the National War College) of 'The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze' [Penn State Press, University Park, PA, 1997], recognise that this MVD General, whom the book whitewashes, is a monster: 'The most serious charge against Shevardnadze during

his years as Republic leader was that he arrested, tortured and executed political dissidents.... Many Georgians hated him for his purges of politicians and dissidents'. (The authors do not, of course, elaborate or answer the charge). That is a gross understatement: at the very least, Shevardnadze supervised 25,000 deaths during overt Communism. No-one knows how many he has murdered since he was imposed on Georgia on 7th March 1992, following the third GRU-directed military operation to remove the legitimately elected Zviad Gamsakhurdia from the Presidency, an unjust putsch that was warmly supported by the British Foreign Office and the US State Department. As a consequence, Georgians, who had rested their long-frustrated aspirations for genuine political independence on Gamsakhurdia, whom they had assumed would be supported by the West, now loathe Westerners with a loathing that can be expected to last for several generations - exactly in accordance with Soviet intentions. For Shevardnadze, who maintains an apartment in the Russian capital, was imposed by Moscow upon Georgia to keep it under control.

The fate of Georgia following the fake 'collapse' of the Soviet Union represents one of the most disgraceful chapters in Western modern history. Successive issues of the US State Department's 'Country Reports on Human Rights' on Georgia since 1992 have read like descriptions of some kind of hell on earth. Unfortunately, space here precludes a detailed examination of the West's 'post'-Soviet treachery towards the Georgian people. But two points about Mr Shevardnadze can be made, pending a detailed and unbiased study of the Georgian tragedy. First, the MVD General, a mass murderer, is a pathological liar, as the following eccentric statement, attributed to him in 'his' book, 'The Future Belongs to Freedom', with its appropriately black cover [Sinclair-Stevenson Ltd, London, 1991], confirms:

'Oh my dear Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Uzbekis, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians - how I love you! How grateful I am that you were there, and always will be. How thankful I am that through you, I have felt myself truly a part of the people' - whom he has systematically and ruthlessly repressed.

Secondly, this Author has been told, quite separately, by two women who met Shevardnadze in Washington and Georgia, that the temperature in the room where he stood, when they were present, was freezing cold - whereas this was not the case elsewhere in the same room. Such a phenomenon is associated with the possessed.

## THE END OF ANTI-COMMUNISM

As Anatoliy Golitsyn observed in "The Perestroika Deception"<sup>31</sup>, citing Lenin's 'legitimation' of open-ended deception: 'Lenin advised the Communists that they must be prepared to 'resort to all sorts of stratagems, manoeuvres, illegal methods, evasions and subterfuge' to achieve their objectives. This advice was given on the eve of the reintroduction of limited capitalism [the New Economic Policy] in Russia, in his work 'Left Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder'... Another speech of Lenin's in the New Economic Policy period at the Comintern Congress in July 1921 is again highly relevant to understanding 'perestroika': "Our only strategy at present, wrote Lenin, 'is to become stronger and, therefore, wiser, more reasonable, more opportunistic. The more opportunistic, the sooner will you again assemble the masses around you. When we have won over the masses by our reasonable approach, we shall then apply offensive tactics in the strictest sense of the word'".

The Aesopian meaning of 'the end of the Cold War' is thus 'the end of anti-Communism'<sup>32</sup>. By staging a sequence of dramatic events, the Leninist strategists created the pretext for, and the circumstances surrounding, a decisive apparent adjustment - the appearance of the burial of Communism - in order to clear the way for 'convergence'; a series of dramatic events creating the illusion of irreversible change<sup>33</sup>. For the revolutionaries are sustained by an unshakeable belief in the historical inevitability of their victory - a psychological trait which itself assists the progress of the World Collectivist Revolution by undermining Western morale. Mr Golitsyn quoted Lenin's statement that: 'All nations will come to socialism. This is unavoidable. But all will not come in the same way. Each of them will bring its own traits into one or another form of democracy... into one or another rate of socialist transformation in various aspects of social life'<sup>34</sup>.

The effect of the Leninists' belief that the total victory of the Revolution is inevitable, is to give vitality to the continuing Bolsheviks' brazenness - to make the covert Communists' 'stratagems, manoeuvres, illegal methods, evasions and subterfuges' appear supremely convincing because their provocations, lies and deceptions are routinely perpetrated with such arrogant panache - leaving observers with no time or inclination to analyse their content dispassionately, and catching those who are meant to be influenced unawares.

## CONSPIRACY AND THE 'MONGOL MENTALITY'

Accordingly, deceptions conjured up by this Mongol mentality have proved almost impossible for the preoccupied Western pragmatic mentality, bred on practical short-termism, to detect. For the Western mind is indeed at a grave disadvantage in this 'war called peace' - as the Soviets have always well understood. At a lecture given to American Communists attending the Lenin School in the early 1950s, Stalin's police chief, Lavrentii Beria, proclaimed that 'capitalism's short-term view can never envisage the lengths across which we can plan'<sup>35</sup>; and the reason for this blindness is that the 'Mongol mind' has the capacity, which the pragmatic mentality lacks, to plan years and decades ahead, and is perfectly at home with the concept of conspiracy. By contrast, the pragmatic Western mind rejects the notion of conspiracy - despite the fact that Lenin openly asserted that his revolution was a conspiracy. Writing in 'What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement', Lenin confirmed, with his usual pedantic playfulness with language, that 'in form, such a strong revolutionary

organisation... may also be described as a "conspiratorial organisation", because the French word 'conspiracy' is the equivalent of the Russian word "zagovor" ('conspiracy') and such an organisation must have the utmost secrecy<sup>36</sup> [Introduction, Note 10]. It has of course been in the interests of the Leninist revolutionaries and their agents of influence over the years to pooh-pooh 'conspiracy theories' - a psychological trick which has successfully consigned all conspiracies, including their own, to the realm of crankiness and fantasy - exactly as intended. This duplicitous characterisation of conspiracy as existing only in the minds of cranks, which has been wonder-

fully 'sold' to the Western journalism profession, can perhaps be described as by far the most successful disinformation operation of all time, not least in terms of its longevity: for it is hard indeed to find a single pragmatic and/or liberal Westerner, especially if he or she is a journalist, who will not pour scorn upon the very notion of conspiracy - and who will not immediately rush to dismiss anyone proposing such an idea, as a 'conspiracy theorist'. The success of this operation is extraordinary when it is recalled that 'strategy' - as for instance, in 'business strategy' - is a well-understood concept in the West, even though conspiracies and strategies both have the following component in common: each harbours a hidden, or covert, dimension which is intended to ensure its success (in contrast to a policy, which is overt).

In the business context, Western observers understand the concept of strategy perfectly well. But because of the success of the long-running disinformation campaign against conspiracies, the idea that foreign governments pursue foreign policy strategies, seems foreign to them. The best explanation for Russian conspiratorial behaviour, and for the hegemony of strategy in Leninist revolutionary thinking and planning, has been provided by Joel Carmichael, the former editor of *Midstream*, published in New York. It enables us to differentiate between the Western pragmatic mentality, which is a severe hindrance to comprehension of continuing Leninist World Revolutionary strategy, and the Leninists' Mongol mentality:

'Now, when the Mongols were about to launch a military campaign, the Great Council - the Kuriltai - would convene as a staff headquarters. Operations and targets would be laid down, with the captains of all the major army units present to be given their orders. Special agents had already been sent to spy on the land...'. This procedure was not a mere matter of information gathering; secret agents, who were sent out long before the troops were to start marching, carried out

systematic propaganda and psychological warfare. The Mongol approach was to persuade the religious minorities that the Mongols tolerated all religions, the poor that the Mongols would be against the rich... and the merchants that the Mongol peace made the [trade] routes safe for business. Everyone was promised safety if he surrendered, and frightful vengeance if he did not. The Mongols believed in carrying on their war a outrance. Their goal was the encirclement and physical extirpation of their opponents' armies.... The Mongols would envelop a vast area and then tighten the ring around it. The columns operated with astonishing coordination, communication between them being kept up by couriers or smoke signals. If by some chance the enemy was too strong at first for the Mongols to burst through his lines, they would pretend to retreat; as a rule, the enemy would then break ranks and rush forward in hot pursuit, thinking the Mongols had been routed. The Mongols would then pivot quickly on their agile little horses, reform their ring, and this time finish things off<sup>37</sup>.

## WESTERN INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY RECKLESSLY DISCARDED

Given this tradition, the blindness of Western defence and foreign policy establishments is breathtaking. This author's three-volume copy of the Oxford University Press edition of the documents of the Communist International, 1919-1943<sup>38</sup>, selected and edited by Jane Degras [1956], contains, inside each cover, a stamp which reads: 'MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LIBRARY SERVICES: WITHDRAWN'. To establish definitively whether the British Ministry of Defence owns a set of these indispensable volumes, the Author telephoned the MOD Library, posing as an army officer, and enquired whether the Library possessed a set of these books; the answer was in the negative.

Likewise, Mrs Christine Stone, the wife of Professor Norman Stone, has confirmed to the author that her husband bought a number of books on Communism which had been discarded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The message is that these key British Departments of State have shredded their institutional memories and have unreservedly accepted the false Leninist 'Break with the Past' as genuine - a reckless abrogation of responsibility which could have been avoided by maintaining at least a skeleton analytical staff devoted to interpreting events in terms of Leninist deception theory (which those departments do not understand: as a consequence, British foreign policy has remained rudderless and confused).

Such analysts could have been instructed to ask themselves questions such as why, for instance, the prominent Soviet GRU officer and implemented Lt-General Aleksandr Lebed, was cited by ITAR-TASS as commenting, on 19th August 1994, the third anniversary of the fake August putsch, in reference to that provocation:

There was only a brilliantly planned and executed, large-scale, unprecedented provocation in which the roles were scripted for the intelligent and the stupid, all of whom consciously or unconsciously played their parts<sup>39</sup>.

Similarly, Western analysts might have looked behind the following statement by that caricature of a Russian nationalist, as Golitsyn calls him - GRU officer Vladimir Wolfovich Zhirinovskiy, as reported in 'L'Espresso', Rome, on 21st January 1994: 'Prague? Let us give it to Germany'<sup>40</sup>.

In a similar interview published in 'Die Welt', Berlin on 31st January 1994, Zhirinovskiy observed: The Czech Republic should go to Germany<sup>41</sup>.

Such observations could only have been made by a senior intelligence officer who was aware of the fact that President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl, meeting in Geneva in September 1990, had concluded a secret Ribbentrop-Molotov-style agreement to divide Czechoslovakia, the details and proof of which are presented in Part Two of this book. Under that secret accord, the Czech Republic was to be merged with Germany within 15 years of the agreement - although this was intended to occur within the parallel broader context of European federalisation, in accordance with the long-range strategies of both the Comintern and of the Pan-German elite, which continues to dominate and drive German policy today.

Zhirinovskiy by the way, was described on 13th January 1994 by Mikhail Poltoranin, head of the Federal Information Centre, as 'just the probe they [the strategists] use to measure the depth of dissatisfaction in [with?] Russia'<sup>42</sup>. As a key GRU officer with knowledge of Soviet strategy, Zhirinovskiy also provides 'probe service' for the Russian Foreign Ministry, anxious from time to time to test whether dimensions of Soviet strategy have been identified and understood by Western observers. The answer is invariably that they have not, as the West is indeed sound asleep.

## COMMUNISM COLLAPSES TWICE

When explaining in 'Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World' that 'the works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity'<sup>43</sup>, Gorbachev also commented, as was mentioned earlier, that 'the Leninist period is indeed very important'. Then he elaborated: 'It is instructive that it [the Leninist period] proved the strength of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, the conclusions of which are based on an analysis of the actual historical situation'<sup>44</sup>.

The 'actual historical situation' referred to here was the remarkably successful 'New Economic Policy' strategic deception devised by Lenin, and its linked 'Trust' deception, which jointly hoodwinked the West into believing that the Leninist revolutionaries had scaled back or abandoned their Communist ideology. This misconception prompted 'The New York Times' to pronounce, on the front page of its issue of 13th August 1921, that 'LENIN ABANDONS STATE OWNERSHIP AS SOVIET POLICY', throwing Communism overboard<sup>45</sup> [see page 55].

Seventy years later, on 26th July 1991, 'The New York Times' prematurely announced the 'death of Communism' on its front page for the second time [see also page 55] - proclaiming that 'GORBACHEV OFFERS PARTY A CHARTER THAT DROPS ICONS', and that 'HE CHALLENGES EVEN SANCTITY OF MARXISM-LENINISM'<sup>46</sup>. On that occasion, too, a spanking new Communist Party programme had been announced (at the 29th CPSU Congress) which had evidently, yet again, consigned Communism to history. If Communism had been abandoned in August 1921, why did it need abandoning again in 1991? Because it had not, in fact, been 'thrown overboard' in 1921 at all. That being the case, historians at least should have asked, what confidence could we have in the assertion that Communism had been abandoned in 1991?

None, of course - which was why, the second time round, the KGB needed to go to special lengths to organise the globally publicised 'August coup' provocation, code-named Golgotha<sup>47</sup> - to provide a 'convincing' pretext for the appearance of the abandonment of Communism, the reported banning of the CPSU, and the subsequent controlled 'collapse' of the Soviet Union. Communism and the CPSU were 'closed down' in the space of just three weeks - which was exactly the length of time that Stalin took to close down Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' deception in the 1920s; only this time round - in 1991 - the 'closedown' was much more 'creative': cadres were able to 'regroup' under the 'state of the whole people' 'democratist' dispensation decreed at the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990 [see pages 75,85, and Note 100].

## THE BRUTAL FINAL PERIOD OF 'RESTRUCTURING'

Only with the assistance of such pyrotechnics, the Soviet strategists and their intelligence services had calculated, could it be guaranteed that the West, though softened-up by 'perestroika' for half a decade, would be decisively weaned away from its perception of the 'image of the enemy'. If the enemy was perceived to have 'collapsed' so spectacularly, then the West would promptly disarm, and plough funding on a massive scale into the 'former' Soviet Bloc, believing that it had 'won the Cold War' - an arrogant claim that is still heard in the United States to this day, in accordance with Sun-Tzu's strategic prescription [see pages 56-57]. However as previously noted, the Leninist content prescribes that it is only the image of the enemy that has vanished, like the smile on the Cheshire cat. That reality remained

lost on Western analysts, policymakers and observers - as readers of 'The Times' of London were reminded on 29th December 1997. An article by Michael Evans, discussing the further culling of residual British military power in the context of the 'collapse of Communism', concluded:

'How many submarines, anti-submarine warfare frigates and air defence aircraft we will need in the next century will largely depend on whether [sic!] Russia readopts a hostile posture. At this point, however, the British Government can afford to restructure radically, knowing that the warning time for a major war in Europe is about five years'<sup>48</sup>.

The present analysis makes it plain that it is not a question of whether Russia readopts a hostile posture, but when. At the appropriate stage, a belligerent external posture will again be adopted; and at the appropriate stage, too, domestic repression will be applied in territories where a de facto Communist dictatorship has been established [see below], since the consolidation of final victory may require the use of all methods and resources available, in consolidating global hegemony. In this connection, a Reuters report backed by separate press stories dated 3rd January 2001, in the dying days of President Bill Clinton's Administration, asserted that US officials were insisting that they had evidence that Moscow was moving tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea, which is the most militarised area in the world. 'Over the past six months', one US official said, 'there has been some movement of tactical nuclear weapons into Kaliningrad: we don't know how many, we don't know what type, and we don't know why'. Such a firm statement leaves no doubt that the US authorities had proof of these movements. In response, the Russian Ministry of Defence had claimed that these reports 'absolutely do not correspond with reality'. The crucial significance, for the intended European 'settlement' of the continued deployment of Russian military power in Kaliningrad, is addressed in Part Two.

Bearing in mind Anatoliy Golitsyn's unparalleled record for predictive accuracy in this context, it should be recalled that the defector warned the Central Intelligence Agency and the West in March 1989 of the satanic proportions of the final denouement of 'convergence' - which will arise because, since 'convergence' will never in practice be complete, the revolutionaries will insist on nevertheless trying to complete it: 'The final period of 'restructuring' in the United States and Western Europe would be accompanied, not only by the physical extermination of active anti-Communists, but also by the extermination of the political, military, financial and religious elites. Blood would be spilled and political re-education camps would be introduced. The Communists would not hesitate to repeat the mass repressions of their revolution in 1917, of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe in the Second World War or of the Chinese Communist victory of 1949. This time, they would resort to mass repressions in order to prevent any possibility of revolt by the defeated, and to make their victory final'<sup>49</sup>.

As for 'The Times' statement, it reveals that the author had no knowledge of Leninist deception strategy, did not understand that the rulers of the 'former' Soviet Union and of all the 'former' East European countries are Communists committed to the unchanging and ruthless revolutionary agenda of World Government, and had accepted Soviet disinformation so completely that he believed that the 'lead-time' before 'a major war in Europe' has been extended to five years. That the lead-time

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, AUGUST 13, 1921

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LENIN ABANDONS  
STATE OWNERSHIP  
AS SOVIET POLICY

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Official Decree Retains Control  
of Only a Few of the Big  
National Industries.

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TO LEASE TO INDIVIDUALS

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Payments for Postal, Railroads  
and Other Public Services  
Are Re-established.

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NEW YORK, FRIDAY, JULY 26, 1991

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GORBACHEV OFFERS  
PARTY A CHARTER  
THAT DROPS ICONS

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HARD-LINERS CRITICIZED

---

Opening a 2-Day Meeting, He  
Challenges Even Sanctity  
of Marxism-Leninism

Top: The New York Times announced the death of Communism prematurely on 21st August 1921, when it interpreted the introduction of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' [NEP] strategic deception as a decision by the Soviet Leninist revolutionaries to abandon Communism. Above: Having failed to learn the lesson of its mistake 70 years earlier, The New York Times announced the premature death of Communism for the second time on 26th July 1991, when reporting on the 29th CPSU Congress in Moscow. Of course, the second announcement has predictably turned out to be as inaccurate and irresponsible as the first.

prior to a 'major war in Europe' remains just a matter of minutes was specifically confirmed by the former Russian Defence Minister, General Igor Rodionov, a.k.a. 'the butcher of Tbilisi', who stated that 'Russia must openly declare that it has the right to use the entire arsenal of weapons at its disposal, including nuclear weapons'<sup>50</sup>.

An hysterical 'debate' which has been stoked up unofficially, and aired on certain secondary Internet-based 'news' services, seeks a definitive conclusion to the conundrum: will the Soviets use force against the West, or will they rely upon their great success to date in corrupting the West from within? The correct answer is that, since this is a 'war called peace', all means at the Leninists' disposal will be employed.

#### THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF SUN-TZU'S 'THE ART OF WAR'

The blindness of the West, and its arrogant assumption that 'we won the Cold War' particularly reconfirms the timeless effectiveness of the advice given by the ancient Chinese military strategist, Sun-Tzu, in his treatise entitled 'The Art of War': 'Pretend inferiority and encourage your enemy's arrogance'<sup>51</sup>. It is known that 'The Art of War' was required reading in the East German and Soviet armed forces. As Mr Golitsyn explains in 'New Lies for Old': The ancient Chinese treatise on strategy and deception, Sun -Tzu's 'The Art of War', translated into Russian by N.I. Konrad in 1950 (shortly after the Communist victory in China), was retranslated into German in 1957 by the Soviet specialist Y. I. Sidorenko, with a foreword by the Soviet military strategist and historian General Razin. It was [also] published in East Germany by the East German Ministry of Defense and was prescribed for study in East German military academies: [see facsimile on page 57]. A new translation and other studies of Sun-Tzu were published in Peking in 1957 and 1958 and in Shanghai in 1959. Mao Tse-Tung is known to have been influenced by Sun -Tzu in his conduct of the civil war<sup>52</sup>.

Illusions such as those dispensed by the author of the article cited above from 'The Times' of London are fostered by, and depend upon, the continued success of the Russian 'weak look' strategic deception - which is based upon the practical application in modern conditions of Sun -Tzu's military deception aphorisms:

'All warfare is based on deception'.

'Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity'.

'When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near'.

'Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him'.

'Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance'.

'Keep him under strain and wear him down'.

'When he is united, divide him'.

'Attack the enemy's strategy'.

'Disrupt the enemy's alliances'.

'If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his'.

'Make the devious route the most direct and turn misfortune to advantage'.

The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in, nor can the wise lay plans against you'.

'Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his enemy's fate'<sup>53</sup>.



# THE EAST GERMAN EDITION OF SUN-TZU

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TRAKTAT

ÜBER

DIE KRIEGSKUNST



VERLAG DES

MINISTERIUMS FÜR NATIONALE VERTEIDIGUNG

BERLIN 1957

24788

Russischer Titel:

СУН-ЦЗИ

ТРАКТАТ О ВОЕННОМ ИСКУССТВЕ

Übersetzung aus dem Altchinesischen ins Russische  
und Anmerkungen  
von Oberleutnant J.L. Sidorenko

Mit einer Einleitung

von Professor Generalmajor J.A. Razin

Aus dem Russischen ins Deutsche übertragen

von Ins Balcerowiak 德译者

Für den Buchschmuck  
stellte die Deutsche Akademie der Künste  
das Bild „Der Kampf auf der Brücke“  
(nach einem Steinrelief  
vom Grabmal der Familie Wu, Han-Zeit)  
zur Verfügung

Gesamtgestaltung: Karl Lewin

FACSIMILE OF THE COVER OF THE EAST GERMAN EDITION OF SUN-TZU'S THE ART OF WAR: The front page and credits, INSET) of the East German translation of Sun-Tzu's The Art of War, published in East Berlin in 1957. As Anatoliy Golitsyn reported on pages 42-43 of his book 'New Lies for Old', this work was translated into Russian by N.I. Konrad in 1950 (shortly after the Communists seized China), and then retranslated into German by the Soviet specialist Y. I. Sidorenko, with a foreword by the Soviet military strategist and historian General Razin. Study of this classic work on deception strategy was all but mandatory for cadres throughout the Soviet Bloc. Leninist strategic deception theory and practice complements, and is akin to, the strategic thinking of Sun-Tzu.

## 'ACTIVE MEASURES' OPERATIONS AGAINST WESTERN LEADERS

The successful implementation, through the creative (Leninist) application of Sun-Tzu's teachings and complementary Leninist dialectical strategic deception principles, of the inverted pyramid of lies called 'perestroika', is all the more remarkable in that, as has been shown, absolutely faithful adherence to Leninist revolutionary methods had repeatedly been asserted in public by the Communist leaders and the Party, at every turn. Yet, as noted on page 38, Lady Thatcher told this Author in July 1991 that she had concluded that 'Gorbachev isn't a Leninist any more'<sup>54</sup> - merely weeks before Gorbachev and the KGB executed the biggest and boldest Leninist Bolshevik provocation to date: the fake August coup. Prominent among the planners and implementers of this provocation was the KGB veteran Yevgeniy Primakov, a leading KGB strategist, who flew back to Moscow late in the evening of 19th August, thus conveying the impression that he had not been involved - yet issued a statement on the following day asserting that Gorbachev was not ill but was being held captive<sup>55</sup>.

The Soviets have even gone so far as to hint in public that both the British Prime Minister and President Reagan were the target of 'active measures' operations by Soviet intelligence ahead of the controlled 'Break with the Past'. The nature of these 'active measures' is not known (although in Mrs Thatcher's case, the murder shortly before she came to office in 1979 of her intelligence adviser, Airey Neave, in a car bomb placed in the House of Commons car park, may have been an element of them - since Neave was well equipped to warn her against being taken in by the Soviets); but 'active measures' covers everything from the fabrication of forgeries to the administration of mind-altering psychotropic drugs, to sexual allure or entrapment, to assassination.

It is the Author's view that analysts have overlooked one important reason why Gorbachev was selected by the Kremlin's strategy collective as General Secretary following a prolonged period of apparent infighting which resulted in Gorbachev's alleged rival, Grigory Romanov, being expelled from the Kremlin in the summer of 1985, framed as an alcoholic (which he was not) and forcibly confined to a hospital for alcoholics [see pages XXXX-XXXXXII]. This is that he possesses what can only be described as a kind of demonic sexual allure: and the strategists' key target at the time was Mrs Thatcher. She immediately fell for Gorbachev's 'charms', notwithstanding his boorish behaviour during his visit to London in late 1984, described on pages 17-18. The Author is personally acquainted with two American women, not known to each other, each of whom has separately testified to Gorbachev's sexual magnetism, which the late Dr Malachi Martin described as being sinister. (One of these women also testifies to the near-freezing temperature immediately surrounding the person of MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, reported on page 49; but the other lady is not one of the two who have separately experienced that disturbing phenomenon).

On 19th February 1991, 'Izvestia' reported that 'in the United States and Britain, "Active Measures" against President Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher had limited success'<sup>56</sup>. The inclusion of the qualification 'limited' here should perhaps be disregarded: the proper translation of this statement from the Aesopian language used by 'Izvestia' is that the operations were successful. The fact that they were mounted, and have even been openly acknowledged, is of course significant enough.

Mrs Thatcher failed to understand that she had been duped by Mr Gorbachev, as she made clear to the author in July 1991. During an interview in which the Author

explained details of the Soviet 'bilateral treaty offensive' and spoke of Golitsyn's work, which the former Prime Minister dismissed, Mrs [now Lady] Thatcher not only remarked: 'I don't think Gorbachev is a Leninist any more', but also added the following corollary: 'I don't think we have been deceived - at least, I hope we haven't' [see page 19]. As the Author wrote in the Editor's Foreword to Anatoliy Golitsyn's book 'The Perestroika Deception', this qualifying afterthought clearly implied 'a niggling doubt that the West might indeed have fallen victim to Soviet strategic deception'. Necessarily, by then the consequences of Lady Thatcher's mistakes were crowding in on the West like a gigantic thunderstorm. But if she had entertained such doubts while still in power, it was surely her duty to have had them investigated.

That failure was undoubtedly Lady Thatcher's worst: and the Author has elsewhere described the British Prime Minister's careless accommodation of Gorbachev and all his Leninist lies as 'a millennial strategic error'. A second strategic error of comparable proportions concerned Europe: though troubled by the implications of the 'European project', she pushed through the 1986 Single European Act which paved the way for the Collective's Maastricht Treaty. In the end, she became an enthusiastic supporter of the Leninist deception strategy of 'convergence'. She had already permitted her Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe<sup>57</sup>, to go along with the Foreign Office's plan to hand the priceless capitalist jewel of Hong Kong over to the Communist Chinese, a grand betrayal which could hardly have been urged upon her other than by forces aware of the 'convergence' framework and agenda. Lady Thatcher's most recently monitored geopolitical stance is that 'Russia isn't a threat any more' -just as 'Gorbachev isn't a Leninist any more'.

#### EUROPEAN BILATERAL TREATIES DRAFTED BY THE GRU

When the author interviewed Lady Thatcher in the House of Commons in July 1991, she had no knowledge of the bilateral treaties which President Gorbachev had been signing with key targeted Western countries, and was astonished at the information about these treaties shown to her, even though all the information obtained for that meeting had been extracted from reports published by the BBC Monitoring Service. She would have been even more astonished if the Author had then been in a position to inform her, what he was later able to establish - that the bilateral treaties [see Note 2] were all drafted by the Soviet authorities, with significant input by Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU).

This fact emerged first in a letter dated 28th October 1991 from John McGregor, then Leader of the House of Commons, to Michael Spicer MP<sup>58</sup>, in which Mr McGregor wrote: 'You asked me for details of treaty overtures to the British Government from the Soviet Union. In September 1990, the Soviet Union proposed a bilateral document...'. Much later, when it had become known that the British-Russian bilateral treaty would be signed by President Yeltsin and the British Prime Minister, John Major, on 9th November 1993, the author telephoned the News Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and asked them to confirm that the text of the new treaty had originated in Moscow.

The Foreign Office spokesman, who commented gratuitously that 'you seem to be quite well informed', duly conceded that this was indeed the case. It is wholly inconceivable that if the British-Russian bilateral treaty was drafted in Moscow, the others were not also drafted in the Russian capital - not least

because the structure, content and syntax of the treaties is wholly consistent with what is known about the drafting peculiarities of Soviet intelligence.

While space precludes a detailed analysis here of the bilateral treaties resulting from the 'bilateral treaty offensive' pursued under Gorbachev and then continued seamlessly by Yeltsin [but see Note 2], among the more important of their central consequences are that they individually and collectively undermine NATO while ensuring that the European Union's then-prospective Common Foreign and Security Policy would need to be wholly consistent with Moscow's strategic objectives.

In particular, several of the bilateral treaties contain a clause modelled upon the article in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which provided that neither signatory, unilaterally anticipating aggression by a third party, may provide military or other assistance to that party. Since this depends upon one signatory's arbitrary perception, it rules out, for instance, US access to Spanish bases in any European crisis - because Spain would be bound to assume, in its own interests, that Russia might accuse it of being potentially in breach of its bilateral treaty obligations by even considering permitting US access to Spanish facilities. In the case of the Russian treaty with France, Paris has been recruited as a fully-fledged advocate and agent for Moscow in the councils of the international community - a fitting role for a member of President Chirac's trilateral axis [see pages 32 and 93, and Note 1].

The bilateral treaties serve Moscow's strategic interests not least because the EU member countries are having to take the burdensome obligations arising from the treaties under international law fully into account when meeting in the collective forum of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although the author has drawn attention to this crucial fact in successive issues of 'Soviet Analyst', and by other means, its significance and straightforward logic does not yet appear to have sunk in at official policymaking levels, given the official blindness still infecting Western thinking on Russian issues.

The fact is that the 'bilateral treaty offensive' launched under President Gorbachev and continued seamlessly into the Yeltsin era was initiated by the Leninist strategists, inter alia, precisely in order to bring West European foreign and security policies into conformity ('sync') with Moscow's continuing revolutionary priorities for 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'. On 5th March 1992, a document entitled 'Temporary Provisions of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation', was approved by the former Supreme Soviet. It laid down that the (subsequently further reorganised) Security Ministry 'participates in the preparation of international treaties and organises their implementation within the limits of the Ministry's competence'<sup>59</sup>. Even more pertinent is the fact that, prior to his elevation, in succession to Yevgeniy Timokhin, to the position of chief of Soviet/Russian Military Intelligence (the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, GRU), Lt-General Fyodor Ladygin was in charge of a department within the GRU concerned with the preparation of international treaties<sup>60</sup>.

In 1993, having discussed these matters with a very senior retired British naval officer, the Author agreed that the appropriate UK authorities (especially the Ministry of Defence) should be approached with the argument that, both individually and collectively, the Soviet/Russian bilateral treaties with key

European powers (completed by the British bilateral treaty in November 1993), jeopardised NATO's freedom of action in a European, or even a world, crisis. Although the Author was not allowed to be informed of the outcome of these deliberations, it was later separately explained to him that since NATO was a defensive organisation, the 'Molotov-Ribbentrop' clauses in some of the treaties, which addressed prospective aggression by a third party, could not affect NATO's role in any way. NATO was a defensive organisation, and the bilateral treaties were concerned with aggression; so the Author's concerns were unfounded, since NATO would never be involved in aggression.

This may not have been the sole argument deployed in order to neutralise the Author's argument, but it was probably the main one. Of course, any such official attitude would have been wholly spurious, even back then, because the impact of these clauses was likely to be precisely as described in the Spanish example given above. But in the light of NATO's aggression against Kosovo and Belgrade in 1999 - after this 'defensive' organisation had effectively torn up its Charter and had cancelled out the 'defensive' alibi - any argument that the Soviet-Russian bilateral treaties could not immobilise NATO in a severe crisis prospectively involving the 'former USSR', because NATO was a 'defensive alliance,' has become even worse nonsense than was the case in the early 1990s.

#### THE LENINISTS' ADOPTION OF RIGHT-WING TACTICS

In the Leninist tradition of deception, the 'democracy' unveiled in the 'post'-Communist era is not democracy in the Western sense, but rather 'democratism', a Soviet word which the Author defines as 'the creation and maintenance of the illusion of democracy'. As Anatoliy Golitsyn warned in the autumn of 1990<sup>61</sup>: 'Scratch these new, instant Soviet "democrats", "anti-Communists" and "nationalists" who have sprouted out of nowhere, and underneath will be found secret Party members or KGB agents. The West will pay dearly for its failure to understand that 'perestroika' is

not a denial of Leninism but a radical, creative and effective application of the tactic described by Lenin in 'Left-Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder'. In this document, Lenin wrote that true revolutionaries should not be afraid to discard revolutionary phraseology and adopt right-wing tactics to carry out a revolutionary policy'.

Strongly critical of former President Nixon, who was fatally influenced by the

globalist Dr Henry Kissinger - a man with a decidedly curious pedigree who was a close buddy of Anatoliy Dobrynin, the secret Chief Rezident of the 'Inner KGB', and long-term Soviet Ambassador to Washington - Golitsyn also wrote, in March 1992<sup>62</sup>, that 'Nixon puts too much trust in the former Communist leaders and in their instant conversion into 'democrats', 'non'-Communists and 'independents'. He does not realise that this is a tactical conversion along the lines of Lenin's classic advice to Communists to abandon leftist and revolutionary phrases and to adopt a rightist, opportunistic image in order to achieve their strategic objectives'.

As Eduard Shevardnadze observed, in the course of an interview conducted by Valentin Zorin on Soviet Television recorded before his reappointment as USSR Minister of External Relations, a post he occupied for a matter of weeks in late 1991<sup>63</sup>, 'if we had not freed our foreign policy from ideologised or, as we used to say at that time, class interests etc., we would have found it difficult to find a common language with our partners, and it would have been difficult to overcome the military confrontation'.

## THE 'POLITICAL AFFAIRS' ARTICLE BY CARL BLOICE

Thus the evidence of strategic deception is so overwhelming that Western policy-makers can accurately be described as incompetent and in dereliction of their duty of care in properly looking after the interests of the populations they are supposed to serve. Instead of recklessly discarding their institutional memories and consigning the contents of their strategic libraries to the second-hand book market, the British Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for example, should have redoubled their analytical studies in order to ascertain, in the light of their 73 years' experience of Bolshevik Leninist dialectical deception operations, whether the abrupt 'changes' carefully timed to coincide symbolically with the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, were genuine or false.

This could have been achieved at minimal expense by appointing just a few knowledgeable experts versed in deception theory to review the available Communist literature in the light of Leninist practice and the course of events. For instance, given the well-known fact that the Communist Party USA [CPUSA] had always, since the days of Josef Stalin, enjoyed a special relationship with the Kremlin, Western experts should have taken note of the article which appeared in the May 1991 issue of 'Political Affairs', the Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party USA by the top American Communist, Carl Bloice<sup>64</sup> - a Black American who was a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party USA and operated from Moscow as correspondent for the CPUSA's other journal, 'Peoples' Weekly World'.

The author has first-hand knowledge that<sup>65</sup> that Carl Bloice was very close to Gorbachev and the Kremlin; and both because of this fact and because of the tradition that the Soviets had always attached special importance, since the days of Stalin, to relations with the CPUSA, it is inconceivable that the message contained in Bloice's article did not accurately reflect the intent of Soviet strategy, having probably been approved in advance by Soviet officials. In this important article, Bloice referred to the use of 'special methods' in the pursuit of the strategy - 'special' being a KGB-revolutionary euphemism for 'secret'<sup>66</sup>. Bloice's article began with a quotation from Lenin:

The New Economic Policy introduces a number of important changes [which are] due to the fact that in their entire policy of transition from capitalism to socialism the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are now adopting special methods to implement this transition and in many respects are operating differently from the way they operated before: they are capturing a number of positions by a "new flanking movement", so to speak; they are drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive against capitalism. In particular, a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control, are now being permitted....<sup>67</sup>.

Bloice then went on to explain that the 'changes' under Gorbachev 'are being undertaken with a view to strengthening the system', as Gorbachev had always insisted. The switch to 'state-controlled capitalism' would indeed 'require "special methods"' - an allusion to the fact that the 'New Form' of Lenin's 'state-controlled capitalism', which was in the process of being installed in parts of the 'former' USSR, was placed into the hands of the intelligence services from the outset. Bloice quoted Lenin as having written, in his letter 'To the Russian Colony in North America' [1922], that 'the New Economic Policy has changed nothing in the social system of Soviet Russia'; and he concluded that under Gorbachev, the Communists were simply following Lenin's precedent in 'operating differently from the way they operated before'.

## COVERT COMMUNISM, 'STATE-CONTROLLED CAPITALISM' &amp; 'CRIMINALISM'

Thus the Russian banks which suddenly emerged from nowhere were funded with the hard currency proceeds of several decades of narcotics operations supervised by the GRU, money being transferred from banks primarily in Scandinavia - a development which incidentally triggered banking problems in some Scandinavian countries. Early in 1992, President Yeltsin issued a decree authorising Russian residents to open foreign currency accounts. Huge networks of enterprises were taken over from the outset by KGB and GRU officers: for instance, Zhirinovskiy has had many irons in the fire: as a fully 'licensed' GRU 'industrialist', he was even, at one stage, marketing goods and tee-shirts branded under his own brand name. This development and the wholesale promotion by the intelligence structures of 'criminalism' beyond the long-established Soviet involvement in the global drugs offensive - and beyond the KGB's and the MVD's traditional involvement with the Soviet mafiya - have ensured that the 'market system' which the West, and the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, originally assumed would become roughly comparable to the market systems in the West, are controlled by the KGB-GRU in the interests of the continuing Party and its strategists. For the intelligence services have 'controlled' the Soviet Government, in effect, at least since Yuriy Andropov was General Secretary of the CPSU. In June 1995, Oleg Poptsov, Director of the Second National TV Channel, let the cat out of the bag when he told *Obshchaya Gazeta*<sup>68</sup>: 'We should not forget that the representatives of the former political system have all adapted beautifully to the new economic situation. They are in banking. They were the first to understand all the positive sides of a system of government-controlled capitalism. They were very good organisers, and they were pioneers in commercialising the country'.

'They', of course, were, and remain, the 'special' cadres of retrained 'former' KGB and GRU officers who seized control of the economy and the financial system in 1990-91. These are the heirs of the Communist criminalist organisation descended from Feliks Dzerzhinsky's Cheka, which President Yeltsin commended in a speech delivered on 20th December 1997 (Cheka Day), and which President Putin has similarly lost no opportunity to praise. Neither has Putin bothered to disguise that he is

a member of the CPSU and that the Soviet Union remains in existence (and vice versa). When CNN showed Mr Putin 'voting' at the Russian 'parliamentary elections' in December 1999, the I. D. booklet he handed to the clerk sitting across the table, so that he could cast his 'vote', clearly showed the letters 'CCCP' in a dark greyish colour on the booklet's inside cover, a detail which CNN - supposedly televising a 'democratic, post-Communist' election - failed to explain. On 20th December 2001, Putin, who was briefly in charge of the Federal Security Service [KGB] before his elevation to the premiership and thence to the Presidency, stressed in his 'Cheka speech' that 'the main result of the security services' work over the last decade is that they have become an organic part of the democratic government, its natural and necessary component'. Translated, this admission confirms what can easily be established by reviewing the pedigrees of key personnel on the Moscow political stage - namely, that the Russian Government is 'directed', and has been 'taken over' by, the intelligence services.

According to an official biography of Putin posted on the Russian National News Service website in 1997, but deleted from subsequent biographies, Putin began his career as a GRU military intelligence officer. Later (in 1984) he attended the KGB

Red Banner Institute of Intelligence (the Andropov Institute). On 11th July 2001, the BBC reported that Aleksei Musakov, a Russian 'scholar' with 'known links' to the Russian intelligence services, had told an international political science meeting in Berlin that Mr Putin's 'path to power' had been paved by Russia's intelligence elite under the direction of Yevgeniy Primakov - a revelation, incidentally, which confirms this Author's view of the significance of Primakov's code-name, his family name being Finkelstein [RFE/RL Security Watch, Volume 2, #27, 19th July 2001]. In fact Russia's 'controlled democracy' is altogether in the hands of Soviet/Russian intelligence officers, as was also admitted on Chekist Day 2001 -by Gennady Seleznyov, Speaker of the Duma (Lower House of 'Parliament'), when he added: 'Let's congratulate the workers of [the] special services and wish them success in their difficult work, especially since many of them are sitting among us here' in the Duma.

Intelligence officers, including GRU personnel like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, were specially retrained to function as bankers and businessmen under cover of a publicised reduction in the numbers of KGB personnel, from which the West drew much satisfaction. But it turns out that the 'reductions' which so impressed the West at the time simply arose from the fact that these officers had been redeployed into their new banking and 'biznes' roles', and as controllers of cadres of hardened operatives functioning in the underworld, and released from parts of the Stalinist GULAG forced-labour system (which, however, has remained in continuous existence since the 1930s, and has even been expanded since the 'collapse of Communism' [see page 102]).

The establishment of the 'New Form' of Lenin's 'state-controlled capitalism' - whereby these KGB / GRU operatives literally took over control of Soviet entities and set up and ran the false 'free enterprise' system - was noted by British intelligence, but went unheeded among the Western policymaking community. Nor has the West yet understood that the KGB/GRU is engaged in global 'criminalism'.

Yet confirmation that this is so, has been provided by the 'second echelon' Leninist dialectical actor, Grigory Yavlinski. In an outbreak of Leninist candour (not to be confused with the truth) in 'The Financial Times', Mr Yavlinski explained:

Far from creating a market economy and a political democracy, Russia has formed and consolidated a semi-criminal oligarchy. This malign structure was largely in place under the old Communist system: [but] after Communism's collapse, it changed its appearance.... Old Soviet monster monopolies were left untouched, competition was rejected. The nomenklatura seized control of the Government and Russia's resources jointly with the underground economy and the criminal world. The new ruling elite is neither democratic nor Communist, neither conservative nor liberal, neither red nor green. It is merely greedy and rapacious.... Russian people and Western leaders must understand the dangers they confront. They should abandon their complacency about Russia and its supposed transition to a market economy. We all need to worry about... the criminal state that is emerging from the ruins of the Soviet empire<sup>69</sup>.

However, Yavlinski was being very economical with the truth. In addition to repeating the lie about 'collapsible Communism' - which, as a 'former' Communist himself he would have known to be inaccurate - he had lied that the new ruling elite was 'not Communist', while failing to point out that the intelligence services were behind this controlled grab of state property, and were operating in the interests of the deception strategy. Yavlinski's Financial Times article shows once again that



an understanding of the dialectical method, within which lies jostle with the truth, enables the observer to extract what is true from the Leninists' copious wrappings of disinformation and lies. Every statement from a Russian source, whatever political label is carried, must be analysed with a view to separation of the lies it contains from any buried truth, just as it is necessary in archaeology to sieve dirt from a dig.

It was quite true that what had emerged from 'collapsible Communism' was the criminal state (with its external extensions). This is the manifestation and ultimate consummation of Lenin's revolutionary model - the unavoidable consequence, in fact, of the contemporary triumph of that evil, which the Leninist World Revolution is in the process of exporting to the whole world. As a result, experts now say that Colombia - long targeted for penetration and control by the GRU as a key drug centre - is 100% a criminalist state; while the assessment for Mexico is 70%. The current estimate for the United States is said to be 30%. Actually, the truth about false 'free enterprise' is different, and much more sinister, even than the so-called 'moderate reformer' Grigory Yavlinski implied - namely, that the Leninist strategists have grafted onto their 'New Form' of Lenin's 'state-controlled capitalism' formula, their long experience of 'criminalism' - and in a demonically 'creative' (Leninist) manner, as a weapon for the perpetuation and funding of KGB-GRU-Party control and for the simultaneous worldwide exportation of organised criminality in pursuit not just of state, but of global revolutionary strategic objectives. The primary thrust of KGB-GRU 'criminalism' is the global drug-trafficking business which, as Dr Joseph D. Douglass explains in 'Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and the West',

is an intelligence operation run by the GRU, because it is considered to be a form of sabotage. The GRU also controls the Soviets' long-established global terrorism offensive - the current manifestation of which originated from decisions ratified by the Tricontinental Conference organised by Soviet intelligence in January 1966 in Havana, resulting initially in the establishment of a network of terrorism training camps outside the Cuban capital under the control and supervision of KGB Colonel Vadim Kotchergine. These became the model for the successive 'generations' of training camps and their cadres of international terrorists that have since become such an effective revolutionary scourge of the whole world. The GRU's drug operations are run in close coordination with the international terrorism operation. In both cases, Soviet Military Intelligence provides direction, discipline and a coordinating role.



In addition, and as an increasingly important adjunct to drug operations, the GRU-controlled global mafiya has long since branched out and burrowed into many other 'business' activities, especially into banking and the financial sector. Yet as late as 2001, two years after the publication of 'Red Cocaine', Western governments had apparently still not understood the central importance of the Soviet drug offensive, both as a sabotage operation and as a means of entering the 'engine room' of capitalism: the banking system. After this Author had sent a copy of Dr Douglass's book to Britain's so-called 'Drug Czar', appointed by Tony Blair, there was zero response. A follow-up telephone call and the supply of a further copy, made no difference. The man resigned from his post late in 2001, having achieved nothing. However a senior official of HM Customs and Excise was more sensible, at least having the courtesy to reply, indicating that the book would be read with care at a high level. That this was urgently necessary is shown by the illustrations on page 67 of a Russian 'self-assembly' submarine under construction in Colombia, which was to be used for the transport-

ation of drugs. It was intercepted by Colombian intelligence in September 2000 while secretly under construction in a warehouse near Bogota.

Collaboration between the FBI, MI6 and other Western intelligence services with Russian intelligence entities in 'the fight against organised crime', as in respect of parallel coordination in the 'fight against international terrorism', enables the Leninist criminalists to learn first-hand how Western police experts operate against the very criminal activities for which the Leninist actives are themselves responsible - and to dupe their Western counterparts into believing that they are dedicated to 'rooting out' organised criminality. In reality, they are themselves instrumental in spreading its tentacles throughout the world, in parallel with their by now long-established global narcotics operations, - a point that simple-minded Western policemen and their policymaking superiors seem incapable of grasping. The situation has deteriorated to such a degree that in some British cities - Wolverhampton, for instance - the police refrain from entering certain neighbourhoods, where every category of drug can be obtained in large quantities on demand. In fact the British police now openly refuse to provide protection of any sort in areas where they believe their officers might come to harm. So the GRU-sponsored global drugs offensive has successfully converted parts of 'civilised' Britain, well beyond lawless Northern Ireland, into 'no-go' areas where law and order has simply ceased to exist at street level.

Following controversy in the United States over the appearance in the US press of photographs of a particularly odious-looking Latvian GRU officer, Grigory Loutchansky, shaking hands with President Clinton in the White House, the former Director of Central Intelligence, Mr R. James Woolsey, published a statement on 6th November 1996 in which he, like others, criticised the fact that the US Democratic National Committee had issued an invitation to this Russian underworld creature to dine with the President. Mr Woolsey's statement concluded with the following observation: 'At a Congressional hearing in April, the... Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch, identified Grigory Loutchansky's company, NORDEX, as an organisation associated with Russian criminal activity.... Mr Deutch then refused to discuss the company any further in open session to avoid disclosing sensitive information'<sup>70</sup>.

That made it clear beyond any doubt that the CIA knew perfectly well that NORDEX is/ was an organisation run by Soviet intelligence. (Other 'former Soviet Bloc entities with the suffix 'ex', such as KINTEX [see page 68] and GLOBEX, are also 'KGB firms'). Despite this fact, the nasty Mr Loutchansky was duly photographed with the President in the White House. The fatuous illusion that the Russians were as interested in 'cracking down on organised crime' as the United States, had been encouraged on 7th April 1996, by Boris Tereschenko, of the so-called Russian 'Directorate of Economic Crime', when announcing that he was working with the US Secret Service to 'fight' money-laundering. Within two years, money-laundering scandals involving Russian operatives pre-positioned by Soviet intelligence to monitor and handle the ever-expanding flows of drug money proceeds through the Western banking system via the Bank of New York, the Republic National Bank of New York and other Western institutions, had briefly become headline news, after \$4.6 billion of money lent to Russia by the International Monetary Fund had vanished, via Russia's tame money-laundering centre in southern Cyprus. The necessary money-laundering facilities in Cyprus had been established in the late 1980s by Andrei Gromyko's son, who had abruptly vacated a senior position at the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He had later



Colombian Police and Navy officers inspect key components of a huge Russian-fabricated submarine in Facatativa, just outside Bogota, the capital of Colombia, on 7th September 2000. On the preceding day, Colombian Police officials had discovered the submarine under construction in a shed, along with documents in Russian, Spanish and English. Police and Naval officials said that the submarine would have been capable of shipping 200 tons of cocaine below the ocean's surface. Its largest component measured 100 feet long by 11 feet wide. INSET: Captain Fidel Azula stands inside a large component to measure its dimensions.

surfaced in Cyprus, where his name was for some years listed under his family name, Katz, in the Limassol telephone directory.

In March 1996, 24 top 'law enforcement' officials from Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] completed a 'leadership management program' at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy in Quantico, VA. A lengthening series of such cooperative bilateral arrangements had been inaugurated, starting as early as 1988, between Western intelligence agencies and Soviet intelligence, to 'fight organised crime'.

On 11th November 1999, the Bulgarian Ambassador to the United States, Philip Dimitrov, addressed a meeting in Washington attended by the Author. His theme was the progress of Bulgaria generally 'since the fall of Communism'. As soon the Ambassador invited comments, the Author asked the following question: 'Is the official Bulgarian firm known as KINTEX still in business, run by KGB officers and trafficking in drugs?' Taken aback, the Ambassador blurted out carelessly that 'the KGB people who were running KINTEX have been cleared out' [sic!]. With this slip, the Bulgarian Ambassador confirmed officially - for the first time - (a) that KINTEX 'was' (is) a KGB firm and (b) the Bulgarian connection to the global Soviet drugs offensive to demoralise the West. When the author immediately pressed home with a supplementary question - asking: 'Is KINTEX still involved in drug-trafficking?' - Mr Dimitrov, looking irritated, repeated his earlier statement that 'the KGB people who were running KINTEX have been cleared out'. Immediately after the question-and-answer session, he left the building. Before leaving 'with his nose out of joint', he had TWICE confirmed, under pressure, that KINTEX 'was' (is) a KGB firm and also, by implication, that it 'was' (is) handling drug-trafficking operations. This single slip provided first-hand confirmation of the thesis of Dr Joseph Douglass's book.

Now any logical person would have thought that if the 'non'-Communist Bulgarian Government was interested in improving Bulgaria's image, it would long since have procured the liquidation of KINTEX - instead of which, as Mr Dimitrov revealed, it had remained in existence a decade after the 'changes' of 1989-91. As for the suggestion that KGB officers can be 'cleared out' (by implication, by the Bulgarian authorities), this was plainly ridiculous - since it is of course the relabelled KGB that is in control, not the other way round. It appears that, caught off-guard, Mr Dimitrov, in addition to being unexpectedly frank, was being 'economical with the truth'. The strong likelihood is that KINTEX remains in the drug business, and that it remains under the control of the intelligence services (the Bulgarian KGB being simply a 'branch' of the relabelled Russian KGB - with Russian intelligence officer-serving within it). It should be pointed out here that while the GRU remains very much in overall charge of the global drug offensive, because as noted it is sabotage, the KGB handles certain practical aspects (such as, in the case of KINTEX, training and providing staff for the operation), especially the investment and management of the resulting financial accruals.

Writing in the journal 'Soviet Analyst'<sup>71</sup>, the Author noted that 'before the 'fall of Communism', US intelligence officials knew all about Soviet two-track tactics. How about revisiting that knowledge and applying it here? The GRU-KGB - and its proxies such as the Bulgarian intelligence service - run the 'criminalism' sub-strategy, while open agencies of the Russian Government 'fight' it, with Western official intelligence, funding and police help. That way, Moscow can simultaneously monitor, control and impede Western investigations, leaving us bewildered and at the mercy of

global criminalism'. With the subsequent spread of the evil spirit of Lenin's 'criminal state' worldwide, these observations are even more pertinent today than when that grave warning was published in December 1996.

In a taped transcript published in 'Komsomolskaya Pravda' in April 1994<sup>72</sup>, Otari Kvantrishvili, a Georgian mafia 'leader' (subsequently murdered, which is typically the fate of such operators when they start to place their own interests ahead of those of the revolutionary collective's instructions, as they frequently do), remarked: 'They write that I am the mafia's godfather. [But] it was Vladimir Lenin who was the real organiser of the mafia and who set up the criminal state'.

On 7th June 1994, The Washington Times cited a Russian 'investigative journalist', Yuriy Schekochikhin, as the source for a statement that Kvantrishvili had been 'surrounded by people close to the President, famous writers, actors and police generals'<sup>73</sup>. On the same theme, the former 'second echelon' Vice-President of Lithuania, Algirdas Katkus, told a French publication in 1995 that 'one tries to make Westerners believe that the mafiya is the product of post-Communism, whereas in reality it is organised, controlled and staffed by the KGB'<sup>74</sup>, which remains a criminal organisation as has been the case since the days of the Cheka. Since Russian sources have openly admitted this to be the case, why has the West paid no attention?

The US intelligence community had long since been reminded by Anatoliy Golitsyn of the fact that Soviet intelligence controls and manipulates Russian organised criminality. In a Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency entitled 'The Cost of Misplaced Trust' dated 27th September 1993, following the murder of the CIA officer Fred Woodruff near Tbilisi in August that year, Golitsyn wrote<sup>75</sup>:

The Russian and Soviet 'security organs' have been reorganised and renamed many times in their history without these changes significantly affecting their personnel, their mentality or their operations. The recent reorganisation and alleged reform of the KGB is no exception. When Lenin's New Economic Policy with its limited toleration of domestic and foreign capitalism was introduced in the 1920s, the KGB's predecessor set up a new department, which became known as the Economic Department, to deal with smuggling, currency offences, black market operations and other economic crimes. In order to control the activities of domestic and foreign capitalists the Economic Department resorted to recruiting Western entrepreneurs by blackmail or other means. In his original report to the British, the GRU defector Walter Krivitsky stated that five or six out of every ten Western businessmen in the USSR [had been] recruited by the Soviets'.

In the US context it was the Economic Department that recruited Armand Hammer<sup>76</sup> and others. The Department provided the Soviet service with some of its best legal and illegal Rezidents like Vassili Zarubin, former illegal and legal Rezident in Europe and the United States, Yevgeniy Mitskevich, former Rezident in Italy, and Aleksandr Orlov, former Rezident in Germany and France. All of them, while serving abroad, ran agents recruited by the Economic Department. With the adoption of the new strategy in 1959 the KGB re-established the Economic Department as the Anti-Contraband Department under Sergey Fedoseyev'.

This Department arrested possible future Soviet entrepreneurs and blackmailed foreign diplomats and officials engaged in currency offences or black market dealings.... In parallel with the Economic Department, the Soviet Ministry of the Interior maintained a department known as the OBKhS which was responsible

for uncovering theft and embezzlement of state property and which developed an extensive network of secret agents in the criminal world. No doubt, with the present acceptance of domestic and foreign capitalism in the CIS, the successors of the Economic Department and the OBKhS will energetically expand their agent networks among domestic and foreign entrepreneurs and criminals'.

Confirmation of the accuracy of this disturbing prediction - based upon Mr Golitsyn's background knowledge of Leninist revolutionary and criminalist precedents - has become embarrassingly conspicuous, with the proliferation of Russian and East European criminalist operatives and actives in all Western countries since the so-called 'end of the Cold War'. The previously mentioned scandals which erupted in 1998 surrounding the Bank of New York, the Republic National Bank and some other prominent institutions that had employed emigre Russians who later provided 'insider' money-laundering services for the KGB-mafiya, represented merely the most widely publicised of innumerable scams perpetrated since 1991 by Russian intelligence operatives - including Ponzi pyramids and other fraudulent operations.

For as noted, 'criminalism' is being employed by the continuing Leninist strategists as a 'creative' new, revitalised dimension of the revolutionary attack on Western societies - to increase opportunities for penetration, subversion and control, to assist with the money-laundering of the untold wealth accumulated for the World Revolution through the GRU's global narcotics operations, to penetrate Western banks and corporations, and to gain access to sensitive banking records for blackmail and other nefarious purposes in the interests of the New Collectivist World Order. Regrettably, since they appear to lack any understanding of Leninist strategy, Western intelligence services and police experts have failed to identify the phenomenon of 'criminalism', let alone that it is an intelligence operation of the KGB, with the GRU in charge of its global narcotics component.

Yet this theme was further confirmed by the Russian Security Council official and intelligence strategist, Arkadiy Volskiy one of whose multiple tasks is/was to head up the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [KGB 'biznesmen'], who was cited by 'Izvestia' of 21st September 1994<sup>77</sup> as speaking openly of 'the criminalisation of society in the broadest sense. The criminal structures came down to us from the Communist past. In 1990-91, the economy ceased to be a shadow economy'.

In other words, Volskiy, who knew what he was talking about - being himself a member or director of the Leninist intelligence-criminalist apparatus - admitted that the huge Soviet underground economy, historically controlled and penetrated by the KGB, had become the major component of the 'visible' economy - the very newest and most sophisticated manifestation of Lenin's 'state-controlled capitalism'. With Bolshevik-style 'in-your face' candour, Volskiy implied that this 'sad' development was a 'fact of life', a 'hangover from Communism' - a problem with which the whole world would simply have to come to terms, and which must be tolerated as part of the price of Communism's 'collapse'.

What he did not bother to elaborate upon was the fact that 'criminalism' has been grafted onto the Leninists' global World Revolution offensive and that the objective is to impose Lenin's 'criminal state' model - the wholesale 'criminalisation of society' - upon the whole world. The strategists are not just replicating the behaviour of former SS officers who cornered the black market in Germany after the Second World War: they are emulating it worldwide in the interests of their strategy of

imposing their Revolution and its sick values upon the whole of humanity. And 'criminalism' has prospectively lethal economic consequences. For instance, as the proceeds of drug-trafficking are laundered into 'legitimate' businesses, such as huge bookstore chains, those businesses gradually become monopolies - pushing smaller retailers to the wall. Drug-trafficking thus leads to the establishment of monopolies 'by other means' - that is to say, it fosters economic conditions that are conducive to, and consistent with, the ultimate objective of globalised collectivism.

A parallel objective of 'criminalism' generally is to discredit capitalism by spreading criminalism everywhere, so that the resulting anarchic conditions can be exploited to press for 'global justice' - a prerequisite for the World Dictatorship. In 1995, this aim was discussed in the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal 'International Affairs'<sup>78</sup> by the Russian Interior Minister of the day, Viktor Yerin, who called for urgent 'common... national legislation... to harmonise the approach of countries in the fight against organised crime and to ensure the inevitable punishment of persons involved in this activity irrespective of the place and country where they may have committed their crimes'.

At 5.00 pm on 27th July 1996, a report on US National Public Radio asserted that General Aleksandr Lebed had commented as follows on the destruction of TWA Flight 800, which had occurred ten days earlier, shortly after the plane had taken off from Kennedy Airport en route to Paris: 'This bombing shows that international terror is a problem requiring broader coordination in future events', the unmistakable implication being that 'future events', such as those of 11th September 2001 when the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon were attacked by hijacked commercial aircraft, were already being planned: certainly, the 'coordination' between Russia and the West against the 'global threaf of international terrorism which Lebed pressed for in 1996, quickly fell into place after those events.'<sup>79</sup>

Thus the 'need' for a 'common global justice system', an essential component of the structure of the intended global dictatorship, is being provoked by the World Revolution, which is itself responsible, under the overall supervision of Soviet Military Intelligence, for the 'international terrorism' provocation. This dimension of the World Revolution is replicated by the EU's so-called 'Third Pillar', which imposes a common system of policing and 'justice' across the European political collective, in the form of a 'single European justice space' and an executive federal police force (Europol) taking its orders from a Single European Public Prosecutor - the intended consequences being, in Britain's case, the supplanting of the Common Law, habeas corpus (the bedrock of British freedom) and hence the entire basis of British legality. In pursuance of this revolutionary objective, late in 2001, the Fabian Blair Government 'surreptitiously' incorporated part of the EU's Leninist 'Third Pillar' into UK law under cover of its anti-terrorist legislation, in the face of a justified uproar in the House of Lords, where it was at once pointed out that the inclusion of these provisions had nothing to do with the international terrorism measures. One consequence of this will have been the introduction of powers enabling a resident of, say, Greece, to apply to a magistrate for a European Arrest Warrant to have someone in Britain arrested on one or more of the 32 counts listed in the relevant Euro-legislation - one of which includes a crime of 'xenophobia' which is not recognised at all in English law. In response, the national police will be bound to arrest the individual concerned and to have him deported to Greece to face

indefinite imprisonment, without the habeas corpus safeguard. The British courts would have no jurisdiction over the case\*.

The European Union Collective will then only need to expand its already extensive list of 'crimes' to include all criticism of the European Union, for the Leninist EU structures and Europol to have acquired powers comparable, if not greater than, those of the Soviet KGB - and for a de facto European collectivist dictatorship to have been established with the full support, in this context, of the treacherous Westminster Parliament, which has long since ceased to serve the interests of the British people in favour of its own de facto revolutionary ideology. And it is no surprise that the 'Mother of Parliaments' has been terminally suborned in this way: as Lenin informed the Second World Comintern Congress in 1920, 'the revolutionary General Staff... is vitally concerned in having its scouting parties in the parliamentary institutions of the bourgeoisie in order to facilitate this task of destruction'.

As US Congressional staffers observed in 1961 when analysing the report by the Czechoslovak Communist Party's official historian, Jan Kozak, on how the Communists used the procedures of the postwar Czech Parliament both to seize power and to consolidate their usurped power afterwards, 'parliaments can be helpful post-revolution vehicles for transforming democratic nations into fully-fledged Communist states' [refer to page XXIX, Preface Note 18, and page 122]. The Labour Government's incorporation in late 2001 of part of the European Union's 'Third Pillar' provisions into its anti-terrorism bill suggests that the Revolution in Britain has already taken place, and that the Westminster Parliament under the Fabian Tony Blair's direction is simply engaged in consolidating it, while the British sleep. EU national governments have acquired the Leninist deception habits which accompany membership of the collective. For instance, both the 'Conservative' Government of John Major and the Fabian Labour Governments have handled the vexed issue of Britain's participation in the Collective Currency system dialectically. The way this works is that the Government appears 'split' over the issue, and within the parliamentary party. Thus Mr Blair (who once stood for Parliament on a platform advocating UK withdrawal from the EEC altogether) adopted a fanatically pro-Euro stance, preaching the standard misrepresentation that Britain would be 'left behind'

\* On 27th December 2001, while nobody was paying attention due to the Christmas and New Year holidays, the European Commission implemented a 'Christmas coup' by imposing legally-binding 'anti-terrorism measures which became law overnight in Britain without the 'need' for parliamentary debate. The sly manoeuvre, which was perpetrated under an EU process known as 'written procedure' (essentially, like a ukase, or mediaeval decree), was brought to light by Statewatch and publicised by the investigative reporter Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in *The Daily Telegraph* on 19th January 2002. Statewatch accused the EU of 'declaring war on democracy under the guise of the war on terrorism'. While presented as a 'tidying-up exercise', the so-called 'Christmas coup' covered a broad swathe of 'terrorist' activity and asylum policy, circumventing the political process at both European and national parliamentary levels. It changed the legal language, eroding safeguards added to the separate, formal EU 'anti-terrorism' package agreed in principle by EU Justice Ministers at Laeken, Belgium, on 6th December 2001. For example, the imposed 'legislation' requires EU governments to crack down on 'passive' support for terrorism, an ominously vague catch-all phrase which was not used in the formal 'anti-terrorism' package. Statewatch added that the 'Christmas coup' represented an incoherent and muddled mix of Community and EU law, and United Nations resolutions. The episode illustrated several themes of this book: (1) The European Union operates deceitfully; (2) It is the devious and malevolent enemy of its Member States - in this case, as it severely undermines scope for legitimate protest and criticism, since 'passive' support for terrorism is not (of course) defined, and could be taken to mean all criticism of the EU Collective itself, which is almost certainly the intention; (3) The constituent captive EU Member States, having recklessly delegated 'general powers' to the Collective, are shown to be absolutely powerless in the face of the constant onslaught of oppressive measures inflicted upon them by the EU's structures; (4) The national political elites do nothing to arrest this torrent of oppressive 'legislation'; and (5) The European Commission is accelerating the 'coup d'etat by installments' to the stage reached in Czechoslovakia immediately prior to the full-scale postwar Communist takeover: see comments above, and by Anatoly Golitsyn on page 36; and further details on pages XXIX, XXXVI [Note 18], and page 122.



if it failed to abandon the pound and adopt the Euro; while his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Gordon Brown, was darkly said by his officials to 'oppose' early entry or to be 'lukewarm' about it - his exact position on the matter being left vague. It had to be, because Mr Brown's function was to act as guardian of the antithesis to the Prime

Minister's thesis. Of course the synthesis - the desired and intended outcome that Britain's currency must be collectivised along with all the other EU currencies - would be achieved after the Government and its allies, assisted by the European Commission, had devoted large resources to assure a 'YES' at the Euro referendum. Once that has been obtained, the ancient British nation will have been destroyed. As Sig. Romano Prodi said prior to the changeover from national banknotes and coin to the Collective Currency's specie, 'the two pillars of the nation state are the sword and the currency, and we have changed that in accordance with Lenin's 'ultimate aim of destroying the state' - except that the qualification 'ultimate' can be omitted.

Just like the Soviets, the European Union specialises in lies, deception and subterfuge. Foreign Office papers released in London under the 30-year rule show that after Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway had applied for membership of the Common Market in June 1970, the six original participants in the Collective realised that these four countries would control more than 90% of Europe's fish stocks; so they laid an ambush by agreeing in principle, a few hours before the applications arrived, that all fish in Western European waters would represent 'a common resource'. Note this early evidence of collectivist intent. Mr Christopher

Booker, who has made a speciality out of monitoring EU deceit and lies for The Sunday Telegraph, reported on 6th January 2002 that 'as the documents [released] for 1970 made clear, the "Six" knew that this was illegal', as it was not authorised

by the original Treaty of Rome, the initial version of the 'rolling collectivist Treaty'. But they gambled that the new applicants would have to accept their decision as part of the established body of Common Market Law (the 'acquis communautaire'). Thus the 'Six' acted criminally; but the Heath Government decided to ignore their illegal putsch, for fear of prejudicing the negotiations. In fact, in the White Paper sent to every British household on its European policy, the Heath Government lied that 'the Community has recognised the need to change its fisheries policy', which, as Mr Booker pointed out, was 'quite untrue'. After fisheries had become the only issue delaying agreement between Britain and the European Economic Community, the Heath Government decided that the 22,000 British fishermen were 'politically insignificant' - whereupon the British negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, informed the House of Commons that 'we retain full jurisdiction over the whole of our coastal waters up to 12 miles', which was likewise 'wholly untrue'. Christopher Booker's report concluded: 'It is clear from the files (released under the 30-year rule) that Rippon's officials knew that none of this was true'.

This was indeed the genesis of the tradition of lying over European issues by national civil servants and their supine political 'masters', which has brought the Westminster Parliament into general disrepute and has resulted in such cynicism towards politicians among the British people that an opinion poll taken in early January 2002 found that while 73% of the British wanted nothing whatsoever to do with the Euro, most thought that Britain would end up participating in the Collective Currency scheme anyway because 'the politicians will take us in against our will'. Since the EU exists to collectivise everything, the electorate is quite correct.

### CPSU FREED FROM ADMINISTRATION, TO CONCENTRATE ON STRATEGY

As we have seen, Carl Bloice confirmed in the May 1991 issue of 'Political Affairs' that Gorbachev's deception strategy was modelled upon the dialectical deception principles of Lenin's 'New Economic Policy', managed by the 1920s Cheka under Dzerzhinskiy - noting that 'in many respects, they are operating "differently from the way they operated before"', a direct quotation from Lenin's 'Draft Thesis on the Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy', with which Bloice had begun his article. This was an authoritative confirmation, published in the West, from a Communist source in the Kremlin, that the 'economic restructuring' over which Gorbachev was presiding, had an exclusively Leninist content.

In conformity with Lenin's own preference for revolutionary activity over governing the Soviet Union he had created, at the end of the 'perestroika' softening-up period, the Communist Party went back 'underground', from whence it had emerged - freed from the day-to-day management of affairs, in order that it could concentrate all its resources on implementing the strategy of global revolution. The Party had acquired long experience of underground activity prior to 1917; in the areas of the Soviet Union which were occupied by Germany during the Second World War; and in countries around the world in which the Communist Party was banned. In a Memorandum warning the CIA's Director of Central Intelligence of the perils of Western partnership with Russian 'reformers' and 'democrats', Anatoliy Golitsyn pointed out in 1993 that 'the 65 million or more former Communist Party and Komsomol members did not disappear or change their views overnight. The Party operated underground for fifteen years before the October Revolution and again during the Second World War in German-occupied Soviet territory... For over seventy years the CPSU led the world's Communist Parties, both legal and illegal. The Party did not lose its expertise in underground work: it retains its capacity to operate effectively behind the scenes in a pseudo-democratic system as well as openly'<sup>80</sup>. Thus underground activity is integral to Party operations - as a Communist Information Bulletin' (a supplement to 'World Marxist Review') dating from 1971, reporting a Plenum Meeting of the Greek Communist Party, stressed:

It is imperative [for Party workers and members] to understand that every Communist must be well trained in underground activities. Conditions of underground work require that Party members... gain experience in underground work [and] be irreconcilable towards any violation of the rules of conspiracy[Note 36]<sup>81</sup>. 'Freed from day-to-day supervision over the economy', Golitsyn had also written in March 1989<sup>82</sup> - anticipating by no less than two and a half years the 'banning' of the Soviet Communist Party and its temporary move into the shadows - 'the Party will devote itself to guiding and implementing 'perestroika' in the USSR and Eastern Europe and to implementing the strategy in the West. The Soviet Party apparatus will become a true General Staff of world revolution to be carried out through the strategy of 'perestroika'. Note Golitsyn's echo of Lenin's phrase 'General Staff [see excerpt from Lenin's speech to the Second World Comintern Congress, page 72]. And as William Z. Foster, the leader of the CPUSA in the 1930s put it, 'when Lenin led in forming the Communist International in 1919, he called it "the General Staff of the World Revolution"<sup>83</sup>.

Golitsyn added, just as prophetically, that 'despite the apparent renunciation of ideological orthodoxy, Communist ideology will grow stronger and more

mature. As 'perestroika' proceeds, ideology in the Communist countries will be reasserted. Each success for 'perestroika' will reinforce the belief of Party members and young Communists in the correctness of their ideology and their cause<sup>64</sup>. This particular prediction has special resonance for the Author, given the unfolding of events on 14th March 1995 when he was invited to address a distinguished gathering of analysts at The Institute of World Politics, on recent developments in the 'former' Soviet Union [see also Introduction, page 15, and Note 30]. The object of the exercise had been to ascertain the essence of Golitsyn's new work, 'The Perestroika Deception'. The Author formed the strong impression that publication of this book was interpreted by some of those present as presenting a threat to their assessments of the 'collapse of Communism'. After two hours of the presentation, this hunch was proved to be correct when the Institute's Director, John Lenczowski, intervened to assert, wholly without reference to anything the Author had said, that the Communist Party could not have continued its activities since its ideology had collapsed. The problem some of those present apparently faced was how to reconcile their observation that the intelligence services remained hyperactive and conspicuous, with their mistaken assumption that the splintered Communist Party was defunct; yet they were not interested in hearing that the Party not only continued to exist, but was busily working underground directing 'democratism' and providing the necessary guidance and instructions to the intelligence services and the millions of Komsomol and other actives who were engaged, according to the new 'state of the whole people' model, in implementing various dimensions of the strategy<sup>85</sup>. Mr Lenczowski had written in this vein to an intelligence correspondent in November 1992<sup>86</sup>, noting that 'although most of the nomenklatura are all still in place, they must operate without the two most potent weapons of totalitarianism they used to have at their disposal - the ideology as an instrument of enforcing conformity, and the organised weapon, the Party, which is completely splintered due to the absence of a Party line'. This was a serious misreading of the situation. On the contrary:

1. The revised and updated ideology of prosecuting the World Revolution 'by other means' has 'reinforced the belief of Party members and young Communists in the correctness of their ideology and their cause' [Golitsyn] - thereby encouraging and consolidating a revitalised global revolutionary Leninist conformity, the essence of which Mr Lenczowski had failed to detect and understand.

2. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains totally in control of the revolutionary strategy and its implementation, contrary to the beliefs of some of the US experts present at the March 1995 seminar, as will now be demonstrated.

In a Memorandum to the CIA dated February 1993, Anatoliy Golitsyn had reiterated that the Communists, with their hands free from having to manage state affairs, were free to devote all their resources and energies to strategy. The political elite still consists of the 25 million 'former' Communists and 50 million young Communists who are the most active political element in Russia and the 'independent' states, and who retain real power. This elite initiates, permeates and directs the new parties and opposition groups, even the anti-Semitic ones, in accordance with the demands of the strategy. The elite receives guidance through various government and semi-official channels<sup>87</sup>.

At the presentation in Washington, the Author was further interrupted by

Mr Herb Romerstein, a US analyst, who exclaimed: 'I suppose you are going to tell us next, that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union still exists, are you?'

This was a most unfortunate intervention on his part, since the Author was at that very moment about to remind the distinguished intelligence experts present that the September-October 1994 issue of 'Political Affairs' had contained, among a display of congratulatory messages to the CPUSA on the occasion of the US Party's 75th anniversary celebrations, a message of praise from the 'Moscow City Committee, CPSU'. Two references to this structure had been published - the first in an introduction to the messages (page 38 of that issue) and the second on page 43 of 'Political Affairs'<sup>88</sup>: '... The Moscow City Committee of the CPSU congratulate you on the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party, USA and on the 70th anniversary of the Communist press in the United States'.

In the April 1995 issue of 'Political Affairs', a further reference, this time to the central coordinating political role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, appeared in an article by Sam Webb, Secretary of the Labor Commission of the CPUSA, reporting on his attendance in January 1995 at the Third Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [the CPRF], led by Gennadiy Zyuganov. This was one of the 'fractions' into which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 'split' in 1991. Letting another cat out of the bag, perhaps on the assumption that no-one other than dedicated Communist Party members would ever read 'Political Affairs', Mr Webb reported:

Also attending were other components of the Communist movement in Russia. The most prominent was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which acts as a coordinating structure of the parties of the former USSR'. Eventually, its aim is to become a fully-fledged party'<sup>89</sup>.

This passage reflected (a) the reality that the CPSU, working 'underground', remains in overall covert supervisory charge of all the false 'Third Way' political labels ('splinters' of the Party) adopted in 1991; and (b) an underlying intention that, at the appropriate time, the CPSU might re-emerge from the shadows to hold the reins of power overtly. This would occur when the accelerating progress made by the World Revolution had reached a stage at which the reassertion of overt Communism, even if initially semi-disguised, would have become globally acceptable - since as previously discussed, 'convergence' is to occur on the Leninists' terms, and as far as possible in accordance with their timetable, although this remains flexible given inevitable uncertainties (= 'Life'). As matters stand, and as has already been noted, the symbols of Soviet power - statues of Lenin, the hammer and sickle, the widespread use of the name 'Soviet' in newspaper titles, such as the further example, of 'Sovetskiy Sport', shown on page 77 - are commonplace in the 'former' Soviet Union today, strongly suggesting that that the covert Leninists do not share the West's reckless assumption that the USSR ceased to exist in 1991. It would be entirely in keeping with Leninist dialectical strategy and practice to maintain the reality, framework, symbols and structure of the Soviet Union in place, while displaying the 'non'-Communist external facade 'for as long as it takes' - that is to say, as the 'military re-formation' in Russia 'marks time' and waits for the 'eastwards-expanding' socialist European Union Collective - the 'new European Soviet' - to complete its 'convergence' towards the Soviet model.

But just to be sure that the West need be in little doubt that the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union does indeed exist, *Izvestia* was cited by *The New York Times* on 6th November 2001 as having commented that a planned 'merger' between President Putin's so-called 'Unity' Party and two other large 'factions' in the Duma represented 'a movement, a front, a league - the CPSU, in effect'. And Sergei Shoigu,

the Kremlin's Emergencies Minister, was quoted as explaining that the purpose of this intended merger was 'to unite all healthy political forces' [which means all Communists - Ed.], 'and all of society, for the sake of a single purpose'.

Not that such signals were anything new. On 31st May 1998, Georgie Ann Geyer reported from Moscow for *The Washington Times* some interesting remarks by Vladimir Ryzhkov ['ryzh' = red] at the 47th Annual Meeting of the International Press Institute [IPI], which was being used by the disinformation apparat to disseminate Leninist candour (not to be confused with the truth). Described as 'the liberal "wunderkind" who was one of the rising stars of the Duma, Ryzhkov was said to have spoken 'brilliantly' about 'all the "dreams" his group of ardent young hopefuls had harbored: an "open system with a strong parliament, with small businesses [note: no reference to large corporations - Ed.], with everyone paying taxes, with a dignified existence for everyone... Ten years have passed since we had those dreams. Let's face it - what is the Russian political system today? Four hundred parties, but the Communists are the only real Party. The common idea is that this is a reform government, but it has large limitations: not a single parliamentary body took part in its formation' - because it was the creature of the intelligence services. Why has this glaringly obvious reality been overlooked by Western Governments?



'SOVETSKII SPORT': The front page of 'Soviet Sport', a Soviet publication dated 21-27 December 1999, purchased in Russia late that year. The large characters above the sportsman's head read: 'Football'. In addition to the use of the word 'Soviet' in the titles of many publications and in other contexts, attention is drawn to the continued existence of 'Komsomolskaya Pravda' - and of 'Sovetskaya Rossiya' [see page 44] and Sovetskaya Belarussiya. What response do pragmatic Western policymakers have to all this? None.

## THE 'UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES' DIVERSION

Mr Lenczowski's outburst at the Washington presentation given by the Author in March 1995 was consistent with the analysis contained in Lenczowski's own book 'The Sources of Perestroika' [Ashbrook Essay Number 2, John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University 1992] which had sought to intermingle recognised Soviet deception with 'unintended consequences', thus satisfying the Western craving for 'pragmatic answers' to all questions. The so-called 'law of unintended consequences' is a questionable intellectual trick or mechanism which facilitates the reconciliation of awkward observations with underlying perceptions or hypotheses into which they would otherwise not fit at all comfortably. Mistaking Leninist 'democratism' for true democracy, and the Republics' false independence scramble (which was ordered and controlled from the top) for a truly spontaneous 'breakaway' movement, Mr Lenczowski's essay mixed shrewd observations with misinformation, taking refuge in the 'unintended consequences' escape hatch:

For seventy years, the tactics of advance, retreat and compromise have proven successful. Perhaps now they will not. Compromise with democracy risks unleashing civil society beyond Party control. And the Communist retreat in Eastern Europe is stimulating the breakaway of nations within Moscow's inner empire. If these forces are now out of control, it is not because Moscow desired them to be so. It is because the Kremlin was compelled to take certain actions to preserve its power, and made some miscalculations in the process. Some actions have been defensive reactions to unfolding events. Others have been bold attempts to go on the offensive in the face of unfavourable circumstances. The systematic disinformation campaign to "deprive the West of an enemy image" is only one example. But whatever the case, unless we make the critical distinction between deliberate intentions and unintended consequences, and unless we distinguish genuine changes from propaganda, our response to ferment in the Soviet Bloc may prove to be dangerously mistaken'.

But the whole point of the present work is precisely to confirm that, true to the tradition of pro-active Leninist revolutionary conspiracy, the consequences of the 'changes' were indeed intended. That was exactly what Gorbachev meant when he uttered his 'chaos, chaos, chaos', and 'collapse, collapse' remarks [page 48] ~ and concluded by affirming his belief that 'as Lenin said, this revolutionary chaos may yet crystallise into new forms of life'. The appearance of chaos was an intentional component of the 'weak look', in conformity with Sun-Tzu's doctrine. Mr Lenczowski completely misread the situation, and has contributed, via his teaching at his Institute of World Policy, based in Washington, in no small measure to the perpetual confusion which has reigned in the US capital concerning the meaning of the Bolsheviks' Leninist 'changes' of 1989-91 and their consequences. For instance, J. Michael Waller, the author of 'Secret Empire: the KGB in Russia Today' [Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994], credits Lenczowski with 'prompting me in 1989 and 1990 to examine Gorbachev's most progressive reforms not as part of a strategic plan but as responses to "unintended consequences" of his "openness" and restructuring efforts, which were largely restricted to the Party'. The Author was informed that the Institute of World Politics is housed in the building previously used as the Soviet Trade Mission.

In addition to the retention of statues and framed portraits of Lenin, red flags, hammers and sickles and other symbols of Soviet power all over the 'former Soviet Union, Russian newspapers have retained the word 'Soviet' in their titles,

customs forms used at the borders of the 'former' USSR referred exclusively to the USSR as late as December 1994<sup>90</sup>, and business transactions between Western firms with any of the 'former' Soviet Republics are required to be channelled through Moscow<sup>91</sup> - confirming that the 'political independence' of the Republics is indeed false, provisional, transitional and controlled, as Anatoliy Golitsyn explained in 'The Perestroika Deception'<sup>92</sup>. Moreover references to the USSR have continued to appear in 'post'-Soviet reports and literature. For instance, a report on 'a secret resolution addressing the work in the Ukrainian Armed Forces', as published

by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS] for 19th March 1996, openly recommended 'Ukrainian Comrades not to be involved in political infighting in their country, to strengthen their ranks [and] to set up primary organisations based on the CPSU platform'. The same report also noted that 'the most powerful branches of the Union of USSR Officers operate in the units of the 43rd Missile Army, in Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, and Kiev'<sup>93</sup>. Globus, published by International Agency "Press USA" and the 'Moscow Creative Union of Literati', distributed in parts of the United States, routinely refers to the USSR in the present tense. Izvestia reported on 18th April 2001 that '83% of Russians are still living in the

Soviet Union'. It is only inside ivory towers and among dreaming policymakers in Western capitals, that the brazen symbols of continuing Soviet power seem invisible.

#### HISTORICAL RECORD: THE FORMAL 'SPLINTERING OF THE CPSU'

The 'splintering' of the Soviet Communist Party was formalised at the 28th CPSU Congress held in Moscow in July 1990. Its purpose, as explained by Mr Golitsyn

in 'The Perestroika Deception'<sup>94</sup> in a Memorandum to the CIA dated March 1990, and specifically confirmed by both Yeltsin and Gorbachev at the July Congress, was to create the basis for the practice of 'democratism' - a game of apparent democracy designed largely for the purpose of hoodwinking the West into believing that Russia had 'embarked on the road to democracy'.

However, as usual, when the Leninists 'embark on a road' for tactical (as opposed to strategic) purposes, it does not necessarily follow that they intend to travel very far along it. Like the 'European process' - the essence of which is 'the process' itself, rather than any detailed conclusion other than the 100% completion

of collectivisation, since as discussed elsewhere, no issues are ever required to be resolved<sup>95</sup> - 'democracy' is never intended to materialise in the 'former' Soviet Bloc, since all the actors on the stage are engaged in playing the game of 'democratism' in the interests of the deception strategy, not of democracy. That this was indeed what was always intended was explicitly elaborated by Boris Yeltsin in his speech to the 28th CPSU Congress on 6th July 1990, when he told the delegates in Aesopian Leninist dialectical language that:

'In a democratic state, a changeover to a multiparty system is inevitable. Various political parties are gradually being formed [out of the CPSU] in our country. At the same time, a fundamental renewal of the CPSU is inevitable.... First, it is necessary to organisationally codify all the platforms that exist in the CPSU and to give every Communist time for political self-determination.... The Party should divest itself of all state functions [see Golitsyn's prediction to the CIA in March 1989, page 74]. A parliamentary-type Party will emerge. Only this kind of Party, provided that there is a mighty renewal [of the CPSU -Ed.]... will be able to

be a leading Party and to win elections for one or another of its factions. With the development of democratic movements in the country and the further radicalisation of restructuring, it will be possible for this alliance to become the vanguard of society in actual fact. This will provide a broad social base for the renewal of society' - the Aesopian meaning of which is not 'society' in the Western sense, but the vast Communist constituency consisting of Party members, the komsomol, the nomenklaturists, the armed forces and the Soviet intelligence services, the 'General Staff' of the World Revolution, in effect - [and to] 'erect a barrier against attacks by the conservatives, and guarantee the irreversibility of restructuring'<sup>96</sup>. Translated from Yeltsin's stultifying Aesopian Lenin-speak:

- 'A fundamental renewal of the CPSU is inevitable' meant that the CPSU would assume a new coordinating role while functioning underground, 'operating in many ways differently from the way it operated before' [cf. Lenin/Carl Bloice].

- 'It is necessary to organisationally codify all the platforms that exist in the CPSU' meant that the intended 'splintering' exercise would be controlled from the top - with various groups and platforms emerging, each with a differentiating political label, ready to play the game of 'democratism'. Note also that the various platforms exist 'within the CPSU', not outside it. This confirms that the 'splintered' parties are 'fractions' of the CPSU, and are to operate dialectically under the overall supervision of the CPSU. Accordingly, whoever wins the resulting staged 'democratic' elections, Communists always win.

- 'Every Communist' [must have] time 'for self-determination': CPSU members participating in 'democratism' will be free to select whichever political platform suits him or her best. Note that 'every Communist! will have this opportunity - a qualification which reveals, again, that 'democratism' is a game to be played by Communists only. Opportunities for non-Communists do not exist and are not on offer, since as indicated, the dialectical game of 'democratism' is to be played exclusively by members of the Communist Party and its related structures. It is not open to non-Communists, not least because there are none.

- 'The Party should divest itself of all state functions' meant that, as Mr Golitsyn had predicted in March 1989 [and see page 74], the CPSU would go 'underground', shedding its day-to-day administrative responsibilities, in order to be able to devote its full resources, energies and potential to implementing strategy. Instead of squandering its energies in administration, 'the Soviet Party apparatus' would, as the defector foresaw, 'become a true General Staff of world revolution'.

- 'To win elections by one or other of its factions': This phrase again revealed that, precisely as Anatoliy Golitsyn had explained to the CIA in March 1990, only Communists would win 'democratic' elections. Since all the 'factions' or 'fractions' would consist of Communists, 'organisationally codified' as Yeltsin had explained, there would never be any danger of non-Communist forces winning. Hence the fundamental wrong-headedness of familiar Western fantasies to the effect that certain characters on the 'post'-Soviet political stage are to be 'preferred' to others, leading to the corollary that the West must support a Gorbachev, a Yeltsin or a Putin, for fear that any replacement would turn out to be 'worse'. For all the players belong to the same revolutionary strategy collective, and are bound by its rule-

- 'A broad social base for the renewal of society' meant the unveiling of the principle of 'the state of the whole people'<sup>97</sup> through 'democratism' [Note 100].



- Erecting a barrier against the conservatives' meant not preventing the imaginary nomenklatura 'conservatives' (as Western observers imagined, applying

Western standards to the Soviet environment) from torpedoing Mr Gorbachev's reforms, but rather ensuring that Western democratic ideas and norms could never take hold in the 'former' Soviet Bloc and would be collectivised and progressively destroyed in the Western democracies. The further meanings of Yeltsin's Aesopian reference to 'conservatives' included:

(a) A clear signal that Yeltsin himself remained a Leninist Bolshevik (since why else would he wish to 'erect a barrier against the conservatives?') and:

(b) A warning that, armed with the full potential of their Leninist strategic deception stance, the Communists would reduce true conservatives all over the world to what Anatoliy Golitsyn has called 'an endangered species' [*The Perestroika Deception*, page 32] - by cutting the ground deceptively from under their feet.

- 'Guarantee the irreversibility of restructuring' meant ensuring that the momentum of the 'new formation' or 'New Form' of Lenin's World Revolution achieved thanks to 'perestroika' could never be arrested. Once the Revolution had achieved its objectives, there would never again be any true opposition. Democracy

will serve, as it does in the 'former' Soviet Bloc and the European Union, no purposes other than for the cosmetic ventilation of false 'opposition', to maintain the illusion that decisions of the political collective are sanctioned by the people

This is exactly what has already happened, for instance, in the United Kingdom, where there will never again be any true opposition to collectivism. This has been de facto the case for years, given the existence of a secret agreement between the main UK political parties that none of them will seek to end Britain's EU membership. But under the 251-page Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, a document of such extreme complexity that no single individual can unravel its nuances, every organisation which seeks to influence politics, or actually does so, during an election period, must now register with a newly-established Electoral Commission. The Act sets out complex requirements, full of traps for the unwary, applicable to UK political parties concerning the maintenance of accounts; imposes

controls on the acceptance and reporting of donations made to registered parties, membership associations and certain individuals; sets financial limits and reporting requirements for campaign expenditure; imposes controls over the amounts which 'third parties' can spend during national elections, and provides for 'third parties' to be recognised by the Commission while imposing upon them stringent reporting requirements; imposes similar controls affecting national referenda; complicates pre-existing rules relating to election campaigns and proceedings; controls most donations to candidates and regulates the financial limits applicable to candidates' election expenses; codifies in the most meddlesome way the controls that apply to political donations by companies; and provides the Commission with enforcement and inspection powers, listing a number of new electoral offences. The opposition 'Conservative' Party hardly reacted at all during the Bill's passage at Westminster.

Asked to sum up the overall effect of this evil, oppressive, anti-democratic legislation, the British constitutional analyst Rodney Atkinson told this Author: 'It destroys democracy. The whole purpose of democracy is to enable the people to control politicians and the state. This Act has given politicians and the state absolute control over the people'. Britain has adapted and adopted 'democratism'.

### GORBACHEV CONFIRMS YELTSIN'S 'PARTY SPLINTERING FORMULA'

President Gorbachev's concluding remarks to the session of the 28th CPSU Congress on 13th July 1990 reiterated what Yeltsin had said on 6th July concerning the essence of the Party 'splintering' exercise, making it clear that Yeltsin, the former First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU - that very central organ of the CPSU mentioned in the cited 'post'-Soviet issues of 'Political Affairs' [page 76] - was all along working hand-in-glove, but in dialectical fashion, with the Soviet President. President Gorbachev also confirmed that the leaderships of the Republics would soon acquire their 'controlled' independence - necessary in order to create the flexible, Leninist conditions for the eventual merging of bits and pieces of the 'former' Soviet Bloc into the eastwards-expanding European Union 'replacement' collective. Here is what Gorbachev told the 28th CPSU Congress in his summing-up statement:

Now, about the Party itself. Allow me to formulate three conditions necessary for the Party to fully demonstrate its viability and actually attain its vanguard potential' [Note: 'Vanguard potential' means the scope for the Communist Party to acquire or enhance its overall hegemony in society. The 'vanguard party' is also the 'fronf party which 'hides' the linked Communist Party - as in the classic case of the African National Congress-South African Communist Party [SACP] equation].

In the first place, to this end it [the CPSU] must, resolutely and without delay, restructure all its work and reorganise all its structures on the basis of the new Statutes and the Congress's Programme Statement, so that under the new conditions, it can effectively perform its role as the vanguard party. We must do everything to firmly establish in the CPSU the power of the Party masses behind an all-encompassing democracy, comradeship, openness, glasnost and criticism'.

'Secondly, when there are various views and even platforms on a number of questions of policy and practical activity, the majority must have respect for the minority. And thirdly, Comrades, we must study, learn, and improve our culture. If we embark on this path, it will be easier to interact and have contacts with other forces' [see Shevardnadze's similar remark, page 61].

The Central Committee and I, said Gorbachev, 'will do all we can to help the Republic Communist Parties gain their new independent status as soon as possible, a status that will lead not to a fragmentation of Communists and nations but to a new internationalist unity of the CPSU on a common ideological basis'.

'Let us prove that the CPSU, as it restructures itself, is capable of living up to these expectations... and then it will become a truly vanguard party whose power lies not in giving orders but in influencing people'<sup>98</sup>.

Translated from Gorbachev's Aesopian Lenin-speak:

- '[The Party] must, resolutely and without delay, restructure all its work and reorganise all its structures': The CPSU was about to embark upon an entirely new phase of its existence, concentrating (in emulation of Lenin) exclusively upon revolutionary activity, reorganising its structures for the purpose. Part of this reorganisation would involve the establishment of 'new' parties consisting of Communists masquerading under different political labels. This task had to be embarked upon 'resolutely' and in accordance with an established and pressing timetable.

- 'We must do everything to establish in the CPSU the power of the Party masses behind an all-encompassing democracy' etc: In this statement, Gorbachev

confirmed Golitsyn's accurate prediction that all political activity would take place within the CPSU framework, with mobilisation of the Communists, intelligence officers, cadres, Komsomol members, and nomenklaturists in common pursuit of Leninist 'democratism', the global Leninist 'war called peace' and a decisive thrust towards the realisation of the objectives of Lenin's World Revolution.

- 'Various views and even platforms on a number of questions of policy and practical activity' confirmed Gorbachev's total identification with the agenda of Party 'splintering', faction 'relabelling' and 'democratism' mentioned by Yeltsin.

- 'We must study, learn and improve our culture': A reference to the need for Party members and actives to familiarise themselves with all aspects of Western democratic practices, structures and organisation, so as to be able to replicate them

faithfully - putting on the clothes and demeanour of the enemy and 'resorting to all sorts of schemes and stratagems, and illegitimate methods', as Lenin wrote ['Collected Works', Volume XVII, pages 142-45] to 'conceal the truth' in order to convince the West of the wisdom of 'convergence' as the only course open to mankind.

- 'If we embark on this path it will be easier to interact and have contacts with other forces': Translation: By disguising that we are Communists, we will be able to intermingle with other political forces abroad, on equal terms. Since our own organisational and conspiratorial expertise is second to none, we will easily be able to infiltrate, influence and guide other political forces in the direction of the Revolution. [See Shevardnadze's similar remark, page 61].

- 'The Central Committee and I will do all we can to help the Republic Communist Parties gain their new independent status as soon as possible': This provides proof that the 'independence' of the Republics was ordered from above. and was not spontaneous, as the British Foreign Office, for instance, assumed, Under the Leninist Party-State system, since the Parties directed and controlled the Republics (as they continue, covertly or overtly, to do today), facilitating the 'independence' of the local Parties meant ordering the 'independence' of the Republics 'from above', under the Parties' guidance. In 1990, Mr Gorbachev's

Politburo was expanded from less than a dozen (the preferred number inherited by Gorbachev from his paranoid predecessors) to 23 members, by co-opting the leaders of a number of the Republics, in preparation for this development.

This is an appropriate point to note that Gorbachev himself confirmed that 'perestroika' represented 'a revolution from above' ['Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World', New York, Harper and Row, Perennial Library edition, 1987]: 'What is meant [by the term "revolution from above"] is profound and essentially

revolutionary changes implemented on the initiative of the authorities themselves but necessitated by objective changes in the situation. It may seem that our current perestroika could be called "revolution from above". True, the perestroika drive started on the Communist Party's initiative, and the Party leads it. I spoke frankly about it at the meeting with Party activists in Khabarovsk in the summer of 1986. We began at the top of the pyramid and went down to its base, as it were. Yes, the Party leadership started ii The highest Party and state bodies elaborated and adopted the program. True, perestroika is not a spontaneous but a governed process'.

Note that Gorbachev said he was addressing Party activists on the well-established 'perestroika' campaign as early as 1986. This fact definitively gives the lie to confused Western assessments that Gorbachev was 'compelled' to embark upon

'perestroika' by the force of circumstances ('happenstance', or 'Life'), as a last resort.

It also gives the lie to the Western fantasy that Gorbachev 'struggled' to preserve the system against overwhelming odds, but that these eventually defeated him - brave fellow (and consequently deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize) that he was. It further gives the lie to the myth, propagated by Gorbachev himself following the KGB's 'August coup' provocation, that T tried and tried and tried to reform the wretched Communist Party, the nomenklatura and the system, but I was unfortunately unsuccessful in this (heroic) endeavour. Therefore, I banned the Communist Party following the 'August coup'. (On the contrary, 'perestroika' was well and truly 'in the works' in 1986, only months after Gorbachev was confirmed as General Secretary of the CPSU [February 1985]. It was 'in the works' because its purpose all along was to prepare the ground for the intended and long-planned dismantling of the Stalinist model, and its replacement by an integrated, researched, flexible Leninist World Revolutionary model controlled and coordinated by the well-prepared 'General Staff of the Revolution', just as soon as the 40-year allied occupation of Germany had been concluded in 1989). All these, and a host of related assessments, were pure inventions. Yet all that was necessary in order to reach this conclusion was to study what the man himself said: why did Western analysts fail to do this?

- [The Republics' new 'independence' will lead] 'not to a fragmentation of Communists and nations, but to a new internationalist unity of the CPSU on a common ideological basis': In this statement, Gorbachev fully confirmed Anatoliy Golitsyn's advice that the new 'independence' of the Republics, imposed from above, would be controlled along Leninist lines - modelled on the precedents of Lenin's Far Eastern Republic and the early temporary 'independence' of Georgia. Note that the 'new internationalist unity' (upgraded ideology) of the Republic Communists and nations (= Republics [see above]) occurs within the CPSU - which is to say that all the Republics' leaderships, officials and structures remain secretly within, and exclusively loyal to, the continuing Communist Party of the (continuing) USSR.

As Sam Webb's article in the April 1995 issue of 'Political Affairs' [see page 76] confirmed, 'the Communist Party of the Soviet Union... acts as a coordinating structure of the parties of the former USSR'. In other words, all political parties throughout the 'former' Soviet Union, are coordinated by the continuing CPSU - which means that they are controlled by the CPSU, not least because they represent covert or overt structures of it. The combined authority of these direct statements by Yeltsin [1990], Gorbachev [1990] and Sam Webb [1993] provides firm documentary proof that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains in charge. Therefore, both the CPSU and the USSR remain in existence.

It is, however, depressingly characteristic of today's intellectual environment in the West that such proof that the CPSU not only remains in existence but occupies its traditionally central position in the revolutionary strategic hierarchy, does not impress those who, with Machiavelli, 'are satisfied with appearances as though they were realities... and are often more influenced by things that seem than by those that are' [see page 38]. The Author recalls the special annoyance with which Herb Romerstein exploded, in the middle of that presentation in March 1995: 'I suppose you're going to tell us next that the CPSU still exists, are you?' [see pages 75-76]. Considering that Herb was a veteran Washington analyst who had ample access to the relevant sources and the appropriate intelligence community connections, his question was surprising.

## ALL POLITICIANS ARE COMMUNIST, SO COMMUNISTS WIN ALL ELECTIONS

To repeat: the statements by Yeltsin and Gorbachev at the 28th CPSU Congress held in July 1990, provided proof enough of the accuracy of Anatoliy Golitsyn's warning to the CIA in March 1990<sup>99</sup> that the Soviet Leninists were engaged in the fabrication of a system of false democracy involving the deployment of a system of 'controlled political opposition' - enabling them to establish a system not of Western-style democracy, but of 'democratism', meaning the maintenance of a democratic illusion, in which Communists win all elections because all who take part are Communists operating under false labels [= 'the state of the whole people'<sup>100</sup>].

As Anatoliy Golitsyn explained to the CIA: 'The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' has rendered possible the introduction of deceptive 'non-Communist and 'democratic' structures. Even so-called free elections do not present a problem to the Communist Parties. Because of their secret partnership with the 'opposition', the Communist Parties are always in a winning situation. It is their candidates - Communist or 'non-Communist' - who always win'.

'This is the new statecraft of the Communist Parties and their security services: it is a new form for developing socialism. Its introduction allows the Communist Parties to broaden their political base' - as Gorbachev told the 28th CPSU Congress [see pages 82-83]: 'If we embark on this path it will be easier to interact and have contacts with other forces' - 'and, in accordance with a decision

of the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, to replace the outlived concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with the new [deeply deceptive, Leninist - Ed.] concept of 'the state of the whole people' while maintaining their power and strengthening their leading role'<sup>101</sup>.

The Communists', Golitsyn continued, 'have succeeded in concealing from the West that the 'non-Communist parties are secret partners of the Communists, not alternatives or rivals to them, and that the new power structures, though they have democratic form, are in reality more viable and effective structures introduced and guided by Communist Parties with a broader base'<sup>102</sup>.

Earlier, in the same March 1990 Memorandum, Mr Golitsyn had explained: 'The West has failed to understand the deceptive, controlled nature of the new 'democratic' and 'non-Communist' structures which have been introduced in the USSR and Europe. The West is jubilant that former 'dissidents', the members of the 'persecuted political opposition', are now becoming presidents, prime ministers, members of government and parliament and ambassadors in these new structures. The Communists have succeeded in concealing from the West that this so-called 'political opposition' of 'dissidents' has been created, brought up and guided by the Bloc's parties and security services during the long period of preparation for 'perestroika'. This phenomenon represents, in part, the development of the Bloc's political and security potential in the interests of the strategy'. 'To this end, the KGB and the security services of the other Communist states were directed to create controlled 'political opposition' on the basis of the NEP [Lenin's New Economic Policy] experience. During the NEP, the GPU - Lenin's political police - created a false 'political opposition' called 'The Trust'. Its members were drawn from former Tsarist generals and members of the upper classes. The GPU introduced this 'opposition movement' to Western intelligence services, which accepted it as genuine, put their faith in it and were deceived'<sup>103</sup>.

Under the illusion that they have a duty to foster democratic structures in the 'former' Communist Bloc, Western Governments sponsor the attendance of election observers at the false 'elections' held there in support of 'democratism'. Under the auspices of the control mechanism calling itself the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these observers dutifully attend at polling stations; and the reports issued afterwards usually declare the elections to have been 'free and fair'. If appended, critical minority reports prepared by sceptical monitors - such as one report by British observers in Georgia which noted that ballot boxes pre-stuffed with fake ballot papers were brought to voting booths ahead of the poll - are simply filed away and ignored. What the sponsors of these 'election observances' fail to understand is that what they imagine is being monitored is not democracy in the Western sense, but 'democratism', in which all the participants are Communists, mostly masquerading under false political labels. Therefore, these gestures and exercises are a complete waste of time and money.

Another obviously related lesson which has never been learned in the West is of direct and urgent relevance to the eastwards-expanding European Union. It is that, as Mr Golitsyn pointed out, 'because of this Communist control, the ['former'] Bloc countries are not true democracies and cannot become so in the future'. The covert Communist movement is not a movement of reform: it is a means to achieve absolute power and to eliminate all opposition to the intended World Dictatorship permanently.

Yet observation, for example, of the mentioned fact that 18 out of 19 members of the Czech Cabinet in 2001 were known 'former' Communists, should have been sufficient to trigger questions in analysts' minds. To the extent that journalists wonder why the so-called 'democratic' regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are visibly manned by Communists, their knee-jerk responses usually emerge along the lines that 'the Communists are making a come-back'. What has never been grasped is that, since all the political players on these theatrical stages were relabelled Communists from the outset, no 'come-back' has ever taken place. All that has happened is that Western observers were bamboozled by the sudden appearance in 1989-92 of controlled 'second echelon' operatives who subsequently changed places with recognisably Communist names from the past. Since personnel changes among the Leninists are deliberately frequent, Western analysts have (a) been confused by the rapid change of faces, and have (b) been reconciled to the disinformation 'line' that it is inevitable that 'many' Communists should reappear on the political scene - since 'everyone was a Communist in those days'. It is in the face of such feeble but beguiling thoughts that serious analysis has long since been abandoned, ensuring the unchallenged triumph of the Leninists' elaborate 'democratism' scam.

A further alibi often heard is that 'it is simply inconceivable that such an elaborate complex of deception could be sustained', given 'the huge numbers of operatives who would have to keep their mouths shut'. The correct response to this diversion is that Lenin taught the revolutionaries to 'tell the bourgeoisie what they want to hear'. Having identified what the West wanted to be told, the Leninists invented the requisite lies: and we accepted them as genuine. In any case, as has been shown, they do not bother to keep their mouths shut. On the contrary, they often let us know what they are up to - to test whether we are listening. Since the revolutionaries always find that we are not, and we have become their enthusiastic co-liars, they have been able to adopt a relaxed attitude towards their deceptions.

## REVOLUTIONARY 'NEW THINKING' AND PSYCHOPOLITICS

The Leninist strategists' grandiose plans for restructuring of the whole world are reliant on influencing people on a grand scale [page 82]. A vital component of the Leninist World Revolutionary influence-building strategy is the 'Gramsci dimension' to which brief reference has already been made. This dimension requires, as also noted, a separate study; but, stated briefly here, Antonio Gramsci's ideas, which were reincorporated into the Soviets' long-range global hegemony strategy when it was re-assessed and upgraded following the death of Stalin, stood Karl Marx on his head. For Gramsci advocated the opposite revolutionary prescription to Marx - that that the cultural superstructure determines the political and economic base. Hence the 'long march through the institutions' launched by the Comintern in 1919 - that is, the focused penetration of the media, the churches, the universities, public interest organisations, large subscription-based institutions, and cultural centres, the objective being to strip national and global culture of traditional (especially true Christian) values and standards, and to replace them with socially and spiritually permissive 'garbage values'.

Hence, for instance, music, instead of enhancing the senses, the soul and the spirit, was to be used to degrade and to open doors for satanic evil, decadence and permissiveness. Publications, films and other works address issues of humanistic appeal, but frame them with creative semantics that bias perceptions of reality - seeking to impose a new 'cultural hegemony' within which it becomes possible to develop the Revolution's ultimate objective in this area: the 'common mind', which was to be receptive to, and even enthusiastic for, the whole panoply of revolutionary 'values' upon which the New World Social Order is to be erected.

Indeed, the degradation of popular music (in which the Soviet Communists were extensively involved, as was exposed in the classic work on this subject, "The Marxist Minstrels: A Handbook on Communist Subversion of Music", by David A. Noebel

[American Christian College Press, Tulsa, OK, 1974]), was aimed at dividing youth from their parents; while feminism, a key element of false 'politically correct' 'New Thinking', 'is the cutting edge of a revolution in cultural and moral values' according to that arch-priestess of feminism, Betty Friedan (as elucidated by Ellen Willis, a staff writer for the execrably permissive New York paper *The Village Voice*, writing in *The Nation* [14th November 1981, pages 494-496]).

And none of this was anything new to the World Revolution: under Stalin, Lavrentii Beria, the Interior Minister and mass murderer, had personally applied his imprimatur to a handbook on psychopolitics (*The Communist Manual on Psychological Warfare*), as taught at Communist framing schools such as the Eugene Debs Labor School at 113 E. Wells Street, Milwaukee, WI, before the Second World War), which taught revolutionary gems such as the following: 'By making readily available drugs of various kinds, by giving the teenager alcohol, by praising his wildness, by stimulating him with sex literature and advertising to him or her practices as taught at the Sexpol (a centre for sexual politics), the psychopolitical operator can create the necessary attitude of chaos, idleness and worthlessness into which can then be cast the solution - Communism'. This crude statement accurately summarised the flavour of the 'Gramsci dimension', which evolved from intimate conversations on mind-control between Lenin and Dr Ivan Pavlov that laid the groundwork for today's global revolutionary push to standardise human thought and behaviour.

Over and above impregnating global culture "with socially and spiritually deadening 'garbage values', Leninist 'convergence' influence-building has involved:

- Influencing Western Governments, their policymakers, analysts and the media to drop their guard and to take the suspiciously sudden false professions of these long-term, dedicated Communist revolutionaries at face value.

- Enticing Western policymakers and politicians' support on the basis of a pack of lies which, once rashly believed, entrap the victim by compelling him or her to become co-liars, and to remain entrapped once the light has dawned; this is especially so among professional analysts, certain academics and policymakers who find it hard, if not impossible, to admit they have been wrong.

- Trying to convert the whole world to 'New Thinking', assisted by 'political correctness', so that opinion-formers who have been misled find themselves unable, due to peer pressure or pride, to accept that they have been deceived - and choose, instead, to become advocates for the covert Leninists' cause. Those who struggle to retain their sanity and intellectual and moral integrity in the face of the revolutionaries' relentless mass mind-control offensive in support of their agenda, risk being marginalised. As Anatoliy Golitsyn warned in March 1989, 'they will be attacked as reactionaries, bureaucrats with outworn ideas, political or religious Cold War warriors, spoilers or just fascists. The attack will aim to neutralise them by ridicule and to turn them into an endangered species'<sup>104</sup> [see also page 81].

- Persuading the West that open-ended 'cooperation' with these actors is risk-free because they have, all of a sudden, 'embraced democracy'.

- Allowing the West to go on believing that it 'won the Cold War' [Sun-Tzu], so that it was now safe to disarm, leading to assertions such as that Europe now has the luxury of a 'lead-time' of five years ahead of any war in the region.

- Convincing, above all, Western Governments and their key structures - led by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the US Department of State - that these sudden 'non'-Communists could be trusted, and that it made sense to welcome them without reservations as 'comrades-in-arms'.

- Quietly blackmailing the West to 'cooperate' on an open-ended basis, with the implied (and, from time to time, openly proclaimed) threat that the consequences of 'backsliding' will be a 'restoration of the Cold War', or a Hot War. However the West faces a 'New Form' of Cold War, far deadlier than before.

- Disguising from the West that the continuing Leninists' objectives are fundamentally hostile to capitalism and to Western civilisation, and that the Leninists' sudden adoption of Western attitudes, smiles and behaviour masks what Carl Bloice, citing Lenin, called in his 'Political Affairs' article of May 1991 a 'new flanking movement' - based on Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' strategic deception, which had involved 'drawing back in order to make preparations for a new offensive against capitalism' - permitting 'a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control'. Judging by the responses of Western corporations, banks and businesses, and by the eagerness with which the international financial institutions have overlent to these Bolsheviks (and by the covering-up of the small matter of the IMF's 'missing' \$4.6 billion loan to Russia), it seems that Western Governments and the international financial community failed to exercise appropriate prudence. In disregarding those few observers, like Golitsyn, who cautioned that the Leninists were 'revisiting the NEP', they have reaped their just rewards.



## EUROPE, NATO AND THE 'FORMER' REPUBLICS' FALSE 'INDEPENDENCE'

As already discussed, the sudden political 'independence' of the Soviet Republics, 'declared' one after the other in the course of 1991, conformed to the Leninist model, rather than to the wishful-thinking of Western policymakers. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office thought that the independence of these countries was genuine, and published a useful diary, listing inter alia the date when each Republic 'achieved' its 'independence', without so much as a twitter from the Soviet power. Since the Foreign Office had destroyed its institutional memory, it was now ignorant of the precedent for the Leninists' past use of false political independence in pursuit of given tactical objectives within the overall strategy, or 'General Line'. Nor, evidently, had it taken note of Gorbachev's confirmation at the 28th CPSU Congress [13th July 1990] that the 'new independent status' of the Republic Communist Parties was ordered from the top - not seized against the wishes of an impotent central power in Moscow<sup>105</sup>. As Gorbachev was careful to point out, the 'new independent status' of the Republic Parties would not lead to the break-up of the Soviet Union in actual fact (although it would set a precedent for the break-up, for instance, of Canada and the United Kingdom), or to 'a fragmentation of Communists and nations, but to a new internationalist unity of the CPSU on a common ideological basis'. Thus President Gorbachev revealed in July 1990 that the 'independent' Republics would be collaborating on the closest possible basis with Moscow in pursuit of the strategy - exactly as Anatoliy Golitsyn had explained in a Memorandum submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency well ahead of these events, in March 1990. Leninist dialectical dualism had enabled the Soviets to pull off a feat which nobody in the West could have imagined: the sudden 'disappearance' of the State component of the Party-State duopoly, with no fundamental practical consequences, since the organisational and 'General Staff' structures of the Party (though temporarily hidden from view and operating 'underground' for the purposes of the strategic deception) remained intact, and in total control of the situation. The Author recalls that televised reports from Moscow during December 1991 and into the following year showed lights burning late at night at the Foreign Ministry's offices, implying that the 'General Staff' was working round the clock to modulate the world's perception and reception of the 'changes' over which it was presiding.

One of the Foreign Ministry's most pressing objectives was to ensure that the new, 'controlled' political 'independence' of the 'former Republics', implemented via the Republic Communist Parties, was unreservedly accepted as genuine by the world at large. In March 1990, Anatoliy Golitsyn told the CIA in a report that 'in the Far East, Lenin [had] set up an ostensibly independent non-Communist Eastern Republic as a buffer state between Soviet Russia and Japan. But its independence and non-Communism were only a facade. In reality, it coordinated its actions with the Soviets and, after two years, applied for and was 'granted' membership of the Soviet Union'.

Likewise, as is the position today, 'capitalist concessions in Georgia and the use of Georgian facilities for trade with Europe and the United States were used to convey an impression of Georgian independence, despite the country's occupation by Soviet troops'. Golitsyn added that 'the West fails to understand the controlled nature of the emergence of the 'independent' Republics in Eastern Europe and in the Baltic and Transcaucasian regions of the Soviet Empire' - commenting in the same report that:

The present Communist strategists are concealing that it is they who are now creating 'independent' Republics, repeating on a broader scale Lenin's experience with the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics. The strategists are concealing the secret coordination that exists and will continue between Moscow and the 'nationalist' leaders of these 'independent' Republics. There has been ample time and every opportunity to prepare this coordination in advance'.

'Because of its existence, the fragmentation of the Soviet Empire will not be real but only fictional. This is not true self-determination but the use of 'national forms' in the execution of a common Communist strategy'<sup>106</sup>.

Not only did none of this occur to the bewildered, reactive and partly penetrated structures of the leading European Governments, which accepted the sudden 'mass independence' gestures of the Soviet Republics as genuine - without pausing to consider why their 'independence' had materialised at all, given that the Soviet centre controlled such awesome repressive power - but the duplicated (Leninist) structures of the EEC would also countenance no interpretation of events other than that the Soviet Union and Communism had suddenly collapsed. Blind as well as sympathetic to its fellow-'socialists' in the 'former' Soviet Bloc, the EU has engaged in extensive 'cooperation' ever since with the 'newly independent states of the ex-USSR' - to cite an information sheet from the European Commission issued in 1994<sup>107</sup>. The precedent for such 'cooperation' had been set as early as 1986, when the USSR and the Central and East European countries had indicated that they would be concluding bilateral agreements with the European Community [EC].

This trend flew in the face of the picture painted by the false defector Oleg Gordievsky, with Christopher Andrew, in their book *Instructions from the Centre* [1991]<sup>108</sup>, in which the then head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, was portrayed as beside himself with anxiety about the prospect of the European Community usurping the USSR's ambition to exert pan-European hegemony. The probable purpose of any disinformation in that volume was to obscure the deep penetration of the European structures by Soviet agents of influence.

Also, with effect from as early as 1986, the Gorbachev Politburo had ceased to refer disparagingly to the European Community as the civilian arm of NATO, as one senior EU figure<sup>109</sup> put it in 1994. The blind Europeans were immediately impressed by the new Soviet Government's welcome apparent change of attitude towards the European Community - responding, as the strategists had anticipated, by seeking to expand ties as rapidly as possible with first the Soviet Bloc, and then with its 'successors'. In doing so, the Europeans courted entrapment in the resulting 'net of expanding relationships'.

One of the Leninist officials who have cumulatively shed most light on the seamless continuity of the deception strategy from the Gorbachev era into the Yeltsin period and beyond, has been the brilliant (former) Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev<sup>110</sup>, who was reported by 'Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung' on 8th January 1994<sup>111</sup> to have stated that 'the more states are intertwined with one another, the more durable will be the net of their relationships'. He also said in the same context and interview that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] 'is a net we have thrown over the

West'. On 22nd September 2000, President Clinton told the United Nations General Assembly that he wanted to take the United States into a 'web of institutions that will set the international ground rules for the 21st century'.

The European Union's member governments and the political collective's structures have failed to detect, or else have chosen to ignore, one fundamentally unfriendly hidden strategic purpose of the 'liberation' of Central and Eastern Europe, and of the 'former' Soviet Union's apparent fragmentation - which was to create the conditions for the intended adherence, in due course, of the 'former' East European satellites and of the 'former' Soviet Republics, to the eastwards-expanding European Union collective. By this means, the unified (Communist) political space 'from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' will gradually be established.

By encouraging the illusion that the European Union has an 'historic opportunity' and a moral duty to entice and welcome all the East European countries and then the Republics and Russia itself into the orbit of the West, the strategists have bamboozled the socialist European Union Collective into active cooperation with them in furthering the creative implementation of the Leninist strategy to establish a single (eventually Communist) European space in accordance with the unchanging objective enunciated by Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and their successors. The trick has been to encourage the Europeans at national and collective levels in the mistaken view that the way to deal with Russia is 'not to isolate it, but rather to 'draw' it into the West's structures so that Moscow is not 'left out in the cold'. This is comprable to the psychological pressure routinely used on the reluctant British, to persuade them to abandon the pound sterling and their residual sovereignty. In reality, it is not the West which is enticing the East into its



The former German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, left, whose KGB code-name was 'Tulpe', seen near Bonn, Germany, on 12th June 1991 with his Soviet counterpart at the time, the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who had served as the chief Soviet controller of agents of influence.

orbit, but the East which is covertly enticing the West into its enlarging sphere of control through 'convergence' on its own terms. Since the leaders of the European Union are typically socialists, the Moscow strategists have encountered few problems in pursuit of their gradualist 'Atlantic to Vladivostok' strategy, since the EU Collective regards this objective as its own.

Moreover the European Parliament is consciously implementing Soviet strategy - which still seeks to detach Europe from the United States so as to isolate it and ultimately, with the Chinese, to dictate terms - as was made clear by its Chairman, Jose Maria Jil-Robles Jil-Delgado, in an article entitled 'European Union: Privileged Relations with Russia' which was published in 'International Affairs' [Volume 44, Number 4, pages 40-41, 1998]. It pointed out that 'an important goal' of the EU Collective is to achieve 'a balance in the privileged relations between Russia and the United States'. In translation from the familiar Soviet-style Aesopian language used by that Spanish author, this meant that united Europe would be 'neutral' (that is, a prospective enemy of the United States).

Any doubt about this was removed when the European Parliament's Chairman stressed the social (= socialist) orientation of the EU's intended relations with America: 'In our relations with the United States, we are proceeding from the "New Transatlantic Agenda", a new name for relationships in the entire sphere of policy, economy, commerce, culture and science. Our extending cooperation with the United States rests on them' - meaning that in any 'friendly' relationship with the United States, Washington must accept the European Union's 'New Transatlantic Agenda' - code for a revolutionary social-political programme. Whether this position represented the position of the Spanish personage concerned is uncertain, as the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal is perfectly capable of rewriting submitted copy and attributing statements to 'contributors' that they may not have made.

But it was inevitable that the "New Transatlantic Agenda" would mature, given that 'such relationships have been established by the (US) state governmental structures, local self-administrations [sic], economic agencies, universities, and cultural organisations. The final aim is contacts among common [sic!] people' - an oblique reference to the Leninist revolutionary role which the EU sees for itself as an 'agent for change' inside the United States, which the Russians still refer to privately as 'the main enemy'. This role will mature when the 11 EU candidate countries, mainly to the East - and mainly 'former' Soviet Bloc states which are today run by covert Communists - have become EU members. 'When all 11 countries join the European Union, it will reach its limits in the East which, to a great extent, will be Russia's western frontier'. Note that the EU official has in mind the Pan-German concept of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals', which of course includes 'European' Russia. 'This', Jil-Robles added, 'explains why not only good-neighbourly relations with Russia are important: we need something of an immeasurably greater importance - a new association between Russia and the European Union'. The Russian Foreign Ministry's experts could hardly have put their strategy better themselves. By frequently publishing articles by influential 'foreign guests', the Ministry underscores the 'appeal' of its own policies.

Soviet overtures towards the EU were coordinated with the unrolling of Moscow's enticements and play-acting towards NATO, as was elaborated in MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze's mistitled book 'The Future Belongs to Freedom'<sup>112</sup>.

NATO was to 'restructure itself' in exchange for Moscow sanctioning the unification of Germany. The 'post'-Soviet literature, especially the official journal 'International Affairs', has been full of inspired references to the 'transformation of NATO'.

For instance, an article in Volume 4, #5 (1995) of that official journal pushing for 'collective security' ('Europe: Towards a New Security Model'), surprisingly showed (a) that Moscow has deliberately fostered conflicts in the 'near abroad' in order to 'reinforce' the 'need' for new transnational security structures\*, and (b) that at least one purpose of the Chechen crisis has been to establish a collective intervention precedent\*\*. The author, Yuriy Ushakov, Director of the Directorate for European

Cooperation at the Russian Foreign Ministry, urged that 'the collective security model'... 'should pave the way for a gradual evolutionary synthesis of several processes: integration within the CIS and the EU, strengthening and increasing the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, transforming NATO [and] working together to prevent or resolve conflicts'.

The most revealing word used here was 'synthesis', which of course, given the article's Leninist provenance, presupposed a foregoing 'thesis' and 'antithesis'- in this case 'east-west confrontation' (the Stalinist model: thesis) followed by 'sudden conditional cessation of east-west confrontation' (the Leninist model: antithesis). In such a Russian context, the use of the word 'synthesis' provides documentary proof that Moscow's aspirations for European 'convergence' and for 'collective security' through the transformation of NATO, are indeed Leninist in content - which, in turn, means that there has been no discontinuity of Soviet intentions and strategy.

For under Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin, the Soviets have demanded nothing less than 'a reorganisation of NATO and new relations between the allies' - code for the emasculation of NATO in preparation for the Soviets' long-planned system of collective security, and for the splitting of loyalties as Germany, and its obliging associate, France, were co-opted by means of their bilateral treaties with Moscow into de facto alliance with Russia [see Note 2] and through the Russian-German-French Trilateral Commission headed, prior to his becoming President, by Jacques Chirac [Note 1].

\*(a) Problems (in 'Europe') 'can be solved', according to the Russian Foreign Ministry apparatchik, Yuriy Ushakov, 'only by joint efforts. No "state" [note this belittling of the word state by the use of parentheses - Ed.], however powerful, can create a closed, prosperous little world for its own use, ignoring the need for international cooperation [i.e., cross-border intervention is indispensable - Ed.]. Nor can bloc thinking and a revival of the logic of closed alignments help meet [the] new challenges and threats' [unspoken: 'which we have been frenetically fostering around the periphery of Europe in order to provide the West with incentives and a pretext for ever closer 'security cooperation' - by which we mean the promotion of our highest priority: the intended system of collective security].

\*\*\*(b) 'Russia fully avails itself of the ability of the OSCE to help solve this or that problem coming entirely within the jurisdiction of our state, as recent months have shown more clearly than ever in the case of the Chechen crisis, interaction within the OSCE on Chechen affairs is an unprecedented instance of openness on the part of a Great Power, of its readiness to proceed in situations [that are] particularly complicated and delicate from the point of view of international politics, in strict accordance with its obligations, and to help consolidate the Organisation [OSCE]. Thus the OSCE has set an important precedent. From now on, drawing the OSCE into the solution of daunting problems in the event of a similar crisis in some other country (alas, no-one is safe from this) will be not so much a question of the political will of the country concerned, as a common cause [Leninist phrase- Ed.] of all OSCE members relying on past experience'. This passage shows that OSCE intervention in Chechnya (which was nominal) was a contrived precedent induced by Moscow to help set an example for 'collective security' intervention elsewhere, which is what the Soviets have been urging. However, under both Presidents Bush, as under President Clinton, the West has competitively embarked upon 'collective security' transborder military interventions of its own. It is as yet unclear whether these operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan) are inspired in part by Western rivalry with Moscow and by a determination to 'lead the way' in collective security operations so that some 'Western model' of collective security ultimately prevails, based on Western precedents. If so, this would imply that Western policymakers do possess a shrewd idea of what the Revolution is up to, in which case their incompetence in unravelling Soviet strategy generally is indeed incomprehensible. Finally, the anti-nation state tone of this 'International Affairs' article by Yuriy Ushakov was summarised in the following separate passage: We would not like any countries or European institutions to withdraw into their shell and are against the primacy of national or group egoism' (meaning: national sovereignty).

The required response from NATO coincided with the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990. Shevardnadze explained in 'his' book "The Future Belongs to Freedom" that:... 'We waited impatiently for the outcome of the NATO session in London [June 1990], having every reason to hope that it would enhance the process' (of restructuring NATO and European relationships according to Soviet priorities - Ed.). 'Now the question of a united Germany's membership of NATO took on another colouration.... When the news came out of the NATO session in London, I knew there had been a response. The declaration passed in London indicated that NATO too was embarking on the path of transformation, decreasing its purely military emphasis, and changing its strategy. Most importantly, NATO's declaration expressed a readiness to announce that the two alliances were no longer enemies'.

NATO also spoke in favour of limiting the offensive capabilities of armed forces in Europe and of opening talks on reduction of tactical nuclear arms. There was also talk of a re-evaluation of the 'forward-based defence' strategy and of the doctrine of 'flexible response', along with the announcement that the doctrine that contemplated the possibility of using nuclear weapons was changing'.

At meetings held in Moscow and Arkhiz, North Caucasus, between President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in mid-July 1990, 'the changes brought about by that time enabled the two countries to look at things differently.... In other words, bilateral diplomacy promoted the successful outcome of multilateral talks'.

In short, as soon as NATO had indicated that it would 'restructure itself' in accordance with Moscow's formulation, indicating that its key doctrines would be re-evaluated, Moscow gave the go-ahead for the implementation of the unification of Germany, on the basis of 'accelerating a draft agreement... for the international legal settlement of the external aspects of German unification'. At the same time, extensive bilateral discussions between the Soviets and Germans 'related to the signing of important bilateral treaties' took place, Shevardnadze (or rather, his ghost-writers) explained - resulting in the 'so-called' Great Treaty, the idea of which had originated in 1987, but in the conditions of that time could not be implemented<sup>113</sup>.

Being interpreted, what all this meant was that having induced the West to confuse the erosion of the enemy's image with the substance, the Soviets sought, and obtained, nothing less than the 'restructuring' - the reorientation - of NATO, via the alteration of its doctrines and postures, in addition to undermining its effectiveness through the parallel Soviet 'bilateral treaty offensive'. Thus the price charged by the Soviets for German unification was much higher than was provided for in the Soviet-German bilateral treaties and accords alone, onerous as they were.

Naturally, as a veteran Leninist and secret policeman, Shevardnadze's revelation of the truth about what the Soviets secured in exchange for 'permitting' Germany's unification, was accompanied by egregious lies. One lie, on page 21 of 'his' book, sticks especially harshly in the throat, given Shevardnadze's notorious record as the brutal Interior Minister and then First Secretary in Georgia under overt Communism, and his bloody repressions in that unfortunate Republic since: 'I saw in the East European upheavals of the 1950s and 1960s a reflection of Tbilisi in March 1956. My generation and I acquired "a 1956 complex" for the rest of our lives - rejecting force as both a method and a principle of politics'<sup>114</sup>.

When 'Stalin II' 'invited' Soviet and Ukrainian troops into Georgia in 1993 - watching impassively as 50,000 young Georgian lives were sacrificed and the Soviet

Air Force destroyed much of the beautiful Black Sea resort of Sukhumi, no reference to the inconsistency of that behaviour with the foregoing statement published in 'his' deceitful book appeared in the Western press; while Lord Howe, the former British Foreign Secretary under Lady Thatcher, took no steps to amend the eulogies to MVD General E. Shevardnadze which were to appear in his autobiography [see Note 57].

By the spring of 1991, NATO was singing at the top of its collective voice from Moscow's musical score. At the Conference on the Future of European Security held on 25-26 April 1991 at the Cenin Palace, HQ of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, Manfred Woerner, NATO's Secretary-General, cast all caution to the winds, assuming without further question that Soviet intentions were genuine. If he had been spoon-fed the Soviet 'General Line' verbatim, he could not have made a statement more in tune with Soviet geopolitical 'New Thinking', since he used the very language employed by Genscher, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze themselves:

"The challenge for us as Europeans', Woerner pronounced [see page 12], blind to Soviet deception strategy, 'is to draw the Soviet Union into our common endeavour, to dispel any temptations to isolate it. We at NATO maintain the transatlantic link, fettering the North American democracies as closely as we can to Europe's destiny. From the viewpoint of security policy, our reference system reaches from the shores of the Pacific to Vladivostok'<sup>115</sup>. With advocates and implementers of Soviet strategy in high places in the West's security and official structures, Moscow's primary focus has been to cajole and pressurise its fellow-travelling aides to deliver its revolutionary objectives.



In this carefully contrived picture, the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, a 'former Communist', ostensibly 'welcomes' the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeniy Primakov, at the start of the conference of the annual NATO meeting in Berlin, on 4th June 1996. Note that Primakov appears to be pulling the NATO Secretary-General towards him, rather than the reverse. The 'post-Soviet propaganda experts must have been truly overjoyed at this photograph, which was distributed worldwide by Associated Press. For it signalled to those whom Lenin called 'the interested' that the Western military alliance was being enticed into Russia's orbit, not the other way round. Likewise, 'convergence', the essence of the present phase of global revolutionary strategy, is to be effected on Moscow's terms - not ours. Source: AP.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES AND THE E.U. COLLECTIVE

There is in fact no excuse for this generalised Western failure to detect the existence of the continuing Bolshevik geopolitical strategy, since as reiterated throughout this analysis, the Leninists are far from bashful about revealing their strategic intentions. As Yelena Bonner, the wife of the long-standing (late) agent of influence, Andrei Sakharov, has said, with first-hand knowledge of the accuracy of her observation: "The point is that the Communist goal is fixed and changeless - it never varies one iota from their objective of world domination, but if we judge them only by the direction in which they seem to be going, we shall be deceived'.

Yet the West is easily deceived - not least by those subtle means to which reference has been made and which have been deployed from the outset of Lenin's Revolution, based on Soviet elaborations of the findings of Dr Ivan Pavlov - the author of mind-control methodology, developed through his experiments with dogs - with whom Lenin had extensive discussions [see page 87], even inviting him to stay for many weeks to elaborate his ideas about human and animal behaviour: for Lenin had realised that the Revolution could be saved and prosecuted with much greater success if a means could be found of standardising human thought and behaviour, thereby establishing mental hegemony - which is the essence of Gorbachev's 'New Thinking'. As Dr Boris Sokoloff, a Russian medical doctor heavily involved with the Russian Revolution itself, but who escaped from Russia and reached the United States, wrote in his book 'The White Nights' [1956], 'Communism is a movement directed against individualization and towards the standardizing of all man's activities. Steadily and persistently, the Soviet regime is driving toward its ultimate goal: control of human behavior'<sup>116</sup>. Thus we can trace the origins of 'political correctness' directly to the Soviet Leninists. It is referred to, for example, in 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism'. The relevant essay stressed the critical importance of influence-building operations in preparing the ground for Western capitulation to Soviet revolutionary objectives:

'... in deciding other affairs, methods of public influence, the influence of public opinion, will be utilised. Under Communism, public opinion will become a mighty force, capable of bringing to reason those individuals who might not want to follow Communist customs and rules of behaviour in the community'. 'Political correctness' prepares the mind for an 'imposed truth', disallowing the real truth and perverting our intellect, so that we cease seeking the truth and understand only what takes our fancy. The spy George Blake summed it up when he told a fellow prisoner in the early 1960s that 'individual choice would eventually be mastered by a central Soviet control of thought process' [see page XII]. That veteran Communist's insight is supported by the authority of the late Louis F. Budenz - a prominent American Communist until he saw the light and courageously devoted the rest of his life to exposing overt and covert Communism. Budenz wrote in 1954 that 'the struggle for the future will probably not be so much through engines of war, as through the continued penetration of the thought processes of the world's population' ['The Bolshevik Invasion of the West', The Bookmailer, Linden, NJ, 1966, from 'The West at Bay: How it got that way (In Lieu of a Preface)', page 6].

Under the main heading 'Cooperation and the Rapprochement of Peoples' 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' [pages 735-753] lays down that 'Communism means new relations between the peoples. They will arise as a result of the furtha



development of the principles of socialist internationalism, which today constitute the basis of relations between countries'. This would be achieved not least because 'the cultures of different peoples, national inform, will be increasingly imbued with the same Communist content. Their drawing together on this basis will provide a mighty stimulus to the mutual enrichment and development of national cultures and in the long run will lead to the formation of a single, deeply international culture that will be truly the culture of all mankind. Under Communism, public opinion will become a mighty force, capable of bringing to reason those individuals who might not want to follow Communist customs and rules of behaviour in the community'. As was explained on page 10, the European Union Collective performs precisely that Leninist function - the kollektiv being 'the setting for group pressure', since its 'task is to instil... habits of collectivism... to foster an acceptance of group control over values, attitudes and behaviour' [Kassof: see Note 21, page 23]. Hence, any deviation from 'correct thinking' will not be tolerated in the New Collectivist World Order, let alone in collectivised Europe. And in addition to reconfirming the central revolutionary importance of the prevailing headlong onslaught of collectivist 'political correctness', covering all dimensions of 'New Thinking' and human existence, this unsubtle threat illuminates an opinion of the Advocate-General of the European Court of 'Justice', made in 2000, to the effect that criticism of the European Union is to be equated to blasphemy\*.

Arguably most deceived of all are the powerful Pan-Germans who have been in charge of directing German policy since long before the days of Dr Konrad Adenauer. As discussed in Part Two, it is inherent in Pan-German thinking that Germany's true interests lie to the East. In the autumn of 1990, Anatoliy Golitsyn warned the Germans that they will be double-crossed by their 'posf -Soviet allies:

'What Kohl fails to realise is that the Soviet strategists aim to use Germany's economic and technological might to convert the USSR into the dominant power in a united Europe.... The domination of a united Europe

by a Soviet-German political and economic partnership would be a significant achievement for the second round of the October World Socialist Revolution'<sup>17</sup>.

\* The European Court of 'Justice' reacted vehemently to an item in the Eurofile column that appeared in The Daily Telegraph on 28th October 2000, filed by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. He had reported that the Advocate-General of the Court had pronounced that criticism of the European Union Collective could be restricted without violating freedom of speech, on the ground that it was akin to blasphemy. The Court then proceeded on a course of deception, in the following manner. It told the British House of Commons Library, the European media and other callers, that this assertion was totally untrue. But it failed to post the Advocate-General's opinion on the Court's website, as normally happens - referring callers instead to a

separate case, which was posted on the website but which contained no references to blasphemy, thus throwing everyone off the scent. Two weeks later, under protest, the Court posted the offensive opinion on its website, stating that it had been 'mislaid'. The European Court of 'Justice' further lied that there had been a misunderstanding, for which it now apologised, but added that The Daily Telegraph had misconstrued the Advocate-General's opinion. The reason for the Court's lies and deceit vis-a-vis British enquirers was as that the ruling threatens a primary principle of English law - namely, that a governing body cannot restrict criticism in order to protect its reputation - although in this case, of course, the EU has no reputation to protect, since as every informed observer whose mind is not yet controlled and corrupted knows perfectly well, the EU collective functions by means of pressure, intimidation, harassment, coercion, lies and confusion: in other words, its reputation stinks. In his follow-up column on 11th November 2000, Ambrose noted that the Advocate-General's 'point was not made lightly. It was a central building block' of the argument that 'the EU can legitimately punish dissent'. With the EU's so-called Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed at the European Council in Nice, the stage is set for persistent critics such as this Author to court eventual arrest, and to be jailed for blasphemy. Blasphemy represents pouring odium on God: so the 'builders of Europe' seek not only to supplant the nation state, but the Almighty, as well. Since 'there is no God', the God of the EU collective is to be the European Union itself. Psalm of David Number 53, verses 1-3 applies: 'The fool hath said in his heart. There is no God. Corrupt are they, and have done abominable iniquity: There is none that doeth good... no, not one'.

## PREPARATIONS FOR ENTRY INTO THE ENEMY'S CAMP

Immediately after the softened-up leftist delegates of the Council of Europe had voted by acclamation in early 1996 for the admission of Russia as a member of the Council - an objective targeted by Moscow for several years given the open-ended opportunities for influence-building that membership of this particular forum would bring - Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister at the time, said in an interview that 'Russian membership of the Council of Europe will open up intensified new cooperation between Russia and Europe and will assist us in reaching our objectives of achieving membership of the European Union and of NATO'<sup>118</sup>. This 'line' was reiterated by Yevgeniy Primakov in the following statement reported by the Russian Information Agency on 28th February 1996: 'Upon Russia's admission to the Council of Europe, this forum acquired a truly universal character, and constitutes for the whole of the European Continent a major step towards a genuine unification of Europe'. That the Russian goal of EU membership is realistic has of course long since been made plain by the former British Prime Minister, John Major, who said in his 1992 New Year's Day statement on BBC Radio 4 that 'I look forward to the day when Russia is a fully-fledged member of the European Community'.

On 18th November 1992, ITAR-TASS, the official Russian 'news' agency, gave advance details of a treaty with the European Community which would, in part, 'establish how far Russia may be integrated into the European economic space'<sup>119</sup>. On 13th May 1996, the Foreign Ministers of the European Union countries approved and repackaged existing agreements with Russia, presenting the measures as a new initiative fostering closer cooperation on economic, trade and collective security issues - timing their so-called 'action plan' in the 'hope', as Western media reports uncomprehendingly explained, of helping President Yeltsin to 'fend off' the challenge from his 'Communist rival', Gennadiy A. Zyuganov'<sup>120</sup>.

An unnamed Western official - evidently ignorant of the Russians' use of the Leninist dialectical method and thus of the fact that all the 1996 Russian Presidential candidates were either overt or secret Communists, including President Yeltsin himself - elaborated with excruciating naivete that 'obviously, like everyone else, they want to help Yeltsin, and they see this as a way to show support'<sup>121</sup>. Time after time, the sheer stupidity of the West has enabled the Leninists to play simple games calculated to delude Western policymakers into conceding something of long-term strategic value to the Russians and their continuing 'former' Soviet Bloc associates, in exchange for some imagined, ephemeral piece of make-believe inserted into the Western psyche to help make Westerners feel less uncomfortable in the face of continued harassment and provocation by the Leninists.

In contrast to the remarks of John Major on New Year's Day 1992, the much more knowledgeable leading 'Pan-German' policymaker and Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, a protege in the past of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, knew exactly what he was talking about when he remarked in the same context that 'it is very important that Russia is integrated into a new European security architecture'<sup>122</sup>. This official German statement, among others, proves that Germany works overtime to further the realisation of Soviet collective security strategy. For the elimination of any residual doubt about this, a German Foreign Ministry spokesman, Werner Hoyer, confirmed on BBC One O'clock News on 17th June 1997 that Germany seeks a system of 'collective security' - that is, the objective of the Comintern since the 1920s.

NATO's 'landmark summit' of July 1990, held in London, had brought the Western military alliance's mindset closely into correlation with that of Gorbachev's 'New Thinking'. That NATO had been well softened-up, was made plain in a letter dated as early as 20th January 1992 from the then Assistant Secretary-General of

NATO for Political Affairs, Ambassador G. von Moltke, to a correspondent<sup>123</sup>. The letter captures all the illusions induced in the Western official mentality by just six years of 'perestroika', which gave birth to the prevailing hazardous European slide towards the actual realisation Lenin's 'Common European Home':

'Political events have considerably changed the whole picture to an extent that it appears to me academic', wrote von Moltke, 'to speculate about President Gorbachev's political intentions or a Soviet agenda towards Western Europe. The Soviet Union has dissolved and President Gorbachev has left the scene. We are now dealing with an entirely new political situation...'. 'We have moved from confrontation to cooperation, and we have given this process concrete expression through our successful programme of diplomatic liaison, proposed at our landmark Summit in London in July 1990.... This process will help the former members of the Warsaw Pact to overcome their deep sense of isolation and to integrate into our Western community of democracies. To equate the new members of the Commonwealth of Independent States with the vanished Soviet Union would be erroneous and misleading'. 'Our efforts are guided by the conviction that, in order to address the security problems of the transforming Europe, new [collective] security structures are needed. Our task in building a new Europe [sic] requires both bilateral



On 3rd October 2000, current and former officials met in Berlin to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the two plus four' conferences, which had prepared the ground for German reunification ten years earlier.

The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, third from left, welcomes the former US Secretary of State, James A. Baker (fourth from right), Roland Dumas from France (at the right), Lord Hurd from the United Kingdom (third from right), MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze (centre), and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West Germany (second from left). Also present were Markus Meckel from East Germany (left), and East Germany's last Prime Minister, Lothar de Maiziere (second from right). Source: Associated Press AP.

and multilateral approaches. Bilateral treaties between Alliance members and the Commonwealth of Independent States are a legitimate and welcome part of the overall efforts to establish a new relationship among European states'.

These high-level NATO observations - written in response to an Occasional Paper published separately by this Author in 1991, entitled 'The Soviet Agenda for Europe', which gave details of some of the Soviet bilateral treaties - demonstrate that NATO had absorbed and adopted Soviet policies and had succumbed, at its crucial London Summit Meeting in July 1990, to intensive Soviet overtures so that it was now engaged in the unwitting implementation of Soviet collective security strategy. It was, after all, the Soviets who had been pressing for collective security arrangements ever since the Comintern specified that collective security was its highest priority in the 1920s<sup>124</sup>. It was, after all, both Lenin and Gorbachev who had invoked the 'Common European Home' idea, to facilitate the realisation of the Soviet collectivists' achievement of hegemony and collective security in the region, in accordance with the remit of the Second Comintern Congress that [the intended] 'Communist society... recognises no form of state'.

As discussed on page 103 et seq., the 'restructuring of NATO' led directly to a period of contrived dialectical public grumblings orchestrated by Moscow for strategic purposes and fronted by Yevgeniy Primakov and General Aleksandr Lebed - who, at the appropriate moment of psychological warfare, all of a sudden 'withdrew' his previous opposition to the expansion of NATO. Meanwhile on 22nd March 1997, President Yeltsin declared that Russia should join the European Union 'in order to end its Cold War-era isolation for good'. And before leaving Helsinki at the end of a two-day summit meeting with President Clinton, Yeltsin insisted that Russia should be recognised, at last, as a 'full European state.... We are also prepared to join the European Union'<sup>125</sup>.

Compare this demand - which The Sunday Times' inadequately briefed correspondent Peter Conradi reported on 23rd March 1997 'came as a bolt out of the blue to many observers' - with Gorbachev's Oslo Nobel Peace Prize lecture statement of June 1992 about 'the European space' embracing the (by then 'non-existent') Soviet Union and reaching to the shores of the Pacific - 'going beyond' mere 'nominal boundaries'; and then consider the appropriate answer to the following simple question: 'In what way did the geopolitical policies, public statements and aims of the Yeltsin regime differ one iota from those of its predecessor?'

Russian membership of the European Union and of NATO would consolidate Russia's achievement of Sun-Tzu's key objective: entry into the enemy's camp. Writing on 4th January 1988 about 'the United States' sudden switch from confrontation to acceptance of Gorbachev's 'process' and ignorance of the strategy behind Anatoliy Golitsyn noted that 'in Sun-Tzu's terms, the pinnacle of strategy is to be invited into the fortress of the enemy' (referring here to the United States). He also explained how successive Communist leaders had used disinformation to 'enter the American fortress - the enemy's camp - without opposition'<sup>126</sup>.

For instance, Khrushchev had 'used disinformation about Sino-Soviet differences to gain his invitation to visit the United States. Brezhnev and Deng used disinformation about Sino-Soviet hostilities to gain their invitations. Gorbachev, in turn, has used disinformation about Soviet democratisation to obtain his invitation'. In January 1988, Golitsyn emphasised that 'President Reagan's embrace

of Gorbachev's initiatives as positive developments has provided the Soviets and the KGB with an opportunity for active interference in American politics. It gives them the chance to activate and use for their strategic purposes the friends and agents of influence they have acquired within the American elite over the past twenty-five years. During the confrontational period, these agents were afraid to act because of the danger of exposure<sup>127</sup>. Following the formal visit of President Gorbachev's delegation to the United States in late 1987, these agents of influence were given a new lease of life; and since then, they have never looked back.

## APPLIED DIALECTICS: THREE GEOPOLITICAL CASE STUDIES

To illustrate how the continuing Leninist strategists and their revolutionary implementers have applied the dialectical method to procure specific strategic objectives in the European context, three Case Studies have been selected. It is necessary to insert these here, because they each relate to the continuing Soviet Leninist objective of entering the enemy's camp [Sun-Tzu]:

### Case Study 1: The dialectical method used to enter the Council of Europe

Confirmation of the routine use of the dialectical method, from a prominent Leninist implementer of strategy, Vladimir Lukin, formerly Russia's Ambassador to the United States, was published in 'International Affairs'<sup>128</sup>. In this extraordinary article, Lukin (and the Russian Foreign Ministry) had the arrogance to admit, gratuitously and openly, that the special manoeuvres they perpetrated to 'ease' Russia's admission to the Council of Europe were all a game<sup>129</sup>. Furthermore, Mr Lukin knew that in making these cynical admissions, no-one in the Western official structures would pay the slightest attention.

Following his return from Washington, Lukin resurfaced as Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs. Russia had originally sought to join the Council of

Europe with an application on 7th May 1992 - following which, the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Council of Europe nations had responded (on 25th June 1992) with

a favourable resolution. The matter was then placed on the 'back burner' for several years. Finally, after Russia's eventual admission, the rubber-stamp State Duma 'voted', Lukin wrote, 'by an overwhelming majority for joining the prestigious European organisation. Such were the main stages of this road which proved to be not so easy'. He then explained the difficulties Russia's strategists had had to overcome in order to achieve their objective - and the Leninist, dialectical manner in which they had set about doing so.

The problems were partly of the Russians' own making. In the first place, Mr Lukin explained, 'the world was still experiencing the shock of the Pervomaiskoe tragedy' - which had culminated in the televised bombardment of the 'Black and White House'. Secondly, 'on 2nd February 1995, the procedure' for considering Russia's application for Council of Europe membership 'was interrupted because of the tragedy in Chechnya'. Thus Russian policy had been 'interrupted' by two 'tragedies' or roadblocks [Life], created by the Leninists themselves, which the strategists had been obliged to manoeuvre round. How to proceed, given the technical difficulty that 'by the time the discussion in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly started, Russia's chances of being admitted to the Council of Europe were 50-50', because 'the procedure for admitting a new member is very complicated', requiring two-thirds of the deputies in attendance? Lukin proceeded to itemise the 'special measures' taken by the strategists to 'overcome' these 'roadblocks'.

First, President Yeltsin's Press Secretary, Sergey Medvedev, announced that 'the deployment of the (Soviet) army in Chechnya had been done legitimately', adding that any 'refusal to admit Russia to the Council of Europe would essentially mean this organisation's support for Dudayev' [the Soviet-controlled 'bete noir' renegade Chechen warlord of the day].

'Naturally', Lukin explained, 'such a statement caused some fuss at Strasbourg'. (Dudayev, a 'former Soviet Air Force General based in Estonia, was then the Chechen leader working dialectically with Moscow in part to provide a diversion so that the West in due course 'conceded' the need for substantial deliveries of military hardware to the colossal new military district of Mosdok<sup>130</sup>, Ingushetia, being constructed under Yeltsin).

However any anxieties within the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly were evidently allayed when, as Lukin explained, the leader of the overt Russian Communists came to the 'rescue', playing a dialectical role. For Zyuganov made a responsible speech, and showed clearly that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was indeed backing democratic policy and was going to follow the principles of democracy for the future, as well'.

The Council of Europe was duly 'satisfied' with these completely meaningless, deceitful and worthless assurances, having no understanding of 'democratism', and willing to take the 'democratic credentials' of the Russian Communists - not even of 'relabelled' Communists, but of the overt Communists themselves - at face value!

As Anatoliy Golitsyn noted in January 1988, 'despite the advent of 'glasnost', the Soviet credo - 'whenever required, lie for the Party line' - remains unchanged'<sup>131</sup>.

Lukin then says that he himself passed a letter to the Council of Europe by another dialectical actor - Sergey Kovalev, who was then playing an assigned dialectical role for the KGB strategists as a 'human rights' expert, a task subsequently assumed by a Presidential Human Rights Commission, chaired by Vladimir Kartashkin. In the letter, Kovalev admitted that 'Russia certainly cannot yet meet the Council's democratic standards', and wasn't it unfortunate indeed that 'the situation with regard to human rights in this country has grown worse than ever for the past year'\*? However this meant that 'to refuse Russia's admission would mean the Council's keeping away from solving the problems of the largest European nation, which would contradict the very causa sui of this organisation'. Another flight of fancy.

Finally, that caricature of a Russian nationalist, the GRU 'actor' Vladimir Wolfovich Zhirinovskiy, was deployed to make certain that the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly took the desired decision. In the following passage from Lukin's article, we have official confirmation from strategic level, sanctioned by the Russian Foreign Ministry

\*THE SOVIET GULAG REMAINS IN EXISTENCE: All official, and most unofficial, 'human rights' activism in the Leninist 'former' Soviet Union is, as would be expected, deceptive. For many years, successive annual issues of the US State Department's 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices' document have reported that 'between 10,000 and 20,000 detainees and prison inmates die in penitentiary facilities annually'. The first such document published under the new Bush Administration, which appeared in September 2001, modified this statement inexplicably, asserting that 'according to human rights groups, approximately 11,000 detainees and prison inmates die in penitentiary facilities annually, some from beatings, but most as a result of overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and lack of medical care'. However these US official reports paint a misleading picture. In May 1997, a special issue of 'Soviet Analyst' [Volume 24, Number 3] published a list of 30 forced labour camps in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The camps, which were described in detail, with their geographical locations, had been separately identified by sources in Russia and Ukraine, and validated by a Western intelligence source, as having been operative in 1995 and 1996. In the case of a camp in Kazakhstan, a Western computer engineer reported that, having been given a GULAG map reference, travel directions and other details of a suspected labour camp, he had duly boarded the requisite public transport and, upon alighting at the requested bus stop, had indeed found himself standing immediately outside a huge labour camp, complete with watchtowers, barbed wire perimeter, guards and dogs. Despite extensive international distribution of that issue of 'Soviet Analyst' and its placement with 'mainstream' media outlets, the report, which established that some of the identified penal institutions using slave labour had been established and expanded under the 'democratic' regime headed by Boris Yeltsin, was completely ignored. On 4th January 2002, The Times and The Daily Telegraph in London both reported that a British academic, Judith Pallot, a geography lecturer and fellow of Christ Church, Oxford, had told a conference that in the summer of 2000, she had 'stumbled' on AM-244, a complex of 17 operational 'correctional colonies' containing 100,000 people in Perm' oblast in the Urals, in the valleys of the rivers Kolva and Berezovaya. The colonies, all components of a single labour camp, were among a large number of such camps which have been continuously occupied since Stalin's GULAG, and were located in a region known for its labour camps. The Russian 'prison' system maintains a total of 122 'forest camps', according to the reports. Dr Pallot told a conference: 'Though we tend to think there was an amnesty after Stalin' [Why? - Ed], 'I was surprised to find that there were still whole regions to which the Russians were still sending people, continually occupied since Stalin's time'. In other words, Dr Pallot provided further confirmation of 'Soviet Analyst's' report, published in May 1997. She added: 'Nobody writes about forest camps. They're in the wrong place. I think they are inhuman and degrading. I think they are unacceptable'. On 19th January 2002, Agence France Presse reported from Moscow, without elaboration, that 'fourteen prisoners at a Russian hard-labour camp escaped to freedom by digging a long tunnel under the compound fence. It was the biggest breakout recorded in post-Soviet Russia' [The Daily Telegraph, 19th January 2002].

which published it, that everything contained in book's this analysis concerning the mutine use of Leninist dialectical strategic deception operations by the Russians to achieve their tactical and strategic objectives, is correct: 'Vladimir Zhirinovskiy also did his work well. He was in good shape and did his best to show everybody present [at the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg] what a wild and horrible person he is. Russia, he said, is the most democratic state in the world, unlike any member of the Council of Europe - for instance, the Germans, who are harming the Turks, the Turks who are suppressing the Kurds, and so on. Having succeeded in frightening the gentle Europeans [indicating how much the Leninists despise the compliant European 'useful idiots' - Ed.] he concluded by saying that he personally would be happy if Russia were refused admission - as, in that case, he (Zhirinovskiy) would win the Presidential elections by a still larger margin'.

After that, the 'gentle Europeans' just had to agree to Russian membership of the Council of Europe. In order to appreciate the full force of this open admission of the routine use of Bolshevik dialectical deception techniques, it should be recalled that the GRU officer, Zhirinovskiy, is a 'licensed pocket Hitler' whose task, in addition to acting as a 'probe', as already described [page 52], is principally to enunciate dialectically 'opposite' [antithesis] lines for the revolutionaries as a means of procuring intended outcomes [the synthesis]. For instance, Zhirinovskiy's outbursts procured a 'YES' vote in Finland's EU referendum.

Lukin's article then bragged that Russian membership of the Council of Europe would enable Moscow to 'exercise its influence' on all the Council's decisions. Russia had gained 'access to the treasures of European democracy'.

This example of the use of the Leninist dialectical deception methodology to achieve tactical objectives within the framework of the 'General Line' - the long-range deception strategy - provides clear insights into how the Leninist strategists and their implementers operate. Such behaviour is standard practice. However, after many years studying Soviet strategy, the Author has reached the conclusion not merely that Western policymakers have no idea of strategy, but also that there are no corners of Western structures where 'post'-Soviet strategy is evaluated. So it is hardly surprising that the West is blind to all this.

### Case study 2: The dialectical method used to penetrate NATO openly

On 9th May 1995, the British Prime Minister of the day, John Major, who was visiting Moscow, delivered a speech at the opening of a Second World War memorial, in which he assured the Russians that Britain and its Western allies were determined 'not to isolate' Moscow [see page 91]. The phraseology and syntax he employed on that occasion appeared to have been derived directly from the KGB's own writing-school. Experience enables the analyst familiar with the revolutionary collective's methods and practices, to detect the provenance of language used in official pronouncements. The fact that a prominent Western figure uses the KGB's own forms of expression proves only that the user's mind, or that of his or her supporting bureaucracy, has been infected by the 'central Soviet control of thought process' identified by George Blake [see pages XII and 96]. (John Major's pro-Russian interventions, though, were so extreme - witness his statement in his New Year's Day broadcast on 1st January 1992, looking forward to Russia becoming 'a fully-fledged member of the European Community', and his pas-de-deux with the KGB officer Boris Pankin during the bombardment of the 'Black and White House', that other allegations have been advanced). 'Having banished the divisions of the past', said the British Prime Minister, echoing Gorbachev's propaganda line, 'we must not let even the shadow of a new division fall across Europe. We need to forge a chain of new relationships binding us together in a durable peace'<sup>132</sup>. This comment precisely echoed the similar Leninist observation made by the Russian Foreign Minister of the day, Andrei Kozyrev, reported on pages 90-91. President Bill Clinton made a similar statement in 1997 [see also page 91].

Wittingly or not, Mr Major provided yet further confirmation to the strategists that their dialectical methods were indeed achieving 'truly magnificent' results [see pages 130-131 and Note 97]. The erosion of the 'image' of the enemy had certainly been mistaken for the absence of any enemy at all, (which is presumably why MI6 now hardly has anyone monitoring the 'former USSR' any more) - as had been asserted by the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on 19th November 1990 by the Warsaw Pact and NATO powers, which had pronounced that the signatories were 'no longer adversaries'. Since the former Warsaw Pact signatories were heirs of the Leninist tradition, their signatures to that document lacked any meaning or force, since Lenin had taught his followers that accords signed with non-Communists could be torn up with impunity when the interests of the Revolution so required. Obviously, no such doubts ever troubled the mind of Mr Major or his officials, just as they had been banished from the pragmatic mind of Ambassador von Moltke. 'That was yesterday', von Moltke told his correspondent in the letter cited on page 99: 'Hadn't you noticed?'

Such blindness has hidden from the West Moscow's routine use of the dialectical political method to achieve its tactical and strategic objectives. The method usually involves the sudden emergence of two opposing official 'lines' - one of which is supportive of the option favoured by the West [thesis], and the other which is ostentatiously opposed to it [antithesis]. One or other of the 'lines', or even both of them, may portray the relevant set of circumstances or objectives 'upside-down' or 'back-to-front' - a reminder of the satanic undertones and origins of the Revolution. In a satanic ceremony, the Mass is read back-to-front. When it came to enticing NATO far beyond the rash initial outbreak of 'post-Cold War' 'restructuring' in preparation for the establishment of Moscow's cherished system of 'collective security', on which the Soviets had successfully made German unification contingent back in 1990, the Russians deployed this dialectical political method liberally. Specifically-key figures, led by Yevgeniy Primakov - who now moved from overt control of the relabelled Foreign Intelligence Service (KGB) to the position of Foreign Minister in January 1996 so that the KGB's strategic intelligence input could be coordinated all the more impeccably with the activities of the Russian Foreign Ministry - set about denigrating NATO's plans for eastwards expansion. It was left to various other controlled figures on the Russian stage to put the opposite point of view - playing down the 'dangers' Russia faced from NATO's expansion plans. In due course, as will be seen, Primakov and Yeltsin themselves 'came round' to acceptance of NATO's expansion - a move which will have fatally weakened it, as it allows itself to be penetrated by new members which remain secretly controlled by the continuing Soviets.

Since NATO's plans for eastwards expansion were of course naively based upon the 1990 Joint Declaration's unreliable written assurance that the 'former' Soviet Bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe were 'no longer adversaries' and upon the false unstated premise that they were no longer Communist, either - it having long since become 'politically incorrect' even to discuss their political orientation - the actual and intended effect of the orchestrated outbursts against NATO led by Primakov was to encourage the Western proponents of NATO expansion to 'stick to their guns'. For to the pragmatic Western mind Russian opposition to NATO expansion provided self-evident justification for expansion - since it showed how urgently the candidate countries needed NATO's protection.

This is of course a complete misreading of the situation, based on the incorrect assumption that the Central and East European NATO 'candidates' are free to take the relevant decisions without 'post'-Soviet input, whereas in reality they are all active participants in the implementation of Moscow's strategy to establish its permanent hegemony over the whole Eurasian landmass inter alia through a system of 'collective security', which self-evidently would be controlled by secret Soviet power. In pursuing this strategy, the Revolution's planners believe - correctly - that they cannot go wrong, since their detailed studies of the Western mentality have shown them that the pragmatic Western mind cannot grasp, and is extremely unlikely to grasp, the idea that the 'liberated' former Soviet Bloc states of Central



and Eastern Europe remain controlled by covert Leninists who are in fact beholden to Moscow and in certain respects (intelligence affairs, especially) controlled from the centre, as before. The truth of this was brought home to the Author when Milos Zeman, the Czech Prime Minister, included a cynical 'joke' comparing Tony Blair to Lenin, in the course of his speech before international bankers attending the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Prague [22nd September 2000].

Nobody who is not a Communist (with the exception of this Author!) ever mentions Lenin these days. But Mr Zeman told the bewildered world financial community: 'I see the striking similarity between Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Tony Blair. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said: 'To learn, to learn, to learn' (referring to the Leninist methodology and the techniques of revolutionary activity - Ed.). Tony Blair said: 'I have only three priorities: first, education; second, education; thirdly, education' (referring to the Labour-Fabian agenda to abuse the British education system to teach revolutionary 'attitudes', so that the population becomes 'of one mind' - Ed.). But I am sure that this is the single similarity between Blair and Lenin'. Mr Primakov's dialectical campaign on NATO issues was persistent, sophisticated and effective. Space precludes a detailed description of its many twists and turns, but snapshots will illustrate the modus operandi employed. Take the impact of a visit by the NATO Secretary-General of the day, Sr Javier Solana, a 'former' Communist from Spain, to Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in February 1997. What did Sr Solana think he was achieving by this visit, with its 'undeclared, behind-the-scenes' purposes, asked Mr Sergei Yastrzhembsky, President Yeltsin's spokesman, rhetorically, as late as February 1997 - by which time Moscow's objectives had largely been achieved?<sup>133</sup>. When Russia had 'proposed' closer military links between the 'former' Soviet Republics and Russia, NATO had been unenthusiastic. (Such overt military links had been pushed into the shadows when Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov had earlier 'resigned' from his supreme position as CIS military coordinator - a move designed to disabuse the West of the impression that the Republics' military forces remained integrated with and controlled by those of the Russian Federation (as is the case), which might have 'delayed' steps towards their progressive 'integration' into collective security arrangements such as the OSCE, involving the West: in a dialectical twist, this stance was later overtly reversed. The West as a whole, and the leadership of NATO, is opposed to any form of political or military integration between the newly independent states - the Republics of the former USSR - especially when they are initiated by Moscow', said the Russian President's spokesman<sup>134</sup>, pointedly drawing attention to the opposite stance that the West should take.

On the contrary, pronounced Sr Solana from Georgia, the prospect was for 'enhanced cooperation'. In any case, Moscow's 'war of words' would and could not prevent 'the inevitable.... These countries want to rejoin a Europe from which they are artificially separated. ... NATO does not regard the relationship between these countries and NATO, and the relationship between these countries and Russia, as mutually exclusive', a NATO source told Reuters<sup>135</sup>. Thus the seeds had already been sown for the further expansion of NATO into parts of the 'former' Soviet Union, in the context of 'collective security'.

On 24th July 1996, General Aleksandr Lebed, then Russia's top security chief - a label he seems to have acquired purely for the brief dialectical dance he was about to perform, since he was 'sacked' by President Yeltsin shortly after Moscow had procured the anticipated NATO response, or had received assurances that it would be forthcoming - proclaimed dialectically that, despite a barrage of criticism of NATO's expansion project from high levels in Moscow, he himself had no objections to NATO enlargement. This announcement appeared in 'The Financial Times' of the following day under a huge banner headline, which read: 'NATO GROWTH NO THREAT, SAYS LEBED'. Before leaving for a visit to NATO in Brussels on 6th October 1996, however, General Lebed voiced renewed presidential opposition to NATO's expansion.

Then, after three days in Western Europe, he reversed himself yet again, criticising President Yeltsin's 'anti-expansion' NATO policy as outmoded and harmful to Russian interests, saying in comments to 'news' agencies on 8th October 1996 that the Kremlin was trying 'to take a 15-year-old political line amid completely new economic, military and other conditions'. Finally, on returning to Moscow, where the State Duma summoned him to 'explain his conduct', Lebed reverted to the 'line' which had prevailed on his departure - with his own spokesman, Aleksandr Barkhatov, now insisting that Russia had by no means accepted NATO expansion<sup>136</sup>.

This was the dialectically fertile background against which Yevgeniy Primakov, who was by now labelled by the Western press 'a veteran Cold Warrior', felt free to spell out 'far tougher' conditions for Russia accepting NATO's expansion into Central Europe. Primakov said that NATO should agree to a 'charter agreement' which would ensure Moscow a large measure of influence over the decisions the alliance would be making. In laying down these new conditions, the Foreign Minister was the essence of reasonableness: 'A number of problems directly affecting us', he said, 'must be discussed in our presence and decided by consensus before [decisions are] executed. Agreement is not an aim in itself. We want a new document that reflects our concerns and establishes a system that guarantees our security. Moscow is very touchy, very concerned about NATO expansion [which] will change our geopolitical situation completely, making it much worse than it was before expansion'.

In other words, having played the dialectical game successfully, Primakov now 'brought his influence to bear' in favour of Russia 'reluctantly' accommodating NATO's expansion plans - and laid down Moscow's terms 'in these circumstances', accordingly. The effect of his orchestrated 'opposition' had been exactly as the strategists had intended - and had followed the classic pattern which they had established in the course of many years' research conducted by the institutes established for such purposes under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the early 1960s:

First, Russian official 'opposition' to NATO expansion - given alarming weight by the vociferous participation of General Igor Rodionov, then Russian Defence Minister, at a special NATO session held at Bergen, Norway, on 26th September 1996 - had been paralleled by official Russian voices expressing the opposite view - namely, that NATO expansion was 'no big deal'. These had encouraged NATO officials to 'persevere' with their expansion project, as secretly intended by the strategists.

Secondly, as NATO officials - led by Sr Solana who, as a 'former' Communist himself, would have known the dialectical score - struggled to 'persevere' with their expansion strategy, Primakov had prepared the ground for, and facilitated, concessions on the part of NATO 'in exchange' for Moscow abandoning its (false, dialectical) opposition to the expansion scheme. What was withheld from NATO's politicians and officials (with the exception of Sr Solana), was that Moscow fervently desired NATO to expand eastwards - on its own terms, and in furtherance of its own 'collective security' intentions.

Russian manipulation of NATO attitudes was further assisted by a key agent of influence in Washington, the US Secretary of Defense, Mr William Perry, who had participated in the 'Global Security Project' sponsored by the Gorbachev Foundation in 1993, and designed to foster the idea of 'collective security' through dialogue between US defence and intelligence experts and various covert KGB / GRU officers and representatives of the Soviet military. Alarmed by General Rodionov's opposition, and in response to the campaign orchestrated by Primakov, Mr Perry duly offered Russia a 'security partnership' involving unprecedented access for Moscow to the affairs of the NATO alliance. At Bergen, General Rodionov maintained his dialectical 'line', ostentatiously pretending to be unimpressed, and continuing with his vocal opposition despite the reality that Mr Perry's strategic 'concession' was precisely in accordance with Moscow's objectives<sup>137</sup>. As an immediate consequence of Russia being granted access to NATO's affairs, Moscow was able to raise its political and

military presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels - prompting the alliance's Supreme Commander, US General Wesley Clark, to complain that too many Russian representatives 'are known to be military intelligence officers more interested in ferreting out information than building' [cooperation]<sup>138</sup>.

On 20th March 1997, President Yeltsin arrived in Helsinki for a summit meeting with President Clinton amid 'noises off' which indicated that Russian 'opposition' to NATO expansion would not be pressed much further. The Russian President predicted a mood of 'friendliness and compromise', with *The Guardian* predicting that 'RUSSIA MAY CLIMB DOWN OVER NATO'<sup>139</sup>. At Helsinki, President Yeltsin signified tacit acceptance of NATO expansion, while maintaining dialectical consistency by describing NATO's plans as 'a serious mistake'. At a joint news conference with President Clinton, Yeltsin said that an understanding had been reached 'minimising the negative consequences for Russia', allowing the participants to 'solve issues by consensus'. The press dutifully reported the Russian spin that President Yeltsin was now 'reconciled to NATO expansion'<sup>140</sup>.

The stage was now ready for a set-piece spectacular - a ceremony at a one-day summit meeting held in Paris on 27th May 1997 at which, according to *The Times* of London, 'NATO and Russia blew away the last breath of the Cold War' by signing the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation' (which of course excluded 'erstwhile' nuclear 'powers' such as Ukraine, or any other Russian Republic to which Russia reserved the right to transfer or locate nuclear equipment). So 'enthusiastic' about this accord did *The Times* deem the Russian President to be, that it reported that he had 'astonished the

NATO leaders with an impromptu promise that he would remove the warheads from nuclear weapons pointing at their countries'<sup>141</sup>.

This undertaking to de-activate Russian nuclear weapons was curious indeed, given: (a) The endless propaganda to the effect that 'the Cold War is over' which had swamped the Western media for the preceding six years; (b) The fact that President Yeltsin had emphatically undertaken, amid much fanfare and on numerous earlier occasions, to ensure that Soviet nuclear weapons would no longer be targeted at Western cities; (c) Information leaked from a classified CIA document and published in *The Washington Times* on 12th May 1997 that 'recent malfunctions of equipment controlling Russia's vast nuclear arsenal have... switched nuclear missiles to combat mode on several recent occasions'<sup>142</sup>; (d) A statement by the newly appointed US Defense Secretary, William Cohen, on 29th April 1997, in which he had said that 'we don't know the exact nature of the command and control over Russian nuclear systems'; (e) President Yeltsin's approval, according to remarks in Moscow by the then Security Council Deputy Secretary, Boris Berezovskiy, on 10th May 1997, of 'a new security doctrine for Russia that stipulates the right to use nuclear

weapons first'; (f) A French Ministry of Defence report, disseminated by Reuters on 2nd May 1997, that Russia maintained a massive stockpile of between 18,000 and 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons; and: (g) The development and deployment under the Yeltsin regime of Topol-M, a deadly intercontinental missile that is launched into orbit and against which the West is or was believed to be at some considerable disadvantage.

But leaving aside *The Times*' naive euphoria over President Yeltsin's deceitful observations concerning the targeting of nuclear missiles, and the reported 'astonishment' with which NATO delegates to the Paris ceremony had greeted this Leninist gesture, Richard Perle, the distinguished US defence and security strategist, noted at once that the agreement read like a Soviet-drafted document redolent of Soviet-style moral equivalence; that Russia had been given a seat at the NATO table before new candidates for NATO membership had been admitted; that Russia had been made an 'equal partner' in respect of both political and security matters in a new 'Euro-Atlantic community context'; that the document explicitly affirmed the primacy of multilateral organisations in which Moscow

enjoys a de jure and de facto veto; and that Moscow will always co-chair the newly established 'Permanent Joint Council', whereas the United States would only serve as co-chair on a rotating basis, taking turns with the other 15 NATO member countries. In other words, Primakov's dialectical play-acting had delivered not just the intended interim result, but had truly obtained for Moscow yet another 'Great Leap Forward' towards the realisation of its highest strategic priority: the establishment of a collective security system. Under President Putin, the atrocities of 11th September 2001 were at once successfully leveraged to enhance cooperation between NATO and Russia, even though that issue was unrelated to the attacks and had nothing to do with 'the fight against international terrorism'. The Author has separately analysed, in 'Soviet Analyst', and briefly on pages 117-119, the further 'Great Leaps Forward' in respect of attaining its collective security objective that Moscow had already, by early 2002, derived as a consequence of its deft exploitation of the aftermath of the events of 11th September 2001 - an outcome of its long-term revolutionary international terrorism strategy controlled and directed by Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). However that takes us away from the focus of this Case Study on the use of the dialectical method to achieve strategic advances, which is complete as described above.

### Case study 3: Primakov's 'staged row with Yavlinski' in Washington

The former CIA Director of Central Intelligence [DCI], Robert M. Gates, published a book of recollections in 1996 which contained evidence of a Bold, Bolshevik Leninist dialectical provocation perpetrated in 1991 right under his nose by Yevgeniy Primakov, assisted by the supposed 'Young Turk' 'moderate reformer', Grigory Yavlinski, who was for a period the 'darling' of the West in general and of the international financial institutions, in particular [see page 64]. The purpose of this operation was to persuade the United States that the Soviet Government was in a shambles, riven by internal strife.

And the significance of this example is not simply that the message was conveyed only when Primakov and Yavlinski were together with President Bush [Sr.] in the White House - you can't get much bolder than that - but also that the former DCI was evidently blind to the ruse, since he reported it without any comprehension of its objective. This alone yielded an additional bonus for the Soviets: first-hand confirmation that officials at the highest level of US intelligence and policymaking had no knowledge of Leninist dialectical operations, and were 'willing and eager' to be lied to, so anxious was official Washington to accept Soviet fabrications and ploys as genuine - notwithstanding that for Bolsheviks to tell the truth was like Eskimos wearing no clothes. On this occasion, though, the Soviets did tell the truth, or rather indulged in 'in-your-face' candour (as always, never to be confused with the truth) -but for reasons of strategic deception. Mr Gates wrote:

'On 27th May [1991], also at Gorbachev's request, our old 'friend' Yevgeniy Primakov - who had earned our cordial dislike by his game of footsie with Saddam Hussein in January and February - rolled into town to talk about economic reform and, especially, Western economic assistance. He brought with him Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shcherbakov and the economic reformer Grigory Yavlinski. Prime Minister Pavlov in April had produced his 'anticrisis' economic plan which made some positive noises but essentially kept the central government as the final authority on economic matters. The idea that this plan had much positive in it or that Primakov had anything of value to say on the economy struck us all as ludicrous.... Scowcroft, Zoellick, Ed Hewitt and I urged Bush to ask questions directly of Yavlinski - whom we were confident Primakov was bringing only for show... Primakov and Shcherbakov both made it apparent that the Soviet Government had no idea what it was doing on the economy and that any Western aid would be money down a rathole. The meeting in the Cabinet Room on 31st May was as sharp and unfriendly an exchange as I could remember as our side asked hard questions and the Soviets had no answers. Yavlinski might as well have been on our side of the table for the critical obser-

vations he made and his obvious lack of support for his Government's program...<sup>143</sup>.

Note how the former CIA Director's eye is 'off the ball' from the outset, and how deaver, incisive and relevant Mr Gates thought the questions posed by the US Government officials and Cabinet members were! From the perspective of the former DCI, their hard questions had decisively floored the visiting Soviets, and the outcome of the meeting was that the Soviets had been utterly humiliated, leaving the Americans triumphant. After all, Mr Gates and his colleagues were unanimous that 'the idea that... Primakov had anything of value to say on the economy struck us all as ludicrous'. Good for them! But why had Mr

Primakov brought Yavlinski along? Since Mr Gates evidently, by his own de facto admission here, lacked even the most elementary understanding of the Leninist dialectic, of Leninism, or of the Mongol mentality of Leninists, he had no means of gauging what the real purpose of this abrupt visit, made at Gorbachev's request, really was. In short, the CIA and the Bush Cabinet were blind: yet they thought they were clever, incisive, relevant and hard-nosed, and that asking 'hard economic questions' would be a productive exercise!

It was clear that, beneath all their bravado, the Americans had failed to understand the purpose of the Russians' sudden visit. They had simply accommodated the Soviet President's request that the US Cabinet should receive the visitors, please, to hear what they had to say about the Soviet economy. Mr Gates does not even seem to have marvelled at the spectacle of the young Yavlinski, labelled an economic adviser, contradicting such a senior Soviet policymaking and intelligence official as Primakov, in the presence of the head of the CIA and the President of the United States. He - the head of the US intelligence community

- had failed to ask himself the necessary and elementary question: what lay behind this curious conduct, and breach of protocol?

Observe that this display of profound internal differences within the Soviet Government, exported to the very heart of the US Government, was initiated by Gorbachev himself, using his highest-profile Leninist strategic colleague directly, plus a reliable poodle (Yavlinski)

- just three months ahead of the 'August coup', which Gorbachev had himself obliquely

predicted by his reference to a forthcoming 'dramatic event' in the course of his Paris press

conference with President Mitterrand on 6th May 1991, three weeks earlier (see Introduction, page 7, and related Note 13). What the Americans will not have known is that Primakov had invited Yavlinski some months previously to stay at his country dacha - where the details of this Leninist theatrical provocation were undoubtedly discussed, debated and honed.

Hence, just three months before the 'August coup', the stark message was delivered from and via the highest level of the Soviet regime, direct to the inner sanctum of the US Government, that the Soviet Government was in disarray - and, by extension, that it could fall apart: certainly things were 'sliding out of control'. In accordance with the advice of Sun-Tzu, the Americans were provided with absolutely reliable 'confirmation' of the 'weak look'. Yavlinski had not been brought along 'just for show', as the CIA Director had assumed (because he just could not fathom out why he was there), but, on the contrary, to argue fiercely in front of the US Cabinet against the top Soviet officials, including the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, who had accompanied him. It was Yavlinski's task to excoriate Primakov and his colleagues in front of President Bush and his senior associates. Such behaviour in the era of overt Soviet power, had it been genuine, would have merited a spell in the Soviet GULAG. But Mr Gates could not even work that out for himself, either.

The Author is aware of another instance of 'deliberate' arguments staged in order to impress Western observers. A group of distinguished American visitors were invited to the temporary offices of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. On arrival at the premises, they were left hanging around in the entrance hall, which was overlooked by a large, ornate sweeping staircase. After some considerable delay, two officials emerged at the upper landing, evidently engaged in a heated argument. This discussion, which was audible to the Russian-speaking American visitors assembled below, continued in loud tones all the way

down the staircase and into the reception area. Its Leninist dialectical purpose: to impress the American visitors with the 'openmindedness' of the Gorbachev Foundation (a manifestation of the Lenin School combined with staff from the International Department of the CPSU), where all questions were 'open for debate', and to differentiate the Gorbachev Foundation from the stereotype of 'post-Soviet institutes still run along more rigid lines by elements of the 'unreformed' nomenklatura. That this argumentative behaviour was ham-fisted and rude, and keeping the visitors waiting was discourteous, were irrelevant so far as the officials (KGB operatives) were concerned: the American visitors were kept waiting precisely so that they could hear the disputation - and draw the intended conclusion, which would then appear in the journal which they were responsible for publishing.

The foregoing Case Studies required virtually no resources and no more than an orderly press-cutting file and knowledge of how the Leninist dialectical method works in both theory and practice. As soon as 'Competing voices', adopting contrary positions, emerge in any given Kremlin or 'post-Soviet context, a dialectical ploy is certainly in operation. The observer skilled in the interpretation of the Leninist dialectical modus operandi can accordingly, by identifying what is the thesis and what is the antithesis, work out the underlying Soviet objective (the synthesis). What is certainly true is that a Western policymaker or official who encounters such ploys has no chance of understanding what is going on, without a grounding in Leninist Bolshevik strategic deception theory. At such a late stage of the World Revolution, the best and most reliable primers in these techniques for serious students and officials are Anatoliy Golitsyn's two classic works, 'New Lies for Old' [1984] and 'The Perestroika Deception' [1995 and 1998].

#### EAST EUROPEAN UPHEAVALS 'ORDERED FROM ABOVE'

The fact that, despite his unequalled record for accurate analysis and predictions, Anatoliy Golitsyn's sound warnings and advice have not so far been heeded by policymakers suggests that he must also be right in his assertion that the intelligence services of the main Western powers have been comprehensively penetrated for many years. The CIA was penetrated by both the KGB and Chinese intelligence as early as 1958. Both British services were deeply penetrated over a prolonged period. The West German services were penetrated from the outset after the Second World War, and 'the KGB had seven sources' in the two French intelligence services<sup>144</sup>; and this was roughly the situation prevailing many years ago now, long before the 'mass walk-in' by KGB and GRU officers which has been a primary consequence of the relaxation of Western attitudes and vigilance towards the continuing Soviets. However, the level of comprehension in Western policymaking circles appears to be far worse than Golitsyn has described: hardly any strategic analysis takes place at all, it seems, in or behind the corridors of power. It has already been mentioned that MI6 is reported (as of early 2002) to have, according to a reliable source, 'hardly anyone monitoring the 'former' Soviet Union at all'. Even if the entire contents of this book were erroneous, that fact alone would imply an astonishing level of reckless official arrogance and complacency.

It is all the more reprehensible in that a number of identified pre-'perestroika' trial balloons were floated at various times by the Communists, to measure Western, especially German, reactions to the intended Leninist courses of action.

In November 1987, for instance, a senior Soviet diplomat located in Geneva announced the intended fall of the Berlin Wall. Details of this statement appeared in the German Lutheran press at the time<sup>145</sup>. Much earlier, in September 1985 - over six months after Mikhail Gorbachev had become General Secretary - an article by

a certain Gyorgy Dalos, entitled 'Die Befreiung der Sowjetunion von ihren Satelliten' appeared in 'Das Kursbuch' [Kursbuch Verlag GmbH, Potsdamerstrasse 98,1000 Berlin 30]. In this article, Dalos wrote as follows [translation from the German]:

'Let us imagine [that] a rejuvenated Central Committee in Moscow decides to free the Soviet Union from its increasingly burdensome confederates. "Just understand, Comrades", says the barely 31-year-old General Secretary, "that these small eastern European states with their chaotic economic situation, with their incomprehensible inner contradictions and their harmful ideologies will simply continue to hinder our Communist structure. In my view, it would be much more correct to leave these societies - while guaranteeing our military interests - to their own dynamism of development"'<sup>146</sup>.

The article by Gyorgy Dalos proceeded to summarise the outline of the strategy of 'freeing' the satellites and installing controlled 'second echelon' leaderships (on a temporary basis pending the reinstallation of overt Communists) which was duly implemented under Gorbachev in Eastern Europe in 1989. The young General Secretary of the CPSU is 'speaking' [in the article by Dalos]: "From the propagandist point of view, this would bring us only benefits... because we could then be hailed once again as liberators of these countries.... Let us fantasise further: the First Secretary's words are unanimously enacted, the Warsaw Pact is terminated, the Soviet troops stationed in the Eastern European region are disbanded amidst military music and flowers, and the former Eastern Bloc countries make a start on controlling their own problems. Through free elections, in which several parties may participate, they create their parliamentary institutions, they open their borders and guarantee freedom rights, including sensible limited private ownership [= 'state-controlled capitalism']. All other things - McDonald's network, unemployment, peep-shows - will automatically follow".

The Central Intelligence Agency has recently revealed that the order for Hungary to open its border to East Germans, the step which 'triggered' the controlled collapse of the East European satellites, was given at the highest level in Moscow. This information appears in the work mentioned on page 49 entitled 'The Wars of Eduard

Shevardnadze', by Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Chief of Public Communications, Public Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and Melvin A. Goodman, Professor of International Security Studies, US National War College [1997]<sup>147</sup>. On page 248 of that book, which was written to 'legitimise' Shevardnadze, it is stated that 'Hungary allowed 60,000 East Germans to leave for the West, and thousands more moved into Prague and Warsaw. Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn allowed East Germans to leave after talking by phone with Shevardnadze'.

In other words, the Soviet Foreign Minister gave the signal to Mr G. Horn to start the process of opening the borders which led to the removal of the Berlin Wall. Mr Horn is the Communist who later ran Hungary as its 'non'-Communist Prime Minister. But instead of recognising that the signal for the implementation of 'collapsible Communism' came from the Kremlin, which of course meant that it could not have been spontaneous since the Soviets possessed the requisite military power to crush it, the CIA's communications director immediately went off on a wild-goose chase, commenting that Gyula Horn's 'action altered his previous image as a young supporter of the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, when he had guarded bridges on the invasion route'. The whole of that 'politically correct'

book, incidentally, provides written proof that the Central Intelligence Agency remained at sea throughout the 'changes', buying into every lie thrown at them.

There has been no discontinuity - merely a Leninist, deceptive switch in tactics, with no change in the long-range strategy. The Soviets and their East European comrades-in-arms adopted, as Lenin explained in the context of his New Economic Policy deception, 'special methods to implement transition' and 'in many respects were operating differently from the way they operated before'. They were 'drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive against capitalism' by creating the preconditions for 'convergence' - the synthesis, on their terms. 'Special' is the KGB's euphemism for 'secret'.

The 'former' East European Soviet Bloc countries have since retained and strengthened their military relationships with 'post'-Soviet Russia - even as they have applied for NATO membership, and have been courted by the West as new members of that alliance. For instance, only seven months had passed following the 'collapse' of the Soviet Union, when the Polish Minister of National Defence of the day, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, announced that Poland intended to sign an agreement on military cooperation with Russia. In the same statement, the Polish Minister revealed Poland's total identification with Soviet-Russian strategy to establish a system of collective security. Specifically, Mr Onyszkiewicz told the newspaper 'Rzeczpospolita' that Poland was 'concerned about constructing a system of common security in Europe, a task that cannot be carried out without Russia'<sup>148</sup>.

An analysis of Ukraine's security strategy, based upon study of an article by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the day, Anatoliy Zlenko, published in the January 1994 issue of 'International Affairs'<sup>149</sup> confirmed Ukraine's function in pressing dialectically for comprehensive inclusion in West European security and political structures, in order 'to provide reliable guarantees for Ukraine's external security' - against an entirely fictional latent threat to Ukraine's political and territorial integrity from Russia. At the same time, though, Zlenko confirmed that 'we see our relations with Russia as a special partnership'. Western analysts were intended not to notice the illogicality of Ukraine enjoying a 'special partnership' with Russia, if it was at one and the same time a latent 'threat to its existence.

That the Ukrainian Government works in precise continuing harmony with Russian strategy was further revealed by Anatoliy Zlenko in the following passages from his article in 'International Affairs':

'Ukraine's main foreign policy spheres [include] growing participation in European regional cooperation [since] practically all the new independent states expressed a desire to cooperate and eventually to join NATO and the Western European Union [WEU] in order to ensure their national security'.

No, that is not their real purpose in clamouring for entry into the European fortress - for 'entry into the enemy's camp': their purpose is the furtherance under Moscow's leadership and instructions, of the Soviet strategy of fostering the emergence of a 'single political space from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' buttressed by a Soviet-dominated system of collective security - which, manifestly, would be at the permanent mercy of (secret) Soviet military power.

Ukraine was motivated, Zlenko reiterated, to search 'for ways of integrating into the world system, establish ties with European structures and joining them.... We advocate comprehensive international systems of global and



European security, seeing participation in such systems as a basic component of our national security.... Ukrainian diplomacy concentrates on helping evolve and strengthen reliable international security mechanisms at bilateral, sub-regional, regional and global levels. Security for ourselves through security for all is a universal approach upheld by Ukrainian foreign policy'.

Upheld by it, but not scripted by it: the 'hymn-sheaf is drafted and printed by the strategists in Moscow, who are so convinced of the West's ignorance of their Leninist dialectical routine that they have been happily encouraging a dual image, so far as Ukraine is concerned: (a) the image of the vulnerable, 'fledgling' 'post-

Soviet Republic in need of Western material, financial, moral and security support; and (b) the parallel image of the faithful collaborator with Moscow in the furtherance of Leninist common security objectives:

To our way of thinking, the European region, which is now living through a period of deep change, including changes involving conflict, should become a single whole, a common house for all countries and peoples in the region. The ultimate goal in the European sector is therefore full integration of Ukraine into

political, economic, cultural and other Europe-wide ties benefiting the Ukraine and the European community as a whole.... Ukraine is seeking integration into the more important European institutions'.

Anatoliy Zlenko's article thus made it clear beyond any doubt that far from being the independent arbiter of its own foreign policy, Ukraine is a fully-paid-up, controlled advocate and captive of Moscow's Leninist strategy, pressing 'independently' for total incorporation [ = 'full integration'] into the intended system of collective security and into European institutions - so much so that it even uses the Russian Foreign Ministry's own journal to advertise this fact.

That Ukraine, other 'former' Soviet Republics and the Central and East European states remain integrated within the framework of collective security which the Russian strategists have, independently, been consolidating and refining in the Eurasian theatre, was inadvertently made plain in Western press reports following the shooting down by a 'Ukrainian' missile of a Russian airliner flying from Israel over the Black Sea on 4th October 2001. In its report on that crash dated 14th October, The New York Times stated, in a despatch from Moscow:

'On October 4, the day of the disaster, Ukrainian land, sea and air forces were conducting the largest military exercise in the nation's 10-year history. Russia's own Air Force Commander was in attendance along with officials of several other former Central [the word 'Soviet' omitted here! - Ed.] Asian and East European nations as Ukrainian forces fired 23 missiles at drones flying off the coast'.

Translation: (a): 'Russia's own Air Force Commander was in attendance': No, not just in attendance: this was a huge exercise involving a large number of 'former' Soviet Bloc Republics and countries. Such exercises are controlled and run by the (Soviet) CIS military establishment and infrastructure. In other words this was a CIS (Soviet Bloc) exercise, commanded by the Russian (Soviet) Air Force Commander; (b): Officials from Central Asian and East European nations were 'present' along with the Russian Air Force Commander: The presence of officials from Central Asian Republics made sense in the above context, but why were officials from East European countries present? Such countries have either applied for NATO membership, or belong to the Western alliance, despite remaining under continued de facto Communist

control. The answer, of course, is that these countries were taking part in the exercise.

Thus Golitsyn's assessment that the controlled 'independence' of the Soviet Republics, implemented from above, had been ordered/or strategic purposes, is correct. Only this time round, it is not simply one 'transitional state' - Lenin's Far Eastern Republic, created to establish a temporary buffer against Japan - which is to be integrated into the whole, but nothing less than 'former' Soviet Republics, together with the Central and Eastern European countries, that are to be progressively integrated into a (Soviet-dominated) system of 'collective security', in parallel with or via their membership of NATO, the European Union's intended collectivised military force, and the European Union Collective itself. That is the objective, and it is not a friendly one. On the contrary, the aim is Sun-Tzu's 'entry into the enemy's camp' - by means of encirclement, integration, collectivisation, absorption and subversion.

'Present Soviet-Western cooperation is only temporary', wrote Golitsyn to the unheeding CIA late in 1990<sup>150</sup>. 'Optimistic expectations of long-term Western dividends from Western support for 'perestroika' are doomed to disappointment.... When the chick hatches, it will display its true antagonistic nature and seek to dominate the nest'. When that unpleasant turn of events materialises, the West will yet again be taken by surprise.

To paraphrase an expression used by Marx, the United States will be left stranded in isolation to contemplate its own destruction and demise', Golitsyn added. With the West's guard down, the Leninists will be tempted to smash the West with their clenched fist- since, as Golitsyn reiterates throughout 'The Perestroika Deception', brute force will be used to 'finish die West off' when the time is ripe.

## PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS AND EUROPEAN COLLECTIVISATION

That prospect should cause no surprise: after all, the Soviet push for 'collective security' has been gathering momentum against the background of heightened and televised violence in the Caucasus and elsewhere - as local falsely 'independent' regimes such as the Georgian repression apparatus, have gone about their grisly tasks of suppressing recalcitrant minorities, with or without overt Russian, Ukrainian and other 'post'-Soviet military assistance - leaving Russia's hands 'clean', for international public consumption purposes (except in the no-go region around Chechnya, from which the West is largely barred).

Instead of the Soviet militia supervising repression - as in Tbilisi in April 1990 for instance, when 19 demonstrators (mainly young women) were killed by poison gas and sharpened trenching shovels - it has been the uniformly Stalinist regimes controlling the 'independent' states of the 'ex-USSR' which have mainly been doing Moscow's repressive dirty work, providing, at the same time, the rationale for 'collective security' arrangements which Moscow insists, to a chorus of Western agreement, are so desperately necessary given the 'dangerous new world in which we live'.

Where Moscow's dirty and bloody hand has been exposed, as in Chechnya, the West has quickly sought to draw a veil over the atrocities concerned - enabling Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, for instance, to fraternise with the intelligence officer in charge in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, with apparent general and electoral impunity: the British Prime Minister has played snooker with Putin on at least one of his visits to Russia, and Blair's invitation for President Putin and his family to

visit Chequers, his official country residence, for two days at Christmas 2001, raised the interaction between these two leaders to an unprecedented level of frequency and intimacy. Careless and laid-back, the British authorities appear to pay little attention to small details such as the development and use since at least the 1960s by Soviet/Russian intelligence, of mind-altering and behaviour-modification drugs for use against Western targets. Mr Blair's behaviour reminds one of John Major's exuberant display of verbal support for Yeltsin's bombardment of the 'Parliament' building in 1993, which suggested that his mind might have been tinkered with. Since we know that the Soviets used 'active measures' against Margaret Thatcher, why should later UK Prime Ministers not have been similarly targeted? According to a paper by Dr Joseph Douglass Jr., the secret CIA programme code-named MKULTRA (one of a range of parallel secret US programmes) authorised in 1953 by Allen W. Dulles when he was Director of Central Intelligence, was initiated in response to what Dulles termed (in a speech at Princeton on 10th April 1953) Soviet-developed 'brain perversion techniques, some of which are so subtle and abhorrent to our way of life that we have recoiled from facing up to them'. With the help of a large cadre of former Nazi scientists imported from Germany, the Soviets had perfected psychoactive drugs for use against targeted personnel, especially Western leaders and diplomats. Three days after delivering his wake-up speech at Princeton, Dulles approved the MKULTRA programme, the objectives of which mirrored the achievements of the parallel Soviet-Nazi project - certain products of which were extensively tested on Central Asian tribes, of whom large numbers were massacred in the process. By reviewing the aims of the US programme as described by Dr Douglass, a clear perspective on the Soviet armoury of offensive behaviour-influencing and mind-altering drugs can be obtained. Dr Douglass reported that the primary objectives of MKULTRA included the development of psychoactive drugs that would 'cause mental confusion', 'alter personality structure', 'diminish ambition and working efficiency', 'promote illogical drinking', 'cause euphoria with no subsequent let-down' and 'induce amnesia respecting events immediately preceding and during the use of mind-control drugs'. These objectives were supplementary to the 'truth drugs' (TD) and 'Toosen-the-tongue' drugs already in development.

Although this Author has serious problems accepting without qualification the bona fides of Colonel Dr Kanatjan Alibekov (a.k.a. Ken Aribek), a much-quoted defector, who reached the West in 1992 and works in the United States, this former Deputy Director of Biopreparat, a large Soviet biological warfare project, revealed in his memoir 'Biopreparat', published in 1998, the existence of a top secret KGB development programme code-named Fleta (Flute). Much of Alibekov's information dovetails with intelligence revealed by the late General-Major Jan Sejna, the former senior Czech official and defector debriefed by Douglass himself. Sejna was personally involved in planning and monitoring Czechoslovakia's participation in the Fleta project, which Alibekov says was concerned with the development of psychoactive drugs and neurotoxins to used 'alter personalities and modify human behaviour'. [Influencing Behavior and Mental Processes in Covert Operations', Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., PhD, Medical Sentinel, Volume 6, Number 4, Winter 2001]. In addition to the distinct possibility (this Author would suggest, probability) that gullible Western figures like John Major and Tony Blair would be obvious targets for such treatment,

Dr Douglass explored, in his article, the possibility that Soviet activism behind the international terrorism offensive (controlled, like the global drugs offensive, by Soviet Military Intelligence) might be disguised in part through the use of such personality-altering drugs:

'In thinking over my previous discussions with General Sejna, following the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, I was struck by the possibility that the psychoactive drugs he described (and which the Chinese were also actively developing) could have played a significant role in recruiting, brainwashing, and controlling the young men recruited for terrorist operations, and ultimately in helping to assure the reliability and commitment that was needed to mobilize in synchronicity the large number of suicidal young men needed to carry out the mission'.

Since the political elites in Britain and the Continental countries have been systematically engaged in committing mass national suicide and have been falling over themselves in their haste to consign national sovereignty to history and to collectivise every dimension of European existence, one is entitled to wonder, in the light of such information, whether such drugs have been used by the Leninists on a large scale against Western politicians and policymakers. The indecent rush to fulfil Lenin's 'ultimate aim to destroy the state' could be explained by the success of long-term covert Soviet mind-control techniques other than the use of drugs.

But some examples of possible Western targets do require an explanation. One of the most conspicuous candidates is Lord Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO and formerly Mr Blair's Secretary of Defence. Although this character has a left-wing pedigree which might alone explain his behaviour - the Moscow paper 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' reported in November 2001 that Robertson was responsible for Soviet policy in the British Labour Party in the 1980s, leading the Party's delegation to the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986 - some of his statements since becoming head of NATO have clung so faithfully to the Soviet 'General Line' that the possibility of some mental interference cannot be dismissed out of hand'.

For instance, on 27th September 2001, Reuters reported that Lord Robertson had said in Brussels that 'the Russian response to the terrible attacks on the United States has not only been befitting of a major partner of this alliance but has also been the reaction of a real and genuine friend'. Since separate detailed analysis, some of which was published in 'Soviet Analyst', left little doubt that the atrocities in question represented a consequence of the long-established active GRU-controlled international terrorism sub-strategy of the World Revolution, this statement was hard enough to swallow. But at a news conference in Moscow on 22nd November 2001, Lord Robertson revealed his open support for the Leninist strategy to liquidate the nation state, and backed up his outrageous statements on that score with a torrent of easily recognisable, if tired, Soviet Leninist propaganda. According to The New York Times' report of 23rd November 2001:

'... Lord Robertson sounded almost like Mr Putin in arguing that the current NATO approach to Russia is outmoded in a world facing new threats [sic]. "In the past", he said, "we were divided by walls and by fences and by ideology and by armies. Today the threats to the Russian people are very similar, if not exactly the same, as the threats to the people in the NATO countries and the West. The international terrorists have gone global. So why are we all dealing with things as individual nations? Migrations, refugee flows make borders a complete nonsense. So

why do we pretend that tank and infantry formations are going to give any country or any group of countries a total insurance?'"

Without diverting to the international terrorism issue, analysis of these comments reveals the following elements of Soviet Leninist propaganda and disinformation which a Secretary-General of NATO should have recognised. His failure to do so raises suspicions that Lord Robertson is much more than just a 'useful idiot'. His remarks contained the following 'curiosities':

(a) 'In the past, we were divided by walls and by fences and by ideology and by armies': This is recognisably lifted directly from heavily over-used Soviet-style propaganda dating from more than a decade previously;

(b) 'Today the threats to the Russian people are very similar, if not exactly the same as, the threats to the people in the NATO countries and the West': In the 'international terrorism context' with which Lord Robertson was dealing, this was untrue: the 'apartment bombings' which afflicted some Russian cities have been exposed by Western analysts as provocations by Soviet intelligence. Their strategic purpose was to create an illusion of 'terrorism equivalence' between Russia and the West,

so that 'international terrorism', a World Revolution weapon for which the Soviet Bolsheviks are ultimately responsible, could be leveraged to the status of a 'global threat' necessitating the closest possible cooperation between Russia and the West, in the 'fight against terrorism' - a strategic 'convergence' objective hinted at on 27th July 1996 by General Akesandr Lebed [see page 71] - which fell neatly into place shortly after the attacks on the United States of 11th September 2001. Note Lord Robertson's sly use of the qualifying phrase 'if not exactly the same as', which meant that any threats faced by the Russian people are not the same as those facing the West (of course). Robertson's careful choice of words here does indeed suggest that the NATO Secretary-General is rather more than just another 'useful idiot'.

(c) 'International terrorists have gone global', apart from being a tautology, revealed Robertson's identity of view with Putin that international terrorism' is a 'global issue which, like all 'global issues' (which it is the objective of Soviet strategy to promote and exploit), cannot possibly be addressed by the pathetic, redundant, nation state. Hence 'why should we all be dealing with things as individual nation states?' Note the Leninist revolutionary assumption that no decisions can be taken unilaterally. The only valid decisions are those taken collectively.

(d) 'Migrations, refugee flows make borders a complete nonsense': In other words, the nation state is finished. National borders are redundant. All nations should be merged without further delay. Neither Stalin nor Lenin could have said it better.

(e) 'So why do we pretend that tanks and infantry formations...' were any use any longer - against this 'New Form' of 'global threat'? How could Moscow ask for any gift more helpful to the realisation of its strategic objectives than a Secretary-General of NATO who denigrates his alliance's tanks and military formations on the implied ground that they are wholly redundant in the face of the 'new type' of threat facing humanity, in the form of international terrorism? Note that this 'line' coincides precisely with intermittent dialectical Russian demands that NATO should be disbanded (thesis). These alternate with (oppose) the constant pressure for military collectivisation (collective security: antithesis).

In the meantime, NATO is doing much more than merely responding to Russian overtures for ever deeper involvement with NATO. On 29th November

2001, as the Soviet strategists collected the fruits of their successful leveraging of the international terrorism issue to accelerate the process of east-west 'convergence', a NATO official told Dow Jones Newswires that 'we sense very strong indications from President Putin that he wants to change the way that Russia does business. We take that at face value and we will work on that basis'. Thus all caution concerning Moscow's motives has been thrown to the winds, along with the alliance's institutional memory. NATO officials serving today are presumably ignorant of Sergei Rogov's proclamation, via 'International Affairs' in 1995, of Moscow's expectation that 'it will become possible to create a Euroatlantic security area or, in other words, the comprehensive collective security system which has long been discussed in our country as the highest goal of our foreign and defence policy'<sup>151,152</sup>.

These aspirations show not the slightest sign of any discontinuity from the strategy outlined below by MVD Eduard Shevardnadze, in the course of his interview on Russian television on 19th November 1991<sup>153</sup> [see page XXXIII]:

I think that the idea of a Common European Home, the building of a united Europe, and I would like to outline today, of Great Europe, the building of Great Europe, great, united Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, including all our territory, most probably a European-Asian space, a united humanitarian space: this project is inevitable. I am sure that we will come to building a united military space as well. To say more precisely: we will build a united Europe, whose security will be based on the principles of collective security'.

Imagine how immeasurably helpful it will have been, too, for the Soviet strategists to have had Mr William Perry to deal with as Defense Secretary during Mr Bill Clinton's first term. In addition to authorising visits to the Pentagon by GRU officer-Mr Perry had been, prior to his appointment, one of the joint authors of a joint paper entitled 'A New Concept of Cooperative Security', presented to the group attended by top Russian strategists including KGB and GRU officers, established by the Gorbachev Foundation's 'Global Security Project'. The source for this is a document in the Author's possession, issued by that Leninist organisation, dated 17th March 1993<sup>154</sup>.

We have it on the authority of Mme Alberti, resident in Paris and formerly Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Secretary, that the Gorbachev Foundation/Moscow is the centre for Communist propaganda in the 'former' Soviet Union and throughout the West, and a central locus of Communist strategic operations<sup>155</sup>. By May 1992 it was staffed by over 100 apparatchiks from the 'former' International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. The 'Global Security Project', operated by the Gorbachev Foundation/USA, was developed by The Gorbachev Foundation/Moscow, which operates separately from, and was 'not linked with', the now moribund Gorbachev Foundation/USA, directed during 1995-2000 by the long-term apparent agent of influence, Dr Jim Garrison, from the former Admiral's House at the Presidio, San Francisco Bay (formerly a US military base). In addition to its 'State of the World Forum' influence-building activities in the United States and elsewhere, which focused for over half a decade on the substitution of 'Gramsci garbage values' for civilised values, morality and true spirituality, it was an active sponsor of the paganist United Religions project, supported by Mikhail Gorbachev, which seeks to establish a 'common' global religion as part of the Revolution's mission to impose a 'single way of thinking' upon humanity - to make us all 'of one mind'<sup>156</sup> [see also pages 34 and 87].

## THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM'S INTENDED 'CENTRE OF GRAVITY'

At a news conference on 21st December at RAF Halton, outside London, when he and his wife Lyudmila visited the British Prime Minister at Chequers, President Putin said that a new NATO-Russia Council, and the mechanics of the new relationship between Moscow and NATO 'driven' by the 'momentum of cooperation following the events of 11th September 2001', would be established 'by May 2002'.

A Reuters report noted that the 'pressure' for the new structures came from Mr Blair, who had 'written a four-page letter to Lord Robertson and fellow leaders of the alliance suggesting their establishment'. A standard Soviet ploy is to procure that others 'call for' what the Leninist strategists are seeking.

Penetrated at the very highest level as it appears to be, NATO needs to come belatedly to its senses. On 6th April 1998, *Der Spiegel* reported<sup>157</sup> that intelligence agents from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic remained in close contact with Russian spy operatives, and that the three former Warsaw Pact countries had been 'attempting' to place agents within the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Later reports (in 2000) indicated that the GRU had 'returned' to Prague, which it uses, as previously, as its Central European base. No-one familiar with Anatoliy Golitsyn's two books<sup>158</sup> would have been in the slightest surprised at such information. However since the Western policymaking community has bought the entire package of Soviet-originated lies, it is stuck in 'deep denial' - refusing to entertain even the faint possibility that the West has indeed been deceived.

Occasionally, however, one comes across a hint that not everyone in the West is fast asleep. In a BBC 'Assignment' television programme, entitled 'Disputed Borderlands', broadcast in Britain on 5th November 1994<sup>159</sup>, the reporter, Mr Allan Little, asked a senior Ukrainian Government official named Boris Tarasiuk a highly intelligent leading question concerning the intended location of the centre of gravity of the intended 'collective security system':

**BORIS TARASIUK:** 'We have to design a new approach, a new concept of all-European security, which will be freed from the division of the Continent into military blocs'.

**ALLAN LITTLE:** 'Where would the centre of gravity in such a system be, where would the real decision-making power lie?'

**BORIS TARASIUK** [unable to prevent himself from breaking into a broad smile on-camera]: 'Very interesting question. It's a question for... to be a subject for a special conference. Well, I could tell you that I know the answer to this question, but I would prefer rather not to answer it.'

**ALLAN LITTLE:** 'What's your... well, what are your doubts about it?'

**BORIS TARASIUK** [still looking uncomfortable at having been asked a pertinent question by a Western journalist, probably for the first time in his life]: 'Well, I think that the time hasn't come yet for giving an answer'.

The time had not yet come to reveal that the system of 'collective security' - on which Moscow has focused ever since the Comintern decreed it to be the key objective - is to be centred on Moscow itself. The reason the time was not yet ripe, and was still not ripe as this book went to press, was that Western military power had not yet been 'irrevocably' collectivised.

In the meantime, Soviet-Chinese military power, buttressed by the Good Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Feder-

ation and the People's Republic of China, signed in Moscow during the official state visit of the Chinese Communist Party Chairman Jiang Zemin on 15-18 July 2001\*, continues to expand and to test the boundaries of Western tolerance, which seem to be without limit. In October 2001, the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, announced that Russian-Chinese ties had reached 'an unprecedentedly high level' since the signing of the treaty, although the two powers have worked seamlessly (and dialectically) together in pursuit of their shared World Revolutionary objectives for over half a century. Yet although President Bush Jr. - echoing Lady Thatcher's similar comment that she 'could do business with' Gorbachev in 1984 - had said glowingly of President Putin on 24th July 2001 that 'this is a man with whom I can have an honest dialogue', it was reported on 28th November 2001 that Russia had sold two guided missile destroyers to China equipped with the lethal Russian SSN-22 Sunburn missile, developed under Presidents Yeltsin and Putin by 'financially strapped' Russia. And ITAR-TASS, the official news organisation, reported on the same day that the state-controlled Rosoboronekспорт agency, which markets Soviet military-industrial complex output worldwide, had blocked the sale to Boeing Corporation of copies of the X-31A air-launched anti-ship missile. Boeing, 'taking Russia at its word' that it is 'no longer the enemy', had entered the market for this weaponry on normal commercial terms. The equipment contains technical information believed to be useful for US military intelligence in developing defences against the Russian SSN-22; but the sale was reportedly prohibited by the Russian authorities because it would 'infringe on Russia's defence interests'. On 24th July 2001, The Washington Times reported that officials connected with US State Department and Coast Guard arrangements for monitoring the activities of Russian merchant vessels had concluded that Moscow was continuing, as under overt Communism, to use its merchant fleet to spy on sensitive US defence and military facilities, including nuclear submarines.

These are typical examples of frequently encountered, open semi-technical reports which make it clear that - below the highest levels of contact between presidents, prime ministers and secretaries-general, where reality is distorted through the prism of the panoply of power - Russia and its closest Leninist World Revolution ally remain determined and deadly enemies of the United States. As for the European powers, their capitulation to the Leninist collectivist agenda is in the process of decapitating their ability to project military power independently, although their possession of military resources has not yet been neutralised.

The main psychological weapon being deployed by the Leninist strategists to achieve this primary objective is Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking' - which is nothing less than an ongoing influence-building offensive against the West designed to bend the Western mind so that its preferences come to conform

\*COMMUNIST CHINESE WORLD REVOLUTION OBJECTIVE: That Communist China seeks the global victory of Lenin's World Revolution is confirmed in the 'Foreword by the Editor' contained in 'The Perestroika Deception', by Anatoliy Golitsyn, page XXIV [ISBN 1-899798-03-X]. The following passage from that Foreword is reproduced here verbatim:

"Behind the impressive smokescreen of pseudo-democracy, pseudo-capitalism and pseudo-reform, this Russian-Chinese 'cooperation-blackmail strategy' is irreconcilably hostile to the West. Again, this is no mere presumption. It was explicitly confirmed in May 1994 to Clark Bowers, a member of an official US Republican delegation to Peking, by Mr Mo Xiusong, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, who is believed to be the highest-ranking Chinese Communist official ever to have answered questions put to him by a knowledgeable Western expert on Communism;

BOWERS: "Is the long-term aim of the Chinese Communist Party still world Communism?"

MO XIUSONG: "Yes, of course. That is the reason we exist".



exactly with those of the Soviet collective of continuing Leninist World Revolutionaries. The extent to which this objective has been achieved was disturbingly revealed when George Robertson, while serving as Mr Blair's Defence Secretary, and long before his elevation to the peerage and to the position of NATO's Secretary-General, was interviewed by The Daily Telegraph, in the issue of 4th November 1997, spouting 'post'-Soviet strategy in the very language and syntax used by the experts working for Soviet intelligence who have developed the methodology of the collective's psychological offensive over the years. It was undoubtedly, in part, as a consequence of this interview, that the Labour Party expert on Soviet affairs was suddenly translated to his NATO post, where he is probably Moscow's most promiscuous and dedicated 'agent of change' and instrument of 'convergence'.

This is how we can really disarm', the then British Defence Secretary told the London newspaper. 'Disarmament of the mind'. Recalling the methods used in the 1950s and 1960s by Moral Rearmament, allegedly Soviet-inspired psychological warfare experiment based on group confession and alleged prospective blackmail, Mr Robertson pronounced: 'It works. Deploying the military to reduce the threat

(from the Russian military) can be done... by joint military work'. The Russian military didn't trust politicians; and 'no wonder, after 50 years of Communism' [sic!]. Then Mr Robertson revealed how far his mind has strayed from reality. Echoing Andrei Kozyrev's remarks about the 'net of relationships' which Moscow had developed in order to entrap the West, but either failing to comprehend the meaning of his own observations or understanding only too well what he was saying, Robertson added: 'The network of institutional relationships keeps growing and so many people are involved that it would now be impossible to go to war, because people are tied up in committees all the time'.

Thus, after barely a decade and a half of hyperactive strategic deception operations, the Moscow strategic collective had reduced the United Kingdom's defence thinking to this: since NATO and Russian officials were, as a result of the ever-growing network of institutionalised relationships in Europe, so heavily engaged in committee meetings, war was now out of the question. This comment was just as mindless as Lord Robertson's reported remarks in Moscow in November 2001, which prompted questions in many capitals (including, believe it or not, in Moscow) as to why such a buffoon had been appointed to such a crucial position. If a junior politician were to make observations as uniformly perverse as those for which this man has been responsible, his career would surely be foreshortened.

In the political firmament, the only figures who may possess the degree of arrogance needed to make remarks in public as crass and outrageous as those Lord Robertson is in the habit of making, are Bolsheviks. Lord Robertson may be merely what Lenin called a 'useful idiot'. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is curious that his public comments cited here appear to have been lifted directly from the dated Soviet propaganda of the early 1990s. Lord Robertson rarely says anything original. His public remarks even lack the subtlety of Boris Yeltsin, one of the least polished of Bolsheviks, who intoned at a press conference in Moscow with President Clinton on 2nd September 1998: 'There will be enough events to ensure results'.

If war is now 'out of the question', the British Defence Secretary of the day should have asked himself why the 'post'-Soviets still maintained a stockpile of up to 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons, why they were not destroying warheads as they

had been expected and had undertaken to do, and why they had developed and deployed Topol-M, their new space-launched intercontinental missile system against which the West was believed to have inadequate redress. These three-stage, solid fuel rockets which measure 75 feet in length, weigh 47.2 tons, and can deliver nuclear warheads 16,000 miles away, had been tested since 1994 160, even though the West's 'ally and partner', Boris Yeltsin, was supposed to be a peaceable 'fellow democrat'.

When the new Russian Defense Minister and former Chief of the Russian Rocket Forces, Igor Sergeev, unveiled what he called this '21st Century Weapon' at a ceremony on 24th December 1997, at Saratov, he declared that no anti-missile technology existed which was capable of neutralising these deadly space-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lord Robertson, in his later manifestation as NATO Secretary-General, should have been concerned about such claims, and should have wondered why, for instance, the Russians were engaged in testing their lethal Shkvall (Squall) and Scorpion anti-ship torpedo-type weapons, capable of unprecedentedly rapid underwater speeds, if 'disarmament of the mind' was truly a reality. One shudders to imagine how much vodka must have been consumed in the Kremlin on the news of Robertson's appointment to the top NATO posting.

Meanwhile, as the 'network of institutional relationships' which Robertson imagines preclude war, keeps expanding, so will the ability of the Western powers to deploy effective military power be ever more progressively diminished. Lord Robertson's naive illusions (unless he is an agent himself) are rooted in the erroneous perception that 'post'-Communist Russian words, actions and undertakings can be trusted, and upon a failure to understand that the cast of actors in Moscow consists entirely of unreconstructed professional Leninist world revolutionary activists.

Robertson may not realise that whereas Western policymakers normally approach compromise in good faith, the revolutionary concept of compromise is entirely different. Professional revolutionaries are taught to compromise only if in doing so, the interests of the Revolution are thereby advanced. For them, compromise is always provisional, since their objectives never change. As the revolutionary Gerry Adams pronounced after the conclusion of that unsatisfactory accord in Belfast on 10th April 1998 known as 'the Good Friday Agreement': 'This is just a phase in our straggle. That straggle must continue until it reaches its final goal'<sup>161</sup>

That was a perfect summary of the revolutionary dialectical approach - by a contemporary open disciple of Lenin, who actually models not only his speech but also his appearance, complete with the beard, upon his evil dead mentor. For Mr Adams, though, Lenin is alive. Adams is not 'out of his mind': he's 'in Lenin's mind'.

Adams is simply one of the more prominent Leninist revolutionary supporters of violence masquerading as 'peaceful' democrats on the European stage at the beginning of the new century. According to the Soviet compendium 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism', 'the parliamentary method of transition to socialism... would at once endow it with the necessary authority, facilitating the necessary transformations'. In postwar Czechoslovakia, with parliament having been converted into a riotous, revolutionary assembly, the badly shaken opposition fell apart, enabling a draconian land 'reform' (confiscation) bill to be passed - whereupon parliamentary resistance to the Communist conspiracy came to an end. The analysis by Jan Kozak of how the Czechoslovak Assembly was hijacked [see page 72], shows that where possible, the Leninists prefer to secure control by legal or seemingly legal methods.

## 'AN ELABORATE MAZE OF COMPULSIVE LIES'

As suggested earlier, many of the changes of prominent Leninist personnel observable on the Moscow stage at frequent intervals since the false 'changes', have been intended, in part, to confuse the enemy by throwing the validity of past statements by implementers of the deception strategy into doubt. Typically, members of the 'General Staff of the Revolution' are ordered around like employees of Western conglomerates: one day they are serving as a deputy in the controlled, packed Duma; another day, they have surfaced in an important (Party) post, or in the structures - just as a Western executive finds himself appointed to be Public Relations Officer at

a plant in Akron, Ohio, one year, and is summoned back to Head Office two years later to be assistant to the Vice-President. One moment Andrei Kozyrev is Foreign Minister; the next, he surfaces as a Deputy in the State Duma. One week Vladimir Lukin is Russian Ambassador to Washington; the next, he has joined Kozyrev in the rubber-stamp legislature. By shifting key revolutionaries from one position to another, the strategists procure that doubts in the untutored Western pragmatic mind about the relevance or permanence of their publicly expressed views are left hanging in mid-air, are never resolved, and hence are always liable to become the subject of doubt or sterile debate. This compounds the maze of strategic lies, and helps to protect their perpetrators and the World Revolution from exposure.

Tomas Schuman (a.k.a. Yuriy Bezmenov: see page VIII), a Soviet defector long resident in the United States, used to say that 'the Soviet system is an elaborate maze of compulsive lies. We cheat everywhere, on any occasion, through all the ages, and for a variety of purposes, or without any'. 'We do it naturally', a bright young Russian government official admitted to Hendrick Smith, author of 'The Russians' [Ballantine Books, New York 1997-88, page 21]. 'It is to our advantage... It is a very important feature of our national character'. What the Russian whizzkid failed to add was that the Soviets/Russians cheat, lie, deceive and enjoy pulling the wool over foreigners' eyes, which is almost a national sport, because the vast constituency consisting of covert Party members, overt Komsomol cadres, nomenklaturists, the intelligence community and the armed forces - the 'General Staff' - is steeped in Leninism: all are disciples of Lenin, and are 'in Lenin's mind'.

One can imagine a pragmatic sceptic in the West, in response to some of

what has been explained in this book, protesting that 'Gorbachev is no longer in power' - or that 'Andrei Kozyrev's statements when Russian Foreign Minister are no longer of any interest because he was replaced by Primakov and then by Ivanov and is now only a Duma deputy'. Such an attitude equates the members of the Leninist strategic collective and their implementers - all of whom are dedicated life-long loyalists to the strategy and the revolutionary cause - with Western career politicians who are perceived to be driven by self-interest, and who compete with their colleagues for power. But the Leninists could not be more different: they do not 'compete' among themselves after the manner of Western politicians. They compete among themselves only in respect of the ardour with which they can contribute to the realisation and completion of the mad collectivisation objectives of Lenin's World Revolution. They are out of their minds, but in Lenin's mind.

Since the murder of Brezhnev, and especially after Gorbachev's 'victory' over Romanov, any tendency towards competition between the revolutionary players for Soviet power has in any case been decisively replaced by revolutionary coopera-

tion, which makes for smooth transfers of power as occurred when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were replaced, unlike the retrograde murderous episodes which ended the supreme tenures under the strategy collective, of Brezhnev and of Andropov himself. This 'new spirit' reflects what Yeltsin described at the 27th Congress in February 1986 as 'that Bolshevik spirit, that Leninist optimism, that call to struggle against the old and the outmoded, in the name of the new' [see page 40].

Having 'banished' internal tensions by adopting, among themselves, a truly collectivist approach to the completion of Lenin's World Revolution, the strategists and 'General Staff' are so encouraged by the inherent promise and proven success over the years of their deception strategy, that they are not slow to boast that the whole world is required to adapt to global collectivism, prior to adopting it - as was explained by Andrei Kozyrev in the course of an interview on 4th December 1992, on Mayak Radio. Notwithstanding that the 'socialist camp' was supposed to have vanished into thin air, this brilliant Leninist implementer pronounced that:

'We are talking about... a principled choice for Russia's course and consequently, to a considerable extent for the course to be pursued by the other states not only of the Commonwealth of Independent States, not only of the former Soviet Union, but also of the whole so-called socialist camp... because of the reality which consists of the fact that the Russian Federation has been at the centre of that configuration and is today economically, culturally and in many other senses certainly the locomotive which by the direction and speed of its movement determines the direction and speed of movement of other states'<sup>162</sup>.

During a trip to Iran in April 1994<sup>163</sup>, Kozyrev pronounced, according to ITAR-TASS... that his visit 'is not a turn away from the West; we shall not turn away from the West anywhere, but a mere consideration of the fact that Russia is a great power and it must, and is, playing on all chessboards of world politics abiding by corresponding rules. We are Christians where it is appropriate, we are Europeans in Europe and Muslims in the orient'<sup>164</sup>. This approach to 'Life', Andrei Kozyrev added, was 'not hypocrisy, but Russia's multi-faced image'.

A more intrinsically Leninist statement from such an authoritative source could surely not be imagined. 'We are dealing', as the son of a well-known Soviet emigre, who had served Stalin, pointed out to the Author in the early 1990s, 'with 100% cynicism'<sup>165</sup>. Thus these Leninists even take pride in advertising the fact that they are never to be trusted -by anyone, Christians, Europeans or Muslims. For the intend, when the time is ripe, as Lenin prescribed, to 'apply offensive tactics in the strictest sense of the word'. As Anatoliy Golitsyn has written: 'The Soviet transition to a new political structure shows that the strategists are thinking, planning and ing in broad terms, way beyond the imagination of Western politicians'<sup>166</sup>.

The Russian political elite 'do not regard Communism as defeated. On the contrary, they see reforms and 'democratisation' as the means of carrying forward their longstanding strategy of 'convergence' with and victory over the West'<sup>167</sup>.

'When the right moment comes, the mask will be dropped and the Russians with Chinese help will seek to impose their system on the West on their own terms as the culmination of a 'Second October Socialist Revolution'<sup>168</sup>.

Yet the West, fast asleep, has so far opted for the laziest, easiest choice: to take these dedicated, ruthless, disciplined Leninist revolutionaries' false image at face value. It will certainly come to regret this millennial error, the scale of which

cannot be adequately expressed in words. In Europe, where Lenin's Revolution is being completed at breakneck speed by the EU Collective, assisted by dedicated collectivising national governments - the most efficient revolutionary combination yet devised - the pain on awakening will be severe, on economic grounds alone. It was interesting that the European Commission acknowledged, in its ELI Economy 2001 Review, that the common interest rate system had - as this Author and others had predicted for years ahead of currency collectivisation - caused severe problems for a number of EU members, namely Ireland, Portugal, Finland, The Netherlands and Spain, for which 'a significantly higher interest rate would have been appropriate'.

As Eurofacts, published in London by Global Britain, explained, the European Commission's report described Portugal's position as 'alarming', admitting that 'the Irish economy [too] is vulnerable to violent swings in the economic cycle because it has more in common with the British and US economies than with Continental Europe'. Commenting on Ireland's current economic difficulties, Bernard Connolly, a former high-ranking EU official [see pages VII and XIII - Ed.] wrote in 77K Irish Times on 31st December: 'It is ironic that this humiliation should come just a few days after Argentina was reduced to riots, 27 deaths, debt default and a state of siege. What Argentina is suffering now, Ireland will very likely suffer over the next two or three years'<sup>169</sup>. This is the penalty the Irish will pay for their ideological determination to separate themselves politically from Britain.

The 'captive nations' of the socialist European Union do not yet realise that they form part of a regional collective space which will precisely match the Soviets' openly stated intentions, as expressed so clearly by President Gorbachev himself in the course of his Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo in June 1992 [see also pages XII and XXXIII]: Our vision of the European space from the Atlantic to the Urals is not that of a closed system. Since it includes the Soviet Union, which reaches to the shores of the Pacific, it goes beyond nominal geographical boundaries'<sup>170</sup>.

To anyone who thought that the Soviet Union had 'collapsed' in December 1991, that statement - made in a prepared, written, formal speech to a worldwide audience six months after the 'collapse' of the USSR, so that the reference to the Soviet Union was clearly no mistake - provides the necessary corrective.

The outstanding question might seem to be this: was the 'European project', which originated from a Pan-German blueprint, as reviewed in Part Two, hijacked by Soviet-style Leninist collectivism using the usual method of penetration, or was it a collectivist project from the outset? The question would be misplaced, for the Pan-German version, honed by the National Socialist (Nazi) International, is also collectivist. Thus the Soviet and the German dimensions represent yet another dialectic - or, what is perhaps more easily understood, two components of the same pincer movement. So, perhaps a more appropriate question is whether the two idolatrous powers, the covert Soviet Union and Germany, which are promoting this 'New Form' of hell on earth, are actually in competition - the one promoting 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' and the other 'building' 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals', even as they collaborate openly and, as will be revealed, in secret. This question is resolved at the end of this book.

In the meantime, in Britain, responsibility for the crisis of sovereignty rests with those national politicians who were deceived from the beginning by the guile of the collective, and who lacked the vision and determination to renounce it. ■

## APPENDIX: 'REFORMATION' OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE REVOLUTION

The origins of the Soviet strategy to replace the Stalinist control model with a refurbished, globally exportable Leninist model of the World Revolution, upon which the completion of European collectivism depends, is traceable from Soviet published sources. The radical new, post-Stalin strategy which was to be realised by the intelligence services on the basis of fresh instructions from the Communist Party's Central Committee, was first revealed formally at the 21st Soviet Communist Extraordinary Party Congress held in Moscow in January 1959, when the Chairman of the Committee of State Security [KGB - Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti], Comrade Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin, announced the Party's decision to revert to the methods of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy's Cheka - which, in addition to carrying out its repression and terror 'duties', was also the main instrument for the 'creative' implementation of Leninist deception strategy. The Communist Party's decision involved developing the full potential of the security services to enable them to mobilise and maximise the aggregate resources available to the Party in pursuit of a revitalised global revolutionary deception strategy. Shelepin described this 'General Plan' in the following disguised Aesopian language:

'We are all familiar with the enormous work of Comrade Feliks Dzerzhinsky [Lenin's Cheka chief] and the methods employed by the state security agencies in the first years of the Soviet regime.... In adopting measures to improve the work of the Cheka machinery [sic], we are obligated to strive, with the assistance and under the direction of the Party organisations, for improvement in training all the state security agencies' personnel in the spirit of the Party Central Committee's demands and the glorious traditions of the Cheka, and to endeavour to restore and introduce into all our activity the style and methods of work of the splendid Bolshevik Dzerzhinsky [APPLAUSE]<sup>171</sup>... [Lenin] insisted that this institution be confined to sphere of the purely political'.

What emerged from this statement, and from 'a great deal [that] has been accomplished in this respect in recent years [since Stalin's death - Ed.] under the direction of the Party Central Committee', as Shelepin put it, was the 'Shelepin Plan', which consolidated and implemented the Party Central Committee's upgraded revolutionary directives. The primary feature of the Plan was that the intelligence services' resources were to be redirected towards planning, developing and realising the full potential of its skills and assets, especially the strategic deception tradition inherited from the legacy of Lenin and Dzerzhinsky. Deception and drugs were to be given the highest priority, while Soviet Military Intelligence was to develop those revolutionary dimensions for which it was best suited, including the promotion of international terrorism in tandem with drug operations (both of which were launched in the 1960s). Other components of the multi-dimensional 'peacetime' offensive against the West which were to be run by the intelligence services under Party direction were to include 'the Gramsci dimension' to build on the degrading consequences of the spread of drug addiction to promote and universalise moral permissiveness and to destroy national institutions, and 'criminalism' to maximise the opportunities which the drug offensive would open up so that organised criminal activity - Lenin's 'criminal state' - could be distributed worldwide as a means of corrupting the banking system and corporations, destabilising governments where possible, and discrediting capitalism (with which criminal activity was to be compared and equated). 'We must', intoned Comrade Shelepin, untiringly strengthen the state security agencies.... There need be no doubt, Comrades, that the personnel of the state security agencies, under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee' would do everything that was now demanded of them.

The next progress report on the 'Shelepin Plan' surfaced in October 1961, which was a most uncomfortable month for the whole world. It was the month when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened its Twenty-Second Congress, which was held in the Kremlin's newly completed 'Palace of Congresses' - a modern structure built of marble pylons and glass, with seating for 6,000 people. The huge new auditorium, which had been completed for the occasion, was built to accommodate 4,408 'voting' delegates (4,394 attended) and 405 non-

voting delegates, who arrived armed with a so-called 'consultative vote'. The huge list of delegates, indicating the exceptional importance of this Congress, was more than three and a half times the size of any of the three preceding Congresses - the last of which, the Twenty-First Congress, had been held with 1,269 'voting' and 106 non-voting delegates<sup>172</sup>.

The Twenty-Second Congress was preceded by the ostentatious launching of a Soviet multi-stage ballistic missile fired into a target area in the Central Pacific - a distance of some 8,000 miles from the launch site. A series of widely publicised nuclear weapons tests was conducted while the Congress was in session; and Nikita S. Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Party, took the opportunity to inform the Congress of the successful detonation of a 50-megaton hydrogen bomb. The Stenographic Report<sup>173</sup> of the Congress further confirmed that Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union had a 100-megaton bomb, but would refrain from detonating it, because "even [if this were done] in the most remote places, we could still break our own windows".

The full significance of this unprecedented firework display in the atmosphere was not understood either at the time or subsequently - although Western experts were duly awed, as intended, by this intimidating manifestation of global terror by means of such pyrotechnics. For these sudden, massive Soviet atmospheric tests were 'by far the largest and most extensive any nation had ever conducted - including instrumented high-altitude shots, ABM experiments, and two detonations in the 40 to 70 megaton range'<sup>174</sup>. Following the Soviet tests, the United States conducted several small underground tests, after the completion of which Khrushchev publicly announced that the Soviets 'regret the decision by the United States Government to resume nuclear tests'<sup>175</sup>, a claim rightly identified by specialists as a prime example of the Leninist revolutionary technique of 'offensive denial'<sup>176</sup>.

Understandably impressed by this crude orgy of implied terror on a global scale - which was all the more intimidating because the tests broke an existing moratorium on atmospheric tests - Western analysts naturally interpreted Khrushchev's firework display in terms of the arms race and evolving arms control criteria. This appeared to be a valid response, given military intelligence requirements and the urgent need for an accurate Western understanding

of the meaning of these unprecedented events. Moreover Mikhail Gorbachev, employed the same Leninist 'in your face' technique of 'offensive denial' 25 years later, in response to President Reagan's announcement in May 1986 that the United States would not comply with SALT II unless the Soviets stopped cheating. Gorbachev's angry response, like Khrushchev's, was aptly described as 'an excellent example of offensive denial coupled with a threat that US actions would require Soviet counteractions that would only lead to another needless escalation of the "arms race"<sup>177</sup>.

But the full significance of Khrushchev's Bold Bolshevik Breach of the moratorium on atmospheric tests only becomes clear when seen in the context of the huge Congress which accompanied it. For it was at the Twenty-Second Congress that the leadership unveiled nothing less than the long-range strategic deception programme, based on the groundwork laid down by the 'Shelepin Plan', which was to be ratified at a Congress of 81 Communist Parties on 6th December that year, to promote Lenin's Revolution throughout the world using the full potential of the strategic deception tradition and assets of the immense global Communist network. The means to be employed would include 'convergence', to be procured in such a manner as that the West would be brought, using principles of deception developed by the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun-Tzu, to believe that 'convergence' of the Communist with the capitalist systems would be achieved on the West's terms - whereas the Leninists intended the opposite, namely that that the 'New World Order' will be Communist.

As the late Israeli-Russian analyst Avraham Shifrin explained to this Author, the plan would involve building on 'their main method - sending and creating agents of influence in every sphere of Western society, be it the sciences, the arts, literature, education, politics, or anything else - and constantly guiding these agents who are supposed to play the chief role in changing the psychological climate in Western society so as to facilitate the fulfilment of the final goal, which is ripping the free Western countries of their present independence and merging them into a New World Order under One World Government. They believe

that this 'One World Government' will be Communist, and you can trust them: it will be. Until that final stage, the Communists and the West will work hand in hand, although every now and again there are some differences of opinion about the methods employed"<sup>178</sup>.

In this context, the unprecedented display of Soviet nuclear power which preceded and accompanied the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress was not only intended to intimidate the whole world, and to confuse the enemy, but even more importantly to celebrate, in the most arrogant, headline-catching manner that could be devised, the final ratification by the Soviet Communist Party of an agreed long-range deception strategy for the realisation of the objectives of Lenin's World Revolution.

The progress of the 'Shelepin Plan' to maximise the domestic and world revolutionary potential of the Soviet intelligence services was duly reviewed at the CPSU's 22nd Congress. Mikhail Gorbachev, who rose early in his career to be Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Stavropol regional Komsomol Committee - and who, as Golitsyn points out, was 'neither the originator of the strategy nor the father of Soviet democracy', but was chosen by the strategists to preside over the 'perestroika' phase<sup>179</sup> - was among the 4,394 delegates who attended the 22nd Congress, held in that brand new modernistic, glass, steel and concrete Palace of Congresses<sup>180</sup>. Mikhail Gorbachev was therefore familiar, from the outset in 1961, with the 'Shelepin Plan' and with its imperative on behalf of the Party to maximise the intelligence services' strategic deception potential. For it was at this Congress that Shelepin was able to announce the completion of the wholesale reorganisation of the KGB in line with Dzerzhinsky's alleged model, so that the Soviet intelligence services would henceforth be in charge of managing, developing and maximising the resources and 'creative' possibilities of the global revolutionary deception strategy under the Party's instructions: 'The state security agencies', Shelepin told the 22nd Congress, including the young delegate Gorbachev, 'have been reorganised... relieved of functions not proper to them.... The Party has restored true Leninist style and methods of work in the state security agencies. An exceptionally big role is being played in the activities of the agencies of the State Security Committee and the Party organisations, which have taken a worthy and fitting place in all our work'<sup>181</sup>.

This is the textual authority for our knowledge that (a) the intelligence services were directed by the Party after the death of Stalin to realise and maximise the full global revolutionary potential of the Party-State, and (b) that the Soviet Communist Party and the intelligence services are, to a considerable degree, interchangeable. The Party penetrated the state security agencies in 1959-61 and thereafter, which presupposes that the same occurred in reverse. These sources also explain why and how the KGB, under Yuriy Andropov and later, acquired an enhanced presence in the Politburo; why most of the prominent players on the Moscow stage under Yeltsin were identifiable as KGB or GRU officers; why the top intelligence officer Colonel Vladimir Putin, who began his career in Soviet Military Intelligence [GRU], was imposed by the strategy collective, as Boris Yeltsin's successor; and why President Putin was reported in 2001 to be systematically installing GRU officer-in-sensitive positions throughout the structures of the Revolutionary 'General Staff'.

In reality, Lenin's Cheka was not initially the sophisticated instrument of strategic deception evoked by Shelepin: its deception skills, based on Lenin's directives, were gained during implementation of the later 'New Economic Policy' and the 'Trust' scam. The decree ordering the foundation of the Cheka - the Russian word for 'linchpin', made up from the organisation's Russian title meaning the 'All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution Speculation, and Sabotage', promulgated on 20th December 1917 on Lenin's order - required the Cheka to (1) persecute and liquidate all attempts and acts of counter-revolution and sabotage all over Russia, no matter what their origin; (2) hand over to the Revolutionary Tribunal all counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs and work out measures of struggle against them; and (3) make preliminary investigations only in so far as that may be necessary for suppression"<sup>182</sup>. By February 1918, the Cheka had pub-



licly trusted local revolutionary councils to seek out and shoot immediately a large swathe of opponents, counter-revolutionaries, enemy agents and spies, agitators, speculators, organisers of revolt against the Government, arms traders and others to whom Cheka agents might be expected arbitrarily to take a disliking. Significantly, when meting out praise to the Cheka and its successors, Shelepin dialectically contradicted the 'line' about KGB 'reform' that he had espoused earlier in his speech, when he had added that 'we shall continue mercilessly to punish all enemies of the Soviet people' [APPLAUSE], meaning of course the enemies of the revolutionary Leninist clique. For, as John Barron explained in his book 'KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents' [1974]<sup>183</sup>, Lenin had perceived that as a minority representing virtually no-one but themselves, the Communists could survive and rule only through force'. Therefore, 'The Shelepin Plan', while paying lip-service to the reform of the intelligence services by redeploying them on revolutionary and strategic deception development work, in reality expanded their role enormously.

In his comment on the repeated 'reorganisations' of the KGB [see page 69], Anatoliy Golitsyn concurred with John Barron that 'since the days of the Cheka, the secret political police has been reorganised and retitled many times, becoming successively the GPU, the OGPU, the GUGB/NKVD, the NKGB, the MGB and the KI, and the KGB\*' [and subsequently, of course, the variously relabelled segments of the KGB such as the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) or Russian External Intelligence Service, and the Agentsvo Federalnoy

\*On 6th February 1922, the hated Cheka was 'abolished' and replaced by the GPU, the State Political Directorate, which was made a subordinate division of the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. When the Soviet Republics were federated in 1923 to form the USSR, the GPU became the OGPU, or Unified State Political Directorate, and was detached from the NKVD. After the OGPU had presided over the dispossession and collectivisation of about 10 million peasants and millions had perished, and had acquired a reputation for terror matching that of the Cheka, a further name-change was required. On 10th July 1934, Stalin reconstituted the OGPU as the GUGB, the Directorate for State Security, and again made it part of the NKVD, choosing as head of the NKVD Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda, who had zealously directed the slaughter of the peasants, terrorised the intelligentsia, and suppressed political minorities. The NKVD controlled the conventional police (militia), the border guards, internal troops, the concentration and labour camps, much of the transportation system, and a large number of economic enterprises (the source of the intelligence services' expertise in 'biznes'and underground criminalist activities). After removing Yagoda (who was later put on show-trial and shot), Stalin appointed Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, known as the 'bloody dwarf'. Stalin fired him in 1938, probably because he knew too much about the purges, and he was eventually shot in the Lubyanka, where Yagoda had also perished. The ambitious disciple of Stalin, Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria, replaced Yezhov as head of the NKVD. By 1941, as a result of ever-expanding forced labour programmes, the NKVD was managing a large part of Soviet industry and virtually the whole of Siberia. These responsibilities were so onerous and unrelated to the basic work of the secret political police, that it was decided to detach the GUGB from the NKVD, which again became 'independent' and was retitled NKGB (People's Commissariat for State Security). Beria

remained head of the NKVD but tried to retain effective control of the new NKGB by persuading Stalin to accept one of his personal proteges, Vsevolod Nikolaevich Merkulov, as its director. In 1946, the NKGB and the NKVD acquired the status of Ministries. The NKGB became the MGB (Ministry for State Security) and the NKVD became the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). The odious Lavrentii Beria was elevated to the Politburo and was succeeded as head of the MVD by Lieutenant General Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov. In 1947, Stalin established the KI (Committee of information), which absorbed all the foreign sections of the MGB and some units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much to the fury of the Armed Forces, it also took over the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). John Barron's description of KI officers is colourful: As they showed up in Western capitals with their baggy suits and belligerent manners, these veterans of the prewar purges reinforced the gangsterlike reputation Soviet intelligence had acquired in the 1930s'. In 1951, Beria, accommodated by Georgiy Malenkov, betrayed the head of the KI, General Viktor Semonovich Abakumov, who was arrested. In the autumn of 1951, Semen Denisovich Ignatiev became director of the MGB, which now regained its former responsibilities for clandestine operations abroad. At Stalin's death, Beria manoeuvred to depose both Kruglov and Ignatiev, and merged the MGB with the MVD, of which he now assumed personal charge. He thereby gathered under his direct control the political police, their foreign operations, the militia, some 300,000 special troops, the concentration and labour camps and their inmates, and a substantial segment of Soviet industry, including the nuclear and missile programme. Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov (Scriabyn) knew what fate awaited them unless they countered Beria at once. According to unconfirmed reports, he was shot by two Generals who jumped out of cupboards as he entered a room in the Kremlin for a meeting of the Politburo. However the official version was that Beria was arrested on 26th June 1953. On Christmas Eve 1953, Pravda announced that Beria had been shot for having been, among other things, a foreign spy. The new leaders reorganised the entire system of repression, as Beria had attempted to do, and on 13th March 1954, the formation of the KGB was announced. The all-powerful Special Commission (Stalin's Inquisition) which, in concert with the secret police, had tried and sentenced political prisoners in the 1930s, was abolished. The GRU was left alone, and the MVD was greatly reduced in size and importance, although it subsequently reacquired awesome powers of repression. In 1973, the Soviet leadership invited the KGB Chairman, Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov into full membership of the Politburo. The main source for this information is John Barron's classic work, 'KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents' [Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1974]. The global revolutionary role of the 'post-Soviet secret intelligence services is now greater than ever.

Bezopasnosti (AFB) or Federal Security Service]. 'But their mentality ideals and aims have always been the same. So has their relationship to Soviet rulers, the Party and the people', whom they repress. In this respect, the emphasis which has been placed in this book on differentiation between the Stalinist and the Leninist models, which is necessary in order to illustrate Gorbachev's remit in simple 'shorthand' language, can perhaps be misleading. For Stalin was a consummate Leninist: 'He merely took the Soviet people further down the path Lenin clearly charted, with ghastly consequences that have now been well documented'.

Barron made the point that Stalinism was a variation of Leninism; and since the sinister overtones of Leninism imply pressure, harassment, intimidation and coercion, and ultimately violence, the Leninist model represents no form of 'improvement' over the Stalinist one. Its relevance for the present stages of the World Revolution is that it is simply more flexible. But, as Golitsyn has warned, it sets the stage for a 'reversion' to Stalinism, in its sense as a de facto synonym for mass violence and terror.

The Leninist European Union, which is acquiring and accumulating powers which will be expanded over time to be comparable to the Leninist terror-state, is therefore preparing the basis for the exercise of mass terror, which may be deployed once its false legitimacy has collapsed along with the Euro and its other collectivist attempts to 'organise... relations between the Member States and their peoples'.

Europe will again experience the knock on the door at dead of night.

The way terror became the basis of Soviet Communism was described by Barron as follows: 'By 1924, when Lenin lay disabled and dying from strokes' (he died, appropriately enough, rumour has it, from creeping paralysis brought on by syphilis, but according to the autopsy, 'from cardio-respiratory arrest following a brain haemorrhage in a context of atherosclerosis'<sup>184</sup> - Ed.), he had already cast the mould of future Soviet society. He had bequeathed the Russian people dictatorship by an oligarchy, supported by a privileged New Class, wholly dependent upon a political secret police force. He had securely established the principle, practice and mechanism of political police force and terror as the foundation of the dictatorship. Concentration camps, arrests on the basis of class, sentences and executions without trial, the extorted confession for purposes of a show trial, the hidden informant, the concept of "merciless mass terror", were introduced not by Stalin, but by Lenin. The terror decreed decades later as Stalinism was pure Leninism, practised on a grandiose and insane scale'. In short, one could say that Leninism leads inevitably to its 'lower form': Stalinism.

The KGB/GRU are in the driving seat, as announced by the KGB Chairman, A. N. Shelepin himself, in October 1961 - not only because the intelligence services are in charge of managing the prosecution of Lenin's World Revolution under the Party's direction, but also because the KGB today controls the vast flows of funds derived inter alia from the global GRU-controlled drug offensive against the West, which is the most lucrative source of finance for the prosecution of the World Revolution. In her book *The State Within a State: The KGB and its hold on Russia, Present and Future* [Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1994] Yevgenia Albats quoted Aleksandr Shelepin, who had been KGB Chairman from 1958 to 1961, as having said latterly that 'it was precisely with the coming of [Yuri Vladimirovich] Andropov' [who was the powerful Chairman of the KGB for 15 years] that the KGB once again [sic] became a state within the state... Andropov restored everything I tried so hard to liquidate at the KGB'. (Among other gratuitous confusions, Albats - whose written work on the Soviet intelligence services must, in this Author's opinion, be 'handled with care' - obfuscates the strategic continuity between the 'Shelepin Plan' and Gorbachev's 'perestroika').

As mentioned on page 63, on the 80th anniversary of the establishment of Lenin's Cheka under the murderous Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, which occurred on 20th December 1997, President Boris N. Yeltsin - that long-serving Communist, the former First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, who had described the atmosphere at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986 as 'again marked by that Bolshevik spirit, that Leninist optimism' -

celebrated 'Security Citizens' Day', also known as 'Chekist Day', or 'Cheka Day', with a speech praising the Cheka, GPU, the OGPU, the GUGB/NKVD, the NKGB, the MGB and the KI, and the KGB and their 'post-Soviet derivatives, the SVR and the AFB. Similarly, KGB/GRU Colonel Vladimir Putin has been the guest of honour at each successive 'Chekist Day' since December 1999. In his 1997 speech, Yeltsin said:

'As I look back, I realise that we nearly overdid it when we exposed the crimes committed by the security services - the punitive bodies, the cruel state security machine - for there were not only dark periods, but also glorious episodes in their history, of which one may really be proud<sup>185</sup>. Yeltsin was referring to the successful application of the 'Shelepin plan'. Comrade Aleksandr Shelepin concluded his address to the 22nd CPSU Congress by praising 'the truly breathtaking horizons being opened up to us by the magnificent new Programme of the CPSU' [PROLONGED APPLAUSE]. It was in fact this 'magnificent new Programme' of Leninist strategy that the missile pyrotechnics were timed to celebrate, impressing all whom Lenin called 'the interested' with the glory of Soviet power and the Marxist inevitability of the global victory of socialism, now that a foolproof strategic deception plan had been developed to realise the Revolution's full potential.

The Soviet literature indeed contains a number of references to the launch of the long-range Leninist deception strategy during this period - following a decision in principle to revert to the wholesale use of strategic disinformation<sup>186</sup>, as used under Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy A secret training manual written by a GRU officer, Popov, for internal use, was consulted; in about 80 pages, it described, Golitsyn explains in 'New Lies for Old', the technique of disinformation. The Central Committee also reviewed a manual written by KGB Colonel Raina, entitled 'On the Use of Agents of Influence'.

And when writing in 'Proletarian Internationalism: Guideline of the Communists' [1970], the Soviet apparatchik V. Polyansky<sup>187</sup> recorded that: The 1957 and 1960 Moscow Conferences of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties have made a deep imprint on the history of the international Communist movement. They made a major contribution to the devel-

opment of Marxist-Leninist theory. At these conferences, by the collective efforts of the fraternal Parties, the objective laws of development of the world revolutionary process were defined, and the principles of the international strategy of the Communist movement in a new situation elaborated. The Conference did much work on new forms of international ties...'

This statement explicitly confirmed Golitsyn's theme that a long-range strategy was refurbished, upgraded, modernised and mobilised using the 'full potential' of the intelligence services, which were theoretically (though by no means in practice) divested of some of their previous (overt repressive, Stalinist) responsibilities. It knocks on the head the knee-jerk response of all those Western observers who responded that Golitsyn was 'paranoid' (a KGB disinformation and denigration theme which continues to this day) - and that those few analysts who knew he was right, were crazed 'conspiracy theorists'. Referring to the International Conference of Communist Parties held in June 1969 - a follow-up meeting to the Eighty-One Party Conference held in Moscow in December 1961, which ratified the revised long-range strategy - V. Polyansky added that 'the entire proceedings of the Conference were based on Leninist methods of work, typical of the Communist movement, viz., **democratism**, the equality of all Parties in considering the agenda, **collectivist analysis of common problems and joint elaboration of the common political platform**'. The words shown in bold type here are words highlighted by Lenin in his written teaching on the revolutionary use of language, and, with the exception of 'democratism' - a word which the European Union does not yet use, but the essence of which characterises the rigged proceedings of the highly 'undemocratic' European Parliament - are employed extensively in the European Union's Maastricht Treaty and its derivative documentation. Finally, Gorbachev's top strategic adviser, Georgiy Arkadevich Arbatov, writing in his book "The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics"<sup>188</sup>, specifically confirmed Golitsyn's

explanation, in both of his works, that the long-range strategy for spreading the Revolution to the whole world, abolishing nation states and merging them into a global Leninist collective, which was settled in 1957-61 and ratified at the Eighty-One Party Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow on 6th December 1961, was indeed the foundation of Gorbachev's 'perestroika' and the phenomenon of 'collapsible Communism' that followed it.

Implementation of of the strategy may well have been slowed by what the Soviets during Gorbachev's tenure called 'the period of stagnation' under Leonid Ilych Brezhnev - although the Leninist meaning of this phrase is that it was the revolutionary strategy which was stagnating, especially given the need for awaiting the conclusion of the 40-year period during which the occupation of Germany had been mandated by the wartime allies. At all events, in 'The System' [1992], Georgiy Arkadevich Arbatov says that 'one can trace most clearly a direct continuity between the ideas of the Twentieth Party Congress, detente and new political thinking'. Indeed, the implementation of successive 'detentes', culminating in 'perestroika' in preparation for the relaunch of the World Revolutionary model, were direct, intended consequences of strategic decisions taken in the late 1950s. And the central role of the KGB in implementing the Leninist 'changes' of 1989-91 was explicitly confirmed in 1990 by the KGB General who had controlled the dissident-hunting and persecution machinery for Andropov - Filipp Bobkov, Deputy Chairman of the KGB - when he told the Moscow paper *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, that 'we in the KGB contributed quite a bit to the process of perestroika because... without it the Soviet Union could not move ahead'<sup>189</sup>.

The authors' Foreword to the edition of *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*<sup>190</sup> prepared by the CPSU Central Committee's Propaganda Department and first published in Moscow in 1959 to serve as the updated sourcebook of Leninist theory for students and implementers of the Revolution worldwide - lists, next to the name of the project's director, Otto Wilhemovich Kuusinen (a former leader of the Comintern), the name of Georgiy A. Arbatov. Thus Arbatov - Gorbachev's most important strategy adviser, and the author of the campaign to erode the 'image' of the enemy in the late 1980s - was one of the main editors of the official textbook on the long-range disinformation strategy when it was launched 30+ years earlier.

Like many other leading Soviets, Arbatov lost no time in rewriting history - even publishing the Russian edition of 'his' book *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* [first issued by Random House Inc., New York, 1992], in 1991 -before 'the system' had even been 'collapsed' by the KGB, which meant that 'he' would have been drafting the book much earlier than that. This suggests that the Leninist authors of strategic lies do worry about being exposed: at least, they did until the strategists discovered what they had long suspected and what the careful research carried out by the specialist institutes of the Soviet Academy of [Leninist] Sciences had predicted - that even if Western analysts did finally succeed in teasing out the truth and exposing the Bolsheviks' lies with extensive documentation, no-one, least of all in Western policymaking circles, would believe a word of what they had to say. ■

#### A U.S. PRECEDENT FOR 'COLLAPSIBLE COMMUNISM'

'Collapsible Communism' is nothing new. In January 1944, the National Committee of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) agreed to call a Special Convention to dissolve the CPUSA and to establish in its place a 'non-partisan' 'educational association' for the duration of the United States' alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany. A directive had in fact been issued from Moscow mandating the 'dissolution' of the CPUSA. On 20th May 1944, the Convention duly 'dissolved the Party'. The same membership then reconvened to establish the Communist Political Association. A special issue of the CPUSA's journal 'Political Affairs', celebrating 50 years of the CPUSA (1919-1969), reported that 'in keeping with this decision, all forms of organisation based on the shops and industries were eliminated. Only the community clubs remained'. But in the 'Constitution of the Communist Party of the United States of America', published separately as a small booklet by 'Political Affairs', Article IV: Structure, Section 1 [page 13] reads as follows: 'The basic unit of the Communist Party shall be the Club'. Therefore, although formally dissolved, the underlying structure of the CPUSA remained in existence. When the time came for Moscow's directive to be rescinded, the CPUSA was 'reconstituted'. Likewise, when the CPSU was vaguely 'banned' by Gorbachev, its constituent components, focused on the Moscow CPSU Committee, remained operationa.

## Notes and references:

1. 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 43, Number 1, 1997: The German Factor of European Security, by Igor Maksimych, head researcher of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 'If the rebirth of the slogan "common house of Europe" is for some reason undesirable, then there should be a return to the concept of constructing a Great Europe (especially as serious preparatory work has already been performed by a Russian-German-French commission headed by Jacques Chirac back before he was elected President). It would be good to recall Francois Mitterrand's unduly forgotten idea of a European confederation as the final goal of European integration'.

2. The Soviet bilateral treaty offensive, launched under Gorbachev and continued seamlessly into the Yeltsin era - demonstrating a total lack of strategic discontinuity for that reason alone - tied the 'captive' European powers down into a network of bilateral treaties. Following the prearranged 'collapse' of the Soviet Union, the bilateral treaty network was extended to link the controlled, provisionally 'independent' 'former' Soviet Republics to the main Western powers. The significance of this 'treaty offensive' is that the Western powers will be held to their obligations under international law, whereas Russia and the 'former' Republics, being ruled by Leninists, for whom the breaking of solemn undertakings with the 'bourgeoisie' is encouraged when the correlation of forces so permits, will be liable to be in breach of theirs. A partial list of the bilateral treaties and accords with the Soviet Union/ Russia finalised under Gorbachev and Yeltsin includes the following:

- Finland: A bilateral treaty with the USSR initiated in Moscow on 9th December 1989.
  - France: The Treaty on Accord and Cooperation between the USSR and France, signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Mitterrand on 29th October 1990, was never ratified by the Assemblée Nationale. A revised bilateral treaty was signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Mitterrand on 7th February 1992. This contains compromising and burdensome obligations for France, which was thereby converted into an agent for Moscow. France and Russia are obliged to 'build a peaceful Europe with a community of interests endowed with permanent security and cooperation mechanisms' (collective security); to foster 'a European union... providing in particular for the implementation of a joint foreign policy and a security policy'; and to 'strengthen the bonds of solidarity between themselves and among all European states within the framework of a confederative approach'. Hence France is legally bound, under international law, to prepare for its own dissolution within a European Federation. Further, France 'pledges to promote rapprochement between the EC and Russia... assisting its integration in the European economy'. Additionally, 'France shall assist Russia's participation in, or joining of, international financial establishments of which the latter is not a member'. This Treaty binds France so closely to Russia that it can be argued that France is not a viable member of the Western alliance - or, at least, not a member upon which what remains of the decimated alliance could reasonably rely in any crisis. Note, too, that fundamental dimensions of Soviet strategy are enshrined in this Treaty, which also 'just happen' to be enshrined in the European Union collective's 'rolling Treaty' as well.
  - Germany, Moscow's primary collaborator, signed two formal bilateral treaties with the USSR and a number of side accords, including secret agreements, on 9th November 1990. The main bilateral treaties were the Treaty on Co-operation in Economy, Industry, Science and Technology, and the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness, Partnership and Co-operation. In September 1990, President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl signed a secret accord in Geneva to carve up Central Europe: see Part Two. Russia calls itself the legal successor of the Soviet Union.
  - Greece: The Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Greece was signed by President Gorbachev and Mr Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the Greek Prime Minister of the day, on 23rd July 1991. This bilateral treaty was accompanied by three parallel intergovernmental agreements, one of which deals with 'the prevention of dangerous military activity'. Thus the Soviets exploited their repressive operations in the Caucasus in the interests of obtaining a formal Greek treaty undertaking which could destabilise any NATO operations in the region. In a despatch from Moscow on the same day, a TASS 'diplomatic correspondent', Andrey Pershin, observed: 'This document sets down not only a new legal and political basis for the all-round development of relations, but also serves as yet another element in the architecture of the Common European Home.... The treaty can rightly be placed in the same category as similar international documents concluded between the Soviet Union and Italy, Spain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany'.
  - Ireland: On 22nd July 1991, the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who had been switched into Shevardnadze's slot the previous December from his job as chief controller of agents of influence, signed a series of bilateral accords with the Irish Republic, including a Soviet-Irish Protocol on Consultations, a cultural accord, and 'an agreement to develop economic, industrial and scientific cooperation'.
  - Italy: A Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation signed by President Gorbachev and Sig. Giulio Andreotti (later disgraced at home) on 18th November 1990, based on the Soviet-Italian Declaration agreed on 30th November 1989, was buttressed, on 19th December 1991, by a Joint Declaration on the Fundamentals of Relations between the Italian Republic and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, signed by President Yeltsin and Sig. Andreotti in Rome. The accord, citing the bilateral treaty signed under Gorbachev, referred to 'the framework of the New World Order'.
  - Norway: The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, signed a Joint Protocol with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry on 8th March 1992.
  - Spain: On 10th July 1991, Sr Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Prime Minister, and President Gorbachev, signed the Soviet-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow. On 24th April 1994, President Yeltsin and Sr Gonzalez signed a new bilateral treaty which replaced the treaty signed on 10th July 1991. This treaty requires the signatories to 'form consistently a single European space in the political, economic, legal, humanitarian, cultural and ecological spheres' [Article //]. Other powerful statements of Soviet strategy, to which Spain subscribes through this treaty, include an obligation to 'strengthen... collective security', and to 'build... a democratic international order on the basis of common values'. By 'democratic' the Leninists mean 'collectivised' and rigged in their favour. The point to note is that any values that are 'common' to the Leninists will be their values, not those of the West, since the Leninists will not accept any 'values' which do not conform with their objectives. Therefore, 'a democratic international order on the basis of common values' will not be 'democratic' at all, but rather a false system based on the Leninist device of 'democratism' designed to ensure that power resides in the hands of structures which focus on consolidating the

World Revolution and establishing the intended Leninist World Dictatorship. Typical of these structures is the intended 'World Parliament', the delegates to which will consist of representatives from proliferating NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), all of which are of the Left, and have suddenly sprung up in recent years, in fulfilment of the 'Gramsci dimension' of the Revolution, which promotes the emergence of 'a common mind'.

• United Kingdom: On 30th January 1991, President Yeltsin and the British Prime Minister, John Major, signed the Joint Declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation. This was followed on 9th November 1993 by the signing in London of a Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation.

On 26th November 1990, President Gorbachev, reporting to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the outcome of the Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, revealed the strategic Leninist logic and significance of the Soviet bilateral treaty offensive over which he had presided to date. Gorbachev was reported by Soviet Television to have said:

'For the first time political trust has acquired the form of documented political pledges. The new type of bilateral declarations and treaties which the USSR has recently concluded with the unified Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Finland - and there are others on the way, too - and, of course, the documents signed by the 34 states at the Paris meeting itself [a reference to the Paris Charter and to the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, which asserted that the signatories 'are no longer adversaries'] create the political-legal foundation of the New Europe with which it has decided to proceed into the 21st century. There are no military opponents in Europe any longer, and the blocs established by the Cold War will inexorably lose their original functions'.

The Soviets/Russians intend to hold their West European treaty 'partners' to their obligations under international law which arise from the bilateral treaties. This was made clear by the former Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, who told a meeting of the Foreign Ministry's Council on Foreign Policy in November 1993 that 'first of all, it is time to carry out existing bilateral accords' [*International Affairs*, journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, March-April 1994]. But while the Russians will insist upon the meticulous adherence of the Western parties to the letter of their respective bilateral treaties, they will themselves feel free to renege on any component undertaking as they see fit, in accordance with Lenin's advice to the revolutionaries that they may with impunity tear up agreements reached with 'the class enemy'.

3. The Franco-German Treaty of the Elysee signed by General Charles de Gaulle and the German Chancellor of the day, Dr Konrad Adenauer, in Paris, on 22nd January 1963.

4. *The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, page 406. See Note 41 of the Introduction, page 26.

5. Collaboration between EU Member States and the European Union Collective promotes, as reiterated in the Soviet Russian and world Communist literature, 'a future union of all nations in a single world economic system', as described in *'Political Affairs'*, Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party, USA; pamphlet published with the issue of May-June 1964, citing Stalin's *'Foundations of Leninism'*, first published in 1924, International Publishers, New York, 1932, page 82. The 'single world economic system' will be a centralised, collectivised (Communist) world dictatorship which, since it will tolerate no opposition, will embark upon 'perestroika' - a global bloodbath. The unification of the world would thus be a terminal disaster for mankind and must be resisted by all who understand the truth of what is happening.

6. *'Leninist Theory of Revolution and Social Psychology'*, B. Porschnev, Novosti Press, Moscow, 1988, page 24.

7. *The Perestroika Deception: Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency*, Anatoly Golitsyn, Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 and 1998, page 26.

8. *'New Lies for Old'*, Anatoly Golitsyn, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1984 [finished in 1980]. In this work, Golitsyn revealed the essence of Khrushchev's long-range deception strategy, developed in collaboration with Mao Tse-Tung.

9. *'Sputnik: Digest of the Soviet Press'*, August 1990, page 65.

10. *'Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World'* [Author's emphasis], Mikhail Gorbachev, Collins, 8 Grafton Street, London W1, 1987. A separate edition was published in New York by Harper & Row, Perennial Library edition (1987).

11. *'Warning to the West'*, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, unprovenanced.

12. *'Record of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties'* held in Moscow, 5th-17th June 1969, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague, 1969, address by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, page 172.

13. Li Ch'uan, commentator of the T'ang period [618-905] in China on 'The Art of War' by Sun-Tzu, cited in the edition translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963. The work was translated into Russian by N.I. Konrad in 1950, shortly after the Communist victory in China [Anatoly Golitsyn, *'New Lies for Old'*, op. tit, page 42]. See page 57.

14. *Record of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties* held in Moscow, 5th-17th June 1969, op. cit., address by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the International Meeting on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of Lenin, Moscow, 17th June 1969; page 41.

15. *'The Perestroika Deception'*, op. cit, Anatoly Golitsyn, published by Edward Harle Limited, London and New York 1995 and 1998, page 84.

16. *'Information Bulletin': Documents of the Communist and Workers' Parties*, XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 9/1986, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague, page 160.

17. See *'Soviet Analyst'*, Volume 22, Numbers 9 & 10, June 1994, report on Gorbachev's appearance on the 'Larry King Live' TV show in the United States, 6th November 1993. See also Note 21.

18. *'I'm involved in a different political role'*: Gorbachev was referring here inter alia to his work as the strategists' front man in the Gorbachev Foundation/USA and the Gorbachev Foundation/Moscow, a 'New Form' of Leninist revolutionary strategic planning and influence-building instrument based in Moscow, Amsterdam and San Francisco. This entry specialises first of all in promoting 'global issues' which are 'incapable of solution' by the outmoded nation state, and therefore require 'global solutions'. Its separately established US namesake spawned the sinister 'State of the World Forum' conferences held between 1995 and 2000, at which 'New Age' types intermingled with members of the professions, politics and the global establishment, 'new paradigms' for a 'unified world' were debated, true Christianity (but no other religion) was targeted for destruction - not least through the establishment of a San Francisco-based United Nations-style 'United Religions' organisation co-sponsored by the Gorbachev Foundation - and campaigns such as global environmentalism were promoted (Leninist environmentalism being exploited as cover for the Leninist strat-

egists' progressive assault on private property and ultimately for 'population reduction', an issue discussed at successive 'State of the World' [= 'World State'] Forum events. Dr Jim Garrison, the Director of the Gorbachev Foundation/USA and of 'the State of the World Forum', told the author in September 2000 that there was 'no connection' between the Gorbachev Foundation/USA, which he said was now just a shell, and the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow. In late December 2000, an article by Gorbachev addressed to George W. Bush appeared in *The Washington Post* and in other world newspapers, including *The Straits Times* of Singapore. The article noted that Gorbachev was 'head of the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow'. This organisation is a central locus of Leninist globalist strategic planning and implementation, staffed by apparatchiks from the International Department of the CPSU and the Lenin School. In the author's interview with Garrison published in 'Soviet Analyst' [Volume 26, Number 7, September 2000], the author asked Dr Garrison: Were these experts or employees at the Gorbachev Foundation/Moscow apparatchiks from the (former) Soviet structures, the Academy of Sciences and Institutes?, to which Dr Garrison responded: 'Yes'. This response, from such a favoured and well-connected (in Moscow) US agent of influence, provided concrete first-hand confirmation that the Gorbachev Foundation/Moscow is indeed a key continuing instrument of Soviet Leninist strategic planning and World Revolution implementation. It is not a 'vanity operation' for Mikhail Gorbachev.

19. *The Perestroika Deception: Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency*, Anatoly Golitsyn, op. cit, page 123.

20. 'Pravda' and 'Izvestia', 27th February 1986, pages 2-3; speech by Comrade B. N. Yeltsin, First Secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee which, under Yeltsin's later Presidency of Russia, remained the central locus of continuing Soviet Communist Party supervisory and control operations; condensed text of speech, 'Current Digest of the Soviet Press', Current Soviet Policies IX, Documentary Record of the Soviet Press, Columbus, Ohio.

21. The word 'Life' has a special Aesopian meaning in the Communist Leninist lexicon. Essentially, it means events which intervene and stand in the way of the furtherance of the objectives of the Revolution, or which delay it or divert it from its 'inevitable' path: inconvenient obstacles to revolutionary 'progress' which the Revolution must circumnavigate without being diverted off-course. Its meaning was plain in the following crucial statement by Viktor Chernomyrdin in 'Russia' TV Channel, Moscow, 2030 GMT, 15th December 1992, in which the newly appointed Russian Prime Minister signalled to those whom Lenin called 'the interested' that he remained a dedicated Leninist strategist and revolutionary, devoted as always to pursuit of the agreed long-range strategy (reformulated in 1959-61), known as the 'General Line' or just 'the Line'. Chernomyrdin emphasised that there would be no deviation from the Leninist strategy whatsoever, and that any appearance of deviation would be attributable to 'Life': 'My colleagues in the Government who are working today will pursue this line. The planned line. The one which has been worked out.... Life, makes amendments to our programme, additions, perhaps, changes. But we will keep to the basic line'. This statement is of lasting and central importance, but its meaning is evident only to those who have understood and mastered the essence of the continuing Communists' global deception strategy and can interpret the Leninists' Aesopian manner of communication.

Another striking instance of the use of the word 'Life' was a comment by Gorbachev, interviewed on the 'Larry King Live' TV show on 6th November 1993 [see Note 17]. Asked by a viewer: 'What changed you, your Honor? What made you able to turn a place without freedom into one with freedom?' [sic], the elated Gorbachev replied: 'Life changed us! Efforts to reform after Stalin were made. Khrushchev tried it, and Kosygin. Nomenklatura always acted to block it'. Life here means 'things got in the way of the full realisation of our revolutionary potential'. Note also the lie that the 'nomenklatura always acted to block' reform'. In the Communist dictatorship, you did what you were told: if an order was received from the highest level to embark upon a given course, you responded accordingly. This was just one of many false arguments developed by the strategists to explain to the West what was otherwise inexplicable - why the Politburo had found it expedient to invent the phenomenon of 'collapsible Communism'.

22. Report by Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, 25th July 1988, 'International Affairs', Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 1988.

23. The campaign for the abolition of the 'image of the enemy' was spearheaded by Georgiy Arbatov, veteran head of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and President Gorbachev's closest strategist and a member of his Politburo. Writing in 'Kommunist' in June 1988, Arbatov proclaimed that 'the image of the enemy that is being eroded has been... absolutely vital for the foreign and military policy of the United States and its allies. The destruction of this stereotype... is Gorbachev's weapon.... Neither the arms race, nor power politics in the Third World, nor the military blocs, are thinkable without "the enemy", and without the "Soviet threat"'. In the same article, Arbatov pointed out that the United States would not be slow to acquiesce in this rapid erosion of the threatening 'image' of the Soviet Union, when he noted that 'of course, this weapon is not secret, but it does have tremendous power'. The strategy of eliminating 'the image' of the enemy would mesmerise the West (as Manuilski had predicted in 1930), which could be relied upon to confuse the 'image' with the substance: the enemy itself would remain wholly intact, and would be strengthened immeasurably as a consequence of the open-ended transfer of Western technology and finance. This devious Leninist 'line' was predicated upon the assumptions that the cement which held the Western alliance together was the perception of the Soviet Union as the enemy; that once this threatening image had been erased, even partially, then the Western alliance system would fall apart; and that without this alliance system, the United States would ultimately, following wholesale disarmament, find itself incapable of responding adequately to any decisive projection of Soviet power - say, from the Soviet Baltic Sea province-enclave of Kaliningrad in Northern Europe, and southwards from the colossal military base territory constructed at Mosdok, Ingushetia, under Yeltsin. See Part Two.

24. Marxism-Leninism prescribes that the 'class struggle' presupposes exploitation, so that 'class struggle' comes to mean the elimination of exploitation; and by frantic logic, this in turn presupposes the abolition of nation states, since nation states exist to facilitate the exploitation of the working class and the peasantry. This gobbledygook has been perpetuated into the 'new' era, and examples of such rhetoric occasionally surface. It is outmoded, though, since 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' has been superseded by 'the state of the whole people'. See Note 97 and 100.

25. 'Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism: Programme Statement of the 27th CPSU Congress', 'Pravda', 15th July 1988, pages 1 and 3.

26. *The Perestroika Deception*, Anatoly Golitsyn, Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 & 1998; op. cit.,

Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency dated March 1989; page 17.

27. 'Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA', Mark Riebling, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1994, page 408.

28. 'Relevance/Special Report, September 1994, 'The New Lies Strategy: The KGB's Advance through Retreat', under the section entitled 'The Grand Illusion'.

29. The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 and 1998; op. cit., Memorandum to the CIA dated March 1989; page 25.

30. See 'Comecon Reports', now 'Eastern Europe Analyst', Volume 6, Number 3, Summer 1990, page 1; World Reports Limited, 108 Horseferry Road, Westminster, London SW1P 2EF, UK.

31. The Perestroika Deception: Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency', Anatoliy Golitsyn, Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 and 1998; op. cit., Memorandum to the CIA dated March 1989; page 19.

32. The Author is indebted for this correct insight to Mr Justin Yu, of New York City, one of the shrewdest observers of Soviet-Chinese deception strategy.

33. See 'Soviet Analyst', published by World Reports Limited, 108 Horseferry Road, Westminster, London SW1P 2EF, UK, Volume 21, Number 3, January 1992, 'Collapsible Communism', Michael Bakowski, pages 6-7.

34. The Perestroika Deception: Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency', Anatoliy Golitsyn, Edward Harle Limited, London and New York, 1995 and 1998; op. cit., Memorandum to the CIA dated March 1990; page 104.

35. See 'Brain-Washing, A Synthesis of the Communist Textbook on Psychopolitics', distributed in the 1950s by Kenneth Goff, who had attended the Eugene Debbs School of Labour, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a Comintern affiliate. Kenneth Goff was a former American Communist whose report on Soviet mind-control techniques was authenticated by a senior US intelligence officer. Separately, Dr Boris Sokoloff MD, a US doctor of Russian extraction who had played an important role in events leading to the Bolshevik Revolution, revealed in a book entitled 'The White Nights' [published by The Devin-Adair Company, 1956, New York], that Lenin had held intimate conversations with Dr Ivan Pavlov which had laid the groundwork for Soviet operations to standardise human thought and behaviour - the essence and origin of the contemporary scourge of 'political correctness', and the inspiration for the Leninists' long-term campaign to develop the 'common mind'. On page 292, Sokoloff reported:

'Communism is a movement directed against individualization and toward the standardizing of all Man's activities. It is the farthest-reaching attempt ever made in this direction. Steadily and persistently, the Soviet regime is driving toward its ultimate goal: control of human behaviour. It states officially that man can transcend his heredity and transform his environment and so achieve full uniformity of behavior. In this gigantic social and biological experiment, carried out largely through the [mis-]education of children and youth, the Soviets are using the conditioned-reflex mechanism on a large scale. They openly declare that this is essential to their purpose, that through such standardization a complete hold over their subjugated peoples can be attained'. Contemporary 'political correctness', the origins of which can be traced in the Soviet literature, is the modern manifestation of this dimension of Lenin's Revolutionary experiment.

36. 'Collected Works', Vladimir I Lenin, Volume 5, Page 475, International Publishers, New York. Lenin continued: 'Secrecy is such a necessary condition for this kind of organisation that all other conditions (number and selection of members, functions, etc.) must be made to conform to it. It would be extremely naive indeed, therefore, to fear the charge that we Social-Democrats desire to create a conspiratorial organisation'. In the next paragraph, Lenin wrote of 'a powerful and strictly secret organisation, which concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret activities, an organisation which of necessity is centralised'. Given this level of discipline and secrecy, it is perhaps not surprising that pragmatic Western observers are ignorant of, confused about, and unable to grasp the rudimentary outlines of, Leninist strategy and behaviour. All the KGB, GRU and Security Council officials interviewed, for instance, for the BBC2 TV series shown in January 1998 mentioned on page 47 entitled 'Tsar Boris: The Yeltsin Years', would have been subject and accustomed to such secrecy discipline. This background, tradition and training in conspiratorial operations and secrecy further enhances their Bolshevik boldness, since they have little fear of being exposed - and would scarcely be concerned if they were, as secrecy, deceit and Bold, Bolshevik Bravado are the hallmarks of their activity.

37. 'A History of Russia', Joel Carmichael, Hippocrene, New York, 1990. Joel Carmichael, the veteran former Editor of 'Midstream', published in New York, is probably the greatest and most prolific historian of Russian and Soviet affairs writing in the United States, of the 20th century.

38. The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents', Selected and edited by Jane Degras, Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956.

39. Lt-General Aleksandr Lebed, interview with ITAR-TASS, 19th August 1994.

40. Report of an interview of Zhirinovskiy conducted by Rolf Gauffin in 'l'Espresso', Rome, 21st January 1994, pages 76-79, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-94-018 dated 27th January 1994, pages 20-21.

41. Report in 'Die Welt', Berlin, 31st January 1994, page 3, cited in FBIS-SOV-94-021, 1st February 1994, pages 19-21.

42. Remarks by Mikhail Poltoranin, head of the Federal Information Centre, published by ITAR-TASS World Service on 13th January 1994, cited in FBIS-SOV-94-009 of 13th January 1994, page 43.

43. Mikhail Gorbachev, 'Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World' [Author's emphasis] Perennial Library edition, New York, 1988, pages 11-12.

44. The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 84.

45. The New York Times', New York, Saturday, August 13, 1991, front page: see also 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Numbers 9-10, pages 5 et seq.

46. The New York Times', New York, Friday, July 26, 1991, front page: see also 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Numbers 9-10, pages 5 et seq.

47. Golgotha, the KGB code-name for the fake 'August coup' vanishing act of 19th-21st August 1991, with blasphemous connotations with the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. From time to time, Leninist strategists-implementers conduct tests or 'probes' [see Zhirinovsky's role in this regard, page 52] to ensure that no leakage of truth and reality has begun to contaminate the mind-controlling propensities of 'New Thinking' launched under 'perestroika' and extended worldwide ever since. For instance, on 17th May 1996, The New York Times carried a front-page report filed by Alessandra Stanley concerning one of Gorbachev's not infrequent



outbursts of blasphemy (although the reporter failed to notice that his remarks were blasphemous): 'Comparing himself to Jesus Christ, Gorbachev remarked, in an interview given at the tiny village of Krasnogvardeiskoye during the 1996 Presidential 'election' campaign, that 'I will fight to the bitter end, even if you crucify me. I am reminded of Jesus Christ on the way to Golgotha. How he walked through the streets and people spat at him'. Golgotha was blasphemously chosen as the KGB's code-name for Gorbachev's fake 'August coup' vanishing act, or 'dramatic event', because the provocation was deliberately planned so that after his 'disappearance', Gorbachev 'rose again on the third day' - ready to 'resign' as General Secretary and to 'renounce' Communism, in preparation for the change of scenery which ended on Christmas Day (an occult date) 1991 with Mr Gorbachev proclaiming on television to the whole world that he had 'resigned' as President of the Soviet Union, which he had meekly permitted to 'cease to exist' with the three-stage theatrics beginning on 8th December [see page 4 et seq.]. The whole world swallowed this theatrical display in a single gulp, along with the Christmas pudding and the brandy, without so much as a second thought. And Gorbachev's probe to see whether his mention (which appeared on the front page of The New York Times) of the KGB's programme code-name Golgotha rang any bells in the West, will have given Moscow the anticipated reassurance that all was well: no-one (of any importance, at any rate) had noticed that the 'vanishing act' was a Bolshevik strategic deception.

48. 'The Times', London, Monday 29th December 1997, page 20.

49. The 'Perestroika Deception', op. cit, page 34.

50. Mary Fitzgerald, 'Military Thinking in Today's Russia', 'Orbis', Spring 1993, page 283.

51. Sun-Tzu, 'The Art of War', Trans, by Samuel B. Griffin, Oxford University Press, 1963, page 67.

52. 'New Lies for Old', Anatoly Golitsyn, op. cit, pages 42-43.

53. Sun-Tzu, 'The Art of War', Translated by Samuel B. Griffin, Oxford University Press, 1963, op. cit, pages 66,67,68,

69,77, 78,97,100 and 102.

54. The present author reported this remark in 'The Perestroika Deception', Foreword by the Editor, page XXI. The former Prime Minister added: 'I don't think we have been deceived - at least, I hope we haven't'. This revealed that she retained a nagging doubt that the West had been deceived, a possibility she would naturally not wish to contemplate since the deception had succeeded primarily because of her own ill-advised action in 'opening the door ajar' 'enabling', as also explained in the Foreword to Anatoly Golitsyn's second volume, 'the Soviets to thrust it wide open for the purpose of exporting their insidious "perestroika" deception to the West'.

55. 'Spies without Cloaks', Amy Knight, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, Chapter One, page 20.

56. Report in 'Izvestia', 9th February 1991.

57. When he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe, who solicited this Author's advice as a currency and economic analyst on a number of occasions, appeared to be level-headed and sensible, to the point of being considered dull by the press corps. However after his appointment as Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey went badly off the rails. This is made clear in his autobiography, Conflict of Loyalty [Macmillan, London-1994], which reveals that Howe had no understanding of Soviet deception strategy, and had absorbed Soviet disinformation like ink sinking into blotting paper. Howe's favourable remarks on MVD General Shevardnadze reveal a lack of judgment, as well. Even the CIA has come to acknowledge that, as Georgia's Communist Interior Minister, Howe's friend 'Shevardnadze arrested more than 15,000 people, including 17,000 members of the Communist Party, numerous Government Ministers and 70 KGB officials', and 'was responsible for the torture and execution of many innocent people, including dissidents'. He 'initiated purges as First Secretary of the Georgian CPSU [The Wars of Shevardnadze', Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Chief of Communications, Public Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and Melvin A Goodman, Professor of International Security Studies, US National War College, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997]. As gauleiter of Georgia in the 'democratic' post-Communist period, after supplanting Zviad Gamsakhurdia, E. Shevardnadze presided over 'a late Bolshevik Revolution' in his Republic, where he is known as 'Stalin II'. When holding power as Interior Minister under overt Communism, his office was located several floors above the cells in which some of his victims were tortured. Given such openly available information, therefore, it was disconcerting to read the following passage Lord Howe's book [page 439]: 'Even in his private life, Shevardnadze knew his own mind. His wife Nanuli... refused his first proposal of marriage. She was, she had warned him, the daughter of 'an enemy of the people' and was fearful that the liaison might harm his Party career. He was undismayed, quit his Party job, re-presented his case to Nanuli - and was accepted. Fortunately for all of us, he was able to resume his Party career'.

This kind of copy, encountered routinely nowadays in books such as Lord Howe's and the work on Shevardnadze referenced above, seems to mimic KGB-style manufactured 'detail-copy', created for the benefit of Western readers, the general purpose of which is to provide 'colour' to the disinformation or distortion in hand. But the paragraph of greatest concern appears on pages 436-437 of the autobiography.

Here, the former British Foreign Secretary reports that one of his wife, Elspeth's, fellow students while she was studying for three years at the London School of Economics was a certain Kurt Stengl, whom Elspeth befriended and who had been invited 'to Carlton Gardens [the London home of the Foreign Secretary] for student parties with Elspeth on more than one occasion. Elspeth frequently borrowed his notes and, like others, sought and valued his advice'. Stengl never showed up for his final examinations on 30th May 1985. Instead, he vanished without trace, and Lord Howe explains that 'what we now know is that, during Gordievsky's first two weeks back in Moscow, action was taken by his superiors to pull out most, if not all, of the existing KGB 'illegals' in Britain. (An illegal is an agent with a false identity controlled by clandestine means). Kurt Stengl was indeed one of those. It was purely by chance that he found himself working so close to the Foreign Secretary's wife. On the only occasion he met me, he seemed slightly embarrassed by the encounter'. Imagine: The British Foreign Secretary's wife repeatedly invites a KGB illegal to his London home, and the former Foreign Secretary reminisces that the connection had arisen purely by happenstance! Whether the former Foreign Secretary is a fool (despite his intelligence) or a rogue, is a matter for debate; he could just be what Lenin called 'a useful idiot'. Lord Howe's pro-active stance in favour of comprehensive British acceptance of the European Union's agenda, especially the abandonment of the pound and the United Kingdom's participation in the collective Euro, provides a clear indication of his lack of support for the concept of the nation state which he served.

58. Letter from John McGregor, leader of the House of Commons, to [Sir] Michael Spicer MP, a copy of which was furnished to the Author by Sir Michael, dated 28th October 1991, ref: ADS/AG.
59. See 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit., Editor's Note, page 59.
60. See 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 24, Number 1, page 5.
61. See 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit., Memorandum dated September-October 1990, page 123.
62. See 'The Perestroika Deception', op. cit., Memorandum dated 26 March 1992, page 151.
63. Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze conducted by Valentin Zorin, 'Undiplomatic Conversations' programme, Central Television, First All-Union Programme, 1940 GMT, 19th November 1991, recorded before the MVD General's reappointment as USSR Minister of External Affairs, BBC Monitoring Service, SU/1235, A1/1, 21 November 1991.
64. 'Political Affairs', May 1991, Volume LXX, Number 5, pages 14-16, 'An Observation on Economic Changes in the Soviet Union', by Carl Bloice, a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA and Moscow-based correspondent of the CPUSA's 'People's Weekly World'.
65. Communication to the author from the Lenin expert, Dr Paul Busiek, of Springfield, Missouri, who befriended Bloice by subterfuge and confirmed the importance of this member of the CPUSA National Committee and his access to the Kremlin under Gorbachev when Bloice worked as Moscow correspondent of the 'People's Weekly World'.
66. 'Special' is routinely used by the Soviets to mean 'secret'. For instance, see 'Stalin's Masterpiece', Joel Carmichael, 1976 [New York, St Martin's Press, page 11]: There had once been a 'Secret Section' of the Central Committee; it held the confidential dossiers of the Party and of the Government. As Stalin's apparatus took shape, the Secret Section, after subsiding apparently for a while, was revived again and incorporated in his private cabinet as the Special Section'. This time its activities were not only really secret, but even its existence was not officially known until 1934; at no time was it confirmed or discussed in any official Party papers. The Special Section was set up in order to control the Soviet summits - the Party, the Government, the Army, the Political Police itself. It had a ramified staff of clandestine agents, and a separate subsection dealing with personnel on the highest Party level. At a moment's notice it could tell Stalin anything he wanted to know about all aspects, both private and political, of the lives of all the Party and State heads. It exercised a meticulous censorship over the private correspondence of the most important functionaries, some of them Stalin's most intimate colleagues. The Special Section was supposed to watch over every move and if possible every thought of everyone in Stalin's closest circle; as soon as enough notations were put into their personal dossiers, the Special Section could decide what was to be done with them. Anyone about to be ousted would be handled in accordance with his position in the hierarchy by the relevant segment of the Central Committee: a topmost government functionary who was not on the Central Committee would simply be dislodged by the relevant department of the Central Committee; if a member, he would be handled by the Secretariat itself or sometimes by the Orgburo. The Special Section was thus in a position to eliminate anyone from any post; the post would then be filled by an immediate replacement from the Personnel Section'.
67. Carl Bloice's quotation revealing that Gorbachev's 'perestroika' was modelled on Lenin's 'New Economic Policy', and that 'special methods' were being used, with the revolutionaries 'in many ways... operating differently from the way they were operating before' and 'drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive against capitalism'. These are quotes from Vladimir I. Lenin, 'Draft Thesis on the Role and Functions of Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy', prepared on 28th December 1921 and approved two weeks later by the Party's Political Bureau; 'Collected Works', Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, Volume 42, page 375.
68. 'Obschaya Gazeta', No. 23, June 1995, remarks by Oleg Poptsov, Director, Second Russian National TV Channel, cited in 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Number 5, page 11.
69. Remarks by Grigory Yavlinski in a feature published in *The Financial Times*, London; cited in 'Russia Reform Monitor', American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, DC, No. 225, 5th February 1997. The Leninist implementers' use of candour to attract Western sympathy and support, masks an intent to deceive; indeed, wherever unsolicited candour from Soviet players is in evidence, the Western observer should be on guard for lies. Candour contains truth, but reveals it for strategic or disinformation purposes, or both, and usually precedes a lie. Grigory Yavlinski's pose as a 'liberal reformer' [see Case Study 3, page 108] was hollow from the moment he appeared on the stage and ingratiated himself internationally as (briefly) the favoured 'whizzkid' of the future. His dialectical-strategic collaboration with Yevgeniy Primakov in Washington, described in the Case Study, revealed him to have been a key 'second echelon' Leninist operative who had been selected for his smooth charm, which is a particular characteristic of the 'new wave' of Soviets, such as the well-dressed and personable Sergei B. Ivanov, the Russian Defence Minister under President Putin. To illustrate Yavlinski's mentality, consider the following remark by Yavlinski on the BBC's 'Money Programme' on 20th September 1998, in the context of the Russian financial crisis. In his comments, Yavlinski actually threatened the West in true Bolshevik fashion, in an oblique demand for 'emergency finance': 'I'm not blackmailing you', he said. 'You know the map. You can see where Britain is on the map, where North America is, where Europe is. You can make your own decisions'. See also main text.
70. The statement by Mr R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, was released on 3rd November 1996 as a Press Release by the Dole Campaign in Washington. See 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 24, Number 2, page 24.
71. See 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 24, Number 2, page 24, December 1996
72. 'Komsomolskaya Pravda', embracing the word Komsomol, the Communist youth organisation, cited in 'International Herald Tribune', 15th April 1994.
73. *The Washington Times*, 7th June 1994; article following the murder of Kvantrishvili.
74. 'Un pays sacrifié', *Libre Journal*, Paris, Number 26, 1995, page 29.
75. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit., Memorandum to the CIA dated 27th September 1993, *The Cost of Mislplaced Trust*, pages 215-216.
76. Armand Hammer was one of the most prominent agents of influence recruited under Lenin. Hammer hired Senator Albert Gore, following his departure from the Senate, to run the coal subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum. Senator Gore's son, Vice-President Al Gore, was appointed to serve as the opposite number to the Leninist Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chemomyrdin, a key Leninist strategist and implementer as already shown, on a joint US-Russian Commission, under President Clinton. Joint Commissions have been used, especially by the United States, for many years as a means of enhancing bilateral relations.
77. Remarks of Arkadiy Volskiy, a top strategist and member of Yeltsin's supragovernmental Security Council, a locus of

- the strategic collective, reported in 'Izvestia', 21st September 1994, page 9, cited in 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, # 5, 78. For an outline of the 'global justice system' agenda as it had emerged by the mid-1990s, see 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Number 5, pages 9-13. Remarks by the former Interior Minister, Viktor Yerin, 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 41, Number 7, 1995.
79. Remarks by General Aleksandr Lebed cited at 5.00pm on US National Public Radio, 27th July 1996, just ten days following the mysterious destruction of TWA Flight 800: see 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 24, Number 5, page 1.
80. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit., page 164, Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, 30th April 1993.
81. 'Information Bulletin', 5-6, Volume 9, 1971, Supplement to 'World Marxist Review', North American edition of 'Problems of Peace and Socialism', Progress Books, Toronto, Canada, pages 21-22; report on a Plenary Meeting of the Greek Communist Party stressing the 'imperative' need 'to understand that every Communist must be well trained in underground activities'.
82. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, from a Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency dated March 1989, page 27. Thus the CIA was informed 30 months ahead of the event that the CPSU would 'step down' from the overt running of affairs, and would appear to retreat into the shadows, or 'underground' - circumstances of which the Communists have much experience. Notwithstanding this authoritative warning, the CIA was taken by surprise by the events of 1991, although it has since devoted substantial resources to whitewashing its colossal intelligence failures-for instance, by publishing a massive self-adulatory tome in 1999 entitled 'At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1999', edited by Benjamin B. Fischer.
83. William Z. Foster, 'Pages from a Worker's Life', International Publishers, New York, 1939, page 294.
84. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 27.
85. Presentation on continuing Soviet/Russian strategic deception given by the Author at the Institute of World Politics, Washington DC, 14th March 1995.
86. Letter from John Lenczowski, Director, The Institute of World Politics, to a correspondent, dated 4th November 1992.
87. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, Memorandum to the CIA dated February 1993, page 158.
88. 'Political Affairs', Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party, USA, September-October 1994: introduction to the messages of congratulation to the CPUSA on the occasion of its 75th anniversary from Communist Parties around the world, page 38; message inter alia from the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, page 43.
89. 'Political Affairs', Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party, USA, April 1995, article by Sam Webb, Secretary of the Labor Commission of the CPUSA, page 4.
90. In December 1994, a British academic known to the author, visiting Russia for consultations, was required to fill out a Customs Declaration form [see 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Number 3, page 18], which contained the following instructions: KEEP FOR THE DURATION OF YOUR STAY IN THE USSR OR ABROAD. NOT RENEWABLE IN CASE OF LOSS. PERSONS GIVING FALSE INFORMATION IN THE CUSTOMS DECLARATION, OR TO CUSTOMS OFFICERS, SHALL RENDER THEMSELVES LIABLE UNDER THE LAWS OF THE USSR'. The form required an answer inter alia to the following: WITH ME AND IN MY BAGGAGE I HAVE... USSR ROUBLES, USSR STATE LOAN BONDS, SOVIET LOTTERY TICKETS...'
91. The author is indebted to Professor Walter Zarickij of New York City for this confirmation.
92. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn op. cit, page 89.
93. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-96-054, 19th March 1996, page 44.
94. 'The Perestroika Deception', op. cit. An excellent summary of 'false democracy' ('democratism') is on page 87.
95. Euro-issues are never actually intended to be resolved, but are regarded as opportunities for the elaboration, extension and exploitation of the interests of the EU collective. Furthermore, 'solutions' are largely provisional, pending 'review', for the same purposes. This is the Leninist dialectical method in action. A particularly easily understood current affairs example of the Leninist dialectic at work in the region is that of Northern Ireland. It operates as follows: Thesis: 25 years of atrocities, maimed children and bombed buildings and city centres; Antithesis: sudden absence of atrocities, maimed children and bombed buildings and city centres. The Antithesis creates momentum for 'putting every effort into' resolving the problem; the response of the dialectically untutored, liberal, pragmatic policymaking mentality is to exclaim: 'We must not forfeit this historic chance for peace; we owe it to our grandchildren'. The intended synthesis: A unified and radicalised (Marxist) Ireland. If the strategists (the Moscow-sponsored IRA\*) do not achieve their objectives, they trigger a renewed cycle; and this pattern continues until they have worn their opponents down, and have obtained their objectives. If the process takes one or more generations, so be it. To renewed atrocities, the dialectically untutored, liberal, pragmatic policymaking mentality will still respond: 'We must redouble our efforts to 'put the peace process back on track' or to 'reach out for peace'. This is of course futile, since the Leninist revolutionaries are not interested in 'peace', except to gain tactical advantage. Note\*: A sanitised report prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the US Library of Congress entitled 'US and Soviet Special Operations' dated 23rd December 1986, submitted to the House of Representatives' Committee on Armed Services, confirmed, on a map of Soviet subversive operations worldwide, direct Soviet control and sponsorship of the IRA and of many other international terrorist organisations (as opposed to surrogate, or mixed Soviet and surrogate, control, applicable in respect of some other terrorist groups).
96. Statement by B. N. Yeltsin before the 28th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 6th July 1990, Current Soviet Policies XI, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Columbia University Press.
97. The long-range deception strategy replaced Lenin's outmoded 'dictatorship of the proletariat' concept with a new concept, 'the state of the whole people' - a deceptive prescription in which 'democratism' (the creation and maintenance of the illusion of democracy) plays the key role. 'Non-Communists and 'democrats', wearing 'Western' political labels, and owing continued covert allegiance to the Communist Party since they are controlled by the continuing CPSU, create the impression, for international public consumption, of the 'triumph of democracy' - giving rise to the euphemistic, Leninist slogan 'state of the whole people', since it appears that non-Communists as well as Communists are engaged in perpetual debate and are competing for power in the Western sense. But its just a slogan: the Leninist meaning of the slogan refers to the new, broadened power structures with their false, controlled, democratic form, guided by the Communists - in the 'former' USSR, as has been proved here, by the CPSU (directed by its Moscow Central Committee). As reviewed in the Appendix, the long-range strategy of deception was ratified by the Eighty-One

Party Congress held in Moscow in December 1961. The report of the subsequent international meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow between 5 and 17 June 1969, noted in reference to the long-range strategy, that 'the 1960s will occupy a special place in the history of world socialism'. During the 21st CPSU Congress, Khrushchev had arranged for the widely-publicised detonation of a 50-megaton bomb in breach of an existing nuclear testing moratorium and the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile - in celebration of 'the magnificent new Programme of the CPSU' focused on 'the state of the whole people' and Leninist 'convergence'.

98. Closing remarks of Gorbachev before the 28th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 13th July 1990, Current Soviet Policies XI, 'Current Digest of the Soviet Press', Columbia University Press.

99. The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, p. 87, Memorandum of March 1990.

100. As a result of the intensive review by the Party, its specialised Leninist experts and the restructured intelligence services in the late 1950s, the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was replaced, as explained also in Note 97, by the new concept of 'the state of the whole people'. The author feels that this concept - foreign to all but a few Western specialists - can best be explained by Anatoliy Golitsyn himself.

The following references to 'the state of the whole people' are taken from 'The Perestroika Deception', with the Memoranda from which they are extracted, and the page references, shown. It is important for the student and analyst to understand this Leninist concept, which gave new life and vitality to the World Revolution and its 'General Staff':

Memorandum to the CIA of March 1990, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 87:

'The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' has rendered possible the introduction of deceptive 'non-Communist' and 'democratic' structures. Even so-called free elections do not present a problem for the Communist Parties. Because of their secret partnership with the 'opposition', the Communist Parties are always in a winning situation. It is their candidates - Communist or 'non-Communist' - who always win. No other truly independent candidates exist. This is the new statecraft of the Communist Parties and their security services: it is a 'New Form' for developing socialism. Its introduction allows the Communist Parties to broaden their political base and, in accordance with a decision of the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, to replace the outlived concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with the new concept of 'the state of the whole people' while maintaining their power and strengthening their actual leading role'.

Memorandum to the CIA of March 1990, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 91:

'In the past, under Lenin and Stalin, the use of political and security potential had only one dimension: the Soviet security services used their political and security potential repressively against their own population. Now the employment of this potential has two dimensions: domestic and international. The domestic aspect involves the use of this potential to broaden the political base of Communist Parties and to create new 'non-Communist', 'democratic' and 'nationalist' structures, replacing the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with the 'state of the whole people'. With the wholesale introduction of deceptive, controlled 'democracy', this process is virtually complete'.

Memorandum to the CIA of September-November 1990, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 121:

WHY DID THE SOVIET STRATEGISTS OPT FOR A NON-VIOLENT PATTERN OF WORLD REVOLUTION?

From the late 1950s onwards the Soviets have been developing and pursuing a new long-range strategy for World Socialist Revolution. Its essence has been: (a) Replacement of the outdated concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' by the concept of 'the state of the whole people'; (b) Development of new political forces under 'the state of the whole people'; (c) The preparation of economic and political reforms and the transition to a planned socialist market economy and a controlled 'multi-Party system'; (d) A shift in the pattern of World Revolution from one of violence to one of non-violence consistent with a parallel elimination of the image of the enemy'.

Memorandum to the CIA of September-November 1990, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 128:

WHY THE WEST IGNORES THE ESSENCE AND DANGERS OF SOVIET 'DEMOCRATISATION'

Western acceptance of the changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe as a trend towards genuine democracy which serves Western interests and therefore merits Western support shows how little the West comprehends the essence of the changes and the dangers they entail. In part this non-comprehension arises from confusion over terminology. What the West calls 'democratisation', Soviet strategists call the transformation of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' into 'the state of the whole people'.

Memorandum to the CIA of September-November 1990, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 130:

'Special attention should be paid to an article published in [ 'Problems of Peace and Socialism' - the theoretical and informative journal of the Communist Parties] in July 1974. Its Authors were Zawadski, Director of the Scientific Institute of State and Law at Warsaw University; Guliyev, head of section at the Soviet Institute of State and Law; and officials of the Greek and Argentine Communist Parties. The article was based on a discussion which took place at Warsaw University. The paper considered the question of the political power of the working class in the development of democracy in the mature socialist countries and how this relates to the strategy of the Communist Parties [Russian edition, pages 44-45]. The article reminded the reader that, according to Lenin, the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the leading role of the Communist Party, not the participation of other political parties in the government. The article referred to the transition from the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to 'the state of the whole people' and explained that 'the state of the whole people' continues, in reality, to uphold the cause of proletarian dictatorship under mature socialism, joining other socialist states to wage the class struggle against imperialism in the international arena. The 'state of the whole people' does not need to break the resistance of the exploiting capitalist classes because by now they have been eliminated. However, it remains dictatorial and repressive in its attitude towards capitalists abroad. The article further emphasised that, under 'the state of the whole people', the leading role of the Communist Party is retained and enhanced.

'It explained that new elements have been introduced into Communist strategy against the developed capitalist countries, in order to take into account the changes which the technological revolution has brought about in the social structure of these countries'. The phrase 'New elements' referred to the 'Gramsci dimension' of the Revolution, aimed at establishing a new hegemony or superstructure of 'garbage values' in place of old loyalties, which has come to such fruition today.

Memorandum to the CIA of 2nd September 1991, 'The Perestroika Deception', page 145:

The West regards the Soviet Parliament's decision to suspend the activities of the Communist Party as the death of the Communist Party and as a victory for the new democratic forces: it welcomes this development as beneficial to Western interests. This assessment is erroneous. It reflects the naïvete of Western Soviet experts who, in a deep sleep like Rip

von Winkle, have missed out on the thirty years of preparation for 'perestroika' and the transition from the old Soviet state of 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (meaning the Communist Party) to the new Soviet 'state of the whole people'. Western experts have forgotten that this transition was envisaged and planned in the Communist Party programme adopted by the 22nd Party Congress in October-November 1961. The present Soviet Parliament's decision shows that this Party programme has been successfully carried out by the Communist Party itself.

'A new political structure in 'democratic' form has been established. It has become possible for the Soviet Parliament to suspend the old Communist Party because the old Party and Komsomol members have been merged into the new 'democratic' structure. This means that the new political structure created by the old Communist Party is broader, more vital and more dangerous to the West. It also means that the old Party's cause lives on in the new 'state of the whole people'.

101. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 87, Memorandum of March 1990.

102. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 87, Memorandum of March 1990.

103. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 85, Memorandum of March 1990.

104. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 32, Memorandum of March 1989.

105. The most extensive explanation of the Leninist methodology underlying the 'granting' of 'independence' to the Soviet Republics is found on pages 87-91 of *The Perestroika Deception*, Memorandum dated March 1990.

106. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, p. 89, Memorandum of March 1990.

107. The European Commission, Background Report: The European Union and the New Independent States of the Ex-USSR', ISEC/B20/94, London SW1P 3AT, 1994.

108. 'Instructions from the Centre', Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher Andrew, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1991.

109. Speech by Hans Van Den Broek, 1994.

110. Andrei Kozyrev, the former Russian Foreign Minister-a consummate Leninist and the son of one of the 105 Soviets expelled by the Heath Government in 1971, on the joint advice of the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, and the Foreign Secretary of the day, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, given in a joint memorandum dated 30th July 1971 which

complained that the intelligence services had identified 120 Soviet spies, although the actual total could exceed 200, who had failed to cease their operations despite a personal appeal to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrey Gromyko. According to two volumes published in January 1998 citing Foreign Office documents covering UK-Soviet relations between 1968 and 1975, selected from official files at the Public Records Office at Kew, London, MI5 had warned the British Government about the spies' activities for three years. On 24th September 1971, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires was summoned to the Foreign Office and handed a list of 90 Soviet officials who were to be expelled and 15 who were not to be permitted to re-enter Britain - a move which Moscow had apparently failed to anticipate, believing that the British were by then already too weak and accommodating to take any action. Kozyrev's father was among the 'diplomats' expelled on that occasion. Andrei Kozyrev learned his excellent English while living in London during his father's posting there. Of course, with the tremendous success of the Soviet 'collapsible Communism' deception, there has since been what can best be called a 'mass walk-in' by KGB and GRU officers throughout the West. In the United States, for

instance, large numbers of these characters have surfaced as professors at universities (Sergei Khrushchchev, son of Nikita, for instance). There has also been a mass penetration of US infrastructure and business operations by Soviet intelligence and (probably) 'Spetsnaz'(special forces) operatives. For instance, computers at a US mass transportation entity have been managed for some years by a Russian woman who immigrated after the 'changes'. In California, there has been at least one report of a Russian applicant for a job stating on his application form, under the section headed 'previous employment', that he was previously employed by the Soviet special forces ('Spetsnaz'). This indicates the level of laid-back cynicism which characterises the Bolshevik attitude towards the complacent West today.

111. Andrei Kozyrev's widely reported observation following the decision of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Council of Europe on 8th February 1996 to approve a resolution adopted by acclamation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, inviting Russia to become its 39th member country.

112. MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, 'The Future Belongs to Freedom', Sinclair-Stevenson Limited, London 1991, page 141.

113. MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, 'The Future Belongs to Freedom', op. cit, page 142.

114. MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, 'The Future Belongs to Freedom', op. cit, page 21.

115. Proceedings of the Conference on the Future of European Security, Prague, 25-26 April 1991, Cenin [= Lenin, converted with a 'C' for Czechoslovakia] Palace, Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

116. Dr Boris Sokoloff, *The White Nights*, The Devin-Adair Company, 1956, New York, page 292.

117. 'The Perestroika Deception', Golitsyn, op. cit, p. 125, Memorandum of September-November 1990.

118. See Note 111.

119. ITAR-TASS 'news' agency, Moscow, World Service in English, 0749GMT 18th November 1992, citing a report in 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' on Russia's relations with the EC.

120. 'International Herald Tribune', report from Brussels by Tom Buerkle, 14th May 1996.

121. See Note 120.

122. 'International Herald Tribune', report from Brussels by Tom Buerkle, 14th May 1996, citing Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, spouting Russian strategy as reconfirmed by Sergei Rogov, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada, in 'International Affairs', official journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

123. Letter ref. 5816. LC. from Ambassador G. von Moltke, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, NATO, to a Polish correspondent in Britain, dated 20th January 1992 (date mis-typed as: 20th January 1991). The recipient passed the letter, which was sent in response to the recipient's initiative in having sent NATO a copy of this Author's Occasional Paper entitled *The Soviet Agenda for Europe*, von Moltke's letter contains, inter alia, the following observations:

'Recent political events have considerably changed the whole picture to an extent that it appears to me academic to speculate about President Gorbachev's political intentions or a Soviet agenda towards Western Europe. The Soviet Union has dissolved and President Gorbachev has left the scene. We are now dealing with an entirely new political situation. The shifts in Europe's political landscape have transformed our relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as with the states of the former Soviet Union. We have moved from confrontation to cooperation, and we have given this process concrete expression through our successful programme of diplomatic liaison,

as proposed at our landmark Summit in London in July 1990.... We now have to establish closer contacts with the states of the former Soviet Union as well. A Europe "whole and free", as the Charter of Paris calls it, must not have dividing lines of whatever kind. To equate the new members of the Commonwealth of Independent States with the vanished Soviet Union would be erroneous and misleading. These new countries deserve a chance to prove that they can indeed do better than they did under the dominion of Soviet Communism. We should and will grant them this chance'. Both the foregoing and the remaining sentences could have been written for Ambassador von Moltke by the KGB: 'Our efforts are guided by the conviction that, in order to address the security problems of the transforming Europe, new security structures are needed. This requires close collaboration between NATO, the CSCE [now OSCE - Ed.], and the European Community.....Our task in building a new Europe requires both bilateral and multilateral approaches. Bilateral treaties between Alliance members and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are a legitimate and welcome part of the overall efforts to establish a new relationship among European states'.

In short, this letter, of which the Author holds the original, shows that NATO was completely taken in by the Leninists' deception strategy from the outset, that it was blinded to such an extent that it adopted Soviet rhetoric, and that it possessed no institutional memory of Leninist deception theory and practice: in other words, NATO fulfilled the Soviet strategists' expectations to the letter. Note the 'put-down' arrogance of von Moltke's tone - a response to the Author's Occasional Paper entitled 'The Soviet Agenda for Europe', published in 1991, which, as indicated, the Author's contact had sent to NATO for evaluation, von Moltke's reply provides indisputable proof of the success of the Soviet strategic disinformation operation against the West in general, and of the Soviets' absolute victory in the intelligence war, and in changing NATO's perceptions, in particular. This victory alone justified the huge resources the Soviets had devoted to the manipulation of Western perceptions and of the Western official mindset.

124. The Soviet Communist 'Blueprint for World Conquest', 'Human Events', Washington and Chicago, 1946, page 89, citing the Theses and Statutes of the Communist International, as adopted at the Second World Congress, 17th July to 2nd August 1920, Moscow, and published by the Central Executive Committee of the CPUSA, New York, 1921.

125. 'The Sunday Times', London, report by Peter Conradi, 23rd March 1997.

126. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 61, Memorandum of 4th January 1988.

127. 'The Perestroika Deception', op. cit., pages 61-62, Memorandum of 4th January 1988.

128. 'International Affairs', Volume 42, Number 2, 1996; article signed by Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee of Foreign Affairs, entitled 'Russia's Entry to the Council of Europe'.

129. 'It's all a game' - identical to the cynical Leninist remark of Gorbachev at a news conference given in Moscow on 1st March 1996, in which the former Soviet President announced that he would be standing in the forthcoming Presidential election. Source: Reuters, 1st March 1996. See also 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 24, Number 1, page 1.

130. The former Russian Minister of Defence, General Pavel Grachev, announced in 1993 that Russia was in the process of constructing one of the largest military areas in the world, at Mosdok, Ingushetia, from where it would be able to wage 'regional and global war'. The Chechen conflict served the purpose, inter alia, of providing a long-running diversion so that Western attention was focused on the televised warfare in Chechnya, rather than on the colossal military build-up at Mosdok, which is located at the apex of the Middle Eastern region. On 28th October 1993, Grachev met the then US Secretary of Defense, Mr William Perry, a 'collective security' enthusiast, during a trip to a US military base in Kansas, where he and Perry agreed a joint position ahead of revisions to the treaty to limit non-nuclear forces in Europe. General Grachev thereby 'rigged' the decisions in question, ensuring de facto acceptance by the West of blatant Russian breaches of its international undertakings in moving supplies of war materiel to the northern border of Chechnya on the pretext of the disturbances there. However the real purpose of this fancy-footwork was to convey materiel en masse into Mosdok. The importance of Mosdok in the European context, and in relation to Kaliningrad, is discussed in Part Two.

131. 'The Perestroika Deception', op. cit, page 58. Memorandum dated 4th January 1988.

132. 'Major pledge to Yeltsin on end of Cold War rivalry', The Times, London, 10th May 1996.

133. 'Russia hits at NATO plot', The Guardian, London, 13th February 1997.

134. 'Russia hits at NATO plot', The Guardian, ibid.

135. 'Russia hits at NATO plot', The Guardian, ibid.

136. 'Lebed takes three stands on NATO expansion', Martin Sieff, The Washington Times, 20th October 1996.

137. 'Perry offers NATO security partnership to Moscow', The Times, London; despatch from Bergen, Norway, 27th September 1996.

138. William Drodziak, The Washington Post, 11th September 1998.

139. 'Russia may climb down over NATO', Martin Walker, The Guardian, London, 21st March 1997. The author of this piece, Martin Walker, that newspaper's former Moscow correspondent, had published a book favourable to Gorbachev [ 'The Waking Giant: The Soviet Union under Gorbachev', Sphere Books, Penguin Group, London] as early as 1986, based in part on material fed to him by the former head of the Press Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Lomeiko, a former Novosti 'journalist' in Bonn 'and his staff, some of whom', Walker admitted revealingly in his Preface, 'have become personal friends'. Russian staff members at The Guardian offices in Moscow had 'adopted the entire Walker family, and we are all deeply fond of them' [sic]. Thus, even if Mr Walker did not travel to his Moscow appointment as an agent of influence, that is the function he soon, wittingly or unwittingly, began to serve.

140. 'Yeltsin seems reconciled to an expanded NATO'. International Herald Tribune, 22nd-23rd March 1997.

141. 'Russia and NATO bury the Cold War', The Times, 28th May 1997.

142. The Washington Times, 12th May 1997.

143. Robert M. Gates, 'From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War', Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, pages 502-503.

144. For Golitsyn on the extensive penetration of the US, British, West German and French intelligence services, see 'The Perestroika Deception', op. cit, pages 36-38. Memorandum dated March 1989.

145. Information to the author provided by Dr Eckehart Lorenz, a German pastor in Heidelberg, from his reading of the Lutheran press.

146. 'Das Kursbuch', Kursbuch Verlag GmbH/ Rotbuch Verlag GmbH, Potsdamerstrasse 98, 1000 Berlin 30, September

- 1985; provocative article by Gyorgy Dalos entitled: 'Die Befreiung der Sowjetunion von ihren Satelliten: Entwurf einer Mitteleuropäischen Konföderation'; English translation from original German by 'Soviet Analyst'; see also 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 24, 8, page 10.
147. 'The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze', by Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Chief of Public Communications, Public Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and Melvin A. Goodman, Professor of International Security Studies, US National War College, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, page 248.
148. Polish broadcast, 0957 GMT 28th July 1992, BBC Monitoring Service, 30th July 1992, EE/1466, page A2/2. Many pages of statements by Eastern European officials confirming their identification with Soviet strategic objectives could be listed.
149. 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, January 1994, article by Anatoly Zlenko, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. See also the analysis published in 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Number 8, pages 1-6.
150. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoly Golitsyn, op. cit., page 132, Memorandum to the CIA dated September-November 1990.
151. 'International Affairs', Volume 41, Number 7, 1995, page 6; article by Sergei Rogov, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada. For an investigation into Russian 'Collective security', see 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 23, Numbers 6-7, especially pages 7-8.
152. Rogov is the official's KGB code-name. It means 'The Horned One'.
153. Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze on Moscow Television, 19th November 1991.
154. Internal document of the Gorbachev Foundation dated 17th March 1993, in the author's possession. Top Soviet KGB-GRU officers and strategists meeting with American policymakers (including Mr William Perry who became US Secretary of Defense), under the auspices of the Gorbachev Foundation's 'Global Security Project', to promote the Soviet 'collective security' agenda, included Kadyr Alimov, of the Association of Political Sciences in Uzbekistan, an adviser to the Uzbek President Karimov; Dr Peter Gladkov, who in March 1993 was Acting Head, Department of Foreign Policy, Institute of the United States and Canada, headed by Sergei Rogov; Sergei Tarasenko, a former aide to Andrei Gromyko and then Eduard Shevardnadze, before 'resigning' with Shevardnadze to serve as his 'chief of staff' when he established an alleged money-laundering operation known as the Foreign Policy Association in 1991; and the late Academician Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Director of the Centre for Global Problems at the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, identified by Golitsyn in correspondence with the Author, as an important Soviet official. This fact can be independently corroborated. According to 'Argument i Fakti' [Moscow, Number 33, August 1991], Shakhnazarov, when asked for his opinion of Yeltsin's performance during the 'August coup' period, responded: 'He has been marvellous. He has done everything that we expected him to do'. This makes it clear that Shakhnazarov, who died suddenly in 2001, was a senior strategic deception expert and planner. Director of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, until his death, Shakhnazarov was also one of the sources (the other being a telephonist) who revealed that at about 4.00pm on 18th August 1991, communications with Gorbachev's dacha at Foros were cut off [source: Amy Knight, 'Spies without Cloaks', 1996, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ].
155. Communication to the author from Dr Paul Busiek, of Springfield, Missouri, to whom Mme. Alberti conveyed this information.
156. For detailed background on the Gorbachev Foundation, including documentary proof that it was established in the State of California on 10th April 1991, over four months in advance of the 'August coup', as a shell entity named the Tamalpais Institute, see 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 22, Numbers 9 & 10.
157. International Herald Tribune, 7th April 1998.
158. Anatoly Golitsyn, 'New Lies for Old', Dodd, Mead, New York, 1994; and 'The Perestroika Deception', Edward Harle Limited, 1995 and 1998.
159. Assignment, BBC-2 Television, 'Disputed Borderlands', 5th November 1994; transcript of interview between Allan Little and a senior Ukrainian military official, Boris Tarasiuk.
160. 'The Shield', Washington, DC, January-February 1998, page 3.
161. Remarks by Gerry Adams, The Daily Telegraph, 11th April 1998, page 1.
162. Andrei Kozyrev, broadcast on Mayak Radio, 4th December 1992.
163. Andrei Kozyrev, remarks on his visit to Iran, ITAR-TASS 'news' agency, Moscow, World Service in English, 0725 GMT, 5th April 1993, BBC Monitoring Service, 8th April 1993, SU/1658, A1/1.
164. Kozyrev's remarks reveal the Leninists' unbroken intellectual and 'spiritual' links with the Illuminati, as can be seen by comparing Kozyrev's statement with the following passage from a reliable, well-documented source dating from 1885. Monsignor George F. Dillon, D.D. gave a series of lectures in Edinburgh in October 1884 which were compiled in a volume published that year entitled 'The War of Antichrist with the Church' [M.H. Gill & Son, Upper Sackville Street, London]. On page 45, Fr. Dillon wrote: 'I have said that the revolutionary rulers in France were all Illuminati - that is, Freemasons of the most pronounced type - whose ultimate aim was the destruction of every existing religion and form of secular government, in order to found an atheistic, social republic, which should extend throughout the world and embrace all Mankind. Freemasonry welcomes the Mahommedan, the Indian, the Chinese, and the Buddhist, as well as the Christian and the Jew. It designs to conquer all, as a means of bringing all into the one level of Atheism and Communism'.
165. Observation to the author by Andrei Navrozov, the son of Lev Navrozov, who served for many years as a key official translator to the Kremlin.
166. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoly Golitsyn, op. cit, p. 146.
- 167 and 168. 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoly Golitsyn, op. cit, page 158.
169. 'Eurofacts', Global Britain Publications, 18th January 2002, page 1.
170. Mikhail Gorbachev, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, Oslo, June 1992.
171. Speech by Comrade Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin, KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers, 'Pravda', 5th February 1959, pages 7-8, Current Soviet Policies III, Documentary Record of the 21st Extraordinary Soviet Communist Party Congress. Ed. Leo Groulx, Columbia University Press, N.J., 1960, pages 176-178.
172. Reshetar, John S., Jr., 'A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', Frederick A Praeger, New York, 1960, 1964, page 284. This is an essential reference source for insights into the overt Soviet era.

173. The Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, Stenographic Report., Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, I, page 105.
174. Douglass, Dr Joseph. D., Jr., 'Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties', Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., Mclean, VA, 1988, page 72.
175. N. S. Khrushchev, 'Prevent War, Safeguard Peace', Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1962, page 29.
176. Douglass, Dr Joseph. D., Jr., *Ibid.*, in an essay by William F. Scott and Harriet Fast Scott, Appendix E. In this appendix to Dr Douglass's work, these expert authors also elaborated as follows on the gigantic firework display and on Khrushchev's use of the 'offensive denial' technique. According to 'Communism - Peace and Happiness for the People' [Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963, pages 421-422], citing N. S. Khrushchev:
- 'On September 10, 1961, Pravda reported an interview that Khrushchev had granted to Cyrus Lee Sulzberger, the correspondent of The New York Times. During the course of the interview, Sulzberger asked the following question: 'In your public statements you have said it is possible to develop a nuclear bomb equal in explosive force to 100 megatons of conventional explosives. I should like to ask what sense you see in developing such a super bomb? It seems to me that the bomb would be far too big to use for military purposes. Could you comment on this?'
- Khrushchev's reply was as follows:
- 'Yes, that bomb is of enormous capacity and tremendous destructive power. But when war is being imposed upon us and threats are being made to destroy our country and our people, we must take it into account in all earnest. And we shall stop at nothing if the aggressors attack us.... Let those who dream of new aggression know that we shall have a bomb equal in power to 100 million tons of TNT, that we already have such a bomb, and that we shall test the exploding device for it. Let them know that if they attack us it will mean certain death for themselves. We have no choice.'
- In October 1961, the month following this interview, the Soviet Union broke the moratorium on nuclear testing by conducting a series of tests in the atmosphere. One of these, intended to reach 50 megatons, actually may have exceeded 60 megatons. This apparently was an initial test of Khrushchev's superbomb. The tests provided the Soviets [with] invaluable information on the impact of the electromagnetic pulse [EMP] upon communications. There was no admission in the Soviet press that such tests were being, or had been, conducted'.
177. Douglass, Dr Joseph. D., Jr., *Ibid.*, page 73.
178. Personal communication to this Author from the late Avraham Shifrin, written from Israel where he resided for many years after serving in the Soviet GULAG, 29th September 1996.
179. The Perestroika Deception', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, pages 20 and 59-60. On page 59, in his Memorandum dated: 4th January 1988, Golitsyn writes: 'Gorbachev is neither the originator of the strategy nor the father of Soviet democracy. He was chosen and trained by the Party bureaucracy to implement the final phase of the strategy'.
180. The Waking Giant: The Soviet Union under Gorbachev', Martin Walker, formerly resident Moscow corresponded for The Guardian, Michael Joseph, London, 1987, page 10. See also Note 139.
181. Speech by Aleksandr Shelepin, KGB Chairman under the USSR Council of Ministers, 'Pravda', 27th October 1961, page 10, Current Soviet Policies IV, Documentary Record of the 22nd Soviet Communist Party Congress. Eds. Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Grullow, Columbia University Press, NJ., 1962, pages 180-182.
182. 'Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today', J. Michael Waller, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994, page 19.
183. 'KGB - The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents', John Barron, Hodderand Stoughton, London, 1974, page 67.
184. 'Lenin's Embalmers', Ilya Zbarsky and Samuel Hutchinson, The Harvill Press, London, 1997, page 14.
185. Radio address delivered by President Yeltsin on 20th December 1997, the 80th anniversary of the founding of Lenin's Cheka (20th December 1917), English language translation of his speech, RIA Novosti.
186. 'New Lies for Old', Anatoliy Golitsyn, op. cit, page 41.
187. 'Proletarian Internationalism: Guideline of the Communists', V. Polyansky, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, pages 94-95.
188. 'The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics', Georgiy Arbatov, Times Books, Random House, Inc., New York, 1992, with an introduction by Strobe Talbot, who later became Deputy Secretary of State under President Clinton. This provides a perfect example of the direct exercise of influence by a top Soviet official over a target who later duly became a senior US foreign policy official. Arbatov had been appointed Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada in 1967. having been a key editor in the late 1950s of the revised Leninist long-range strategy handbook, 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism'. With such friends in place, it is not surprising that the continuing Leninists have made such remarkable progress with the global implementation of their strategy since the 'perestroika' deception. In 1992, Strobe Talbot was the author of the following impeccably anti-nation state, revolutionary Leninist observation: 'Within the next hundred years nationhood as we know it will be obsolete: all states will recognize a single global authority. A phrase briefly fashionable in the mid-20th century - citizen of the world - will have assumed real meaning. All countries are basically social arrangements. No matter how permanent and even sacred they may seem at any one time, in fact they are all artificial and temporary'. Even the syntax used here betrays the characteristics of KGB-ese, familiar to students of Soviet intelligence and deception operations and literature.
189. Remark by Philipp Bobkov, 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta', 28th December 1990, cited by Dmitry Mikheyev, 'The Rise and Fall of Gorbachev', The Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, 1922, page 155; also cited in J. Michael Waller, 'Secret Empire: the KGB in Russia Today', Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994, page 35.
190. Foreword by the Soviet collective authorship to 'Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma', Moscow, 1959; US Government translation. Research & Microfilm Publications, Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc., New York. Georgiy Arbatov's name appears next to that of the Director, Kuusinen, on page 2. ■

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# PART TWO

## EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS

THE PURSUIT OF PAN-GERMAN  
HEGEMONY 'BY OTHER MEANS'

Europe's slide towards  
the Nazi International's 'Europa'

THE COVERT PAN-GERMAN AGENDA

## TWO OF THE FATHERS OF 'PAN-GERMANY'



**RIGHT:** An official portrait of **Adolph Hitler**. In his book, *'Mein Kampf'*, Hitler alluded extensively to Marx and Marxist collectivism. He shared Lenin's contempt for the nation state, but inconsistently promoted his own notion of a *'Führer Staat'* as a means of preserving the race, and thus the state itself. Among those by whom he was consciously or subconsciously inspired was General Count von Heaseler, who pronounced in 1893: *'It is necessary that our civilisation build its temple on mountains of corpses, on an ocean of tears and on the death cries of men without honour'*. ■



DR KONRAD ADENAUER, the first Chancellor of the German Federal Republic and Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). This official photograph was taken when Dr Adenauer was 81 years old, in 1957. The Chancellor was pictured in his office at the Palais Schaumburg, his Chancellery in Bonn, on 9th September the year. Dr Adenauer, who vigorously promoted, behind-the-scenes, the Pan-German view that Germany's true interests and future lay to the east, was a friend of Hitler's favoured bankers, Drs Abs and Pferdengens.

# THE CONTINUITY OF GERMAN STRATEGIC DECEPTION

## THE PAN-GERMAN AGENDA PURSUED 'BY OTHER MEANS'

Just as there has been no true discontinuity of Soviet strategy - only a Leninist discontinuity, designed to confuse the West, to entice it to 'converge' with the East to collectivise security, and to disarm - so, since the First and Second World Wars, has there been no discontinuity of German strategy. It may be helpful to remind ourselves here of Anatoliy Golitsyn's useful distinction between a policy and a strategy. He points out that whereas a policy is overt, a strategy contains within itself a hidden, secret dimension designed to ensure the strategy's success. German plans for European hegemony can be traced back to the 19th century and were clearly understood by Western observers at least until the early 1950s. In an article entitled 'The World Germanica' published in the New York Herald Tribune dated 31st May 1940, Dorothy Thompson wrote:

The Germans have a clear plan of what they intend to do in case of victory. I believe that I know the essential details of that plan. I have heard it from a sufficient number of important Germans to credit its authenticity.... Germany's plan is to make a customs union of Europe, with complete financial and economic control centred on Berlin... Territorial changes do not concern them, because there will be no Trance' of 'England', except as language groups<sup>1</sup>.

In 1942, the actual blueprint of Hitler's 'European Union' was published in the form of a compendium of papers presented by leading German industrialists, academics and officials under the stern direction of the Reichswirtschaftsminister und Präsident der Deutschen Bundesbank, Dr Walther Funk. The document was entitled 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' (European Economic Community)<sup>2</sup>. Copies of this

rare book survive, for instance, at the British Library, and at the Staatsbibliothek, Berlin. The policy issues covered by the Nazi compendium were largely the same as those contained in the modern European Union Collective's Maastricht Treaty

and its derivatives: a common European currency, a pan-European bank called 'Europa Bank' and thus a common monetary policy, a common agricultural policy, a common European industrial policy, a common employment policy, a common European transport policy, and a common European trading policy.

As the Second World War progressed, the possibility of defeat occurred to the less blinkered among Hitler's planners, prompting a Nazi decision to make secret preparations for a long-range plan to continue the prospectively lost war 'by other means' (politically). Indeed, precisely such a development was accurately predicted by the brilliant Dutch Ambassador to Washington, Dr Alexander Loudon, a man with a deep knowledge of German history, who observed in a radio address at the end of 1943: The Germans will do exactly the same thing as they did in 1918. In case of defeat, the Nazis and the Gestapo will go underground in order to prepare for the next war<sup>3</sup>. The 'next war' is indeed being waged fiercely today - 'by other means'. In 1942, detailed planning was initiated in Berlin to establish a covert powerful Nazi International. Writing in the Hearst Press, Burnet Hershey, its foreign correspondent, reported in a despatch from Lisbon published on 25th January 1943 that he had

observed an 'influx of Nazi officials into Spain and Portugal'. Hershey wrote that 'every talk I had with the Germans in Lisbon made that fact clearer. They may be defeated on the battlefield, as they were in 1918; but they expect to win again at the peace table as they did in 1919'.

'Of course, they will sacrifice Hitler as they sacrificed the Kaiser; but the old gang - the generals, the big industrialists, the phoney professors of mis-education... will try to go underground again to lay the eggs for another war of German conquest'<sup>4</sup>.

A year later, The New York Times' correspondent, Harold Denny cabled in a despatch from Madrid that 'heavy new increments of German agents have been pouring into Spain in recent days in an obvious effort by Germany to save what she can of a situation that has gone badly against her. A thousand Gestapo agents and other German representatives have appeared in Madrid alone in the past fortnight. Significant additions to the German population have been noted in other parts of Spain.... In Madrid, German spies swarm in the big hotels in such numbers that even casual visitors cannot help noticing them'<sup>5</sup>.

On 13th April 1944, the New York Herald Tribune gave details of huge sums deposited by high Nazi officials and industrialists in American and neutral banks. And on 19th July 1944, the US Office of War Information reported that 'Swiss bankers are alarmed about the huge sums transferred recently by Germans to Swiss and Portuguese banks.... They are of the opinion that these monies will serve one day to finance the resurrection of the Third Reich'<sup>6</sup>.

Newsweek magazine further reported, on 19th October 1944, that, according to diplomatic advisers based in Buenos Aires, 'German technicians and military experts are believed to be reaching the country incognito by devious routes'. And on 15th January 1945, Newsweek declared that 'many of the men that Himmler sent to Spain and Argentina to carry out Nazi plans for postwar survival, carried passports under false names and later were reported dead in Germany. All have had framing in Nazi political methods'.

#### THE NAZI INTERNATIONAL CENTRE IN MADRID

This was how there came to be established in Madrid an organisation known as the German Geopolitical Centre, thought to have been the headquarters of the Nazi International. Those headquarters controlled an international organisation operating in Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Morocco, Argentina and elsewhere, known as 'Die Spinne' (The Spider). The Nazi International specialised in the propagation of ideas developed after the First World War by General Professor Karl Haushofer, a gifted officer in that war and a fanatical Pan-German who refused to accept that Germany had been defeated in 1918. On returning from France, he had developed a detailed plan for Germany's resurrection which later served as a blueprint for German diplomats and industrialists. Central to Haushofer's ideas was the 'line' that Germany's natural geopolitical orientation lay towards the East, given its theoretically inexhaustible supplies of raw materials and 'Lebensraum'.

As a dominant figure associated with the Deutsche Akademie in Munich, the meeting place for Weimar Germany's elite, the General exerted enormous influence on industrialists, scientists and political leaders, selling the idea of the 'Führer Staat' to German ruling circles during the Weimar Republic period. Haushofer's ideas predominated, too, at the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, the University of Berlin, the Oriental

Seminary and the University of Heidelberg - at each of which the bright American student, George Kennan, studied during a prolonged sojourn in Germany. Kennan later became a leading spirit among those at the US State Department and the Pentagon who were overawed by Haushofer's dictum that Germany was the key to Europe.

A corollary to this dictum was that Germany was the 'bulwark against the East', and that without a strong Germany, the world would fall into chaos. In 1946, this ideology overwhelmed Secretary of State James Byrnes, when President Truman, heavily pressurised by Kennanites at the Pentagon and the State Department, fired Byrnes and replaced him with General George C. Marshall. This represented a truly remarkable triumph for the Nazi propagandists who had waged psychological warfare against the United States since 1943 - implanting the idea, by influencing George Kennan and other influential Americans, that Germany should be put back on its feet, to safeguard the West against the Communist danger from the East. This propaganda in due course conditioned the American people to accept the Pentagon's view that Germany should be rearmed and turned into an ally of the West - a transformation which, however, the Haushofer school of Pan-German dialecticians sought in order to free Germany from the West and to place it in a position to be able to play the West off against the East. Byrnes had the last word, however: his legacy was that, under an agreement reached between the Allies and Stalin during his tenure, conquered Germany was to be occupied for the "biblical period" of 40 years [see also page 240].

The most striking characteristic of the Haushofer school's prescription was a conviction that Germany and Russia could work together to order the world in accordance with their preferences. This belief was so strong that it overrode the small problem of ideological differences. The German Foreign Minister in office following the First World War, Dr Gustaf Stresemann, an ally of General Haushofer, developed these theories and filled his own head - and the heads of many receptive, dejected Germans - with such grandiose ideas, notwithstanding Germany's military defeat.

In particular, the wily Dr Stresemann greatly influenced Dr Konrad Adenauer, who served as Mayor of Cologne from 1917 to 1933 and who in turn came to wield exceptional influence on all issues of domestic and foreign policy in the Weimar Republic. Dr Adenauer was chairman of the Conference of German Cities, President of the Prussian State Council from 1920 to 1933, and a member of the Executive Council of the Catholic Centre Party. His ideas were identical to the Pan-German ideas of Haushofer, and he was a close friend of Dr Robert Pferdmenges and of Dr Hermann Abs, both leading Cologne bankers and influential supporters of the Hitler regime.

#### THE GERMAN MASTERPLAN DISCOVERED IN 1945

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, in June 1945, the Allies captured certain documents entitled the 'Generalplan 1945', among the files of the shortlived Doenitz Government based at Flensburg. The documents, signed by Grand Admiral Doenitz and Field Marshal Keitel, included a paper grandly entitled 'Europaische Friedensordnung' ('The European Peace-Order'), which displayed a close resemblance to the ideas that were later promoted by Dr Adenauer in pursuit of a Germany-centred united Europe. Point 5 of this plan called for a 'European Union on a federalistic basis'; Point 10 called for a 'Commonwealth between Germany, Bohemia and Moravia'; and Point 12 demanded the 'economic integration of Europe'<sup>7</sup>.

As discussed in Part One, federalism is a Communist-collectivist concept. It was

accorded mystical status by the Soviet Communists on 28th July 1920 as the Seventh Thesis in a document entitled 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) which stated that 'Federation is a transitional form towards the complete union... of all nations' [see page XI]. The Nazis (National Socialists) shared this assessment: Chapter 10 in Volume 2 of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* carries the heading: 'FEDERALISM AS A MASK' for the achievement of German hegemony. In the same vein, Lenin promoted the dialectical ploy that 'separation precedes federation' [see for instance pages XIV and 12-13].

It was in accordance with these principles that the unification with Germany of Bohemia and Moravia was to be allowed for in a secret agreement reached by Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev at Geneva in September 1990, the details of which were leaked in 'Tydenik Politika', a political journal published in Prague, dated 14th-20th November 1991<sup>s</sup> [see pages 200-205]. This secret accord included a provision that 'the Soviet Union agrees to the... incorporation of the Bohemian-Moravian region into the German sphere of economic interests and to the political incorporation of this region into Germany over 12-15 years' [see pages 200-205].

That agreement further anticipated the division of Czechoslovakia, which took place on cue at the end of 1992, and of Yugoslavia. For in accordance with the Soviets' 'relaunched' Leninist revolutionary model, all national borders were by definition provisional and expendable. The secret accord therefore stated that 'the USSR will not impede the division of the CFSR', and further that 'the USSR has no objections to the division of Yugoslavia. It agrees to the shifting of Croatia and Slovenia to the economic sphere of the Federal Republic of Germany'. In agreeing to carve up Central Europe under the noses of the Western powers, Germany acted in its own Pan-German interests, while the 'former' Soviet Union acted entirely in accordance with the logic of its upgraded Leninist dispensation, under which all frontiers are destined for abolition along with the nation states they define.

Nor was there the slightest inconsistency of purpose between the Germans and the Soviets when this cynical carve-up was agreed in 1990. For the 12th point of the document entitled 'The European Peace-Order' of the Nazi 'Generalplan 1945', dealing with the economic integration of Europe, presupposed its intended political integration - and was reflected in the project for Economic and Monetary Union, which has been at the centre of German Pan-Europeanism from the outset.

#### THE DEMAND FOR ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

Another Nazi document captured by the Allies in 1945, entitled 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', contained an explicit demand that long-range German strategy should be directed towards an alliance with Russia. This official document concluded that 'A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers in population would be created from ocean to ocean. Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe, but also from the double continent of Eurasia. The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for development without collision of their interests. The chief emphasis in this bloc will shift more and more to the racially superior, intellectually more active and more energetic [peoples]: that means, to Europe. Thus would be formed an alliance between the young socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West'.

When the Western powers jointly facilitated the establishment of the first postwar Federal German Government under the unreconstructed Pan-German Dr Konrad Adenauer, who had been pinpointed by the Kennan forces as being the 'obvious' man to lead the new postwar Germany, large numbers of staff from the Nazi International Centre in Madrid returned to Germany and proceeded at once to repopulate the German Foreign Office and the flexible structures of Dr Konrad Adenauer's Government and bureaucracy. At the same time, secret officials from the hyperactive Nazi Haushofer-Ribbentrop circles in Madrid and Buenos Aires continued issuing directives to their former Nazi colleagues in the German Foreign Office and in the leading German newspapers<sup>10</sup>.

Trained in the Pan-Germanist school of Realpolitik, with its strict emphasis on Germany's divine destiny in the East, Dr Adenauer became notorious for his political caution and cunning. In one speech, delivered before he had even become Chancellor, he admonished his compatriots to bear in mind that 'we must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression either in Germany or in the United States that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians'<sup>11</sup>. Scarred by the experiences and frustrations of his generation and the Weimar Republic, Dr Adenauer knew, naturally enough, of the close collaboration between German Generals of that era and the Soviets. In 1921, even before the Rapallo Pact had been signed, a secret agreement for the production of armaments in the Soviet Union was concluded by Germany and Lenin's USSR. When, in 1931, the German General von Blomberg met a group of Soviet General Staff officers to celebrate the tenth anniversary of formal Russo-German cooperation, he toasted Soviet Marshal Tuchatchevskiy (who was later executed) with the words: 'We Germans will never forget what the Soviet Army has accomplished for Germany during the past ten years. I toast to... loyal comradeship in arms for today and in the future'. In May 1933, Marshal Tuchatchevskiy told a visiting German staff delegation in Moscow: 'Always bear in mind that you and we, Germany and the USSR, can dictate our terms to the whole world if we stand together'<sup>12</sup>.

And indeed, the Pan-German elite has never forgotten that Soviet sentiment. It was summarised in a document, intercepted by Western intelligence, distributed by the Nazi International in 1950 to its various satellite centres, including Bonn, Lisbon and Buenos Aires, since known as the 'Madrid Circular', which asserted: 'We must not forget that Germany has always considered orientation towards the West as a policy of expedience, or one to be pursued only under pressure of circumstances.... All of our great national leaders have constantly counselled the long-range policy of close cooperation with the East.... The so-called American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the bones of even a single German soldier.... What Germany needs in the future is not democracy but a system of statecraft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would enable the political and military elite in Germany to organise the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities of the German people for the revival of the German race and the re-establishment of Europe as the power centre in the world'. This 'Madrid Circular'- prepared by 'former' Nazis based in Madrid whose colleagues invaded the Adenauer Government's structures to such an extent that, when asked in the Bundestag how many top Nazis were employed in the German Foreign Office, Dr Adenauer replied that there were 134 of them - also contained statements such as

the following: '... we will surely gain the undisputed leadership in Europe, not excluding Britain. In such a roundabout way we would be able to establish the foundation for future world leadership'<sup>13</sup>. The 'roundabout way' - or the secret strategy - in question represented the perverse, continuing, relentless pursuit of Pan-German European hegemony 'by other means', that is, behind the Hitlerian 'mask of federalism'. By concurring with and facilitating the de facto fulfilment of Lenin's scheme to destroy the nation state by means of the collectivist 'merging of nations', Germany would realise her own full nationalistic and even racial potential: as Hans Eichel, the German Finance Minister, told The Daily Telegraph on 17th January 2002 [see page 29], 'since the end of the Second World War the official *raison d'être* of the nation state in West Germany was that that nation state was not the future.... The new thinking was that united Europe was the future'. Would the United Kingdom now kindly accept this intended settlement as a *fait accompli*, without further ado? A polemical article by Father E. J. Reichenberger, a leading Pan-German propagandist, published in the German-Catholic paper 'Nord-Amerika' on 17th April 1952 and reprinted in other German-language papers, asserted: 'We cannot see the reason why Germany should not line up politically with Russia.... From which side has Germany, in the long run, to expect the better bargain?'

For Dr Konrad Adenauer and his colleagues, the answer to this question was predestined. While overtly collaborating with the West, and accepting without thanks the \$9.0 billion that the United States had already poured into Germany by 1951 (which United States News reported on 14th September 1951 that the Germans had 'taken for granted'), the German planners would implement the 'Generalplan 1945', agitating for 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' through which they would ultimately secure actual German hegemony in Europe - while cooperating secretly with Moscow, as revealed in recently published memoirs by the East German spymaster Markus Wolf. These confirm Western suspicions, quite widely held at one time, that German officials maintained clandestine contacts with Communist East Germany, in pursuit of German long-range strategy. Prominent among such Germans was Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the veteran German Foreign Minister, whose wife made monthly visits to the East German city of Halle, the Genschers' home town - and where their contacts could well have included the German-speaking senior Soviet KGB-GRU officer, Vladimir Putin.

#### THE REALITY OF GERMANY'S 'LEANING TOWARDS RUSSIA'

Dr Helmut Kohl, the former and subsequently disgraced German Chancellor, and his top colleagues who were engaged in pressing German strategy to its conclusion, used grandiose, gothic 'Pan-German' language indistinguishable from that typically employed by Dr Adenauer. Dr Kohl's ideas were likewise derived from the tradition of Pan-German 'unified Europe' strategy developed by the Haushofer-Ribbentrop school, elaborated under Hitler's regime, expressed in the 'Generalplan 1945', and expounded for many prewar years by the influential 'unified Europe' enthusiast Count Coudenhove-Kalergi - notably in a 15-page 'top secret' Memorandum to the German Government and General Staff dated 1932, which proposed the initial establishment of a German-French combine in economics, arms and foreign policy. The Count's proposals surfaced 20 years later as the Schuman Plan, which recycled all the basic principles contained in that prewar Pan-German Memorandum<sup>14</sup>.

On this foundation, Dr Adenauer procured General de Gaulle's agreement to a bilateral Franco-German Treaty, which the French and German leaders signed on 22nd



January 1963. This crucial bilateral 'Franco-German Treaty of the Elysee' provided the Pan-Germans with the foundation stone for their project to 'build the New Europe'. Of unlimited duration, it provided that as a matter of routine, 'the two Governments will consult before any decision on all important questions of foreign policy... with a view to reaching as far as possible an analogous position'<sup>15</sup>.

France is separately bound under international law, by virtue of Article 6 of its bilateral Treaty of Cooperation between the Russian Federation and France, signed in Paris on 7th February 1992 [referred to in Note 2, Part One, page 133], to bring Russia into an extended European federation, and to 'strengthen the bonds of solidarity... among all European states within a confederative approach'. That approach represents, of course, 'an analogous position' with Germany's federative 'approach', as intended by the secretly continuing Pan-German strategists and reiterated, for example, by Herr Eichel. The Franco-Russian Treaty also requires France to act as Russia's agent in respect of all international, especially European, affairs, and to ensure 'the maximum possible coordination' of Franco-Russian positions on all strategic issues. Hence, not only must France, under international law, ensure that her foreign policy positions are 'analogous with' those of Germany, but she is also simultaneously bound to maximise the coordination of France's strategic policies with those of the 'former' Soviet Union - which amounts to the requirement that the relevant French policies must likewise always be 'analogous' with those of Russia. When these simple geopolitical realities, available in the public domain for any analyst to observe, were pointed out by this Author at high levels in London, the recipients of the information succumbed to sharp attacks of EGO ('eyes glaze over'), accompanied by displays of shoulder-shrugging indifference. Under Article 3 of the Franco-Russian bilateral Treaty, too, France is obliged to work ceaselessly to promote collective security - which, as we have seen, remains the highest goal of Russian foreign and security policy. Sergei Rogov's insistence that this Comintern objective has indeed remained constant since the 1920s, is confirmed by the Soviet record: for instance, a draft Treaty on European Security submitted by the Soviet Government in Geneva on 20th July 1955, stressed that 'the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe would facilitate the... settlement of the German problem through the unification of Germany'<sup>16</sup>. And calls for the establishment of a system of collective security have been standard features of the Soviet and 'post'-Soviet official literature.

The history of the negotiations between Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Eduard Shevardnadze prior to German unification in 1990, summarised by Shevardnadze himself in 'his' book 'The Future Belongs to Freedom' [see page 49], shows that, as we have seen, the Soviets finally succeeded in exchanging German unification *inter alia* for the 'restructuring' of NATO, en route to the fulfilment of their collective security objective as envisaged by the Comintern in the 1920s. But in addition to the bilateral treaties signed by President Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 9th November 1990 [again, see Note 2, page 133], the brittle German-Russian relationship appears to be buttressed by various secret agreements - over and above the secret accord signed by President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in Geneva, which was 'leaked' in Prague after the carve-up of Czechoslovakia, as examined on pages 200-205.

According to Igor Maksimychev, a 'doctor of [Leninist] political science' and head researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe, writing in the Russian Foreign Ministry's Journal 'International Affairs' [Volume 43, Number 1, 1997]:

Today, we have the opportunity to influence... universal European security directly through our bilateral relations with Germany, which are of a special nature' - special being, as noted earlier, the standard KGB euphemism for 'secret'<sup>17</sup>.

And writing in Volume 41, Number 10 [1995], of the same journal, two Russian Foreign Ministry officials, Vladimir Grinin and Igor Bratchikov, said that Russia and Germany 'coordinate long-term goals... on the international scene'<sup>18</sup>.

On 17th September 1996, Dr Professor Roman Herzog, the first elected President of the united German Federal Republic, who took office in 1994, delivered a notorious Pan-Germanist-federalist speech before the 41st Convention of German Historians in Munich, in which he denigrated the nation state - even though he was President of one of the most powerful nations in the world. President Herzog, who seemed to take much pleasure in confirming an identity of geopolitical orientation with that of the 'former' Soviet Union, trotted out the usual (Leninist) anti-nation state cliches, but went further than any other senior German official had previously gone in publicly identifying contemporary Germany with Lenin's 'ultimate objective of destroying the state'.

For the President of a nation such as Germany to call effectively for its abolition, did not apparently strike the members of Dr Roman Herzog's audience as odd, let alone treasonable - because the Pan-Germans' covert intention, in conformity with Nazi International thinking, has always been that all nation states are to disappear with the exception of Greater Germany. This is indeed the essence of the Pan-German strategic deception: while promoting the abolition of other nations, these people fully intend that Germany itself will flourish, disguised for the time being behind the 'mask of federation': so they appear, on the face of it, to concur with Mikhail Gorbachev's pronouncement in the course of his Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo in June 1992 that 'self-determination of sovereign nations will be realised in a completely different manner'. For both Germany and the 'former' Soviet Union intend that captive nations will 'determine' of their own accord that their residual interests can only be met by submission to the 'imperative' to federate - an 'imperative' which the Pan-Germans presume will never apply to them since Germany will predominate in the intended European 'single space'; and to which the continuing (Soviet) Leninists are indifferent, since their interest is the realisation of their objective of Leninist World Government, presupposing the prior abolition of all nation states with no exceptions. The latent divergence between continuing secret Soviet Leninist World Government strategy and continuing secret Pan-German hegemony strategy is therefore profound - but masked from view as each of these two evil powers seeks to advance its separate strategy in purported coordination with the other.

Among his observations, Dr Herzog proclaimed to the German historians - perhaps in the expectation of encouraging them to rewrite history and thus to treat the emergence of nations as 'a passing phase' - that 'we are facing a new era. The principle of erecting boundaries from which the nation states arose in the 19th century' (indicating that the German President's knowledge of British and French history was minimal) 'is as of little further use as is the expansion with which the nation state was also associated'. And the German President pronounced dogmatically:

At the end of this century, we are at the point of outgrowing the form of the nation state which has drawn the Continent into the abyss with its ideological excesses'.

'...The nation state with the concepts of sovereignty that go with it has out-lived itself. No state today can any longer protect its population or its territory by itself, whether militarily or environmentally'.

Neither can it [the nation state] any longer pursue an autonomous economic policy. Thus the "nation state" in the style of the last century has ceased to exist as an impermeable structure, and to be quite plain, nor should it exist any longer'.

Moreover the nation state is too small for the major problems of life and too big for the minor ones. Indeed, we see that every day: many problems, often ones of vital significance, have for a long time not been solvable at national level. The way for us in the future can only be: Europe'<sup>19</sup>.

Lenin would have been delighted to hear the German President borrowing his own special phrases, like the Soviet word 'form'. Leon Trotsky, too, would have been proud of Dr Roman Herzog. Writing in 'The Bulletin of the Opposition' [see page XI], Trotsky had proclaimed in 1930 that 'the Soviet United States of Europe is the only correct slogan pointing the way out from European disunity, a disunity which threatens not only Germany but the whole of Europe with complete structural and cultural decline'. Ironically, though, Dr Herzog also complained that 'there are accordingly two dangers for the Europe of the future: if the European Union is not structured to reflect the interests of its citizens, it will play into the hands of those who wish to return [sic] to the nation state. And a lack of unity within the Union will be equally of benefit to the advocates of the nation state'.

Clearly, these 'advocates' were inferior beings suffering from fanatical hang-ups, or 'bees in their bonnets' - retarded individuals, living deep in the past, who have never understood that 'the world has moved on'. The only difficulty here was that Dr Herzog was himself compelled to admit - in that very passage, and elsewhere in his speech - that 'Europe isn't working'. It was not structured to 'reflect the interests of its citizens'. But the nation state was just no use at all - being 'too small for the major problems of life and too big for the minor ones' - from which, no doubt, the bewildered historians were required to concur that Singapore, Switzerland and Japan were not viable nations. Of course, the familiar mantra that nation states are 'too small' to be in a position to handle the (unspecified) 'problems facing mankind' is the inverse of the Leninist-globalists' 'line' on 'global issues'. These are 'too large' to be addressed, let alone resolved, by the nation state: so their resolution accordingly presupposes the nation state's redundancy. The 'General Staff of the Revolution' - the Soviet strategists, intelligence operatives, covert Party members and Komsomol cadres, together with the army of internationally dispersed 'former' KGB/GRU officers calling themselves academics at Western, especially American, universities - have been scouring the universe for 'global issues', headed by Leninist environmentalism, which can be milked to foster the Revolution's cherished 'common mind' and to 'demonstrate' that the nation state has outlived its usefulness. Such reasoning is, of course, fraudulent - not least given the crude fallacy encased within its presumption that since the nation state 'is too small to solve global issues which are too big for it, it serves no other recognisably useful purpose. Another absurdity here is the untenable proposition that collectivised arrangements, somehow 'superior' to the nation state, will be any better placed to address the 'intractable problems facing humanity', than nation states themselves.

The left-wing German coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, led by Gerhard Schroder - which followed the fall of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1999 amid a classically Leninist revolutionary 'exposure' operation (similar to the orchestrated exposures of the sins of British Conservative MPs during the 'life after death' Government of John Major, both operations being designed to discredit and decimate so-called

'conservative' political forces) - continued seamlessly with the same integrationist and Lenin-style collectivist propaganda as had been espoused by its predecessor. On 10th February 2000, the Russian First Vice-Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, who was visiting Berlin, handed Chancellor Schroder a message from the then-Acting Russian President and Prime Minister, KGB/GRU Colonel Vladimir Putin, which the official Russian 'news' agency ITAR-TASS said 'focuses on strategic partnership between Russia and Germany'. Kasyanov added that 'there has always been an active and constant dialogue between Moscow and Berlin.... It is a natural process, as Russia and Germany are traditionally the major partners'.

Before a follow-up meeting between Chancellor Schroder and President Putin, also in Berlin, the German Chancellor said that 'we agreed that we both have interests in a strategic relationship'. Greeting the Russian President with full military honours at the Chancellery, Schroder added: 'We want a new beginning in bilateral relations'. The alleged need for a 'new start' had arisen because of certain ephemeral problems - in the category of the Soviets' concept of 'Life': annoying difficulties which had temporarily compromised the implementation of joint strategy, but which both sides agreed could be resolved without adverse consequences - problems such as Moscow's default on its foreign debt in 1998, Russia's demand that Germany should forgive some DM38 billion (US\$18.7 billion) of bilateral debt, and unresolved economic issues. No mention was made on that occasion of bilateral problems between the two powers which were far from ephemeral - such as the growing Pan-German pitch for the re-establishment of its hegemony in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, the tension over which may hold the key to the future of humanity [see pages 233-238].

A month earlier, on 12th May 2000, the German Federal Vice-Chancellor, Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, whose far-left terrorism and political pedigree is reviewed on pages 157 and 249-251, had stressed the need for 'finality' in the process of European collectivisation-integration. In order to be able to 'meet this historic challenge' (of eastwards-expansion, in line with Soviet strategy) 'and to integrate the new member states without substantially denting the European Union's capacity for action, we must put into place the last brick in the building of European integration, namely political integration'.

Acknowledging that the Maastricht Treaty had deprived the constituent EU nation states of key elements of their sovereignty, a development that he welcomed, Herr Fischer elaborated that 'in Maastricht one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation state - currency, internal security and external security - was for the first time transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the Euro was not only the crowning point of integration, it was also a profoundly political act. Note that there appeared to be no question in Herr Fischer's mind that the introduction of the collective currency was 'a good thing', notwithstanding that its value had slumped ever since the first day of its introduction. What was important, clearly, was not the mundane question of whether the collectivisation of national currencies could be justified on rational and pragmatic grounds in any respect at all, or whether a collectivised currency could ever be expected to cease being depreciated, but rather that it represented 'the crowning point of political integration' and was 'a profoundly political act'<sup>20</sup>. Never mind that the savings of millions of 'captive' Europeans has been decimated in terms of the US dollar and their external purchasing power since the doomed currency collectivisation project was initiated.

Early in 2001, a German press report revealed that Fischer had not merely been a radical Left-wing activist in the 1970s, but that he was engaged in violence against the police and may have been a terrorist: a photograph was published of Fischer bringing his fist down on what appeared to be an already injured policeman during a demonstration in the 1970s. The publication of this compromising photograph coincided with the news that Germany's Foreign Minister had been ordered to give evidence in the Frankfurt trial of a left-wing revolutionary terrorist, Hans-Joachim Klein, accused of three murders during an attack on the Vienna OPEC meeting in 1975. Herr Fischer had been accused of supporting the use of petrol bombs during the demonstration. Fischer was arrested following the disturbances in Frankfurt on 10th May 1976, although he claims not to have been present when a petrol bomb was thrown at the car of a police officer, Jurgen Weber, severely burning him. Klein, an alleged accomplice of the notorious Soviet-supported Illyich Ramirez Sanchez ('Carlos the Jackal'), told the Frankfurt court that he had regarded Herr Fischer as a leader and an 'example among the clique' of activists in Frankfurt at the time<sup>21</sup>.

It also transpired that moves to discredit this German Foreign Minister with a violent Left-wing past were being masterminded by Bettina Roehl, the daughter of the notorious terrorist, Ulrike Meinhof, who had committed suicide the day before the Frankfurt riot. The Sunday Telegraph reported on 14th January 2001 that 'the 38-year-old journalist, deserted by her terrorist mother at the age of seven, was now planning to publish a book' which was intended as 'a withering indictment of Herr Fischer and Germany's former radical Left'. A low-life branch of the Soviet-sponsored terrorist clique concerned, known as the 'Sponti' movement of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist students and squatters, had been successfully radicalised by agents of the Leninist World Revolution. Their clique became 'the political hotbed which contributed to the birth of Germany's environmentalist Green Party in the 1980s'. Through the radicalisation of a whole generation of students in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet strategists' 'agents of change' succeeded in creating revolutionary cadres in sufficient quantity to be sure that, in due course, some of these politically motivated radicals would rise to senior policymaking levels in Western structures. Thus the leader of the German Greens, Joschka Fischer, who had belonged with Klein to the 'Spontis', was ultimately elevated to the position of Foreign Minister. Other well-known cases include, of course, former President Bill Clinton, the anti-Vietnam War activist; Jack Straw (British Home Secretary), a 'former' Communist and radical agitator; Lionel Jospin (the French Prime Minister), a 'former' Trotskyite activist; and Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission), a compromised Left-wing Italian politician who, in 2000, was alleged to be under investigation by the Italian authorities for corruption, and whose 'Neo-Communist Manifesto' distributed in February 2000 [see page 10] is the European Commission's current strategy blueprint. And since 'the Berlin Wall fell into the West in 1989 (when the Western powers were caught off-guard by 'collapsible Communism' so that, far from 'winning the Cold War', the West lost the intelligence war' and has, as a consequence, been swamped by agents of the 'General Staff of the World Revolution'), Germany's political and government structures, in particular, have been 'recruited'. Indeed 'normalisation' in Germany has gone so far that the defeated Christian Democrats thought it perfectly logical to choose a 'former' apparatchik from the East German Academy of [Leninist] Sciences, Angela Merkel, to be Chancellor Helmut Kohl's successor as party leader.

Hence, whether one studies the pronouncements of German and Soviet-Russian officials, examines German-Soviet bilateral accords, reviews the Pan-German historical record and the political provenance of postwar German leaders, contemplates the scope for blackmail surrounding the disgraced ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl's alleged links with tainted sources of funding, or recalls the fact that Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, originally from Halle in Eastern Germany, was controlled for years by the chief Soviet controller of agents of influence, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh [see page 91], it would appear to be the case that Germany and Russia are working overtly and secretly together in geostrategic harmony. Nor would this be anything new: on Stalin's birthday, according to Carl von Wiegand, Chief Correspondent for the Hearst newspapers in the 1950s, leading industrialists in West Germany, with their eyes focused on Soviet raw materials, were in the habit of sending carloads of gifts to 'the Red Czar in Moscow'.

Playing to the Pan-German lust for access to Russia's economic resources, with which the Russians are historically familiar, Igor Maksimychev underlined Moscow's 'community of interest' with Germany in his cited 'International Affairs' article, by pointing out that Europe's economic survival may depend upon access to Russian raw materials. (Mr Maksimychev's importance as a commentator who reflects the preoccupations of the Leninist strategy collective in Moscow is confirmed not only by his revelation of the 'special' [= secret] nature of Russian-German relations, but also because this 'International Affairs' article is the source of our knowledge that Jacques Chirac was Chairman of a 'Russian-German-French Commission... before he was elected President'). 'Western Europe', Maksimychev suggested on behalf of the Leninist strategy collective, 'may survive as an innovation centre (a centre of power) on a global scale only if it is capable of supplying itself with the necessary depth in trading areas plus a practically inexhaustible supply of natural resources'.

But having played to the Pan-German gallery, Maksimychev then wrote that 'Russia must take upon itself, at least declaratively, the initiating role in the process of setting universal European integration into motion' - which, being interpreted from the Aesopian text, means that the model of 'universal European integration' (a.k.a. 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'), which Moscow apparently needs to 'initiate', diverges from the geographically more limited Pan-German model ('Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'), which is not what Moscow has in mind. If this were not the case, and the models were the same, Russia would not need, would it, to take any 'initiating role' upon itself, since Germany has been spearheading the 'building of Europe' with every success. In other words, Russia and Germany, while appearing to be sharing the same geopolitical objectives, are in fact pursuing divergent strategies.

The implication of Igor Maksimychev's published remarks is that Russia is opposed to the realisation of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals', which would leave European hegemony in Germany's hands - and wishes to ensure that the momentum for 'integration' follows the Leninists' prescription, with the objective being the 'single political space' stretching 'from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'. In revealing that Russia needs to 'initiate' the 'process of setting universal European integration into motion', this senior Leninist apparatchik made it clear that Moscow thinks that Germany's model was making faster progress than its own, that Germany cannot be trusted to further Moscow's 'universal European integration' strategy, and that Moscow must make sure that the Pan-German strategy is reliably channelled, by whatever means, so that it promotes the Soviet Leninists' objectives at the expense of the Pan-German model.

## THE NAZI PLAN FOR 'UNITED EUROPE'

## 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft'

The European Union Collective conforms largely to the design of the plan for a European Economic Community ('Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft') which was developed by leading National Socialists under the chairmanship of the Reich's Economics Minister and President of the Reichsbank, Dr Funk<sup>22</sup>.

The Nazi plan for European union was consolidated in a book published in Berlin, also entitled 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', consisting of essays by leading Third Reich industrialists under Dr Funk's direction<sup>23</sup>. The facsimile reproduced on page 161 is taken from the front page of this Nazi compendium, published in 1942: the copy was located at the Berlin Staatsbibliothek, but the author has separately photocopied the complete text of the single copy held by the British Library, which was published in 1943. The further facsimile on page 163 shows the book's first Contents Page. Issued in Berlin by the Association of Berlin Business People and Industrialists [Industrie und Handelskammer zu Berlin] in academic association with the Berlin School of Economics [Wirtschafts-Hochschule Berlin], the publication consists of a compendium of papers by prominent bankers, industrialists and economists on the subject of the project in hand - the establishment of a German-controlled 'European Economic Community'. The Table of Contents and Chapters of this volume confirm that the Nazis were indeed planning the establishment of a European Economic Community (collective) - complete with a common agricultural policy, a common exchange rate system and monetary policy, common industrial and trade policies, a common transport policy, and a powerful European Central Bank (Europa Bank) dominated by Germany. In 1941, an American visitor to Britain, Allan Nevins, working at Oxford University, described precisely what the Nazis were preparing. As early as 1941, he had deduced that Hitler was organising his conquests into a United States of Europe. The predominantly industrial Reich had been enlarged by the annexation of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, parts of Belgium, Alsace Lorraine, Northern France as far as the Somme, and Western Poland. All European industrial production was to be regulated in minute detail from Berlin, from where Soviet-style central planning was to be directed, and all trade was to be controlled by means of a regional multilateral clearing system which Germany had already established. 'Cooperation' was to be formalised by means of complex, oppressive, collective legalistic agreements - the coercive model employed by the European political collective today<sup>24</sup>.

At the Congress of Europe held in Rome between 14th and 20th November 1932, the Pan-German Alfred Rosenberg had outlined proposals for the economic restructuring of Europe. These ideas were heavily promoted under the Nazis by the newspaper 'Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft' ['The German People's Economy'], which campaigned for what the Editor of the 1942 compendium, Professor Dr Heinrich Hunke, a leading Nazi industrialist, called 'the concept of the German economy becoming self-sufficient in a new political sense'. Another influential advocate of a 'New Europe' reorganised economically and politically to meet the 'requirements' of the German Reich was a certain German Ambassador, Daitz, whose selected works were published in 1938 under the title 'Deutschland und die Europäische Grossraumwirtschaft'. At a Munich seminar held in January 1939, the farming leader, R. Walther Darre, advocated a rigged, collectivised, market in agricultural produce.

### A NAZI EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

At the conclusion of the volume 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', Dr Professor Hunke drew together the themes set out in the book by the following contributors:

\* Reichswirtschaftsminister und President der Deutschen Reichsbank, Dr Walther Funk, who expostulated on 'The economic character of the New Europe';

\* Dr Horst Jecht, from the Berlin School of Economics, who anticipated the development of the intended 'European Economic Community';

\* Dr Emil Woermann, a Professor from the University of Halle, who described the 'New European Agricultural Order' which would rig farm prices [the forerunner of the EU's disastrous Marxist Common Agricultural Policy];

\* Dr Anton Reithinger, from I. G. Farben, Berlin, the manufacturers of Zyklon-B extermination gas, who invoked the 'New European Industrial Economy';

\* Dr Philipp Beisiegel, Director of the Reich Ministry of Labour, who gave details of the 'New Labour Order', with emphasis on the rigging of labour markets the movement of workers in accordance with inter-state agreements, and the de facto direction of labour (which the EU has so far not dared to emulate);

\* Gustav Koenigs, a State Secretary, whose paper discussed 'European Traffic Questions' - the forerunner of today's 'Trans-European Networks';

\* Dr Bernhard Benning, Director of the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft A. G., Berlin, who elaborated upon 'European Currency Questions', including in particular: 'The harmonisation of European rates of exchange', 'The future form of the European Currency System' ['Die Zukunft des europäischen Währungssystems'], and 'The European Currency Bloc';

\* Dr Carl Clodius, the Manager of the Foreign Trade Centre in Berlin, who described 'European Trading and Economic Agreements', touching inter alia upon 'Principles of European cooperation', 'The European regional principle' [which was the precursor of the Maastricht Treaty's Common Regional Policy], 'Internal requirements of the European Economic Community', and finally 'Methods of European cooperation' [the original thinking behind the oppressive system of extreme collectivist legalism and Treaty-based complexity].

With the possible partial exception of the chapter on the common labour policy, given its emphasis on the direction of labour, the main subjects aired at the Berlin brainstorming sessions in 1941 presided over by Dr Funk, have formed the framework for the EU Collective's Maastricht Treaty and its derivatives. Particularly striking are the Nazis' published blueprints for a European Economic Community the harmonisation of European rates of exchange, a European Currency System the reinvention of coercive legalism as the primary basis for 'methods of European cooperation', and such collectivist concepts as 'Trans-European networks' and the Common agricultural policy. The primacy of the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy today can be traced not to pressure from the French farming lobby, as is usually supposed, but to the proposals put forward by the leader of the powerful German agricultural community, R. Walther Darre, whose seminar in January 1939 was entitled: 'Market organisation of National Socialist agricultural policy as a pacemaker for a new foreign trade organisation'.

On 3rd April 1992, in an address to a meeting of the globalist Bertelsmann Forum, Dr Helmut Kohl omitted to credit the Nazis for linking Germany's destiny with European unification - claiming the authorship of this scheme for himself.



# THE NAZI BLUEPRINT FOR UNITED EUROPE

## Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft

VON


Reichswirtschaftsminister u. Präsident der Deutschen Reichsbank Funk;  
 Professor Dr. Jocht, Berlin; Professor Dr. Woermann, Halle;  
 Dr. Reithinger, Berlin; Ministerialdirektor Dr. Beisiegel, Berlin;  
 Staatssekretär i.W. Koenigs, Berlin; Direktor Dr. Benning, Berlin;  
 Gesandter Dr. Clodius, Berlin, und Gauwirtschaftsberater Professor  
 Dr. Hunke, Berlin

mit einer Einführung von

Gauwirtschaftsberater Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke  
 Präsident des Vereins Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller

Herausgegeben von dem

Verein Berliner Kaufleute und der Wirtschafts-Hochschule  
 und Industrieller Berlin



Berlin

1942

Haude & Spenersche Verlagsbuchhandlung Max Paschke

Facsimile of the main title page of the National Socialist compendium 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' ['European Economic Community'] published under the direction of the Reich Minister of Economy and President of the Reichsbank, Dr Walther Funk, in 1942 (reprinted in 1943), containing papers presented at seminars conducted in Berlin in 1942 on the establishment of a German-controlled European Economic Community. The document, one copy of which is available in the British Library, and another in the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin, contains the blueprint for the European collective currency and monetary policy, a collective Central Bank ('Europa Bank'), a collective agricultural policy, a trans-European transport policy, a common industrial ('market') policy, and other collectivist schemes which the European Union Collective has since implemented. All British Governments since 1970 have known that this project is revolutionary, but have enthusiastically supported it nonetheless.

He explained: 'There is no alternative to a policy which aims at combination, unless we wish to challenge fate and follow the way back to the system of small countries and the rivalries of yesterday.... It has been my policy from the outset to combine indivisibly German unity and the political unification of Europe. For myself, these are two sides of the same coin.... We shall only be able to create this greater Europe provided we irrevocably advance the European core'.

### Chapter and Section headings of 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft'

The main Contents Pages of 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgesellschaft', published in 1942 by Haude & Spenersche Verlagsbuchhandlung Max Paschke on instructions of the Association of Berlin Business People and Industrialists and the Berlin School of Economics, containing the previous year's Berlin papers on proposals for a new European Economic Community, were as follows [names of speakers shown first]:

\* Professor Dr Heinrich Hunke, President of the Association of Berlin Business People and Industrialists and of the Institute of the German Economy:

#### Introduction

○ Economic practice

○ Problems facing the Continental European Economic Community.

\* Walther Funk, Reich Economy Minister and President of the Reichsbank [Reichswirtschaftsminister und President der Deutschen Reichsbank]:

#### The Economic Character of the New Europe

○ False and genuine economic freedom ['genuine' = controlled from Berlin]

○ Continental European cooperation [mask for pressure, coercion etc.]

○ European capacity and how to supplement it

○ State direction of the economy and Community 'work' between 'Member States'

○ Payment transactions between 'Member States', and the European currency

○ Securing Europe's living space and economic market

○ The will to work for the European Community.

\* Dr Horst Jecht, a Professor and leading Nazi economist from the Berlin School of Economics

#### The Development of the European Economic Community

○ The European Economic Community

and the formation of the larger area

○ Problems of the European economic

market in the late classical period and the Middle Ages

○ Recent changes in the issue of the single 'European space'

○ Creation of states and independent state economies

○ Expansion overseas and the impact of it on Europe

○ The separation of England from the Continent

and the creation of the 'free world economy'

○ The economic reformation of Europe: a task which must be addressed now

○ The collapse of the former world economy

○ Objectives and methodology of the European Economic Community.

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Facsimile of the first Contents Page of the Nazi-era compendium 'Europäisches Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' [European Economic Community], published in Berlin, by order of the Reich Minister of Economy and the President of the Reichsbank, Dr Funk, in 1942. The subjects discussed at the forum of seminars organised in 1941 to establish the framework for the intended European Economic Community to be controlled by the Pan-Germans in their National Socialist guise, are essentially those addressed by the European Union's collective Treaty (Maastricht-Amsterdam-Nice), showing that the European Union Collective is derived essentially from this Nazi Pan-German collectivist blueprint. In fact, the ideas contained in this document originated shortly after the First World War, although their predecessors can be traced further back than Bismarck. Plans devised by General Haushofer in the 1920s, and later under Hitler, for 'Greater Germany', as well as the post-war blueprint for a resurrected Reich, all included the economic integration of Europe with a 'Great Germany'.

\* Dr Emil Woermann, a Professor from the University of Halle, and leading Nazi agricultural expert:

The European Agricultural Economic Order  
[= The Common Agricultural Policy]

- The development of farming business methods and the fabric of European foodstuffs economies
- The growth of the global economic division of labour in the agricultural sector
- Rising agricultural output in Germany and Italy
- The supply situation under the influence of economic strangulation and transformation
- Consequences in terms of production policy
- Prospects for increasing European production of foodstuffs.

\* Dr Anton Reitringer, from I. G. Farben, Berlin:

The European Industrial Economy  
[= A Common Industrial Policy]

- The development of industry in the 19th century
- Stages in developing a technological economy
- Effects on social policy
- Europe's loss of industrial domination during the First World War
- The transition to state direction and planning
- The New Europe and its common aspects
- Differences in regional areas
- Review of the relative industrial strengths of the warring power groups.

\* Dr Bernhard Benning, Director of the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft A. G., Berlin:

European currency issues

[= The Common Monetary Policy and the European Monetary System, which has been developed into the European Union's Economic and Monetary Union - the collective currency regime of the Euro. The central bank originally proposed was 'Europa Bank', which has materialised as the European Central Bank. It seems incredible that the Nazis were dreaming up these schemes when their economy was liable to face wartime currency degradation and hyperinflation].

- The two aspects of currency
- Domestic economic problems of European currencies
- Foreign currency management and reciprocal billing
- Extension of multilateral billing
- The problem of the clearing balances
- Harmonisation of European rates of exchange
- The future form of the European Currency System
- Europe's future currency relations with the other key areas of the world
- What about gold?
- The European Currency Bloc.

\* Dr Philipp Beisiegel, Director of the Reich Ministry of Labour and author of works on the direction of labour:

### Employment in Europe

[= The Common Labour Policy,  
aka The Social Chapter]

- O Density of population and the numbers and structure of people in employment
- O People - Europe's wealth
- O Exchange of workers on the basis of agreements between Member States
- O Principles of worker exchange
- O Harmonisation of organisation of employment
- O Use of contractors and shifting of orders.

\* Gustav Koenigs, a State Secretary:

### European Traffic Questions [= Trans-European Networks]

- O The Magna Carta of European internal marine traffic
- O Motorways and the European traffic community.
- O European Community work in the shipping sector
- O European Community work in the air transportation sector\*

\*In the European Union context, this 'line' has developed into the 'Common European Sky', under which all national Air Traffic Control will be subject to centralised European direction, including military flights. By this means, the political collective will be able to ban military flights, thereby neutralising US and British military air operations in and around the European theatre, and across Europe to the Middle East and beyond.

\* Dr Carl Clodius, Manager of the Foreign Trade Centre in Berlin:

### European trading and economic agreements [= The Single European Market]

- O The old trading policy
- O German economic and trade policy since 1933
- O Changes in trading policy brought about by the War
- O The transformation of the law of supply and demand [sic!]
- O The question of European employment
- O The traffic problem
- O Effects of the English blockade on Europe
- O Principles of European cooperation [= extreme collectivist legalism]
- O The European Regional Principle [origin of the subversive European Regional Policy and the Committee of the Regions - a scheme to break down the constituent nation states from within and to foster links between the regions and the Euro-centre in order to render the national centres redundant. This is truly among the most insidious features of the creeping revolution or 'coup d'etat by installments' afflicting EU countries]
- O The economic independence of Europe
- O Europe and the world economy
- O Internal requirements for the European Economic Community
- O Methods of European cooperation [= application of collectivist legalism].

\* Professor Dr Heinrich Hunke, President of the Association of Berlin Business People and Industrialists and of the Institute of the German Economy, who added a conclusion:

The basic question: Europe -  
a geographical term or a political reality?

- O Transformation of doctrine and thinking  
[= Developing collectivist mind control: 'New Thinking', 'The Common Mind']
- O The starting point for setting tasks for Europe
- O The character of the world economy
- O The political weakness of the European Continent  
as a prerequisite for British world domination
- O The concept of the modern national economy  
as monopolised by British opinion
- O Setting up the European Economic Community.

#### A BRUSSELS VIEW OF THE E.U.'S NAZI ORIGINS

'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' and 'The Rotten Heart of Europe'

In 1995, Bernard Connally, a former senior official with the European Commission [EC], published a famous book, 'The Rotten Heart of Europe: The Dirty War for Europe's Money'<sup>25</sup>, in which he laid bare the doubletalk surrounding the activities of politicians, bankers and bureaucrats engaged in forcing Europe into a crippling monetary straitjacket. The book's publishers, Faber and Faber [London and Boston], drew attention to Connally's revelations in the following terms: 'Hidden agendas are laid bare, skulduggery exposed and economic fallacies are skewered in a devastating account of the confidence trick played on Europe by the "would-be" monetary masters of the world'. The book caused a sensation in Europe-watching circles, since Bernard Connally could hardly have been better placed to write the inside story of 'the dirty war for Europe's money'. This was because he had served for many years as the head of the European Commission's unit responsible for monitoring and servicing the Exchange Rate Mechanism [ERM] - the exchange rate-rigging arrangements that preceded Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which came into force with effect from January 1999 - and procured for the Germans the devaluation of their own currency which, for historical reasons, they could not countenance while their currency was the Deutschmark.

The publicity material for the book stressed that 'The Rotten Heart of Europe' told 'a dark story leavened with humour and informed with passion - a passion to tell the true story of a mechanism as politically damaging as it is economically perverse, and of the march to Monetary Union that, the author argues, "is a threat not only to our prosperity but also to our liberties and, ultimately, to our peace". No-one who wants to understand how Britain has been taken for a ride by the proponents of federalism, and why Europe is economically under-performing and politically imploding, can afford to miss this enthralling and disturbing book'.

Mr Connally referred to the Nazi compendium 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', and noted in particular the following remarks of Professor Dr Hunke: "The only possible aim of economic cooperation must be the establishment of the European Economic Community. The decisive conclusion in terms of economic policy is that Europe is not to be what one would call a major area or market in terms of a reduced world economy, in which, moreover, the old structural laws of the Anglo-Saxon world economy apply; rather, the European Economic Community must be shaped in accordance with new political criteria and will consequently appear different from the economic structures of the past'.

In a Note appended to this quotation, Connally added that 'similar sentiments were expressed almost word for word by [Jacques] Delors [the former President of the European

Commission] in an interview in *Der Spiegel* on the eve of the Maastricht Summit'. Elsewhere, Mr Connally observed that the Nazi Professor used 'language redolent of the views, with their racist overtones, of European 'idealists' such as Delors'; and certainly, reading the text of 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' is indeed an unpleasant experience - with hatred of 'the Anglo-Saxons' falling from every page. Curiously, the descendant of this openly-expressed hatred is to be found today only in France, where the new European military arrangements are acknowledged to be intended primarily as a means of driving the United States out of Europe. Mr Connally also drew attention to the paper in 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' on the future 'European Currency System'. Noting that this paper - 'an extension of a July 1940 analysis by the Reich Economics Ministry' - was presented by Dr Bernhard Benning, Director of the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, Connally added that Benning spent five years as a captive of the Soviets, including a prolonged spell at the Buchenwald concentration camp near Weimar in East Germany. After being freed in 1950 and managing to cross over to the West, he continued his banking career - his views evidently unchanged by his experiences. In his paper published in 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', Benning had written: 'There is no argument about the position of the Reichsmark as Europe's leading currency. Berlin will take over a similar position - albeit significantly stronger - to that formerly occupied by London within the sterling area'

Mr Connally was indeed familiar with this character:

'Benning had already become notable as the main proponent of the system of geruschlose Finanzierung (noiseless financing) of the German war effort, which involved tapping the banking system's short-term liquidity. Ultimately, it had horrendously inflationary consequences. After the war - and after spending five years in a Russian concentration camp - Benning became a member of the Directorate of the Bank deutscher Länder, the new central bank which in 1958 was transmogrified into the Bundesbank. He remained a member of the Bundesbank Directorate until he retired, in 1972'.

Another Reichsbank official who slipped seamlessly into the Bundesbank's structures after the war was Alfons Diehl, a key member of the Reichsbank's all-important

Economics and Statistics Department. He took up a senior regional Bundesbank position in the 1960s. To mark the eighth anniversary of Hitler's accession to (seizure of) power, Diehl had issued a rallying call to the Reichsbank's employees in language which, as David Marsh wrote in 'The Bundesbank' [Heinemann, London, 1992] 'bore little resemblance to the studied moderation of central bankers' utterances: 'After a victory march without parallel, the bearers of German arms are ready to do battle against our ultimate enemy.... When the weapons are stilled and a Greater Germany is secure for the rest of time, none of us should be allowed to say to himself that, at this decisive time, he ever failed'<sup>26</sup>.

David Marsh's account of the Nazi plan for Economic and Monetary Union noted that 'in the summer of 1940, as the Wehrmacht rampaged across Europe, the success of the Blitzkrieg convinced the Reichsbank - like many others - that the fighting would soon be over. [So] the central bank and the Reich Economics Ministry actively laid plans for postwar monetary union across a large part of Europe, with the Reichsmark [as] the dominant currency'.

In June 1940, the Reichsbank's Economics and Statistics Department prepared a detailed analysis for Funk and the rest of the Directorate looking ahead to "problems for external monetary policy after the end of the war". The document concluded that the Reichsmark would be the 'leading currency in a German economic area' and one of the world's two 'standard currencies' (along with the US dollar). Additionally, 'within the German currency bloc', fixed exchange rates would be introduced 'to ease the way later to a currency and customs union'.

By July 1940, the Reich Economics Ministry had already drawn up detailed plans for a "Bank for European Settlements", also to be called "Europa Bank" ("Bank of Europe"), as the pivot of the planned postwar monetary system. The bank, to be based in Vienna, would be owned by individual governments and central banks, which would pay in share capital in

proportion to their existing pre-war financial obligations. All payments between member countries would be made through Europa Bank, which would also have the ability to grant Reichsmark credits to members to back export activity. The bank would have the power to levy minimum reserves from central banks "to control expansion of credit by member states". This, of course, was an early blueprint of the collective monetary and currency arrangements which have been installed and operative since 1998-99, with spectacular consequences in that, from the first day following its launch, the EU's collective currency proceeded to depreciate and to remain profoundly weak against the US dollar.

Ironically, the grandiose collective monetary aspirations of the Reichsbank were crushed not only by the outcome of the war, but also by the inflationary consequences of the system of 'noiseless financing' - which had led to a steadily growing accumulation of short-term Government debt to the commercial banks. As Marsh explained: 'In a repetition of developments towards the end of the First World War, most of the debt was accumulated after 1943 in the form of Treasury bills lodged directly with the Reichsbank', rather than la- in the United States today, for instance), with the commercial banks. 'As the money supply soared towards the end of the war, the Reichsmark was reduced to near worthlessness'.

The European currency collective (or 'Eurozone') which materialised in 1999 did not correspond geographically with the Reich Economics Ministry / Benning proposals, as Connally explained in subsequent paragraphs; but the prescription has remained 100% intact, right the way through from the Nazi era - illuminating the significance of the unbroken continuity represented by the presence of the Nazi, Dr Bernhard Benning, at the Bundesbank until his retirement in the early 1970s. Nor is the Bundesbank bashful about openly acknowledging the seamless continuity between the National Socialists' Reichsbank and the Bundesbank. In the Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report 2000, a panel mourning the deaths during 2000 of 22 staff members concluded with the following additional statement: 'WE ALSO KEEP IN REMEMBRANCE THE RETIRED STAFF MEMBERS OF THE BANK AND OF THE FORMER DEUTSCHE REICHSBANK WHO DIED IN 2000. WE WILL HONOUR THEIR MEMORY. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK'.

By 1970, the Nazi blueprint for economic and monetary union had been firmly incorporated into the hidden plans of the Brussels Commission of the European Economic Community - as was made clear when secret Cabinet papers revealed under Britain's 30-year rule were released into the public domain on 1st January 2001. These showed [see also page 32] that the 'Conservative' Government led by Edward Heath suppressed evidence that British membership of the 'Common Market' could lead to political and monetary union. A British Foreign Office document dated 9th November 1970 exposed the debate at the Cabinet in Number 10, Downing Street: 'The plan for economic and monetary union has revolutionary long-term political implications, both economic and political. It could imply the creation of a European federal state, with a Single Currency.... It will arouse strong feelings about sovereignty'. In assessments of these revelations, commentators were unanimous that the Heath Government had deliberately misled the British people, and that if they had known the truth, they would never have voted YES at the fateful British referendum on EU membership in 1975. Baroness Castle of Blackburn, the formidable Cabinet Minister in the Labour Government of Harold Wilson, exploded: 'We always knew that Heath had been dishonest He kept patronising us by telling us our fears were misplaced. But now the truth is out. If the British people had known this, they would never have voted Yes'. Brian Walden, a former Labour MP and subsequently a prolific broadcaster, wrote in The Times of London on 1st January 2001, commenting on the Cabinet documents released under the 30-year rule: 'Document after document in 1970 contains the same message. Europe was heading directly into territory that we now know to be extremely sensitive. The Government knew it and knew the difficulties, but wanted to join anyway. There is undeniable evidence that government tactics were to play down in public the wider consequences of joining and in particular the prospect of economic and monetary union'. All British Governments since 1970 have thus known that the project is 'revolutionary'.



The relentless and ruthless attack on national sovereignty which the European Union exists to prosecute, has been accurately described as 'a coup d'état by installments'. This phrase was first coined by Konrad Heiden, the German author of a book entitled 'Der Fuehrer' [Boston, 1944, page 579]<sup>27</sup>. Heiden showed that the precedent for this model of the gradualist-opportunistic grab for power is Hitler's own seizure of power in 1933. Less than two months after he had been appointed Germany's Chancellor by the elderly President Hindenburg on 30th January 1933, Hitler banned the Communist deputies from the Reichstag and, by resorting to intimidation and mendacity, secured, on 23rd March 1933 - given the absence from the vote, of the Communists - the required two-thirds majority in the Reichstag for an enabling act

which transferred legislative authority from the legislature to his Cabinet, handing his Cabinet general powers, ostensibly for an initial period of four years. He did this under cover of a sweeping emergency decree granted to him by the President following a mysterious fire which had gutted the Reichstag building - now known, of course, to have been a Nazi provocation<sup>28</sup>.

As discussed earlier, each member of the European Union has delegated general powers to the European Commission - a disastrous course of action which means that the European Commission acquired the power to propose and initiate policy, thus forcing all so-called Member States onto the defensive and into perpetual combat with the Commission to alleviate any perceived adverse measures which they fear could operate to their detriment. But while, in this (or any) political collective, as we have seen, the interests of all are supposed to be served, in reality the interests of none except those of the centre are enhanced. And in order to ensure that none of the augmented powers derived from its sole exercise of general powers are ever forfeited, the political collective has invented the self-serving doctrine of the 'acquis communautaire', under which powers once delegated to ('acquired by') the European Union cannot be 'repatriated', contrary to the opinion of certain British 'Eurosceptics' who, as noted, insist that British membership of the European Union can be 'renegotiated'. However, as discussed earlier, a tenant who is dissatisfied with his lease cannot renegotiate the lease on more favourable terms with a landlord who is unwilling to grant a new lease. This is the situation in which the misguided and misled European Union 'Member States' find themselves.

Once the Reichstag had transferred general legislative powers to Hitler's Cabinet, 'a wave of Nazi purges followed, as one institution after another was subjugated. Arbitrary rule replaced government by law in 'a coup d'état by installments'. By summer, all parties except the Nazis had been dissolved.... Well before the Nazi leader assumed the powers of the Presidency upon the death of Hindenburg in August 1934, he had become dictator of Germany'<sup>29</sup>.

Concerning the monetary and currency collectivisation proposals advanced in 1941 by Dr Bernhard Benning, which had been preceded by a pie-Anschluss attempt by Germany to impose a common currency on Austria, and which were elaborated from ideas developed in the Reich Economics Ministry, Bernard Connally added: 'The key features of the Reich Economics Ministry / Benning blueprint were that the Reichsmark would be the leading currency in a German "economic area" and, with the dollar, one of the world's two reserve currencies' [see page 167]. Within the German currency bloc, fixed exchange rates would be introduced to ease the way later for a currency and customs union'. The Exchange Rate Mechanism introduced in the 1970s fulfilled this intention of 'easing the way' towards the currency union which was put in place in 1998-99. There would be a 'Bank of Europe' ['Europa Bank'] but 'for political reasons it could be undesirable to damage the self-esteem of member states by eliminating their currencies. Thus, initially, at least, individual countries would maintain their own currencies, but would agree to permanently fixed exchange rates against the Reichsmark'. Under the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty leading to Economic and Monetary Union, the exchange rates of the 'candidate' currencies were to be 'irrevocably' fixed for the whole of eternity (i.e., to the end of the solar system), a step taken by the European Central Bank in May 1998.

Significantly, the notion that the constituent EU 'Member States' have 'pooled sovereignty' - a 'line' routinely reiterated by British Ministers and officials when they are not hid-

ing from the electorate - is or has been disputed by representatives of one EU Member 'State' only: Germany. The former State Secretary at the German Finance Ministry Horst Kohler, who was appointed to be Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund in 2000, said in April 1992 that via the intended Economic and Monetary Union, 'a good piece of German identity' was, far from being abandoned, exported to other countries. 'We should not fear that others are taking away the D-mark and our stability', he insisted. These remarks reconfirm that the Pan-German interpretation of European integration is alive and well in contemporary Germany, testifying to an unbroken continuity of thinking in elite German circles traceable to the days of the Kaiser, when a German plan for European Union - 'the sort of Europe that the Germans wished to see' - was circulated for official comment in Berlin. Mr Connally's more general observations about the Nazi plan for united Europe concluded as follows: 'Not surprisingly, the developments... required a shelving of the plans for a German-dominated European Economic Community that had been detailed during 1941 in a compendium of papers presented by the President of the Reichsbank (predecessor of the Bundesbank) and a number of leading bankers, industrialists and economists. The blueprint bore a quite startling resemblance to the EEC of the Treaty of Rome, as modified by the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, foreshadowing the agricultural, industrial and regional policies and trans-European networks advocated by the more fervent Eurocrats'. Apart from Mr Connally's mention, scant attention has been paid to the continuum linking the European Union Collective to the Nazi blueprint, despite this Author's paper on the subject (published in 1993) which drew attention to 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft - with one exception. In 2000, the Author was approached by an insistent journalist for The Daily Telegraph, who requested a copy of the Author's paper, adding that Conrad Black - the newspaper's proprietor, owner of The Jerusalem Post and formerly of The National Post, Toronto - had become aware of the Nazi document and that he (the journalist) had been delegated to research into the matter. The Author duly sent his paper to The Daily Telegraph; and that was the last he heard of the matter.

As for Bernard Connally, he was dismissed from his post with the European Commission, on the ground that he was not entitled to write 'The Rotten Heart of Europe' while he was still employed by the Commission (he was on leave of absence at the time). Mr Connally took the Commission to court, alleging unfair dismissal, and the case reached the European Court of 'Justice' (which exists not to dispense justice, but to further the interests of the European Union). The Court asserted the European Commission's perfect right to dismiss Mr Connally and to override his right to free speech. Furthermore, the Advocate-General of the Court ruled, in an opinion, that criticism of the European Union and its institutions was tantamount to blasphemy: see page 97. The matter remained reportedly unresolved at this book's press date: but what had been made abundantly clear was that critics of the European political collective - which is to say, those who refuse to defer to 'the common mind' - will be increasingly oppressed, and ultimately silenced. Mr Connally's case was 'used' to establish this 'line'.

Thus the approach of the European Union Collective to free speech is indistinguishable from that laid down in 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' [see pages 28 and 96], the compendium of the Soviet long-range strategy, which provides that 'under Communism, public opinion will become a mighty force, capable of bringing to reason those individuals who might not want to follow Communist customs and rules of behaviour in the community'<sup>30</sup>.

From the perspective of informed Britons, it is inexplicable that successive UK Governments since 1970 have not only connived at such erosions of freedoms acquired over a millennium, but have also always supported Britain's membership of the EU Collective. Only one conclusion is possible: all of them have tacitly or overtly concurred with the EU's Leninist objectives.

## ORIGINS OF GERMANY'S SECRET ORIENTATION TOWARDS RUSSIA

### The Kaiser's European Union

The British historian Niall Ferguson has pointed out that the United Kingdom's ostensible reasons for entering the First World War - which it need not have done given that there was merely a tenuous legal commitment to Belgium and barely a 'moral' commitment to France - were that entry into the war was, for the political leaders of the those days, a 'matter of honour': 'Nevertheless, desire not to be cast as "Perfidious Albion" was only the veneer behind which strategic calculations lay'. The fundamental argument was that Britain dare not risk a German victory, because any such victory would have made Germany "supreme over all the Continent and Asia Minor". But was that really the German objective?<sup>31</sup>

Ferguson quotes the late Professor Fritz Fischer [see page 210] and his pupils, who, he says, 'were every bit as radical as the British Germanophobes feared. The war was an attempt "to realise Germany's political ambitions, which may be summed up as German hegemony over Europe" through annexations of French, Belgian and possibly Russian territory, the founding of a Central European customs union and the creation of new Polish and Baltic states directly or indirectly under German control.... There was also to be a concerted effort to break up the British and Russian empires through fomenting revolutions'. Although Niall Ferguson is sceptical about Fischer's reasoning - asserting that it was flawed by the assumption that Germany's aims after the war had begun, were the same as German aims beforehand - this authority nevertheless adds to the wealth of evidence that the Russian Revolution was assisted by the Germans for their own geopolitical purposes, as well as to neutralise the threat from the east.

As for Imperial Germany's plans for 'a Kaiser's European Union', Fischer, in a 1961 book entitled 'Germany's Aims in the First World War', described them as follows: '[We need] a commercial treaty which makes France economically dependent on Germany [and] secures the French market for our exports.... This treaty must secure for us financial and industrial freedom of movement in France so that German enterprises can no longer receive different treatment from French'.

'We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice [they] will be under German leadership and must stabilise Germany's economic dominance over Mitteleuropa...'

'Holland: It will have to be considered by what means and methods Holland can be brought into closer relationship with the German Empire. In view of the Dutch character, this closer relationship must leave them free of any feeling of compulsion, must alter nothing in the Dutch way of life, and must also subject them to no new military obligations. Holland, then, must be left independent in externals, but be made internally dependent on us. Possibly one might consider an offensive and defensive alliance, to cover the colonies; in any case, a close customs association'.

But after the war, Germany's official ambitions and perceptions were coloured by sullen resentment at the 'victorious' Allies' reparations demands at Versailles, even though Ferguson argues persuasively that the overall burden imposed by Germany on Russia under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 and a later accord, was perhaps heavier than that inflicted on Germany:

'A supplementary financial agreement signed on 27th August 1918 had imposed on Russia an indemnity of 6 billion marks, despite the declaration in the original Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 that there would be no reparations.

This was in addition to huge cessations of territory: Finland and the Ukraine became independent, while Poland and the Baltic States of Lithuania, Estonia, Courland and Livonia became German satellites. (In the surreal atmosphere of 1918. German princes bickered over who should rule them: the Duke of Urach wanted to be king of Lithuania; the Austrian Archduke Eugen demanded the Ukraine; the Kaiser's brother-in-law, Friedrich Karl of Hesse, had his eye on Finland; while the Kaiser himself coveted Courland). The territory in question represented around 90 percent of the Russian empire's coal capacity and 50 percent of its industry'.

Ferguson then compares these losses imposed by Germany on Russia after the collapse of the Russian military in the aftermath of 1917, with those imposed on Germany by the Allies after Germany's defeat:

'By comparison with this, the territorial terms of the Versailles Treaty were relatively lenient. Besides her colonies, Germany lost around nine peripheral chunks of territory from the Reich itself; but these amounted to just 30 percent of its pre-war area, and 46 percent of the population of these areas was non-German. The Germans lamented the loss of 80 percent of their iron ore, 44 percent of their pig iron capacity, 38 percent of their steel capacity and 30 percent of their coal capacity; but the Russians had lost more in 1918, while the Austrians, Hungarians and Turks all fared worse in terms of territory (the Hungarians lost 70 percent of their pre-war area) and perhaps also economic resources under their respective peace treaties. The loss of Germany's colonies was a blow to prestige: but although extensive (just under 3 million sq. km) and populous (12.3 million people), they were of little economic worth'.

Although he said one thing to his British acquaintances such as Keynes, and something entirely different for internal consumption, Carl Melchior, 'Max Warburg's right-hand man at the Hamburg bank of M. M. Warburg & Co. [and] a Jewish lawyer with a distinguished war record both on the battlefield and in economic policymaking', argued in the course of meetings with German Ministers in Berlin in April 1918 that "'leanings towards Russia" must be contemplated as a future diplomatic strategy for Germany; a view which was endorsed by the Reich President Friedrich Ebert<sup>32</sup>- whose name was subsequently to be adopted as the title of the Foundation of that name which has ever since functioned as a key centre in Germany focused on the promotion of Germany's 'eastwards orientation' and links with the USSR/Russia. And Ferguson adds:

'The Red Army's successes in late 1919 and early 1920, and continuing social unrest in Germany' (Melchior's home town, Hamburg, was under the control of a Soviet-style Workers' and Soldiers' Council, Niall Ferguson recalls), 'prompted renewed prophecies from Melchior of "a kind of League of the Vanquished. .. between Russia and Germany"'. While Ferguson notes that 'Melchior did not mean a word of this; he and Warburg were in fact appalled when [Walther] Rathenau did a deal with the Russians over reparations, during the 1922 Genoa Conference (the Treaty of Rapallo)', the significance of Melchior's utterances was that they revealed that influential Germans were already actively considering the 'Drang nach Osten' (drive to the East) option, as they became increasingly embittered following their defeat and their 'humiliation' at Versailles.

The Rapallo Treaty, which formalised the tacit cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army, was buttressed in 1926 by the Berlin Treaty for Russo-German Friendship - the direct predecessor of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 23rd August 1939, and of the Gorbachev-Kohl treaties of 1990. The idea of approaching Soviet Russia for help had emerged immediately after Germany's defeat in the First World War, originating not least in the minds of the leading Prussian militarists -

although the tradition had originated at least a century earlier. A clandestine agreement for the production of armaments had been concluded between the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia in 1921, even before Rapallo.

Melchior was inclined to make known to his British acquaintances the fact that the eastwards-orientation option was being actively considered - as a means of seeking to soften the Allies' demands. For Franz Wittthoefft, another of Max Warburg's friends, is quoted as having observed, 'shortly after agreeing to join the German delegation to Versailles, that... "Bread and peace are the preconditions for order and work; otherwise we are headed for Bolshevism, and that will be the end of Germany. Yet I detect in this very danger of Bolshevism a certain safety valve with regard to the efforts of the Entente to checkmate us absolutely. If this (revolutionary) malaise spreads from Hungary' (exported by the murderous, but mercifully short-lived, Communist regime of Bela Kun) 'over Germany, neither France nor England will be immune; and that means the end for all Europe'.

In other words, ahead of the Versailles conference, influential Germans were experimenting with various prospective psychological warfare options or 'lines'

to influence the demands of the Allies. It is not credible, though, that Melchior 'did not mean a word' of what he had suggested - that Germany should be seriously considering much closer links with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, he was in fact giving voice to a traditional Pan-German school of thought, motivated by lust for raw materials and lebensraum, which was fast to become a rich seam ripe for Lenin's mining skills.

These skills have since been honed by the Leninists to such effect that the Soviet strategists have succeeded comprehensively in hitching their own Leninist revolutionary hegemony 'imperative' to Germany's regional ambitions, inherited from the plans for 'the Kaiser's European Union' and earlier. This is a risky endeavour, because fundamentally these two powers are at loggerheads. The continuing Soviet 'imperative' is driven by the logic of Lenin's World Revolution, which presupposes that there will, in the end, be no room on earth for any system other than their 'universal collectivism' prescription (thesis) - 'peaceful coexistence' being its expendable dialectical antithesis. By contrast, the Pan-German obsession is for the merging of regional nation states (in accordance, indeed, with Lenin's formula) into an entity which, though called by another name for the time being, will become recognisable as 'Greater Germany'; and in the process, the one nation state which - to survive this process in reality will of course be Germany. Acutely aware that their apparent community of interests and objectives with the Germans masks a fundamental underlying divergence of view, Soviet policymakers write constantly about 'Great Europe', in order to make it clear to the Germans that Moscow will not permit the Pan-German settlement.

To safeguard its World Revolution's interests, Moscow has gone further - converting - through wholesale penetration, blackmail and the hyperactivity of innumerable 'sleepers' and agents of influence - Germany's Nazi-era blueprint, 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', into a primary instrument for the consolidation of the Comintern's Seventh Thesis of 28th July 1920: 'Federation is a transitional form towards the complete union... of all nations'. For, as Sig. Prodi's 'Neo-Communist Manifesto' of February 2000 confirms, the European Union Collective shares in almost all respects the theoretical objectives of the Moscow strategists. The conversion by the Soviets through their agents of the European Union Collective, which is supposed to serve German interests beneath the 'mask of federalism', into a pro-active instrument of the World Revolution, is the perverse consequence of Germany's refusal to renounce its idolatry of regional control.

## LENIN CLEVERER AND NASTIER THAN THE GERMANS

Lenin had an organic relationship with the German Government during the First World War. Since he operated exclusively by means of deception, the practical application of which he elevated into an upgraded satanic art-form, he was more than a match for the more prosaic, pragmatic German 'way of thinking'. Even Lenin's seizure of power had been exploited to yield a deception masking a reality that Lenin had needed to disguise from the West. As Aleksandr Kerensky, briefly Russian Prime Minister in 1917, put the matter: 'The myth that the Communists overthrew Tsarism has been purposely spread to conceal their crime of having strangled the first Russian democracy.... It was not until after his victory that Lenin admitted that his freedom-loving slogans had been a deliberate deception'. Cynicism towards his own people on a scale without historical precedent was matched by equally absolute cynicism in his relations with foreigners.

For the leader of the Bolsheviks was much cleverer than the German General Staff, who, as indicated, supported Lenin because they expected him to destabilise Russia and induce the collapse of the eastern front<sup>33</sup>. Thus began Germany's Faustian relationship with Communist Russia - a relationship which bedevils Europe to this day. As Joel Carmichael, probably the most perceptive of all students of the Leninist Revolution, has explained: 'Since he [Lenin] was the only Russian revolutionary demanding an end to the war - which to the German General Staff meant the immobilisation of the eastern front - it was natural for the German Government to support him. Beginning no later than the spring of 1917, the German Government had been putting huge sums of money at the disposal of the Bolsheviks'.

'At a minimum estimate, these sums amounted to more than 60 million gold marks, or, in today's currency, about \$1,000 million. This huge sum, staggering by any reckoning, though of course a bagatelle for a regime [that was] sustaining millions of soldiers on two fronts, enabled the Bolsheviks to maintain a vast press (41 periodicals) that hammered away at public opinion with the simplest of slogans, and thus made the Bolsheviks both respectable and popular. This ramified press was undoubtedly a factor in the Bolshevik triumph. The German financial subsidy was to be maintained until long after the Bolshevik putsch - until the eve of the German collapse on the Western front in the autumn of 1918'.

## LENIN EXPLOITS THE GERMANS' FRUSTRATION AND HATRED

Thus the first and most fundamental point to be understood about Germany's relationship with Russia, is that the Germans were materially responsible for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution by facilitating Lenin's putsch and its evil consequences<sup>34</sup>. Moreover the method used by Lenin to soften up the minds of the Russian populations in preparation for the intended seizure of power was precisely the same as is being used by agents of the Revolution throughout the West today, thanks to the wholesale penetration of the media that has taken place, in accordance with Lenin's original focus on targeting the press for penetration, which has facilitated a relentless campaign of leftist 'political correctness' - crafting the 'common mind' envisaged and intended

by the revolutionaries from the outset. Meanwhile, as Joel Carmichael added: 'It can hardly be doubted that if the Germans had won the First World War, the Bolsheviks would have been done for. At that time, no Russian army could have withstood a German advance; a moderate monarchist regime, possibly a moderate socialist regime, would surely have been set up. Thus the Germans, unable to foresee their own debacle, went on propping up the Bolshevik Party until it could fight for itself'.

Outside Russia, though, the Jews were held responsible for the Bolshevik putsch. Partly because of this interpretation - the basis of which has been well documented, but pursuit of which takes us beyond the framework of this book - the critical role of the German General Staff and the Kaiser's Foreign Office in sustaining the Bolsheviks was never acknowledged. One of the prime movers in this secret partnership, General Erich von Ludendorff, later became a follower of Hitler. The Nazis knew little of, and cared less about, what had happened to the Jews under the late Tsars: for at least one of the reasons for the high quotient of Jews among the Bolsheviks (albeit perhaps not the primary one) was the vivid collective memory of the accumulated traumas inflicted by never-ending Tsarist pogroms against the Jews - for instance, the massacres of Jews in Kiev in 1880, 1881 and 1882, in Karkhov in 1882, in Warsaw in 1881, in Novgorod in 1884, and in Kishinev and Gomel in 1903. In Kiev, for instance, children were torn from their mothers' breasts and dashed to pieces before their eyes. Four hundred Jews were slaughtered in the space of two days. At Kishinev, Jewish girls were violated in front of their parents. In the aftermath of this particular violence, the Tsarist regime had staged a mock trial, at the end of which two prisoners were given light sentences, while all the resulting civil actions were dismissed out of hand. These experiences had radicalised intellectual Jews throughout the Russian Empire<sup>35</sup>.

Following the Versailles Treaty, the reviving, embittered Germans of the Weimar Republic signed the Treaty of Rapallo on 16th April 1922, in the course of an international conference at Genoa. Professor Richard Pipes' account of developments leading up to the Treaty of Rapallo is as follows: 'The decisive steps leading to Soviet-German military collaboration were taken in the spring of 1921, following Lenin's introduction of the New Economic Policy and the signing of the Treaty of Riga terminating the war with Poland. Surprised and worried by the dismal showing of the Red Army against the Poles, Lenin requested Germany's help with the army's modernisation'. For Lenin, with typical Bolshevik cynicism knew that the Germans, burning with resentment and a desire for early revenge for their defeat and humiliation, had learned nothing from their previous disastrous collaboration with his clique, which had resulted in Lenin's seizure of power.

The fatal decision, with its long-term consequences manifested in Europe's plight today, was taken by Germany, in part, for short-term reasons. 'In this realm, the interests of the two countries coincided, for Germany was no less eager to enter into military collaboration', wrote Professor Pipes. Thus the lure of the two disturbed countries' common interests prevailed. For... 'By the terms of the Versailles Treaty, she [Germany] was forbidden to manufacture weapons essential to modern warfare. Soviet Russia, for her part, also wanted

these weapons. On the basis of this common interest, a deal was eventually struck by virtue of which Soviet Russia provided the German army with a sanctuary in which to build and test advanced weapons in exchange for some of this equipment and the training of the Red Army in their use<sup>36</sup>.

In April 1922, the Soviets and the Germans signed a secret Protocol under cover of the Treaty of Rapallo, a resort located 20 miles from Genoa, where the victors and vanquished, brought together by the French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand, were supposed to be meeting together. The formal Treaty provided that Moscow and Berlin would renounce all financial claims between them. The French author Paul-Marie Couteaux has written that the much more important secret Protocol 'authorised the German armed forces (which had begun training with cardboard tanks in 1919) to test in Russia arms forbidden under the Versailles Treaty. From 1924 onwards, several German plants were built in Russia; tank regiments trained at Kama; gases were tested at Sarkov. The Luftwaffe trained its pilots at Lipietzk, not far from Moscow, under the direction of the Zentrale Moscau, supervised and encouraged by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, the ever-so-pacific Stresemann. Briand thought he was forming the core of European collective security with a 'partner' who, in reality, was tearing up, one by one, the clauses of the Versailles Treaty, to prepare for revenge<sup>37</sup>.

Although this collaboration was discontinued in 1933, nine months after Hitler came to power, it was resumed 12 years later, after Russia's takeover of East Germany - and it has been perpetuated, under the terms of Germany's two treaties with the USSR signed in November 1990, and the secret side-agreements to those treaties, to this day. Even during the mid-thirties, when Germany's 'repatriated' rearmament programme was overt, the Nazis and the Soviets, thought by the West to be deadly enemies, signed a bilateral treaty dealing largely with economic affairs (23rd April 1936). This followed an earlier German-Soviet economic accord and, in 1926, the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship signed by the Pan-German Foreign Minister, Dr Gustaf Stresemann.

In the 1920s and early 1930s, both powers benefited enormously from these arrangements. In terminating the military cooperation dimension on Stalin's instructions, the Deputy Soviet Commissar for War, the subsequently executed Marshal Tuchatchevskiy, told the German Charge d'Affaires in Moscow that 'in spite of the regrettable developments [Hitler's coming to power in Germany], it would never be forgotten that the Reichswehr had decisively aided the Red Army in its organisation'. In May 1933, Tuchatchevskiy had made his famous remark to a German delegation:

'Always bear in mind that you and we, Germany and the USSR, can dictate our terms to the whole world if we stand together'.

In his toast to the Russian Marshal, General von Blomberg said that 'we Germans will never forget what the Soviet Army has accomplished for Germany during the past ten years. I hope that in spite of all the present existing difficulties, our thanks will be expressed indeed. I drink a toast to the well-being and the future of the great and glorious Soviet Army and loyal comradeship in arms for today and in the future'.



## LENIN'S DUAL TACTICS AT GENOA

Lenin ruthlessly exploited the rejection by the Allies of Germany's request for large revisions of the reparations payments; while the conservative and nationalistic elements in Germany were full of enthusiasm for the firmed-up eastwards-orientation of German policy, which they justified in their minds not only on the basis of the common interest, but also as a practical means of punishing the Western powers for the humiliation visited upon Germany. Lenin's hand was strengthened by the Allies' initial unwillingness to trade with Soviet Russia, which they fundamentally wished to do after accepting Lenin's deceptive New Economic Policy at face value; but, as Professor Pipes has pointed out, they were unwilling to provide the USSR with credits until certain debt issues had been resolved. Having decided to reach an agreement with Germany, rather than with the Allies, Lenin resorted to his normal practice - open-ended deception. Stalin used the same Leninist ploy again in 1939, with even more astounding success. In the assessment of Professor Pipes, 'pretending to seek agreement with the Allies, Lenin pressed the Germans into signing a separate accord'. This tactic helped overcome the opposition of pro-Western elements in government and business in Germany, which feared antagonising France. In January 1922, the Soviets fed Berlin with a rumour that Moscow was about to conclude an accord with France which would have provided for de jure recognition of Soviet Russia, together with commercial credits, in return for assurances (only) that Moscow would help enforce the Versailles Treaty. This rumour was carefully calculated to alarm the Germans to the maximum extent, since the German Foreign Office wanted, at the time, at all costs to avoid any revival of the pre-1914 Franco-Russian Alliance. From Russia's perspective, any geopolitical alliance would have needed to be tripartite, as has subsequently proved to be the case: see for instance, page 32. Once the Germans were hooked, the Soviets let Berlin know that the Red Army was preparing to attack Poland in the spring, and desperately needed aircraft.

Pipes has explained that 'the gullible Germans believed these fabrications and hastened in April 1922 to open a Junker air facility at Fili, near Moscow. They also commenced staff discussion with the Red Army on the matter of the imaginary invasion of Poland. The Soviets strung the Germans along without Berlin realizing what was happening'.

At the Genoa Conference on 10th April 1922, the Soviet delegation - led by Chicherin, rather than Lenin, who had been advised by Viktor Krasin to stay at home because of the danger of assassination - engaged in dual tactics. On the one hand, they undertook discussions and negotiations with the Allies, in response to an Allied proposal for the Soviet Government to acknowledge Russia's foreign debts and to compensate foreigners for the losses they had suffered - to which Chicherin responded that this might be possible provided the USSR received diplomatic recognition as well as reconstruction loans. But at the same time, while going through the motions of these woolly negotiations, the Soviet delegation was simultaneously framing their separate treaty with the Germans. Lloyd George exacerbated matters by holding lunches in Genoa with the various delegations, including Chicherin's delegation. Typically the British Prime Minister saw himself as more equal than the others. But his private meetings with the Russians confirmed, in the minds of the Germans, that Soviet warnings of an impending Allied-Russian accord were accurate. Pipes' description of how the Russians foisted a Soviet-drafted treaty on the Germans - the practice used by Gorbachev and Yeltsin in pursuit of their seamless bilateral treaty offensive in 1989-93 (see Note 2, Part One,

pages 133-134) - shows that Soviet practice remains unchanged to this day:

'Convinced by advisors that something untoward was about to happen, Rathenau (the German representative) overcame his misgivings and on 16th April, at the Hotel St. Margherita in nearby Rapallo, placed his signature to a Soviet-German accord, essentially as drafted in Moscow'. As established on page 59, the texts of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin bilateral treaties with targeted EU countries were drafted in Moscow by Soviet Military Intelligence in collaboration with the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Faced with immediately having to justify their behaviour to the Allies, the Germans sought to counter anticipated charges of duplicity by pointing out that the Allies too, had been working on a treaty with Moscow. Under the Rapallo Treaty, Germany and the Soviet Union granted each other diplomatic recognition and most-favoured-nation status, renouncing mutual claims arising from the war, and pledging friendly economic relations. By signing the Rapallo Treaty, Germany had, for the third time since the Armistice, acted independently of the Allies, and contrary to their wishes; and in each instance, the Germans did so in Russia's favour. First, the Germans had refused to join the blockade in 1919; and secondly, in 1920, the Germans had denied France permission to ship war materiel across Germany.

The military cooperation between Germany and Russia which had already begun as early as 1919, was now intensified. On 29th July 1922, a member of the Soviet Military-Revolutionary Council, A. P. Rozengolts, concluded an accord with representatives of General Seeckt - the upshot of which was that, as indicated, the Soviets agreed to allow Germany to produce weapons which were prohibited under the Versailles Treaty - on Russian territory, and in facilities financed and managed by Germany. In addition, the Russians consented to allow German military personnel to train on Russian soil. In return, the Germans contracted to instruct the Soviet military in the use of the newly constructed weaponry.

Two years later, as Couteaux has reiterated [page 176], a number of German arms manufacturers were operating with concessions in the Soviet Union. In the account by Pipes, 'three German facilities in Soviet Russia have been identified: the one in Fili to manufacture Junker airplanes; another in Samara Province to produce mustard gas and phosgene; and a third in Kazan to build tanks. German officers, disguised as civilians, travelled to Russia for combat practice. From early 1924 on, German pilots received training at Lipetzk, flying in Fokker fighters secretly purchased in Holland. Ultimately, 120 pilots and 450 flight personnel underwent instruction there. They constituted the core of Hitler's Air Force'.

According to General Helm Speidel a member of 'Sondergruppe R', the training at Lipetzk laid the 'spiritual foundation of a future Luftwaffe'. The experience gained in Russia is said to have given the German Air Force a ten-year advantage over the Allies. Russian pilots and ground personnel, too, received training at the Lipetzk base. While German officers practised tank and chemical warfare at Kazan and Samara, a large number of weapons produced in Soviet Russia were shipped back to Germany secretly. Technical cooperation between the two countries persisted without interruption for many years, even though information about the two countries' military collaboration leaked out in Germany, while Polish and French intelligence had become aware of these developments. However the West took no steps to curb such activities - enabling the Soviets to lay the foundations of a revived German army, which Hitler was to use for his own purposes.

This background serves to demonstrate that, from 1919 onwards, there was never anything new about Germany's propensity to 'lean towards the east'. The Pan-German elite were always clear that Germany's interests lay in that direction.

## SOVIET DECEPTION AND THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT

Acknowledging the unchanged motivation of the German political and military elite, Professor Pipes concluded that 'the German generals who engaged in collaboration with the Soviet Union were preparing for a World War II that would aggregate the Versailles Treaty and win for Germany the continental hegemony that had eluded her in World War I. Obviously, they would not have initiated the Russians into to their military secrets unless they had expected them to be on their side in future hostilities. Thus the outline of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, which unleashed World War II, and in which Germany, with Moscow's benevolent neutrality, conquered most of Europe, took shape in the early 1920s, when Lenin was alive and in charge'.

In his book *Double Lives* (1994), the American analyst Stephen Koch shed further light on the routine duplicity of the Soviet Leninists in their dealings with Germany after Lenin's death. Maximum use was made of Lenin's teaching that 'a Communist must be prepared... to resort to all sorts of schemes and stratagems, employ illegitimate methods, conceal the truth', and lie as necessary for the Revolution. The senior Bolshevik, Karl Radek, knew from the beginning 'that Stalin's dual policy towards Hitler consisted of overt anti-fascism plus secret appeasement'. In fact, Radek may have been the only figure who was fully aware of the double game - although British press representatives speculated openly after Germany's blitzkrieg had resulted in the Nazi seizure of Paris, that Hitler's next move might be to 'invade Russia'. In the company of the GRU defector Walter Krivitsky, Radek described Soviet 'anti-fascism' as 'strategic eyewash for fools'.

As for Hitler's attack on German Communism, only 'idiots' could imagine that 'Soviet Russia should turn against Germany because of Nazi persecution of Communists and Socialists'. The Soviet anti-fascist campaign, in short, was nothing more than a manoeuvre based upon Leninist dialectical strategic deception. According to Krivitsky, 'Stalin had not the slightest intention of breaking with Germany'. Indeed, the Soviet defector claimed that in 1933-34, no-one in the upper reaches of the Kremlin apparatus, including those... who were closely associated with the anti-fascist campaign, ever dreamed of a genuine break

with Germany. Certainly, the anti-fascist campaign had strategic purposes for the Soviets - galvanizing the left, inducing the democracies to re-arm, and forming an emotional basis for renewed loyalty to the Soviet regime, by maximising the image of the enemy. But what Stalin really sought, Koch cites Krivitsky as having explained, 'almost from the beginning, was alliance with Hitler'.

When the defecting GRU officer (Krivitsky) told this to Western intelligence services, Koch added, 'he was brushed aside as almost mad. When Krivitsky was rebuffed by governments, he went public with his information. His articles were greeted with unrelenting vilification from the left, and gasps of disbelief from everyone else. Alliance with Hitler? [But] when, a few months after Krivitsky published these claims, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in Moscow, exactly when he predicted it would be signed, absurdity had become prophecy'. Anatoliy Golitsyn has faced something similar. Officially, Western intelligence services refused to accept his analysis that Leninist strategic deception determines Soviet behaviour at all times. Now that the predictions contained in both his classic books, 'New Lies for Old' and 'The Perestroika Deception', have turned out to be true, the silence is deafening.

According to the Soviet 'GRU defector', Victor Suvorov<sup>38</sup>, Stalin's real aim was to facilitate such a conflagration in Europe involving Germany, France and Britain, that not only would the European empires be decapitated, but the Soviet Revolution would be free to seize total hegemony throughout Europe by filling the resulting power vacuum. That analysis contains the ring of truth.

Just as the Soviets had played a double game with Germany in 1921-22, deceiving Rathenau into signing a Soviet-drafted treaty at Rapallo, and cursing him in the process (he paid with his life for the Rapallo Treaty two months later, being murdered by nationalist assassins, who had accused him of being a 'pro-Communist Jew'), so did the Soviets employ dual tactics to force their 'line' on the Germans in 1939, by steadily raising their demands on the British and the French. Indeed the Soviets used negotiations with the Western powers to ensure that Germany would pay a high price for Soviet cooperation - re-established under the terms of the secret agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union of 23rd August 1939, which partitioned Eastern Europe between them.

The Soviets then worked out a batch of new economic agreements in subsequent detailed negotiations, under which a prior bilateral Economic Treaty, signed on 19th August 1939, would be implemented - supported by special oil delivery and railway transit agreements arising from discussions concerning German access to the Borislav-Drogobic oil fields in south-central Europe.

A revised version of the new Economic Treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany was not signed until 11th February 1940, following many weeks of problematical negotiations, mainly conducted in Moscow with Stalin's repeated personal involvement. It provided for a colossal Soviet-German exchange of raw materials for German manufactured products, technical designs and equipment, together with other specialised items. This accord provided the economic basis upon which Germany thought it could rely to support its attack in the West, since there would be adequate oil for its tanks, enough manganese for the German steel industry, and plenty of grain for German soldiers and workers. As for goods which the Soviet Union could not supply from its own resources, Moscow would assist Berlin by purchasing them on Germany's behalf elsewhere in the world, or transporting them across Soviet territory to Germany, provided the Germans had placed the necessary covering purchase orders.

In addition, the Soviets greatly assisted the Germans with their naval warfare operations, providing a special naval base at a bay near the Soviet port of Murmansk, together with the use of other Soviet ports, and ultimately making possible the movement of a German auxiliary cruiser around Siberia into the Northern Pacific to prey on allied shipping. In exchange for all this, the Soviets demanded, and the Germans to some extent agreed to assist in, the build-up of Soviet naval power on which Stalin insisted. Having largely failed so far to engage the United States in the construction of his intended naval power - he had tried unsuccessfully to have a battleship built in America, and had made other attempts at receiving US assistance for a modernised and enlarged fleet - Stalin had turned to Germany, which found it expedient to use naval equipment, naval plans and even an uncompleted cruiser as part payment for raw materials delivered by the USSR.

But while the Soviet Leninists were simultaneously deceiving both the West and the Germans, the Germans thought they were deceiving Stalin. Gerhard Weinberg, an astute observer, summarised the position succinctly:

'The Soviet leader was willing to help Germany fight its current war with the Western powers while looking long-term to a build-up of Soviet power - in this instance, in the naval field, in a world torn by war only among the capitalist powers. Hitler, on the other hand, wanted whatever assistance he could get to win the war with the West, which he had always considered the great and difficult prerequisite for unlimited territorial expansion eastwards. He was confident that any improvements that the Russians could make in their navy in the interim, would make no difference to the outcome of Germany's big move east, when it came'.

## THE SECOND PAN-GERMAN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT DEFEAT

After the Second World War, whereas the West assumed that German power had been decisively defeated in 1945, leading Germans had other ideas. Just as their predecessors had refused to accept defeat in 1918, so were senior German policymakers working overtime, from as early as 1941, to design the 'New Europe'- 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' - which would be the instrument for the consolidation of their objectives, despite the so far catastrophic consequences of Hitler's stewardship. For, as the war progressed, and Germany's plans for achieving hegemony in Europe began to disintegrate, policymakers in Berlin turned their attention yet again to the familiar alternative - closer relations with Soviet Russia. A directive dated 15th March 1944, later found by the Allies, from the Intelligence Department of the German High Command, and signed by Admiral Canaris, Hitler's intelligence mastermind, contained decisions by the German Foreign Office, the Security Division (SD) and the Department of Defence (Abwehr), emphasising Germany's 'goal... to crush the enemy's plan whose object it is to destroy for ever the German Reich militarily, economically and culturally'<sup>39</sup>.

This document asserted that 'in the event of a negotiated peace, or should we be defeated, Germany would have everything to gain - in the long run - by joining the East'. The memorandum summarised various means of conveying, to President Roosevelt<sup>40</sup>, by special channels, the suggestion that the Germans are inclined to re-establish intimate relations with the Soviets:

'We must point to the danger that Germany may be forced to cooperate with Russia'. This was an exact replay of the Pan-German attempts to influence Western responses ahead of the Versailles Treaty.

A few weeks before Germany's surrender, a further document, dated 3rd April 1945, found after the war, was initialled by the Chief of the High Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, and by Grand Admiral Doenitz, who became Hitler's immediate successor. Entitled 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', the paper stressed that 'Germany's final comeback can only be achieved in close cooperation with the Soviet Union'. It was this document which contained the observations cited on page 150:

'A colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers of population would be created from ocean to ocean. Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe, but also from the double continent of Eurasia. The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for development without collision of their interests [implying that their interests diverge - Ed.]... Thus would be formed an alliance between the young socialist forces against the old rotten entrenched powers of the West'.

In short, just because Germany was on the brink of total defeat, this did not mean that there had been, or would ever be, any discontinuity of underlying German strategy - just as there was never any true discontinuity of Soviet strategy in 1989-91. In every compromising document of the German High Command drawn up in the closing years of the Second World War and captured by the Allies, it was clear that, from 1943 onwards, German policymakers were stressing the view that any fresh military defeat of Germany needed only to be regarded as an unhappy episode in the far greater struggle for world supremacy.

And in 1944, the French weekly paper 'Combat' had published a 60-page memorandum, prepared by General von Stuepnagel, examining the causes of German military setbacks to date in the Second World War, and at the same time analysing conditions for victory in a future war. He had written:

'What does a temporary defeat matter if, through the destruction of people and material wealth in enemy countries, we are able to secure a margin of economic and demographic superiority even greater than before 1939? If we can succeed in doing this, this war will have been useful, since it will enable us, within the next 25 years, to wage another war under better conditions'.

'Our enemies will grow weary before we do. We shall have to organise a campaign of pity designed to induce them to send us needed supplies at the earliest possible moment. Above all, we must hold on to the assets we have deposited in neutral countries. The present war will thus have been victorious, in spite of our temporary military defeat, because it will have been a march forward towards our supremacy'.

The heirs of the Nazis have indeed proved themselves to be experts at holding onto their assets. Slush funds that financed Hitler appear to have been used for similar purposes in our era: for instance, the Leuna petrochemical works which produced gasoline from coal, located in eastern Germany, and constructed by I. G. Farben at the beginning of the Second World War, was sold, under President Mitterrand, to the allegedly corrupt French oil firm Elf-Aquitaine, with some of the proceeds being allegedly channelled to finance Helmut Kohl and his CDU. I. G. Farben, now Hoechst, is notorious for its tenacious determination to hold on to its former assets. True to form, it fought a protracted lawsuit in the United States to retrieve its US assets, which were only finally released (by Robert Kennedy) through Interhandel, a Zurich front company, in response to pressure by Prince Radziwill, who happened to be married to Lee Kennedy.

It would be interesting to know whether the sale of the Leuna petrochemical works to Elf-Aquitaine represented another covert manoeuvre by Hoechst to facilitate the retrieval of the Leuna plant.

## THE 'MADRID CIRCULAR' OF THE GERMAN GEOPOLITICAL CENTRE

The same Pan-German confidence was evident in a secret memorandum dated September 1950, issued by the German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid, which seemed to represent a blueprint for the foreign policy of the Bonn Government. Later known as the 'Madrid Circular'<sup>41</sup>, this document, a copy of which was intercepted by Western intelligence in the mail, contained the following passages:

Future historians will reveal the great vision with which responsible leaders of the Third Reich created with confident determination those measures which subsequently smashed the united front of the enemy and made Germany again a much desired partner in a new political-strategic alliance. And all this was accomplished at the time when German leaders had to go through the severe crisis of the on-coming defeat. By no means did the political and military leadership of the Third Reich skid into the catastrophe in an irrational manner, as so many blockheads and ignoramuses often tell us. The various phases and consequences of the 'collapse' ('Zusammenbruch') were thoroughly studied and planned by the most capable experts ('fachigste Koepfen'). Nothing occurred by chance; everything was carefully planned. The result of this careful planning was that, already a few months after Potsdam, the coalition of the victors went on the rocks'.

'The decision for a western or eastern orientation was influenced by factors of Realpolitik. In the light of conditions prevailing in 1945, we could expect only from the West - or rather from the United States - moderate conditions for an armistice, measures of relief, and a sympathetic understanding. The machinery which we had prepared so carefully in advance had consciously brought about conditions and situations which after the collapse confronted America's

political leaders with the choice of accepting chaos and Bolshevism throughout Germany, or adopting a constructive programme that would save Germany and the whole of Europe'. Once again, German strategic analysts and planners were using the same means of indirect coercion and intimidation on the Western Allies that they had employed during the run-up to Versailles and Genoa - the threat of universal Bolshevism, if Germany was not comprehensively rehabilitated. And yet, all the while, the strategists were insistent, behind-the-scenes, that Germany's true interests resided towards the east - Bolshevism or no Bolshevism. In other words, these National Socialists insisted that they really had far more in common with the international socialists (Communists) than with the West, which had severely humiliated them twice; and in performing these constant intellectual contortions, they chose, for strategic purposes, to disregard the fact that Soviet Russia had contributed to Germany's latest humiliation. The 'Madrid Circular' continued:

'Such a plan and such a bold programme could only be successfully carried out by a political schooling now proved to have been of paramount importance. When we take into consideration under what tremendous difficulties and dangers the organisation' [i.e., the Nazi International] 'had to work in an underground manner and directed from abroad without any protection or backing by any state, carefully watched and persecuted by agents of a revengeful enemy, then the successful outcome seems like a miracle. In order to bring the Americans back to reason and away from Potsdam, we organised chaotic conditions in a thorough and systematic manner ('haben wir mit gruendlicher Systematik das Chaos organisiert').

The Nazi authors, therefore, claimed credit for exacerbating the apparently unorganised economic and social shambles, and for the universal sullenness, that pervaded Germany following the collapse of 1945:

'Even after the collapse, the National Socialist Party continued to work in a camouflaged way ('getarnt') [i.e., went underground, as the CPSU did in 1991, invoking its long experience of underground work prior to the 1917 Revolution and during the German occupation in the Second World War] 'in many dozens of seemingly innocuous societies and groups, in order to keep alive and undiluted the national outlook of the German people. In the same way as many small brooks go towards making a mighty stream, the various nationalistic and radical groups in the Zonen-Reich carried out, almost without exception, worthwhile and powerful propaganda. Each of these groups had its special task and had to adjust its work in line with certain situations and circumstances. However, it was of chief importance to direct the underlying trend of patriotic propaganda towards the same goal. The more diverse and unconnected these groups appeared on the surface, the less they were apt to arouse suspicion (of the occupying authorities) that they were directed and influenced by a central organization.... We have placed our confidential agents, observers and representatives for special assignments in all groups and parties - even among Communist organisations and their fronts. The greater the number of organisations controlled and influenced by us, the more effective will be the results of our work'.

According to the 'Madrid Circular', it was also in no small part due to the covert operations of Nazi representatives, agents, infiltrators, propagandists and saboteurs, that the peasants delivered almost no food to the cities; no coal was brought up from the pits; the wheels of industry were not turning; and the people were almost starving. The monetary system was disintegrating, too: so, the Nazi 'Madrid Circular' claimed, 'there remained nothing for the Yankees to do but to

give in and scrap the Potsdam programme. Soon afterwards, the Western Zone received food supplies, local self-government, extensive economic health, credits for currency reform, and finally broad political self-determination. Today we are on the last stage towards complete sovereignty'.

The 'Madrid Circular' went even further - claiming that Germany's recovery by 1950 had been entirely a consequence of German Nazi brilliance:

"The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans, but was exclusively the result of our own far-sighted planning. We... created total confusion in Washington. By keeping Germany industrially strong and by gaining the support of influential Senators and Representatives in the American Congress for our propaganda against the dismantling of large industrial enterprises, we finally succeeded in preserving Germany as the leading industrial power in the heart of Europe. Thus the plans of Potsdam and Yalta came to naught and the period of the Cold War began - developing into a struggle between the East and the West on the decisive question as to who should exploit German industry and within whose orbit Germany's industrial potential should be incorporated. In this way, Germany gained valuable time for further manoeuvring'.

The document from the Nazi International reiterated that 'for us the war has never stopped and, as is well known, in war every ruse is permissible'. It concluded with a flourish that 'in 1945, orientation towards the East would have been totally wrong. It could only have stirred up the West against us and, in view of the deep-rooted hatred of the Russians at that time against everything German, it would have brought common action of our enemies against us and would have spelled 'finis' to all our aspirations. Thanks, however, to our correct decisions, the situation has changed entirely today. We are now once again in a position to influence the turn of events. Today we are again making history'. And the authors added dismissively that the Americans 'are now seeking the advice of our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia'.

In the early years of the Nazi movement, Dr Goebbels had written to a young German Communist that 'the day will come when Nazism and Communism will fight side by side the decadent powers of the West'. The Nazi Party's manual of 1933 openly advocated that Germany 'by a close tie-up with Russia will free herself in the quickest way from her present untenable strategic position'. If you are a devil, you do not need a long spoon to sup with one of your kind. And in 1934, Hitler, anticipating his notorious pact with Stalin five years later, told Hermann Rauschning: 'Why should I not conclude a pact with Russia, when, by doing so, I can improve our position? An alliance with Russia will be the last trump card in my hand. Maybe this will become the most daring gamble of my life'.

Some years later, the 'Madrid Circular' clarified what Hitler had implied - that Germany's Ostpolitik, driven by German interests and geopolitical ambition as discussed, was equally dictated by pragmatic considerations:

'In view of the present political situation ('realpolitische Lage'), the policy of orientation towards the West has lost all meaning or sense. A conscious policy of neutrality, going hand-in-hand with close economic cooperation with the East, would come from a long-range point of view, to supersede a merely pro-Soviet orientation'.

'We must not forget that Germany has always considered orientation towards the West as a policy of expedience, or one to be pursued only under pressure of circumstances, such as was the case in Napoleon's time, after 1918, and also after 1945. All of our great national leaders have constantly counselled the long-range policy of close cooperation with East; thus Frederick the Great,



Count von Stein, Bismarck, von Seeckt, Brockdorff-Rantzau and' [omitting any reference, of course, to Hitler] 'in the past 30 years, all our leading geopoliticians'. By the end of 1940, Hitler's policy had run into a blind alley ('Zwangslage') and the hard decision had to be made to ensure by means of the sword access to the gigantic sources of raw materials in the East, which Russia would never have delivered voluntarily, and without which we could never reasonably expect to force a showdown against the Anglo-American bloc'. In other words, the German Geopolitical Centre also attempted to justify Hitler's breach of the Rippentrop-Molotov Pact on pragmatic grounds. Even so, the Fuhrer's mistakes were reluctantly acknowledged: 'Our present policy', the 'Madrid Circular' added, 'must be to overcome the consequences of our previous mistakes. An emasculated Germany should never allow itself to be used as a spearhead in an attack against the Russian colossus. This would be an insane act, and would spell our final doom, whereas Germany as the exponent of European neutrality could gain far-reaching concessions from the Soviets'.

'We must not let ourselves become befogged by Washington's stupid and meaningless slogans about the "struggle of democracy versus Communism". The so-called American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the bones of even a single German soldier. In the present age of regimented and militarised economics, the babbling about democracy and so-called free 'enterprise' is such nonsense that we need not squander a single moment in refuting this American propaganda swindle'.

After this outburst, the 'Madrid Circular' elaborated with a summary of Germany's 'vision' for Europe that was identical to the vision later enunciated by ideologues such as Joschka Fischer <sup>42</sup>: 'What Germany needs in the future is not democracy but a system of statecraft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would enable the political and military elite in Germany to organise' [cf. the Maastricht Treaty] 'the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities of the German people for the revival of the German race and the re-establishment of Europe as the power centre in the world'. Therefore, the German strategists believe Europe to be just an extension of Germany ('Lebensraum').

Finally, the Russian issue was again addressed: 'A correct evaluation of the Russian problem is important for Germany's future. The Second World War clearly proved that Germany was not in a position to mobilise the necessary manpower and... economic reserves.... Our surprising successes in the Polish and Western campaigns lured our political and military leaders into the belief that they could overrun the Russian armies. And it was demonstrated anew how foolish it was to disregard the wise admonition of Bismarck who, throughout his life, warned us against making Russia our enemy'.

At the beginning of 2000, the German General Staff was 're-formed'. General Staffs exist in order to make and perfect military, 'security' and intelligence plans. The German General Staff can now do so with confidence, given fulfilment of the conditions implicit in the German military dictum that 'he who would conquer Europe must first isolate and neutralise the British, particularly the English. Only then may we expand to the East'.

Judging by the brazenly insensitive approach of the Government led by Chancellor Gerhard Schroder in raising the issue of Kaliningrad, which had been assumed internationally to be a taboo subject, the German General Staff believes that the British have indeed been neutralised. But they may not understand that the purpose of Kaliningrad is as displayed in the map on page 237. Alternatively, they may simply be mesmerised by the Leninists' successful 'weak look' deception.

## CONTINUING INFLUENCE OF THE NAZI INTERNATIONAL'S PRESCRIPTIONS

The blueprint prepared and circulated by the Nazis' German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid shaped the basic direction of long-range strategic deception planning underlying Germany's foreign policy from Dr. Konrad Adenauer onwards.

Towards the end of the Second World War, a book appeared in the United States which instantly became a best-seller among the German-American districts of New York, Chicago, Cleveland and St. Paul. Entitled "The German Talks Back"<sup>43</sup>, and published by Henry Holt, this book, written by a German newspaperman, Heinrich Hauser, insisted that the Germans had been 'disgusted with Western civilization, the culmination of which was and is the United States'. Full of 'apocalyptic hatreds against the world of Western civilization... directed pre-eminently against the United States', Hauser wrote that the Germans, in their final despair, would turn to the East, and that Germany would soon become 'the queen on the giant chessboard of power politics'. Hauser even went to far as to advocate that Germany should accept Communism, as a means of consolidating the Pan-German prescription and Lebensraum. 'If the Germans accept Communism for their new dream and ideology, and do it quickly, they will be lifted almost overnight from the status of outcast lepers to the status of allies of the biggest land power on earth. If one has to embrace Communism in order to get Lebensraum, what of it?'

Other ostensibly anti-Nazi Germans were of a similar mind - including Friedrich Stampfer, a former member of the German parliament, who published an article in 'Neue Volkszeitung', New York<sup>44</sup>. As a leading Social Democratic leader during the period of the Weimar Republic, Stampfer had warned the West that, unless leniency was shown, the Germans would turn to the East. Then, in 1944, he wrote: 'There is a way out for Germany from total defeat and - we have to say it openly - the Western powers are pushing Germany systematically towards that way. Germany can change the situation of defeat decisively and at once by lining up with the only real power on the Eurasian continent, with Russia'.

'Germany, even in defeat, can give many things to Russia: the open way, Hamburg and the Rhine, trained General Staff officers, technicians, skilled workers, soldiers, warships, tanks, bombers and the most modern weapons of destruction. Germany can bring about the final destruction of the French-British barrier (to the fulfilment of our ambitions), the liquidation of the British Empire and the end of West European colonial rule'. Since the British and French had destroyed the German Empire, it was high time that Germany took steps to repay Britain and France in kind; and this could only be done by cooperating closely with the Soviets, whose Comintern, at its Second and Sixth Congresses (July 1920 and September 1928) had given high priority to decolonisation by fomenting discontent and nationalism in the European colonies and in India - a fact over which MVD-KGB General Eduard Shevardnadze was to gloat at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (also referred to as the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) held in Moscow on 25th July 1988:

'Let us recall the role played by Soviet diplomats in posing the question of eliminating the colonial system and in resolving this problem'.

The German Geopolitical Centre, although it served as the headquarters of the Nazi International ('Die Spinne'), was in fact just one of a number of carefully camouflaged external postwar entities, masquerading as commercial enterprises or else as German relief organisations. Another main Nazi International establishment was based in Rome. Following the defeat in 1945, the Madrid HQ and the other German geopolitical centres were financed by resources brought to safety, partly via Switzerland, prior to the collapse. On 25th June 1945, William L. Clayton, a former

assistant Secretary of State, testified to a sub-committee of the American Senate's Committee on Military Affairs: 'I should like to discuss... the current and urgent problems of frustrating German attempts to hide abroad a stake for another gamble at world domination'.

'The Department of State has abundant evidence that the Nazis, in anticipation of military defeat, made careful plans to carry on in foreign countries a wide range of activities necessary to support an eventual resurgence of German power. For this purpose, plans were made, and carried out in part, to transfer abroad sufficient funds and specially trained personnel to carry on Pan-German activities, even while the allied armies were in occupation of Germany.... They have made strenuous efforts to move abroad assets of all kinds, which can be converted into funds for the financing of hostile activities'.

'Our safehaven program is a combined effort of the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and the Foreign Economic Administration to deny to Germany, in the interests of justice and future security, the economic power arising from (a) the organized looting of occupied countries, (b) the flight of German capital in anticipation of defeat, and (c) the German capital investment already located abroad when the war began'.

'Our investigations have yielded a considerable amount of information which indicates the schemes and devices which the Germans planned to use in order to safeguard their foreign holdings and transfer additional property abroad. In many cases, they have concealed their interests in foreign properties through holding companies as cloaks. In other cases they have abandoned formal voting control but retained a firm grip on manufacturing concerns through domination of technical processes. They have transformed their holdings into bearer shares in order to take advantage of the fact that the title to such shares can be traced only with extreme difficulty. Moreover, the Germans have also taken advantage in some countries of administrative inefficiency and corruption'.

'The Germans systematically looted all manner of valuable property, not only to satisfy the aesthetic sensibilities of such celebrated collectors as Goering, but to acquire wealth cheaply for concealment abroad. Looting reached its all-time low when gold was picked from the teeth of gas-chamber victims. A more

subtle form of looting was outright 'purchase' with occupation currency from fearful sellers'.

In addition to 'Die Spinne', related Nazi International organisations were known by codenames such as 'Edelweiss', 'Konsul', 'Scharnhorst', 'Sechsgestirn', 'Leibwache', and 'Odessa' (the organisation of the Nazi elite guard). There was even much talk in Nazi circles, as late as in 1951, of a vibrant Fascist International<sup>44</sup>. These organisations were devoted to perpetuating the Nazi concept of Germany's mission to control the world, or the Nazi Weltanschauung ('world outlook'). This ideology was summarised by the 'Madrid Circular' in the following terms:

The training which the German nation received during the twelve years of the National Socialist leadership has created a firm basis on which German world politics will be able to carry on again in the future. No German is willing to fight and die for democracy. The German people, well trained and steeled under National Socialist leadership, are dominated by two sovereign ideas: the concept of a German Reich, and Germany's mission of leadership in the world ('Deutsche Fuhrermission in der Welt'). These two ideas have given our people a powerful driving force for the dynamic execution of the world mission. The mystical element' a coded reference to Nazi satanism which has been misread by one analyst as a reference to 'the thousand-year history of the Holy Roman Empire' - 'and the

religious tradition embodied in the concept of the Reich, sparks our political mission and is especially attractive within the Catholic world'.

'A nation which has lost two world wars in the short span of thirty years but is already again conscious of its future tasks, can never be defeated. National training and political school has conditioned the German people as a first-class instrument for the execution of world politics on a grand scale. No other people on earth has such political maturity, fanatical faith [sic!], iron-clad willpower and flexibility in tactics - not merely only to overcome defeat, but also to start again from scratch. German tradition and belief in a world mission uplifts the whole German nation. Everyone feels within his deepest consciousness that the great national task - the struggle for world domination - will ultimately be crowned with victory.... The present power position of the Slavic world is a geopolitical reality which we must accept, at least for the time being. Germany's future policy should be the quiet penetration of Europe...'

### NAZI PENETRATION OF GERMANY'S POSTWAR STRUCTURES

As soon as the Western powers had conceded that the policy of allowing Germany to putrify, favoured initially by the Allies, was to be abandoned [see below], the Nazi geopoliticians based in Madrid flooded back to Germany and quickly succeeded in establishing the closest possible links with their former friends in the Berlin official structures, with leading journalists and officials who had served in Dr Goebbels' propaganda organisation, and with diplomats from Ribbentrop's Foreign Office who were collectively to shape Bonn's foreign policy under Dr Adenauer.

It was during a debate in the Bonn Parliament on 16th October 1951, that Dr Adenauer admitted that 134 former Nazis who had once served in Ribbentrop's Foreign Office, where already occupying high positions within the Bonn Government's Foreign Service. Other well-known Nazis and geopolitical planners acquired senior positions on leading German newspapers and magazines.

A steady stream of information and propaganda instructions flowed between the Madrid Geopolitical Centre and its collaborators in West Germany, and vice versa. These instructions were summarised in general terms and in just a few sentences by the 'Madrid Circular', as follows:

'It must be our supreme duty to place ourselves in the vanguard of the struggle to keep Europe out of any future war. If we succeed in this, we will surely gain the trust of the people and undisputed leadership in Europe, not excluding Britain. In such a roundabout way we would be able to establish the foundation for future world leadership'. There was, in truth, remarkably little material difference between the way Nazi strategists thought and operated, and the *modus operandi* of their original mentors, the Leninist strategists and the Comintern.

Arguing that, by these subtle means, German foreign policy could transform Europe, so that the Europeans would finally be willing to accept German leadership, the Nazi planners insisted, from the comfort of their Madrid HQ, that Germany would ultimately be in a position to fulfil the objectives reviewed by Hitler's experts in 1941 and summarised in the Nazi blueprint for the European Economic Community, 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft'.

Details of that blueprint had been published by the New York Herald Tribune as early as 31st May 1940 in the article cited on page 147 by Dorothy Thompson, entitled 'The World Germanica', wherein she had written that 'the Germans have a clear plan of what they intend to do in case of victory.... Germany's plan is to make a customs union of Europe, with complete financial and economic control centred in Berlin. This will create at once the largest free trade area and the largest planned

economy in the world. That writer had further warned [further elaboration]:

"The Germans count upon political power following economic power, and not vice versa. Territorial changes do not concern them, because there will be no 'France' or 'England', except as language groups. Little immediate concern is felt regarding political organisations. No nation will have the control of its own financial or economic system, or of its customs. The Nazification of all countries will be accomplished by economic pressure. In all countries, contacts have been established long ago with sympathetic businessmen and industrialists'. This explains the perverse collectivist support of certain UK industrialists for Britain joining the Euro, and for abandoning sovereignty.

Dorothy Thompson went on to describe a terrifying New German World Order, 'with only the master race, the Germans, allowed to bear arms. If, however, the United States wants to concur, all armaments can be radically reduced'.

Now compare this picture of a German-controlled Europe with the description by John Foster Dulles, one of the architects of the United States' postwar foreign policy, as explained in his book 'War or Peace' [Macmillan, New York, 1950]:

'The countries participating in the Marshall Plan have a total population of more than two hundred million and there is a high level of education and culture. That population is greater than the entire population of the Soviet Union or of the United States'.

'These two hundred million and more people have, in Europe and in their African colonial possessions, a great part of the world's natural resources. Coal, iron, copper, potash, phosphate, uranium, are only a few of the many mineral resources found in greatest richness within in this Western-controlled area, a natural wealth that cannot be matched either in the Soviet Union or in the United States'.

This book does not seek to unravel the mysteries of American policymaking confusion, or to measure its currents and countercurrents in the immediate postwar years. If a fear of such a united European bloc had been real, American interests would have been best served by fostering the maintenance of the historic national divisions in Europe, rather than by encouraging, and seeking to accelerate, through such means as covert CIA funding of the European Movement (established as an instrument of the Revolution developed mainly as a result of manoeuvring by the late Dr Joseph Retinger, an itinerant Pole based in London, who was an agent of the Comintern)<sup>46</sup> - the process of European unification, which American observers are only now starting to recognise as a prospective threat.

The fashion for regionalism at the State Department and in the mainstream US media following the Second World War was fed by a US fear of nationalism - which, for American policymakers, meant Nazism. Thus, in a report, the United States High Commissioner in Germany wrote in December 1951 concerning the 're'-emergence of German nationalism: 'Unhappily, most of the established political parties have been stoking the merchandise of nationalism. Even some Federal Ministers have not been above such actions'. Whether the US official had put two and two together, to conclude that it was the continuing Nazis who were fostering this tendency, was not made clear. On 1st November 1951, a pro-Adenauer weekly, 'Christ und Welt', by this time the leading geopolitical mouthpiece in Western Germany, expounded the thesis that Dr Adenauer's policy aimed at the creation of a strong Germany as the main 'pillar'<sup>47</sup> in a United Europe. A few weeks later - on 27th December 1951, 'Christ und Welt' pictured a strong West Germany which could make, in the name of a United Europe, an offer to the Kremlin. For 'without the consent of the Russians', asserted Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 6th November 1951, 'the reunification of Germany is impossible'. Hence, the postwar division

of Germany proved to be the ultimate Leninist dialectical ploy which the Soviets would exploit to try to ensure that Germany's long-term geopolitical alignment would have to be fundamentally centred on Moscow.

The editorial stressed that Germans and Russians would have to live peacefully together, and suggested that the Russians, in order to be reassured, should 'have the right of regular inspection of the strength of the German armed forces'. And on 18th January 1952, 'Der Fortschritt', based in Essen, declared that the strategy of Germany's foreign policy should be: 'Never burn bridges towards the East; gain time and keep on with diplomatic negotiations'.

Certainly, under the Adenauer Government, there was extensive agreement among German policymakers that, some day, the Germans would sit down in the Kremlin and come to an agreement on the issue of German reunification. As T. H. Tetens wrote in 'Germany plots with the Kremlin' [Henry Schuman, New York, 1953], 'such negotiations would be the beginning of a general discussion of Europe's position as a whole towards the Soviet Union. When that moment arrives, the Germans will sit again in the driver's seat - as the strongest nation economically, politically and militarily on the European Continent, nourished with billions of dollars from the United States'. This is what the Nazi International's analysts meant when they wrote in their 'Madrid Circular' of 1950: 'The Americans have lost the Cold War and the entire future, but they are not as yet aware of it'. Forty years later, the Americans thought they had 'won the Cold War' - the Germans having 'sat down in the Kremlin', as predicted.

As for the growing ranks of disgruntled former German soldiers and officers, the view had taken root by the early 1950s that Germany would be far better off siding with the East against the West. A particularly twisted popular argument among German veterans ran as follows: 'If we fight for the Americans, Stalin will ship us by the millions as prisoners to Siberia. That means misery, slave labour and death. But if we fight with the Russians, and the Americans win, we will go as prisoners to the United States which means good food, good treatment and nothing to fear. Thus it is better we go with the Russians'.

## OSTPOLITIK: DIALECTICAL GERMAN ORIENTATION TO THE EAST

As discussed in Part One, Germany and the 'former' Soviet Union are today bound together today by bilateral treaties and secret agreements concluded in 1990. But those accords simply consolidated and formalised what had long been planned and mutually understood. As the informed observer Tetens reported in 1953, 'the Russians know they have nothing to fear from Western Germany. They have secret and open assurances from the industrialists of the Ruhr of Germany's desire for close cooperation with the East'<sup>48</sup>.

Evidence such as this appears to have been ignored by Western policy planners, and especially in the US State Department and at the Pentagon. There, the complacent view had finally prevailed after the war that the Germans would remain filled with hatred towards the Russians, given the rough treatment they had received at their hands, and could be relied upon to remain permanently in the Western camp, if the United States provided adequate necessary assistance to enable them to overcome their defeat. The mistake here lay with the Western assumption that the suffering of the German people at the hands of the Soviets had in any way moderated the mentality of the German industrialists. This central error of analysis could have been identified as early 1948, when a so-called 'great debate' erupted openly among the rapidly recovering Germans, centred around the issue: West or East orientation? The question was first discussed that

year in the Buenos Aires-based geopolitical monthly, 'Der Weg' - the Argentine capital being a key locus of German Nazi International geopolitical operations<sup>49</sup>.

This article owed its inspiration to the shapers of postwar Nazi International policy based at the Madrid HQ. There, the notion was heavily promoted that Russo-German collaboration was desirable, in view of the fact that Hitler had made a serious mistake in attacking Russia. In the 'Christ und Welt' article already cited (1st November 1951), the writer described the West German Republic as 'a sail boat cruising towards two islands far on the horizon and, in order to withstand strong-blowing winds, it sets its course alternately to the left and to the right. Will the day then not arrive when we must make a decision on which island to land? Maybe, but it is not certain. Perhaps one of the islands will be washed away by the waves before we reach it...'. Note the familiar echo of dialectics here: Thesis, German attachment to the Western camp; Antithesis, German rapprochement with the East; Interim Synthesis: German overt attachment to the Western camp, accompanied by contemporaneous German covert rapprochement with the Soviet Bloc.

No articles seemed to have been published in German newspapers discussing the possibility that the Soviet Union might be the island which would be 'washed away by the waves' - this idea being alien to these National Socialists, who shared the Leninists' manic conviction and certainty of the inevitability of the global victory of socialism. On the contrary, German expectations in that respect centred around the United States - with 'Der Weg' in Buenos Aires, prophesying the 'coming doom' of the United States as early as 1949. In the 'Madrid Circular' letter, it was declared to be Germany's solemn task to 'take the leadership in Europe's struggle against the United States', to grab a few more billions from the Yankees' huge dollar chest, 'and then kick them out or simply hand them over to the Russians'.

## DR ADENAUER AND HIS PAN-GERMAN NAZI BAGGAGE

Dr Adenauer represented the tradition of old Imperial Germany, defeated once, which had tried a second time at world domination. After the second attempt had ended in failure, the Germans could not have found a more astute leader for the difficult task of restoring Germany's power than Dr Adenauer. He was a master of political strategy, who derived his rich experience from Germany's past under the Kaiser, from the years of skillful manoeuvring characteristic of the Weimar Republic, and from the political trickery of the Third Reich. Hence, like Shevardnadze after him, the German Chancellor was frequently referred to as the old 'fox'.

Born in Cologne in 1876, he became interested in municipal politics and after serving as deputy to the Lord Mayor of Cologne, served as Lord Mayor of that city himself from 1917 to 1933. During that long period, Dr Adenauer wielded influence on all issues of domestic and foreign policy in the Weimar Republic - as Chairman of the Conference of German Cities, serving as President of the Prussian State Council from 1920 to 1933, and belonging to the Executive Committee of the Catholic Centre Party. He was a friend of prominent bankers - notably Dr Robert Pferdenges and Dr Hermann Abs, both of his home city, Cologne, who were influential supporters of Hitler's regime and were Hitler's 'favourite bankers'.

Yet when the Allied armies occupied Cologne in 1945, the Americans rashly reinstalled Dr Adenauer in his former job as Lord Mayor. The British were less stupid: after the Reich was divided into zones, and the British took over in Cologne, Dr Adenauer was temporarily dismissed from his office, and his political activities were banned - for reasons which have never been revealed. It is tantalising to think that during that period, the British may have understood what Dr Adenauer stood for, and had the good sense to cut him down to size. But the respite was temporary.

In the post-war years, Dr Konrad Adenauer caused the three Western High Commissioners all kinds of problems - framing his behaviour on the basis of the old Pan-German concept of 'Deutschland Uber Alles in der Welt'. This behaviour prompted The New York Times' correspondent, Drew Middleton - who had rushed to report Lenin's decision to 'discard Communism', when the Soviet leader had introduced his New Economic Policy [NEP] deception in 1921 - to comment upon Dr Adenauer's 'fondness for large, even grandiose, political conceptions and theories'. Diplomats found it 'difficult to reconcile these flights of thoughts with the urgency of Germany's needs at the moment'<sup>50</sup>. The Pan-German verbal tradition of grandiose conceptions and theories was subsequently elaborated to the status of a fine art by Dr Adenauer's successor, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, to whom it fell to preside over the final stages of the realisation of Germany's unification ambitions.

On 14th August 1949, The New York Times quoted the following remarks from Dr Adenauer's election rhetoric. Having expressed his hatred for Great Britain, and having declared that the British 'are our true enemies and they intend to block the resurrection of Western Germany', Dr Adenauer, doubtless smarting from the unexpectedly harsh treatment he had received when the British took over his Zone, exclaimed: A nation like Germany, with one of the first seats in mankind's history, has a claim to feel along nationalistic lines. The foreigners have got to understand that the period of collapse and unrestricted domination by the Allies is finished'.

Dr Adenauer even claimed, in 1945, long before becoming Chancellor, in the course of a speech delivered in Berne, Switzerland, that the German people had never surrendered to the Allies. This was because the German military leaders who did so in May 1945 had 'no mandate from the German people to submit to the terms of unconditional surrender'. And Adenauer proceeded to characterise the Allies' confiscation of German patents as 'outright robbery'. In the course of a mass meeting held in Berlin in 1950, Dr Adenauer caused further embarrassment to the occupying authorities when, at his request and in the presence of Allied representatives, he provocatively led a huge crowd in singing 'Deutschland Uber Alles'. Even so, from the first day of his Chancellorship, Dr Adenauer's immediate aim, hardly assisted by such provocative behaviour, was to lull the suspicions which remained alive among the Allies towards Germany. His scarcely-veiled objectives were to free Germany from the consequences of its devastating defeat, to gain full sovereignty, and to make a resurrected Reich attractive again as a partner in a new alliance which would facilitate continued German milking of the Western Allies, especially the Americans - while covertly fostering a rapprochement with the Soviets. Arid in pursuit of these objectives, he took care to exploit the tensions which had escalated between the East and the Western powers. Dr Adenauer modelled his diplomatic methods on those applied before the war by Dr Gustaf Stresemann, who had handled the post-war political situation following Germany's defeat in the First World War. The Western Allies had regarded Dr Stresemann, when he was serving as German Foreign Minister, as a 'good European'.

Dr Stresemann had perfected the art of diplomatic manipulation. Like Drs Adenauer and Kohl after him, he was full of 'grandiose ideas and schemes'. The Western powers chose to overlook, or forgot, the fact that Stresemann had also been among the most fanatical Pan-Germans before and during the First World War, and that, accordingly, the political game he played was full of booby traps. Both Stresemann and Adenauer were masters of dialectical diplomatic double-talk. Both these politicians used Soviet-style ploys. For example, in 1925, Dr Stresemann had commented that 'our policy of offering the Entente powers a security pact was undoubtedly correct... it broke up the Entente'.



This, of course, is exactly the strategy Moscow is implementing today in pursuit of its long-standing objective of procuring a system of collective security - which would leave the whole of Europe at the mercy of overt and covert Soviet military power. Certainly, the Western countries learned nothing of lasting value from their experiences in dealing with the Germans during the 1920s, which were followed subsequently by crude blackmail diplomacy under Adolf Hitler. Dr Adenauer used similar tactics.

In particular, Adenauer was adept at never placing the whole menu of German demands on the table. He moved carefully, step by step, so that whenever Western negotiators thought they had overcome substantial obstacles, they were at once confronted with new demands. These, Adenauer invariably claimed, had been pressed upon him by agitation on the part of domestic opposition forces - orchestrated, it turned out, by Adenauer and his Nazi International or domestic covert Nazi colleagues. Before the war, Britain's Foreign Minister, Austen Chamberlain, had once remarked to Stresemann: 'Whenever we make a concession to you, instead of acknowledging it, you ask for more'. Chamberlain evidently did not understand that the Germans, like the Soviets, always heartily despised weak opponents who made concessions.

This Lenin-like German policy of bold demands, even though Germany was a defeated power, was typified by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, on 17th July 1951, in an editorial which pronounced that 'all concessions in the direction of German equality were won only after Germany had exercised relentless pressure. As Andre Francois-Poncet, the French High Commissioner, quipped, 'well-behaved children do not cry - but well-behaved children will never get anything'. By means of this strategy of always asking for more, Adenauer succeeded in reversing the Allies' policy of dismantling Germany's surplus industry for reparations: General Clay terminated this policy in 1946. According to a report in The Herald Tribune, New York, the reversal of policy had been implemented because the General 'seeks German goodwill for political purposes'. Thus the Americans recklessly traded the tangible assets which the severely weakened Allies so desperately required, for an intangible asset which, had they read the devious Pan-German mind of Dr Adenauer correctly, and understood the significance of his background as well as the power of the Nazi International establishment, they would have known would never be delivered.

In 1949, Mr John L. McCloy, the newly appointed US High Commissioner, accelerated the pace of the United States' capitulation to the wily Dr Adenauer's insistent and provocative demands. According to another report in The Herald Tribune (19th February 1950), 'in six months here, Mr McCloy gave in tremendously to Chancellor Adenauer and the West German Government - gave in at what many felt was an alarming rate, in the hope that demands would cease, but only to be confronted with other demands from other quarters'. Appeasement was, once again, the order of the day.

Having thus boldly seized the psychological initiative from the US High Commissioner, Dr Adenauer succeeded, as the same American newspaper's Bonn correspondent, Ernest Leiser, reported on 9th January 1950, in 'putting the Commission on the defensive and reducing its role to a largely negative one.... By this tactic, Dr Adenauer has increased his prestige and authority in the whole field of politics and has whittled away, simultaneously, at Allied prestige and authority'. This was a perceptive and accurate summing-up of the situation. But most Western observers stayed clueless about the motivations underlying Adenauer's behaviour - attributing it to his 'native cunning', and failing to evaluate it in the broader context of the lack of any discontinuity of underlying German strategy.

## ADENAUER'S DEVIOS RUSE: 'THE MIRAGE OF A PAN-EUROPE'

We now come to the central purpose of Dr Adenauer's post-war strategy. In 1946, Dr Adenauer had visited the United States to discuss his political views and to propagate, as the New York-based 'Staats Zeitung' had explained, his ideas about the need for a United Europe. Meanwhile, in response to subtle German agitation, diplomacy and propaganda in the United States, an influential section of the American press was by now arguing loudly for the 'need' to rebuild a strong Germany; while the Pentagon toyed with allowing Germany to acquire an army of up to fifty divisions, given the growing menace from Stalin's Soviet Union.

From the outset of his supremacy, Dr Adenauer stressed that Germany's requirements could only be realised within the framework of a 'United Europe'. Europe, and especially Germany, must regain its economic strength, the policy of 'punishment had to be abandoned, and Germany must be treated as an equal partner in order to gain the cooperation of the German people for alliance with the West. Since certain American business interests were extremely interested in the revival of a powerful Germany, and Adenauer's agents had informed him closely of this fact, the Chancellor's bargaining position was exceptionally strong, enabling him to keep raising his price.

The plan for a 'United Europe' that Dr Adenauer brought to Washington in 1946 represented, of course, a rehash of the 70-year-old Pan-German aspiration of bringing Europe under the domination of Germany. In the final years of the war, fearing and knowing that the name of Germany would stink worldwide, the Nazis had resolved to launch, following the end of hostilities, a clever worldwide campaign for the creation of a United Europe, in which the defeated Germans would in practise give up nothing, while actually gaining everything they had always coveted. If anything, their geopolitical power idolatry waxed stronger as their hopes rose and Western weakness, vacillation and failure to read their motives accurately, became ever more apparent.

The covert continuing Nazis elaborated with great cunning that since the Germans had lost their sovereignty, it would make sense to talk the other European nations into a scheme in which they would also give up their sovereignty, and in which the Germans, as participants, would automatically gain equality when that happened - so that the stigma would be removed from the Fatherland. Those fronting this carefully-gauged German propaganda campaign were nothing less than demobbed members of Hitler's Waffen SS.

As mentioned, Dr Adenauer's rehashed plan was based on earlier outbursts of Pan-Germanism. One of Dr Konrad Adenauer's powerful industrial associates, Dr Duisberg, of the gas-makers I. G. Farben, had written in 1931, in a geopolitical book by the Pan-German General Haushofer, that 'only an integrated trading bloc, stretching out from Bordeaux to Sofia, would enable Europe to gain that innermost economic strength which is necessary to uphold her leading position in the world.... The longing for a thousand-year Reich cries for a new approach. For such a purpose, we can use the mirage of a Pan-Europe'.

Back in 1932, as noted on page 152, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi had suggested, in a 'top secret' memorandum to the German Government and its General Staff, the unification of Europe, beginning with the creation of a German-French combine in economics, armaments and foreign policy - the key prescription that was finally launched via the text of the Franco-German Treaty of 22nd January 1963 signed by Dr Adenauer and General Charles de Gaulle. This 'Treaty of the Elysee' document forms the basis of Franco-German relations [see page 241 et seq.]. Dr Adenauer was not going to be satisfied with half-measures. Boldly and

provocatively - just like a Bolshevik who was unafraid of his opposite numbers - he angled for the United States to place Germany firmly in Europe's driving seat; and in any case, he looked to the United States, with its inexhaustible supply of dollars, to rearm Germany and Europe against the growing Soviet menace. Clearly, Dr Adenauer implemented the Nazi blueprint, 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe'.

And in pursuit of this policy, Dr Adenauer was assisted by diplomats who had, as noted, once served Hitler and Ribbentrop. His path was smoothed by geopoliticians from other countries as well - including powerful and influential, but misguided, internationalist Americans.

One of the old Ribbentrop-era diplomats, Heinz Truetzschler von Falkenstein, who was appointed by Hitler on 5th April 1943 as Secretary of the Nazis' top-secret 'Europe Committee', which emerged as a result of the Berlin Conference discussing 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' in 1942, was chosen again in 1949 for a similar job by Dr Adenauer. This 'Europe Committee', established to organise a 'New Europe' under the leadership of a 'Greater Germany', was not immediately able, due to the German collapse, to implement the plans which had emerged from the Berlin Conference. But it survived the war, which is why the structure of the Maastricht Treaty resembles that of the list of subjects addressed in 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft'.

Moreover Germany's political press, together with the geopolitical and economic research institutes and organisations which had been established under Nazism, were soon back in existence, functioning again as under Hitler's regime. Leading National Socialist journalists, who had been prominent under Dr Goebbels, and had been interpreters of Hitler's foreign policy, found themselves sitting, as noted, in the editorial offices of the reputable and influential pro-Adenauer press.

For example, Dr Rudolph Kircher, who had been the Editor-in-Chief of *Frankfurter Zeitung* under Dr Goebbels, served as editor of *Deutsche Zeitung* in Stuttgart under Dr Adenauer. Dr Gieselher Wirsing, who had been Editor-in-Chief of the Nazi paper 'Munchener Neueste Nachrichten', and who had been the paymaster of a US Nazi agent, became the editor of a leading political weekly after the war. This publication camouflaged its Nazi geopolitical activities under the innocent-sounding and thoroughly deceptive (not to say, blasphemous) name, already mentioned, of 'Christ und Welt'.

According to 'Frankfurter Rundschau' and other newspapers, many Nazi diplomats managed to escape investigation and punishment by going underground in 1945, or by posing as members of the resistance against Hitler. These people founded the 'Evangelisches Hilfswerk' (Evangelical Relief Committee) at the time of the Nazi collapse; and once they had seen that nothing had happened to them, they went much further, organising in Stuttgart an entity with the innocent-sounding title of 'Bureau for Peace Problems' ('Buro für Friedensfragen')<sup>51</sup>. When Dr Adenauer organised his Foreign Ministry, this key Ribbentrop group was transferred directly from Stuttgart to Bonn. 'Christ und Welt' was founded in 1947 by the same group of Ribbentrop diplomats who had taken cover under the mask of the 'Evangelical Relief Committee'. Other prominent Nazis with Pan-German, 'united Europe' views who moved seamlessly from the Nazi era to the Adenauer period included Dr Karl Silex, a former Nazi journalist who surfaced publishing the pro-Adenauer weekly 'Deutsche Kommentare'. Dr Paul Rohrbach, who had helped to interpret Germany's 'Drang nach Osten' policy under the Kaiser, and had later propagated Nazi foreign policy under Dr Goebbels and Ribbentrop, became one of Dr Adenauer's most prominent public exponents of world political events. Other leading German periodicals which maintained Nazi ideologies included 'Zeitschrift für Geopolitik', 'Der Standpunkt', 'Nation Europa', 'Aussenpolitik', 'Ost-Europa',

and 'Uebersee Rundschau'. The Nazi German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, which had served as the propaganda centre for thirty million 'volksgruppen' Germans of the diaspora, was re-established under Adenauer as the 'Institute for Foreign Relations'. Its first director was an old Nazi official, Dr Franz Thierfelder.

Whereas the overt Nazis had 'bequeathed' one higher institution for foreign policy - the Hochschule Fur Politik in Berlin - under Dr Adenauer, three such organisations sprang up - in Berlin, Munich and Dusseldorf - as the Nazis modelled their influence-building methods after those perfected along Leninist influence-building lines in Soviet Russia. These key agitprop 'research' institutes were supported by the Institute for the History of National Socialism, The German Society for East European Problems, The German Colonial Society, The Ibero-American Institute and many others - all of which were modelled along lines developed by the Soviets and elaborated after the war by the Soviet Academy of [Leninist] Sciences, which spawned institutes like a pig giving birth<sup>52</sup>. The Carl Schutz Society, which had played a decisive part in propagating National Socialist propaganda in the United States under the leadership of the director of I. G. Farben, Max Ilgner, also sprang back to life. So much for the conviction of Western Governments that the 'de-Nazification programme' had been a success. There was some open criticism following the Soviet Leninist 'changes' of 1989-91 to the effect that no 'de-Communisation programme' had taken place, after the model assumed to have been implemented by the Allies after the Second World War in Germany. That argument was based upon the fallacy that a 'successful' de-Nazification programme was conducted after 1945, which was never the case.

By the early 1950s, Dr Adenauer felt powerful enough to insist that there was no alternative to his concept of a united Europe - exactly the same dogmatic stance as that adopted by his successor, Dr Kohl, and by the 'ex'-terrorist German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer. 'It is a great mistake', Dr Adenauer said in an interview, 'to think that the German military contribution is the main problem. The main issue is Europe herself. A united Europe would be a pressing need even if a Soviet danger did not exist'.

In the same interview, Dr Adenauer openly spouted Leninist policy - echoed many years later in almost precisely the same words by the President of Germany, Dr Professor Roman Herzog, and by other top Germans - stressing that the age of national and sovereign states had 'come to an end', and that the future belonged to the great regional power blocs. Nor was this Leninist notion anything new to Pan-German thinking in itself: it had, for instance, as we have already noted, been advocated by the Pan-Germans 60 years earlier, and had later been revisited throughout the Nazi period by the Pan-German elite under Hitler.

Thus there has been unbroken continuity in Germany's anti-nation state, and therefore essentially Leninist, agitation for a United Europe, for nine decades - and, in practice, for significantly longer than that. As Dr Adenauer saw the future, Germany was bent on the reconsolidation of its economic, political and military hegemony over all Europe; and in a speech in July 1951, the Chancellor added: 'The creation of a Europe which is politically and economically strong, is the only path leading to recovery of Germany's eastern territories, which remains one of the essential goals of our activities'. Thus the unification of Europe is not being prosecuted by Germany for the benefit of the rest of Europe, but in pursuit of its own regional geopolitical objectives. This illuminates the dangers that are inherent in the looming crisis over Kaliningrad, discussed on pages 233 et seq.

Having sold the gullible and confused Americans his plan for a 'United Europe', Dr Adenauer presided over increasing prosperity, as the German econ-

omy - fuelled by Western funding and massive reinvestment in productive equipment and infrastructure - embarked upon a high-speed economic recovery. Inspired by Dr Adenauer's example, other prominent Germans rushed to clarify Germany's strategy. Thus, on 15th September 1951, Dr Hans Christian Seebohm,

Minister of Commerce in the Adenauer Cabinet, addressed a mass meeting of Sudeten Germans at Stuttgart, alluding to the monstrous crime that the victors had committed against Germany, Europe and the whole world:

'Does free Europe want to join Germany? Germany is the heart of Europe, and the limbs must adjust themselves to the heart, not the heart to the limbs'.

Leading German industrialists had, according to the Swiss newspaper 'Wochen Zeitung', of 6th March 1952, 'underestimated Russia's strength when they looked at the East through the ideological glasses of Nazism'. Now, the paper explained, German industrialists of the Rhine and the Ruhr will follow their real interests, which they saw best fostered by collaboration with the East. Indeed one of the leading Ruhr magnates told 'Wochen Zeitung' that 'Germany's prospects in the East are far more attractive than those which are offered us in the West'. The Swiss paper added that 'seven years after unconditional surrender, Germany holds most of the trump cards for the international poker game in her hands'.

On 3rd April 1952, amid the first wave of the German debate about a Soviet Note on German reunification which was used as the pretext for the execution of its progenitor, Lavrentii Beria, the mouthpiece of the big Ruhr interests and of the Bonn Foreign Office, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, proclaimed, on its front page: 'The Chancellor follows a tremendous bold plan. First, rearmament, followed later on by talks with the Russians in order to persuade them to move their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal, the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time'.

In fact in early 1949, secret meetings had been held between German diplomats and industrialists, which had been addressed by the former (Nazi) German Ambassador to Moscow, Rudolf von Nadowitz<sup>53</sup>, who, after living in the Soviet Zone, had been used by the Soviet military administration as a transmission belt for making compromise offers to the West. Among participants at these secret meetings had been various close friends and colleagues of Dr Adenauer and his Christian Democratic Union, including Dr Adenauer's successor, Professor Ludwig Erhard. It was because certain reports about these secret negotiations had shocked US officials that Dr Adenauer took care to state, in an interview before his confirmation as Chancellor of the new Federal Republic, that 'we must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression, either in Germany or in the United States, that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians'.

The pertinent phrase here, of course, was 'not to give the impression'. On the contrary, Dr Adenauer and his colleagues set about concocting elaborate deceptions to convince the West in general, and the Americans in particular, that the Germans hated the Russians - from which the Pan-Germans knew that the West would jump to the incorrect conclusion that they (the Germans) were trustworthy allies of the West. Yet at the same time, West German industrial representatives were holding their secret talks in Moscow, clandestine diplomatic contact having been established between the Adenauer Government and the Kremlin. That this was so became clear at the beginning of 1951, when rumours began circulating in Bonn that Moscow would welcome a secret understanding with West Germany. Beria's offer, when it came, in fact represented one of a series of such offers, which had begun when Stalin offered the German people reunification in May 1945. Similar 'trial balloon' offers followed in later years, as the Soviets 'fine-tuned' their strategy.

At the peak of the Germans' euphoria over early reunification, which was shortly to be replaced by disappointment when the Soviets reversed themselves and executed Beria, the political weekly, 'Der Fortschritt', which represented the industrial interests of the Ruhr, published an article entitled 'Courage towards a Rapallo'. The issue, dated 16th May 1952, asserted that: 'Never before has the world political situation been so favourable for Germany as it is today.... It is not for nothing that both power blocs concentrate their efforts on Germany, in order to dominate politically and economically. Therein lies our chance and our obligation. Our economy has to be kept independent from both sides.... This is the way that leads towards sovereignty and equality, which finally will eliminate all those clauses which were imposed upon us as a result of the lost war.... While integration with the West restricts our industry to markets where we are subjected to a cut-throat competition, the Eastern Bloc offers us markets where countless millions are hungry for our industrial goods. Here (in the East) is Germany's market. Here we have to sell our merchandise. Thirty years ago, on 16th April 1922, there were courageous men who, at Rapallo, through direct Russo-German negotiations, brought a great turning point in Germany's postwar policy.... The situation in present-day Germany should exhort our leading statesmen to show courage - courage towards a [new] Rapallo policy'<sup>54</sup>.

Nevertheless, Germany's elaborate and devious plans depended, essentially, upon American support - that is to say, upon the Americans not seeing through German deviousness and Dr Adenauer's two-faced behaviour. Dr Adenauer's psychological offensives towards this end were greatly assisted by the young US State department official, George F. Kennan, who, having spent many years in prewar Germany where he had absorbed the techniques and concepts of German geopolitics, exerted what US News and World Report of 25th July 1947 described as 'a profound influence' upon decisions taken in Washington which led to far-reaching changes of policy. These have infected international developments ever since.

'Under the new [US] policies, the German people will get a chance to recover and to rebuild their industries, subject to supervision', the US publication proclaimed. The US authorities simply abandoned the previous policy of dismantling German productive capacity and shipping it to the exhausted and under-invested wartime allies, and instead adopted Kennan's formula of rebuilding Germany as a 'bulwark against the East' - exactly as the post-war Nazi International planners had envisaged.

This development represented a further example of how the devious mind can easily hoodwink the pragmatic mentality. The new US policy was based upon the fallacy that Germany's geopolitical orientation could always be relied upon, and ignored the German capacity for intrigue and duplicity. The attitude appears to have been: 'We'll take them at their word, and if they deceive us, we'll review the matter' - exactly the same approach as NATO was reported in the autumn of 2001 to have adopted towards President Putin's Russia [see Part One]. This approach perhaps makes sense in ordinary life, but is hazardous when one is dealing with an embittered, devious, idolatrous and unrepentant 'former' enemy.

As noted earlier, Kennan had himself picked up these ideas during his years of study at Heidelberg and at the Nazi Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin. It was there that he was taught (by Pan-Germans) to accept the geopolitical interpretation that Germany represented a 'bulwark against the East', and that without a strong Germany, the world would fall into chaos. But this was nothing more than clever psychological brainwashing, amounting to a pack of lies given the Pan-Germans policy of 'leaning towards the east'. On 11th December 1949, The New York Times

reported that Kennan 'did postgraduate studies at the University of Heidelberg, the University of Berlin, the Oriental Seminary and the Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin' - all of which institutions were well known for teaching Pan-German and Nazi International geopolitical doctrines [see page 148].

Thus it came about that, very soon after the end of the Second World War, American policymakers were quickly infected and overwhelmed by German pan-Europeanism - a fact which was well analysed by Professor John L. Brown of the Catholic University, Washington D.C., in an article published in *The Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, in which he traced the new hegemony of Pan-German ideology in the United States to growing German influence in US cultural and educational circles.

There is no doubt at all that George Kennan's views on Germany were coloured by the distorted historical ideas propounded at the Nazi 'Hochschule fur Politik'. As the American analyst T. H. Tetens observed, Kennan's book, 'American Diplomacy', revealed an unduly accommodating attitude towards Germany, 'the same Germany whose demoniacal spirit and lust for power brought the free world to the brink of disaster twice within a generation'. Absolving Germany from all blame for launching the First World War, the brainwashed US official declared: 'You could not say that anyone had deliberately started the war or schemed it' - a view which historians today reject. According to Kennan, that unparalleled tragedy 'just happened'. On 4th October 1952, *The New York Times* asserted that Kennan's position as Director of the State Department Planning Staff made him 'more than any other single person the architect of our foreign policy'<sup>55</sup>.

## THE 'GENERALPLAN 1945'

### Fragments of captured Nazi documents

As mentioned earlier, several revealing Nazi documents, drawn up in the closing days of the Third Reich, were captured by the Allies in June 1945, along with with the files of the short-lived post-Hitler Doenitz Government based in Flensburg. The documents in question were jointly initialled by Grand Admiral Doenitz and Field Marshal Keitel. One paper, entitled 'The German Freedom Movement', gave details of the establishment amid Germany's ruins of a 'new' political movement designed to preserve German racial principles. Another document, also referred to earlier, was entitled 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', in which the German High Command emphasised the 'self-evident' advantages of a Russo-German alliance against the West. A third document sketched out a bold New European Order ('Europaische Friedensordnung'), which showed a most remarkable resemblance to Dr Adenauer's proposals for a united Europe, as well as to the structure of the Maastricht Treaty. This superfluous Nazi document, which was grandly entitled 'The European Peace-Order', summarised Germany's objectives as follows:

- 1 Liberation of the German people from suppression and occupation.
- 2 Repatriation of the expellees.
- 3 An integrated German racial community.
- 4 Elimination of all arbitrary acts by the enemy.
- 5 European union on a federalistic basis.
- 6 The right to racial autonomy.
- 7 European Common-weal ('Gemeinnutz').
- 8 A European court of arbitration.
- 9 A community of related peoples with the aim of creating a Germanic Reich.
- 10 A commonwealth linking Germany and Bohemia and Moravia.
- 11 Guaranteed protection of racial groups ('Volksgruppenrecht').
- 12 Economic integration of Europe.

The National Socialist policymakers' objective [Point Five] of establishing a new 'European Union on a federalistic basis' echoed the previously cited remit

laid down by the Comintern on 28th July 1920, at its Second World Congress, in the document entitled 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' (Protokoll, 2, page 224), which had codified Lenin's thesis that 'federation is a transitional form towards the complete union... of all nations'. Thus the German General Staff, following Hitler's 'line' laid out in 'Mein Kampf', shared the anti-state vision of Lenin's Comintern. It is a perverse 'line' that has been transported down the decades so that it pervades the enabling legislation of the European Union and provides the supreme rationalisation for the collective's existence.

Point Eight, the 'European court of arbitration' - has of course materialised in the format of the European Court of 'Justice' - which exists, as previously noted, not to dispense justice, but to further the interests of the European Union Collective. It is busily destabilising the British legal system by developing the EU-approved concept of 'Corpus Juris', which is alien to English Common Law, Britain's greatest gift to the world. The European Legal Area Project, managed by the European Commission, is the most lethal of all threats to Britain's most ancient and hallowed liberties, which the British have fought for many generations to maintain.

Point nine, 'a community of related peoples with the final aim of creating a Germanic Reich' should not be dismissed today as a hangover from the Third Reich. Germany could, for instance, unilaterally announce that she was abandoning the Euro and simultaneously replacing it with the deutschemark - in which case the rest of the European Union Collective, having been enticed and entrapped within the collective currency ruse, would arguably have little choice but to adopt the deutschemark as well. Under cover of the immediately and relentlessly depreciating Euro, the Germans succeeded in devaluing their deutschemark, in an attempt (which has failed) to overcome the impact of structural rigidities in their economic system.

At all events, it is well understood by the other EU 'Member States' that the Germans can essentially 'do what they like' - a tacit admission by the others that the European Union is, in fact, an area that is economically and politically dependent upon Germany. Even disregarding the possibility of such a bold initiative to assert their hegemony as the replacement of a degraded Euro by a new deutschemark, the location of the European Central Bank at Frankfurt is among many symbols and indicators of continuing Pan-German aspirations and intentions.

Point twelve specified in the German General Staff's document, calling for the 'Economic integration of Europe', has of course developed into the Single Market and the prospectively catastrophic fiasco of Economic and Monetary Union [EMU] through which the Third Reich's ambition to impose a Single Currency on the whole of Europe, is being realised. The Euro-ideologues' incessant calls for 'more and more integration' are self-evidently entirely consistent with Point twelve. What has so far been lacking is the necessary riposte that these people support the Nazi programme.

## PRE-AGREED GERMAN-SOVIET PARTITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

But it is item number ten of 'The European Peace-Order' which commands special immediate attention. This anticipated a Commonwealth between Germany, Bohemia and Moravia. Here we find truly dramatic evidence of the unbroken continuity of German strategy. For, under secret agreements reached following extensive discussions in Geneva between experts for President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl in September or October of 1990, the Soviets undertook to accommodate Germany's long-standing wish to assert hegemony over, and to amalgamate with, Bohemia and Moravia - first, through the partition of Czechoslovakia, and subsequently, via the



intended further breakup of the Czech Republic: see the following information.

Details of this secret agreement were later publicised in the journal 'Tydenik Politika', which appeared on Prague newsstands during November 1991 [see facsimile, page 205]. The Soviets undertook in the course of these secret negotiations not to hamper the division of Czechoslovakia, which later took place; to bring the Czech and Moravian regions into the sphere of German economic interests; and to facilitate the region's further political incorporation into Germany within 12-15 years. At the time, few in Europe had heard of any question of Czechoslovakia being divided. In the event, of course, the first partition took place thirteen months later, at the end of 1992.

Under the secret Geneva accord, the Soviets further asserted that they would not object to the division of Yugoslavia, would agree to Croatia and Slovenia entering the German sphere of economic influence and interests, and would agree that Ciscarpathian Ukraine would 'join Hungary in the event of destructive activities by Ukrainian Nationalists'. Germany was to 'refrain from activity in respect of issues concerning Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia', and would not consider them to be within its sphere of fundamental economic interests. Significantly, the issue of Kaliningrad was omitted from this menu, although it may have been covered by the reference to Lithuania [details, pages 202-205]. The level of cynicism entailed is all the more striking when it is recalled that both signatories purport to be ardent federalists, seeking together to erase nation states from the map.

An 'open' report about this 'secret' Soviet-German accord to carve-up Czechoslovakia surfaced in the Kiev-based newspaper 'Rada' on Christmas Day 1992, immediately ahead of the country's dismemberment at the turn of that year. Speculating on why the German Chancellor, Dr Kohl, had 'spent too much time holding private conversations' with President Yeltsin during his visit to Moscow which had begun on 14th December 1992, Mr Oleksandr Dubyna referred to an article in the 14th November 1991 issue of the Czechoslovakian newspaper 'Politika', dealing with Soviet-German negotiations on regional geopolitical issues, held in Geneva in the autumn of 1990. The 'Rada' summary of those talks indicated indeed that the Soviets had agreed not to hamper the division of Czechoslovakia, to permit the Czech and Moravian regions to be brought into the German economic sphere, and to facilitate the region's further political incorporation into Germany within 12-15 years. Since the secret agreement was reached in the autumn of 1990, it is clear that the Czech Republic was scheduled to be incorporated into Germany at some stage between 2002 and 2005<sup>56</sup>.

In return, the Germans would compensate the Soviet Union 'for future economic damages inflicted upon it by those processes'. Furthermore, the two sides pledged not to object to 'the restoration of Hungary within the borders that existed prior to the Trianon Treaty' of 1920, under which Transylvania was incorporated into Romania, while Ciscarpathian Ukraine and the Danube-adjoining lands went to Czechoslovakia.

Germany would increase its economic assistance to Hungary, in order to ensure that living standards there would be higher than in Slovakia, thus making the notion of Slovakia joining Hungary progressively more attractive.

Oleksandr Dubyna noted that 'the year that passed since the publication [of the details of this secret agreement] in 'Politika' had 'convincingly proved the accuracy of its principal provisions. If, as late as November 1991, the splitting of Czechoslovakia did not seem particularly likely', it was 'an accomplished fact today'. Germany had not displayed any overt interest in the Baltic States, as had been expected. Rather, it had instead stepped up penetration of and initiatives towards Slovenia and Croatia, as predicted in the text of the secret accord; meanwhile Russia had 'disavowed' its traditional relations with Serbia and had supported German influence in the region (a somewhat dubious statement, in the light of later events). Thus, the 'Rada' article concluded that 'we have weighty reasons to presume that the article in 'Politika' is not forged', in which case 'we can even talk about the next edition of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, edited by Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl'. The writer added that the Yeltsin Government had subsequently 'acted in the spirit of the 1990 Geneva agreements', noting that 'the Berlin-Moscow axis fits very well within the "continental" geopolitical concept, under which Eurasia is supposed to be a centre of world stability. Advocates of this concept view Ukraine, Belarus and the European part of Russia as a single space' - ready to complete 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals', which the Soviets are only prepared to countenance - provided it is seen as a definitive stepping-stone towards the achievement of their objective of 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'.

What the Soviets are not prepared to tolerate under any circumstances is the de facto establishment by stealth of Germany's model of European hegemony, centred on Berlin, and the de facto 'banishment' of Russia to an 'Asian no-man's-land beyond the Urals'. This is the central issue.

To establish what lay behind these extraordinary revelations, the Author contacted a source in Prague who was able to track down a copy of the issue of 'Tydenik Politika' dated 14th-20th November 1991. This is a translation from the Czech language of the details given on the front page, reproduced in the facsimile shown on page 205:

#### TYDENIK POLITIKA : PRIVATE JOURNAL FOR POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Confidential information on discussions held in Geneva, October 1990, between Soviet and German experts concerning geopolitical problems in Central Europe. [Note: As will have been observed, whereas the 'Rada' article stated that the secret talks had taken place in Geneva in September 1990, the text of 'Tydenik Politika' states October 1990]:

\* The German Federal Republic demands [sic] from the USSR compensation for annexed eastern Prussia and for the area east of the Oder-Niesse.

[Note: In the event, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced in 1990 the final German renunciation of any revision of the Oder-Niesse border with Poland. This is one of the peculiar anomalies of this document; but it does not undermine its significance, given that the division of Czechoslovakia and the destabilisation and carve-up of Yugoslavia were accurately anticipated therein].

\* The German Federal Republic demands [sic] withdrawal of Soviet influence in the Bohemian-Moravian region. The Soviet Union is unwilling to tolerate in the vicinity of their borders a Czechoslovak Federal Republic regime which does not accept the Soviet gesture that allowed Husak's regime to fall in Czechoslovakia. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Federal Republic is unceasing in

its agitation against the USSR and is making the position of the Soviet Government and the President more and more difficult. This is a position that is different from that of the Polish and Hungarian Governments.

\* The USSR will [therefore] not object to the splitting of the Czechoslovak Socialist Federal Republic, due to an insufficient guarantee of political equilibrium in Central Europe and the lack of statesmanship of both the Czech and the Slovak nations.

\* The USSR supports the potential membership of the Bohemian and Moravian regions within the sphere of economic interests of the German Federal Republic and the political incorporation of these regions into Germany within 12 to 15 years [of September-October 1990 ].

\* The Federal Republic of Germany will compensate the USSR for the economic losses thus inflicted on the Soviet Union.

\* The Federal German Republic will prepare for a possible decline in popularity of the present Czechoslovak Socialist Federal Republic leadership by preparing groups, having a positive attitude towards Germany and which are acceptable even to the Soviet Union, drawn as an alternative even from left-wing parties [sic],

without evident interference in the process of proliferation of political parties. [Note: This represents confirmation that the Czech and Slovak 'democracies' are false, controlled exercises in Soviet 'democratism': see Part One for 'democratism' details].

\* With regard to the willingness of Hungary to maintain political and economic stability in the Danube region, the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany will not object to the re-establishment of a Hungary within the original borders, as stipulated by the Trianon Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany will increase its economic aid to Hungary in order to lift the standard of living in Hungary above that [prevailing] in Slovakia, so that joining Hungary becomes attractive to Slovakia.

\* The USSR has no objections to the establishment of a German university and high schools in the regions of Bohemia and Moravia, and to the financing of these schools by Germany.

\* The USSR does not object to the breaking-up of Yugoslavia, and supports the transfer of Croatia and Slovenia into the economic sphere of Germany.

\* The USSR has no objections to the deployment of [the means of procuring] political destabilisation [as subsequently materialised in Yugoslavia].

\* The Federal Republic of Germany will not become engaged in issues concerning Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and will not consider them to be an area of [Germany's] economic interest, above and beyond an acceptable level.

\* The USSR will not object to the separation of Ciscarpathian Ukraine in the event of destabilising activity undertaken by [controlled] Ukrainian nationalists, and its incorporation into a Hungarian Republic.

\* The USSR does not object to the gradual colonisation of the Czech border areas by Soviets and Germans [sic: probably a reference to Russian ethnic Germans].

The text is clearly labelled 'Confidential Information on the discussions held by Soviet and German experts', supervised by Gorbachev and Kohl. That the report was genuine, is confirmed by the fact that the issue of 'Tydenik Politika' containing the details of the carve-up, preceded the division of Czechoslovakia and the ensuing events in Yugoslavia. Note, too, the accord's provision for fostering 'alternative political groups' in Czechoslovakia, indicating that Prague was required to embark upon an era of 'democratism' - with the Communists active, as in Moscow (and throughout Eastern Europe) 'splintering' and resurfacing under false political labels - which is why the Government led by Milos Zeman consisted, in 2001, of 18 'former' Communists out of the Cabinet of 19 members. This reality provides a clue that any forays into geopolitics by Mr Milos Zeman would be 'coordinated with' the

'underground'-control-apparat centred in Moscow, and highlights the significance of the reported readoption in 1999 by the GRU, of Prague as their Central Europe HQ.

It would have been in character for the cynical Soviet concessions in this secret, but subsequently 'leaked', Central European 'carve-up' accord, to have been undertaken by Moscow on the basis of Lenin's 'one step forward, two steps back' dictum, and that 'they were drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive' (especially as the Soviet concession related to someone else's territory). And indeed, it appeared that the 'planned' cession of part of the Czech Republic to Germany within 15 years - that is to say, by the autumn of 2005, agreed behind the backs of the Czechs by President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in 1990 - may have been a time-bomb deliberately left in the Central European theatre by the Soviets to provide future opportunities for insisting that the Soviet model of 'universal integration' must take precedence over the satisfaction of old Pan-German aspirations. They will be able to do this by pointing, for instance, at the 'geopolitical realities' displayed in the map on page 237, which enable the continuing Soviets to insist that their prescription for 'Great Europe' must prevail.

At the very least, this 'booby trap' seemed about to spawn serious instability in Central Europe just as this book was going to press (when there were about three and a half years left to go, of the maximum of fifteen specified in the secret accord). For on 26th January 2002, The Daily Telegraph reported that a 'diplomatic row' had blown up after the (covert Communist) Mr Zeman had, all of a sudden, stated that the mass expulsion to Germany and Austria of three million Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia at the end of the Second World War had been necessary because these Germans had belonged to 'Hitler's fifth column' and had helped to destroy 'the only island of democracy in Central Europe'. Given the timetable of the secret Soviet-German accord, Mr Zeman's sudden reversion to this ancient issue, at the beginning of 2002, was interesting and ominous.

Mr Zeman evidently pointed out that more than 90% of the Sudeten Germans had voted for the pro-Nazi party in Czechoslovakia's 'last free elections' prior to the Second World War (notwithstanding that the country was 'free', and had held free elections, after the Second World War up until the Communists seized power in the National Assembly and imposed their dictatorship in 1948). Following the KGB-orchestrated 'Velvet Revolution' in 1989, Vaclav Havel, the 'controlled dissident' who became President of Czechoslovakia, 'apologised' to Germany about the 'transfer'.

In response to Zeman's outburst, Edmund Stoiber, Bavarian Prime Minister since 1993 and a candidate of the 'centre-right' for German Chancellor in the September 2002 elections, was reported to have written to Mr Zeman saying that he was wrong to 'collectively condemn' the Sudeten Germans, accusing him of revisiting 'prejudices of the past', and demanding a retraction. Dr Stoiber's Bavaria adjoins the former Sudeten lands and was subsequently settled by many of the Sudeten Germans who were thrown out of post-war Czechoslovakia after being accused of supporting the Nazis. In Berlin, it was being said on 25th January 2002 that Gerhard Schroder might cancel a visit to Prague in March, but that Joschka Fischer had been ordered to 'try to mollify' his Czech counterpart.

The episode implied an apparent potential for severe tension which was built into the secret Soviet-German accord of 1990 to divide Central Europe - as Germany seeks fulfilment, towards the end of the 15 years provided for in the surreptitious Geneva agreement, of Moscow's illegitimate 'secret' promise that it may reabsorb the Sudetenland. The timing of Mr Zeman's remarks at the beginning of 2002 suggests that they were linked to the secret agreement. The Russians, fronted by the Czechs, will insist that their 'universal integration' model must take precedence over an alleged Soviet undertaking to accommodate a Pan-German aspiration, of which the Putin regime or its heirs will be able to claim that they have 'no record in their files'. It would be wrong to suppose that Mr Zeman's burst reflected Czech alarm at the timetable. No, it was undertaken in the interests of the strategy.

## THE PLAN TO PARTITION CZECHOSLOVAKIA

TÝDENÍK

## politika

ROČNÍK I.  
ČÍSLO 42 cena 3,70

ČTVRTEK

14.11 - 20.11. 1991

SOUKROMÝ LIST PRO POLITIKU A EKONOMIKU

## Důvěrná informace z jednání sovětských a německých expertů o geopolitických problémech střední Evropy-Zeneva, září 1990

■ SRN požaduje na SSSR kompenzace za snižování východní Prusko a za prostor východně od Odry - Nisy.

■ SRN požaduje odsoupení sovětského vlivu v českomoravském regionu. SSSR nehodlá trpět v blízkosti svých hranic režim ČSFR, který nepřijal gesto SSSR, jímž nechal padnout Husákov režim. Vláda ČSFR neustává v agitaci proti SSSR a ztěžuje pozici sovětské vlády a prezidentu. Děje se tak rozdílně od vlády Polska a Maďarska.

■ SSSR nebude bránit rozdělení ČSFR pro nedostatek garance politické rovnováhy ve střední Evropě a nedostatek státotvornosti národů Československa.

■ Sovětský svaz souhlasí s perspektivním začleněním českomoravského regionu do zájmové ekonomické sféry SRN a s politickým zařazením tohoto regionu do Německa v průběhu 12-15 let.

■ SRN vyrovná ekonomické záruky způsobené tím Sovětskému svazu.

■ SRN bude pro možný pokles popularity vedení ČSFR připravovat i pro Sovětský svaz přijatelné garantury nakloněné Německu, jako alternativu i z levicových stran, bez zjevného zasahování do profilace politických stran.

■ Se ztížením na ochotu Maďarska udržet politickou a ekonomickou stabilitu v podunajském regionu nebudou

SSSR a SRN bránit obnovu Maďarska v původních hranicích do trianonské smlouvy. SRN zvýší ekonomickou pomoc Maďarsku, aby se pozvedl standard v Maďarsku nad úroveň Slovenska, aby se tak připojení k Maďarsku stalo pro Slováky přitažlivé.

■ SSSR nemá námitek proti zakládání německé univerzity a středních škol v českomoravském regionu a financování těchto škol Německem.

■ SSSR nemá námitek proti rozdělení Jugoslávie, a souhlasí s odsoupením Chovalska a Slovinska do ekonomické sféry SRN.

■ Sovětský svaz nemá námitek proti použití prostředků politické destabilizace.

■ SRN se nebude angažovat v otázce Ukrajiny, Litvy, Lotyšska a Estonska a nebude je považovat za oblast ekonomického zájmu nad únosnou míru.

■ SSSR nebude bránit odtržení Zakarpatské Ukrajiny v případě destabilizační činnosti ukrajinských nacionalistů a její začlenění do Maďarské republiky.

■ SSSR nemá námitek proti postupné kolonizaci českých pohraničních oblastí Sověty a Němci.

(pozn. red.: originál faxované zprávy byl redakčně doplněn pouze o interpunkci)

## VÝZVA

My, kteří sme sa přihlásili k iniciatíve Za zvrchované Slovensko, obracame sa na občanov Slovenskej republiky s touto výzvou:

Slovenský národ má teraz historickú a nepopakovateľnú príležitosť uplatniť demokratickú cestu prirodzenú a neodolateľnú právo na vlastnú zvrchovanosť. Najnovšie udalosti v strednej a východnej Európe nás uložili v predvečer, že nastal čas rozhodnúť. Už nie je možné odkladať uskutočnenie základného práva na slobodu zvrchovanosť na základe uplatnenia sberačovacieho práva národov.

Vyvíjame všetkých občanov Slovenskej republiky bez ohľadu na politické názory, vierovyznanie a národnosť, aby podporili myšlienku demokratickej, svetlo otvorenej zvrchovanej Slovenskej republiky.

Vyvíjame slovenskú politickú reprezentáciu, aby zasadla za slobodu národnej dohody.

Vyvíjame poslancov SNR, aby si uvedomili vážnosť situácie, aby sa povzniesli nad úzke stranické záujmy a vyhlásili v čo najkratšom čase zvrchovanosť Slovenska a v najväčšej miere sa jej prijali a vyhlásili Ústavu Slovenskej republiky.

Len takto sa môže Slovensko ako rovnocenný partner zaradiť do spoločnosti európskych štátov.

Iniciatíva ZA ZVRCHOVANÉ SLOVENSKO

Z významnejších osobností slovenského politického života Výzvu podpísali m. j.: J. Budaj, M. Kráľko, J. Marquš, V. Mečiar, V. Ondruš, J. Prokeš, S. Kvičica a ďalší.

čas. Slovač 17/91

## Zasloužená pocta

Prezidentská zlatá medaila za podporu štátu Izrael byla při neuvědomění nejvyšší USA udělena zveřejněnou kózi B' nel B' rih prezidentu ČSFR Václavu Hlavcov. Při této příležitosti přednesl V. Hlavcov projev, ve kterém přítomným sdělil, že Československo zklivčuje anti-

semitismus, za což se mu dostalo obrovského aplausu.

A za pozornosti jistě stojí i fakt, že na zmíněné zveřejněné fórum uvádí Československého prezidenta filmový režisér Miloš Forman.

J. Tomáš

Facsimile of the front page of 'Tydeník Politika', published in Prague, dated 14-20 November 1991 providing details of the secret accord reached between President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in Geneva in September 1990, allowing inter alia for the partition of Czechoslovakia which subsequently took place at the end of 1992. The Ukrainian newspaper 'Rada', of 25th December 1992, referred to 'an article in the 14th November 1991 issue of the Czechoslovakian newspaper 'Politika', which dealt with Soviet-German negotiations on geopolitical issues held in Geneva in 1990'. Following up this report, the Author was able, through a contact in Prague, to obtain a copy of the relevant issue of 'Tydeník Politika'. Because the report was published over a year prior to the division of Czechoslovakia and predicted events in Yugoslavia, the provision for Moravia to be absorbed by Germany 'within 12-15 years' of 1990 - that is, between 2002 and 2005 - is of serious contemporary interest.

## A GERMAN-SOVIET 'SOCIALIST UNION'

In the document prepared by the German General Staff in the final days of the Second World War, entitled 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', German Nazi policymakers also floated the option of Germany and the Soviet Union joining together to create a 'Socialist Union' - 'Tying-in with the independence of sixteen Soviet Republics in 1943'. Here is the final confirmation that Nazi Germany's covert orientation to the East - hidden behind the familiar stance of apparent German orientation towards the West coupled with Hitler's 'mask of federalism' - was [is] indistinguishable from contemporary Germany's covert orientation towards the East. Since 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe' formed part of the 'Generalplan 1945' documents captured by the Allies in June 1945, together with the files of the short-lived Doenitz Government in Flensburg, the West knew of these proposals shortly after the end of the Second World War. But because, so far as the Allies were concerned, Nazi Germany had been defeated, the blueprint and proposals contained in the captured documents were never taken at all seriously by Western Governments: after all, the Nazis had been routed, and 'that was that'.

This was unfortunate, in the light of the evidence presented in this book to demonstrate that, just as there was no discontinuity of Soviet Leninist strategy in 1989-91, there has likewise been no discontinuity of the strategy reformulated by the Nazi International's experts during and after the war. Therefore, the fact that these captured documents specifically recommended the creation of a German-Soviet 'Socialist Union', within which each party would remain free to pursue its 'own' interests - proxy for the state of affairs perhaps materialising today - is highly significant, although the arrogance with which the defeated Nazis were continuing to plan for European hegemony with the Third Reich in ruins, leaves one speechless.

Noting that 'the Anglo-American deliveries to Russia will probably be stopped at the end of the war in spite of the granted credits (lend-lease)', the authors of 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe' recommended as follows:

'While to remain in the coalition of the enemy would mean for the Soviet Union continuous friction with Great Britain and America in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East, a coalition with Germany would free for the Soviet Union the road from the Persian Gulf to the oil-fields of Kirkuk and to the Mediterranean' (highly dubious wishful-thinking, of course). 'Such a separate peace' - which the Nazi planners were hoping against hope could somehow be reached with Stalin (another piece of Nazi wishful-thinking) 'is only possible by considerable mutual assurances' (to 'overcome' the bitter legacy of the war and of Hitler's breach of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), and 'it can be built up, as things now are, only along the following lines' [Excerpts: only the relevant points shown]:

1. Germany and the present Soviet Union join together in creating a "Socialist Union". Tying-in with the independence of the sixteen Soviet Republics in 1943 [precursor, with Lenin's 'Far Eastern Republic' of the 1920s, of the provisional, controlled and transitionally Leninist 'independence' of the 'former' Soviet Republics in 1991 - Ed.], the European peoples form nationally defined, self-governing states, allied through a defence and economic union.

Internal forms within the states are to be decided by the people.

2. Germany recognises the Soviet Republics of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Greece, and... Turkey.

3. The Western part of Upper Silesia and all the parts of the Warthegau and Western Prussia, which were parts of Prussia until 1918, remain German territory. Furthermore, Germany gets a stronger influence in Old Bohemia and the South-East.

4. Germany gets a free hand in Northern and Western Europe, especially against Great Britain.

5. The whole 'Socialistic Union' supports Germany, especially through deliveries of raw materials.

6. Germany supports Soviet Russia in the reconstruction of the war-devastated areas.

A further piece of evidence that the Nazis were prepared, at the end of the war, to throw in their lot with the Soviets, and to adopt Communism, also came to light in 1945. As noted earlier, one of the 'New Forms' developed by the continuing Nazi strategists - in the final weeks of the Second World War - was the invention of a 'German Freedom Movement'. One of the documents within the bundle known as the 'Generalplan 1945' stated that 'the German Freedom Movement... dissociates itself from falling back into the capitalistic system'<sup>57</sup>.

The main document contained within the 'Generalplan 1945' bundle, 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', concluded with that rousing summary of the Nazi vision, invoking in grandiose terms 'a colossal bloc of world-dominating greatness, economic power, energy and numbers of population' which 'would be created from ocean to ocean'. This was of course the Soviet model of hegemony 'from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' - in which the Nazis would then have been only too willing to cooperate, in order to procure, by default, the parallel realisation of their own objective of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'. They day-dreamed that, having achieved this objective, they could in practice consolidate their own hegemony to the West of the Urals, and gradually establish freedom from Soviet involvement. 'Not only would the danger of future wars for generations be eliminated from Europe, but also from the double continent of Eurasia'.

A clearer confirmation of the close political affinity between Nazism and Communism - between national and international socialism - could not have been written. Both were hewn, of course, from the same original block - or perhaps more appropriately, both gush from the same mains sewer. At the same time, these sources confirm the underlying divergence of geopolitical interests between the continuing Pan-Germans, heirs of the National Socialists, and the continuing covert heirs of Lenin.

The theme of the desirability of close cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union was further elaborated, in the years that followed, with the same arrogant disregard for the outcome of the war, and the same determination that nothing will be allowed to stand in the way of Pan-German supremacy. For example, a front-page editorial appeared in the heavily Nazi-oriented geopolitical weekly 'Christ und Welt', of 27th December 1951

- two months before the Soviet Note of 10th March 1952 offered, at Lavrentii Beria's instigation, free elections to Germany, a reunified Reich, and all the trimmings necessary for renazification and remilitarisation. The editorial, which mysteriously appeared to have prior knowledge of Beria's imminent initiative, proclaimed that 'if Moscow would agree to free elections and the restoration of an independent (united) Germany, that would be a day of the greatest joy ('Hochster Freudentag') in German postwar history'.

Discussing the prospects for a deal with Moscow, the editorial continued: 'Only under political pressure would Moscow show readiness to return those eastern territories which Russia has already incorporated into her orbit. It would be necessary that we first create a united, healthy and strong Western Europe in whose name the following offer to the Kremlin could then be made: Continental Europe would break away from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets agreed to withdraw their forces behind the Pripet Marshes and release not only the Eastern Zone of Germany, but the whole of Eastern Europe into the European Union'.

'A United Europe standing on its own feet and possessing its own powerful army... such a Europe... will have the strength of a third power'. This statement, reflecting the core of Dr Adenauer's 'bold plan,' was identical with the suggestion made in the 'Madrid Circular' letter of September 1950. It showed that 'the mirage of a Pan-Europe' was indeed a mask, as Hitler had himself proclaimed in 'Mein Kampf', to disguise the pursuit of Germany's strategic plans - which now included the recovery of the eastern territories lost at the end of the Second World War.

On 25th March 1952, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published an editorial which included the following passage:

'Secretary of State Hallstein deserves the merit to have made visible in his famous Ural-statement [see below - Ed.] the approach of American as well as German foreign policy.... That such a current exists in the Bonn Foreign Office has been known for a long time. Occasionally the facts have been leaked out to the public.... According to the opinion of those who make top-level decisions, we have only the choice between neutrality and a policy of joining the West and re-arming. The latter policy will enable us, in the coming years, to start negotiations with the Russians on the future of the whole of Central Europe. It is, therefore, unjustified to blame the opponents of the Russian Note that they want to prevent reunification of the Reich [sic]. They certainly are for reunification, but only in a far greater framework in which Poland and Czechoslovakia are also mentioned'.

The 'famous Ural-statement' is a reference to comments made by the German Secretary of State, Professor Walter Hallstein, in March 1952, in the course of a press conference at Georgetown University, in Washington, DC. When asked by a newspaper correspondent whether his invocation in that speech of 'integration of the whole of Europe' included the territories 'up to the Urals', Professor Hallstein replied: 'Yes, that is what we mean'. This remark caused an international sensation. But Dr Adenauer's official Party press service subsequently corroborated it as an accurate interpretation of 'Western' policy. However, after Professor Hallstein had been attacked as



'irresponsible' by, curiously, the Social Democrats, and also by certain members of Dr Adenauer's own party, Bonn officially lied that the notorious incident at Georgetown University had been 'a misunderstanding'<sup>58</sup>.

But of course it had been nothing of the sort. Professor Hallstein had merely been parroting the usual Nazi 'way of lying' epitomised, for instance, by a document published by the Third Reich's Association for Economic Planning, which had insisted that: 'A continental-European economy under German leadership must... comprise all the peoples of the Continent from Gibraltar to the Urals and from the North Cape to the island of Cyprus... (but) on foreign-political grounds it appears necessary to designate this not... as a German extended-area economy, but fundamentally always to speak of a European Economic Community' [see page 264].

Dr Hallstein was one of the 'signatories', with Dr Adenauer, of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Communities, 'signed' on 25th March 1957. Parentheses are used here because the Treaty of Rome was never actually signed by the six founding 'Member States' of the European Community, and could therefore be technically invalid, or even invalid in fact. This sensational state of affairs became known when the Italian paper, *Corriere della Sera*, published an article in 2000, citing a former Italian official as saying that a young Italian Chancery aide called Giulio Andreotti (later Italy's Prime Minister, subsequently embroiled in scandal, like his fellow former Italian Prime Minister, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi) had contrived to procure the signatures of the Plenipotentiaries on blank sheets of paper because the German, Dutch and Italian translations of the French original were not yet available, and the delegates had to leave for their respective capitals<sup>59</sup>.

The official text of the Treaty of Rome states, at the end: 'In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty: Done at Rome this twenty-fifth day of March in the year one thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven: P.H. SPAAK (the Belgian Communist - Ed.), ADENAUER, PINEAU, ANTONIO SEGNI, BECH, J. LUNS, J. CH. SNOY ET D'OPPUERS, HALLSTEIN, M. FAURE, GAETANO MARTINO, LAMBERT SCHAUS, J. LINTHORST HOMAN'<sup>60</sup>.

Some of these signatures were not applied to the text itself, but to separate pieces of paper. This is like leaving a Will unsigned, but signing instead a blank piece of paper, which could have been added later, or forged. When this information was 'surfaced' in the Palace of Westminster by the Author, with assistance from a Member of Parliament, all attempts to obtain official comments on the matter were fruitless. The initiative - designed to point out that the Treaty of Rome, upon which the entire edifice of the European 'Tower of Babel' is constructed, may be invalid - was torpedoed from the outside by parliamentary lawyers, who pointed out that the fact that the Treaty document may not have been properly signed, while 'of some concern' (which was admitted), was probably of no real significance because the Treaty had, after all, been ratified by the legislatures of the original 'Six' European countries concerned. After the Maastricht Treaty was signed, it transpired that a number of EEC Member States were in fact precluded by their constitutions from applying it. But that 'made no difference', either.

### THE 'FISCHER CONTROVERSY': A GERMAN HISTORIAN 'SEES THE LIGHT'

In perplexing contrast to the information concerning the work and views of Professor Fritz Fischer provided by Niall Ferguson [see page 171], an obituary of Fischer, who died aged 91 early in 2000, published in the London Daily Telegraph on 16th February 2000, noted that, as a Lutheran, he was 'required to defend his convictions from an early age' (this characteristic being a special virtue of Lutheran Christians). After studying in Erlangen and Berlin, he wrote a number of religious-Lutheran books, which were published shortly before the Second World War. These books were 'supported by the Reich Institute for History of the New Germany. There is no evidence that Fischer was then anti-Nazi; had he been suspect, he would hardly have been appointed Assistant Professor of History in Hamburg in 1942'.

Ferguson's quotations from Fischer's work, of course, show Fischer to have been, at the very least, an enthusiastic Pan-German. However military service and two spells of imprisonment by the Allies at Nuremberg ('he was confused with a war criminal of the same name'), precluded him from taking up that post for five years. The obituary then explained Fischer's apparent postwar 'change of heart' as having taken place as a consequence of 'the experience of war, defeat and the Nuremberg trials'. So the postwar Fischer 'spent the next decade investigating the First World War; and what he found in the archives confirmed his suspicion that Hitler was only the last and most extreme case in a "continuity of error" that had begun as far back as under Bismarck'. The Daily Telegraph's obituary continued:

'Perhaps the most important document Fischer unearthed was the "September Programme", drafted by the Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. This set out German war aims in the first flush of victory in 1914. Fischer summarised them thus: "After eliminating France as a Great Power, excluding British influence from the Continent and thrusting Russia back, Germany proposed to establish her own hegemony over Europe'.

'Looking back in a lecture [given] in 1978, Fischer saw the Third Reich and the Second World War that it unleashed, as a reaction to the First World War, [and] as a refusal by the ruling elite to accept its result or to grasp that neither Europe nor America would yield to German domination'.

Subsequent events, and the evidence contained in this book, have confirmed that Fischer was right in accusing the German ruling elite of refusing to accept the outcome of the Second World War - in fact, of course, of both world wars; but he was to be proved wrong in his assessment that 'neither Europe nor America would yield to German domination'. On the contrary, most of Europe, including Britain, has already done so, while the equally confused Americans have, for most of the postwar period, actively encouraged the 'process' of European unification. The obituary notice also contained the following analysis, which 'pre-confirms' a seamless continuity of German strategy from the beginning of the twentieth century (in fact, as indicated, much earlier) through the Second World War and up to the present day, although Fischer's work was confined to demonstrating that policy continuity from Imperial Germany to the downfall of the Nazi regime. For, although he survived through the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties of the European Union Collective, to the threshold of the Nice Treaty (December 2000), which all but completed Nazi Germany's wartime economic 'Lebensraum' objectives, Professor Fischer sensibly preferred not to draw attention to his own Nazi past by writing about the subsequent continuity of Pan-German strategy up to the present day.

According to the British writer of his obituary:

'[Fischer] unleashed a revolution in the study of German history by showing that Hitler's bid to dominate Europe, far from being an aberration, was merely the

execution of policy aims laid down by Imperial Germany. Within a few years of the appearance in 1961 of his book 'Griff nach der Weltmacht' ['Germany's Aims in the First World War'], Fischer had become West Germany's most celebrated - and vilified - postwar historian - because he preferred the truth to Teutonic 'political correctness'.

He was vilified, of course, because, having ostensibly reverted to his true Lutheran self and 'seen the light', he had accused the ruling elite of (arrogantly) refusing to accept the outcome of the wars - indeed, to accept any responsibility for the chaos that Germany had generated, and most of all, for stubbornly refusing to abandon the idolatry of power, and Germany's lust for hegemony, which had driven the country and the world into war in the first place. Furthermore, the post-war Pan-Germans (almost all of them 'former' Nazis) were less than amused at being lectured by a fellow 'former' Nazi on the catastrophic errors of their past. Their hatred of Fischer was all the more extreme because their idolatry had grown in intensity with the passing of the years, and because they remained as convinced of and beguiled by the notion of the 'inevitability' of the 'triumph' of Germany, as the Leninists are of the 'inevitability' of the 'global victory of Communism'.

The obituary notice concluded that Fischer's 'assertion of continuity in German policy from the Kaiser to Hitler not only challenged the received wisdom [sic!] that the Great Powers had blundered into the First World War, but discredited those "moderate" German statesmen, such as Bethmann-Hollweg and Stresemann [sic!], in whose tradition Konrad Adenauer and other 'conservative' politicians of the Federal Republic saw themselves'. If the obituary writer had understood that Dr Gustaf Stresemann, Germany's Foreign Minister in the mid-1920s, was among the most virulent of all post-First World War Pan-Germans, and a mentor of Dr Adenauer, this remark might have been deleted from the report. In actual fact, Adenauer, while still ostensibly just a local political boss, had been a powerful and influential figure in German politics for decades before he came into the limelight in 1949. Indeed, his early influence, even on foreign policy, was so great that Stresemann even saw fit to consult him (Adenauer) - writing him a long letter dated 7th January 1925 in which Stresemann asked Dr Adenauer to approve the text of a German diplomatic Note to the Allies: 'I hope you will be in agreement with the terms of the German Reply Note. In careful diplomatic form it contains the sternest reproaches to the Allied Powers'.

In another book entitled 'War of Illusions' [page 51], Fischer, who ended his academic career as Professor Emeritus of History at Hamburg University, recorded that from 1902 onwards, the German Emperor 'spoke of creating les Etats Unis de l'Europe, naturally under German leadership'. Lower down on the same page, Professor Fischer wrote: 'In the months before the [Russo-Japanese] war and during the war itself, Wilhelm II missed no opportunity of assuring the Tsar of Germany's friendship so that when the moment came, he could demand a reward for his friendship and for Germany's benevolent neutrality. In fact, the [Imperial German] Foreign Ministry tried to interest Russia in a political alliance as early as November 1904'. Some post-war Germans even denounced Professor Fischer as a traitor (unspoken: to the continuing Nazi cause). Thus the German Defence Minister of the day, the portly Bavarian Franz Josef Strauss, demanded that "all available means" be used to silence these "distortions". But Fischer refused to be intimidated, and when *Der Spiegel* printed a number of extracts from his book, 'its scholarly integrity was demonstrated to a wider public'. As for the response of Strauss to 'these distortions', its unbroken continuity with the familiar Nazi approach to dissent, needs no further elaboration. When, in the 1990s, the Austrians elected a government led by Joerg Haider perceived to be 'right-wing', the socialist EU Collective imposed sanctions on the country, claiming that a government of such orientation had 'no place' in Babel utopia.

**COMMUNITY LAW REPLACES TAILED BLOOD AND IRON'**

During 1993, the Luxembourg-based Office for Official Publications of the European Communities published a dreary document entitled 'The ABC of Community Law' by Dr Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, which states on page 32:

'[Community law] is what is entirely new about the Community what distinguishes it from earlier efforts to unite Europe. It works not by means of force or domination but simply by means of law. Law is to do what "blood and iron" have for centuries failed to do'.

Note that this German did not decry the attempts made in the past to 'unify' Europe through 'blood and iron': their shortcoming was simply that they had failed. The end justifies the means. Note the implied lie that decisions in the European Union context are made 'freely'. This is the reverse of the truth. Decisions within the political collective are made behind closed doors - often by the COREPERs (two Committees of Permanent EU Representatives - Ambassadors and their underlings - of the 'Member States' chaired by the Commission), which prepare the agenda, make up their own rules of procedure, and present the exhausted political delegates with virtual *faits accomplis*. The Permanent Representatives exploit the fact that the political delegates will have just flown in from all over Europe and snatched an inadequate night's sleep - and will be only too keen to leave for home as soon as possible. Thus 'Europe' is governed, like the USSR, by apparatchiks, who serve an elite of strategists. This is the 'New Form' of the EU Collective's *modus operandi*.

Furthermore, the European Parliament, which exists for the sole purpose of giving the political collective and its 'Fuhrer-Cornmission' a thin veneer of 'democracy', is so undemocratic that speeches are confined to a few minutes - with a prior requirement that the subject-matter must be cleared by the chair beforehand. The size of the EU constituencies carved out of the 'Member States' so as to provide the delegates (Members of the European Parliament, or MEPs) with the basis to sustain this illusion of 'democracy' - a 'New Form' of Soviet-style 'democratism' - is so vast, that contact between the MEP and his or her constituents is effectively non-existent. No, there is nothing democratic about the European Union Collective.

On the contrary, since the European Union Collective's origins and intentions are totalitarian, democracy in the EU context is just a 'mask' to provide a cosmetic illusion of legitimacy for the European Commission's oppressive Directives, Regulations and rules. Indeed, EU 'democracy' is, if anything, cruder even than the fake 'democracy' invented by the Leninists - who at least use democratic forms 'strategically', for the purpose of hoodwinking the West into believing that they have 'embarked on the road to democracy' - whereas in practice, as discussed in Part One, they are playing a game called 'democratism' (illusory democracy). But in the European Parliament, political labels are meaningless. For instance, the British 'Conservative' Party is affiliated with the Soviet-sounding 'European People's Party'. A British MP who for two years attended sessions of the Council of Europe - another EU 'talking shop' designed to foster 'democratic' illusions - reported that, without exception, all representatives encountered in that environment were from the Left and the Far-Left of the political spectrum.

## APPARENT CONVERGENCE OF GERMAN AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIES

Gencher's article in 'International Affairs'

The April 1993 issue of the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal 'International Affairs' contained an article entitled 'From Vancouver to Vladivostok' by the former long-serving German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher<sup>61</sup>. Genscher resigned suddenly in 1992, after being compromised by Stasi files which fell into the hands of the Western powers. Originally from Halle, in East Germany, Genscher had been in the habit of sending his wife back home almost monthly, for many years: she is believed to have acted as her husband's courier / controller. Genscher occupied the posts of Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic between 1974 and 1992. On 23rd February 1993, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations awarded Genscher a 'Diploma of Honorary Doctor'.

A number of Western politicians have fallen into the trap of allowing their names to be attached to articles published in 'International Affairs'. The Russians appear to be unconcerned at the signal such articles may send to observers abroad, because they may know that the West pays inadequate attention to 'International Affairs', which is viewed as a tedious publication full of dreary articles. The first revelation in Genscher's article concerned the reasons behind the Soviet push to procure agreement at Helsinki in 1975. This campaign triggered the avalanche of developments leading towards 'collective security', and represented a triumph of Soviet strategy. According to Anatoliy Golitsyn [Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency, March 1990: see 'The Perestroika Deception', page 95], 'a massive operation to establish and develop contacts with Western Europe to promote the CSCE (the Helsinki process) was launched under Brezhnev in July 1971 when a Soviet Committee for European Security was set up under Viktor Shytikov'. Inaccurately crediting General de Gaulle with inventing the phrase 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' (it originated as a Soviet cliché), Genscher claimed in his article that 'very soon it was recognised that no stability in Europe could be achieved if the Soviet Union were discounted'.

'Recognising this fact led to proper conclusions as far back as 1975 in the Helsinki Final Act. The participating states agreed to include in that document the whole Soviet Union as well as the United States and Canada - that is, the area extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok'. Thus, as well as achieving a 'Great Leap Forward' in respect of promoting completion of the Comintern's 'collective security' mandate, the Soviets achieved inclusion of the USSR at Helsinki - establishing a precedent which meant that the West could never exclude or 'discount' them in future, from any key negotiations, whatever the issue of transnational importance might be: the greatest prize of all. Armed with this achievement, Moscow began at once to undermine the concept of national sovereignty further: according to Genscher, 'in this sense the new European area of stability is by no means primarily a geographical concept. Key criteria for it are the universal values and fundamental convictions agreed in the 1990 Charter of Paris [at which the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries endorsed the Soviet 'line' that 'the Cold War is over'].

The former German Foreign Minister now proclaimed the Soviet

theme that 'on the basis of this Charter, the vast area from Vancouver to Vladivostok should be seen as the territory on which stability must be provided. Only by treating this area as a single whole can we guarantee stability also for Europe in the strictly geographical sense of this concept'.

It is not known whether Herr Genscher, who had been out of office for a year and had lain low on the back benches in the Bundestag, actually wrote this article for 'International Affairs', which spouts Soviet policy and outlines Moscow's strategy in exhaustive (albeit Aesopian) detail. Any one of the following possibilities might have applied: (1) he may perhaps have written the article himself, in which case, since every word of it coincided exactly with the 'post'-Soviet 'line' of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the German Foreign Minister was in the pay of the Russians, or else was being black-mailed or compromised by them; we know that he was under the control of Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the chief controller of agents of influence [see page 91]; (2) alternatively, the article was written (as the style and content suggests) by Russian Foreign Ministry and Military Intelligence experts, submitted for his 'approval', and published under his name; (3) the third possibility - that Genscher knew nothing about the article until it appeared in April 1993 - can perhaps be discounted, especially given his award of an 'honorary doctorship' by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of International Relations - although that option, too, would not be unusual for the strategy apparatchiks.

Next, Herr Genscher's article provided further confirmation that the regional collective structures, of which the European Union Collective is the most 'advanced', were preplanned - with all of them leading along a railway line (permitting onward movement only) towards the Leninist objective of a Single World Federation of (Communist) States or regional blocs which would in due course dissolve into a World Communist Dictatorship - in pursuit of which aim, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany's Foreign Minister for 18 years, played his part successfully for his de facto patrons in Moscow.

Citing the European Community as a brilliant achievement, Herr Genscher insisted that 'what made the success of the EC possible was that the Community was calculated from the outset to show a twofold trend. First, a trend towards internal development and deepening cooperation. Second, a trend towards expansion. It was only a combination of these trends that made the EC highly viable'. In translation, this means, in effect, that the European Union has no purposes other than to 'deepen' and to 'expand' - that is, its purpose is to direct its 'seething energy'<sup>62</sup> in the interests of the World Revolution. That is what the political collective is for.

The European Community had 'set an example' [unspecified] for other regional blocs like MERCOSUR, the Central American states, ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the North American Free Trade Area [NAFTA]. 'Japan's aspiration to create an economic cooperation zone in East Asia', taken with the other blocs (and several that Genscher omitted, covering Africa and the Middle East) 'show that the idea of regional alignments is also striking root in those parts of the world' (and accelerating the slide towards the elimination of nation states in the process). But Genscher failed to provide any argument at all, for the establishment of these blocs.

On the 'issue' of 'European enlargement' (which, as reviewed in Part One, has no justification at all other than as a further step towards the expansion of federalism and the abolition of nation states), Genscher argued that eastwards expansion was just 'desirable' per se (and in line with Lenin's teaching that 'separation precedes federation'). The European collective was simply the most efficient collectivisation engine yet invented.

When reading this, one easily forgets that it was the long-serving former German Foreign Minister who was writing this Soviet propaganda:

'Simultaneously, the EC and the successor states of the ex-Soviet Union [sic] should set about putting their political and economic relations alike on a solid treaty basis. In so doing, they should bear in mind the historically logical character of European unification. Further development does not admit of any fresh political, economic, social or ecological division of Europe. The new situation in Europe therefore calls for comprehensive and deep-going cooperation by the EC with Russia and other successor states of the ex-Soviet Union. Also needed to this end is a new treaty instrument, a form of cooperation treaties' [code for a 'proforma treaty': 'just sign here']. This dimension of Soviet strategy has since been fulfilled by a broadening of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin bilateral treaty network to include separate treaties between West European EU 'Member States' and the Central and East European countries, as well as the 'former' Soviet Republics - in accordance with Andrei Kozyrev's 1995 dictum that 'the more states are intertwined with one another, the more durable will be the net of their relationships'<sup>63</sup>.

This theme was repeated a few months later by the former British Prime Minister, John Major, when he made his Aesopian pronouncement in Moscow in May 1995 that 'we need to forge a chain of new relationships binding us together in a durable peace'<sup>64</sup>. To put this into perspective, recall that (a) Mr Major's Press Officer used to display a framed copy of 'Pravda' on his office wall; (b) during Boris Yeltsin's bombardment of the 'Black and White House' in 1993, Major stepped out of Number 10, Downing Street, to express his full support for the tank bombardment of the 'Parliament building', accompanied by the veteran KGB officer Boris Pankin, who was then the Russian Ambassador to the Court of St James's; and (c), on 1st January 1992, Major told a BBC Radio Four audience that 'I look forward to the day when Russia is a fully-fledged member of the European Community'<sup>65</sup>. These observations, and other indications, almost suggest that Mr Major may have suffered from a 'conflict of loyalty'<sup>66</sup>. Across the Atlantic, former President Bill Clinton later spoke a similar language - telling the United Nations General Assembly on 22nd September 2000 that he wanted to take the United States, as well, into a 'web of institutions that will set the international ground rules for the 21st century' - further advancing what Genscher claimed as his 'vision' of a vast 'single political space from Vancouver to Vladivostok'. That phrase, however, was not initially used by Genscher: its overt authors included Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze.

By inviting prominent Western figures to 'write' for 'International Affairs', the continuing Leninist strategists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow have developed a sophisticated means of propagating their

Leninist strategic and policy lines 'on an objective basis' - by making it appear as though the views expressed in their columns are those of the guest author concerned. And in most cases, as with Genscher's article, they probably are. Throughout this article, though, Genscher said nothing at all that contravened the 'General Line' and the detail of strategy as understood by the Author, as Editor of 'Soviet Analyst'. By attributing their own 'line' to Genscher, the Soviet editors invited the reader to accept its objectivity and validity: 'We in the European Community have just come close to removing through the Common Internal Market the obstacles to trade that arose during the existence of isolated nation states [sic] and long created difficulties in our economic cooperation. The United States shows what economic forces can be deployed in a large area where there are no economic barriers'.

However, the American States lack sovereignty, which is why the collectivists are so keen on the phrase 'United States of Europe'. And since, although this is stating the obvious, the Russian Foreign Ministry would never publish an article in its journal which did not contain material that corresponded with, or furthered, its revolutionary objectives, the total extinguishing of sovereignty is the aim of the Russian Foreign Ministry, too. The remarks of the former German Foreign Minister and the editorial 'hospitality' of the Russian Foreign Ministry prove that both share Lenin's 'ultimate objective of destroying the state'. Genscher's successor, Joschka Fischer, endorses the same revolutionary 'line'. Other passages from Herr Genscher's 'International Affairs' article leave one in no doubt about the total identity of Russian Leninist and German Pan-European collectivist objectives today, at the present 'stage'. For the Pan-German heirs of the Nazi International, for whom Herr Genscher fronted for so many years as a leading strategist, have effectively 'bolted the framework' of their strategy onto the broader revolutionary substructure of the continuing Leninist globalists, and are, for the time being, 'free-riding' with their 'friends' from the east.

Accordingly, Herr Genscher insisted, 'nothing is going to be like its former self any longer in either the East or the West. The peoples of Europe must [sic] accept the unity of their Continent as a whole. This applies to the peoples of Western Europe, primarily the EC, in which this circumstance has not yet won recognition among all members'. In other words, we are going to fulfil our hegemony ambitions against all obstacles, come what may: and those who oppose us will have to be 'brought to reason'. When the Berlin Wall 'fell', it fell into the West - which is to say, that the East burst into the West, not the other way round. Genscher was a key player in bringing this about. And his article in 'International Affairs' made it clear that, so far as the Russian strategists were concerned, Herr Genscher's activities had been favourable to the advancement of the Leninists' project to establish a 'single political space stretching from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'.

'We Europeans', Genscher added, 'cannot allow nationalists to decide the destiny of Europe' - 'nationalists' being the pejorative insult flung at all who believe in the nation state. In order to prevent these 'nationalists' from derailing the One-World train, 'the task is to develop an all-Europe political architecture' (of control). Of special importance will be the abol-



ition of national legal systems and their replacement by 'a common European Legal Area', which 'must receive practical help'. Here, the former German Foreign Minister was referring to what became The European Legal Area Project, which sought to develop and impose 'Corpus Juris' and which, over time, will displace English Common Law. For instance, 'Corpus Juris', fully implemented, would end the British system of separate judge and jury: indeed, the Blair Government sought to remove juries for certain trials and was reported in early 2002 to be badly split on the issue at Cabinet level, with some Ministers protesting strongly at this revolutionary proposal (so that it was inadvertently revealed that some members of Mr Blair's second Cabinet had not yet realised that belonging to the EU Collective necessitates ultimate submission to 100% of the Collective's initiatives and decisions). A decision whether to prosecute would be initiated even before the opening of an investigation. As one commentator has pointed out, 'it is no exaggeration to say that if implemented, the United Kingdom, without habeas corpus and trial by jury, would in all reality become a police state' - or, at any rate, a state much more akin to that favoured by the Nazi International and by the continuing collective of Soviet Leninist revolutionary strategists.

Finally, the former German Foreign Minister proclaimed from the pages of the Russian Foreign Ministry's official journal - which has been published with similar Leninist Aesopian geopolitical content since 1954, indicating a lack of strategic discontinuity - that 'United Germany will go on urging the West to regard Europe as a single whole, and to perceive all-Europe stability as a cause requiring collective actions. Germany has made a decision on extensive long-term cooperation with Russia. This... is evidence of a will for the joint shaping of our future'.

The Author is accordingly able to rest his case that Germany and Russia are working together for the implementation of shared revolutionary objectives, centred upon the extinguishing and collectivisation of all sovereignty - except their own. Once the constituent nation states have been 'destroyed' - and the Pan-Germans think they have triumphed or are on the verge of achieving their frustrated regional objective, which will then begin to frustrate Moscow's blueprint for 'universal European integration' - these two evil powers will turn on each other: and the consequences may be unspeakable for the whole world. Genscher's message was that 'the best periods' of the German-Russian relationship were when the Germans and the Soviets were helping each other to rearm. But military cooperation and war preparations hardly provide a secure basis for trust. And the fact is that both are tense, as will be demonstrated - knowing that the other knows that each is 'using' the other in pursuit of its own strategic objectives.

Before he resigned suddenly and mysteriously, allegedly (according to German security information) following the discovery of compromising intelligence buried among the Stasi files found after the Soviets left East Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher was meticulous in facilitating Gorbachev's task of closing down the Stalinist model of control by preparing the ground for the relaunch of an updated, flexible Leninist revolutionary model for the whole

world. According to the 'German Tribune', 17th March 1991, Genscher told a journalist that Gorbachev 'is keeping on course in all fields' - by which he clearly implied that the German Foreign Office had intimate knowledge of the intentions of Soviet strategy. 'Gorbachev has to tackle numerous tasks simultaneously', Genscher added. 'He is doing this with great quality of leadership and personal authority'. Then he added this confirmation that Bonn was fully aware that there had been, and would be, NO discontinuity of Soviet strategy: 'We must acknowledge the continuity of Soviet foreign policy'. Given Genscher's credentials, THIS STATEMENT IS DEFINITIVE.

Herr Genscher further told Bonn's Diplomatic Corps, in a farewell address on 15th May 1992, that German policy laid particular stress upon 'strengthening the Atlantic Alliance as a pillar of stability... from Vancouver to Vladivostok' - the phrase used by both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze; and he evoked the Hitler-Adenauer formula by reiterating that 'future-oriented cooperation with our eastern partners and their integration into the emerging One Europe, and the development of a Pan-European architecture', were indispensable. Earlier, on 4th March 1992, Herr Genscher had remarked at Martin Luther University, in his home town of Halle, that 'the end of the Cold War... represented a unique opportunity to extend our system of common [but unspecified - Ed.] values from Vancouver to Vladivostok'. Gorbachev could hardly have put the point better himself.

#### THE NAZI INTERNATIONAL'S PLAN IS BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN

Presenting the Konrad Adenauer Prize in Munich on 17th May 1992, Dr Helmut Kohl, then German Chancellor, informed his audience that 'in Maastricht we laid the cornerstone for the completion of a European Union. The process leading to this objective is irreversible'. Nothing, however, is irreversible, except death - since Man has free-will. The only people who speak seriously of 'irreversibility' and 'inevitability' are the heirs of the Nazi International and the continuing disciples of Marx and Lenin - and susceptible draughtsmen of collective treaties, such as the Maastricht Treaty, which use such oppressive, coercive and dogmatic language in conformity with the ponderous Pan-German tradition. By insisting that 'the process' of European collectivisation and federation was 'irreversible', the German Chancellor was arbitrarily and dictatorially denying the relevance or role of democracy - and denying the populations of Europe any future opportunity to reverse the repeatedly catastrophic errors of their misguided elites. Indeed, Marxist epithets such as 'inevitable' and 'irreversible' hint at the very essence of totalitarianism: which means that all parties subscribing to this Nazi-style collectivist-socialist language are, at heart, totalitarians, not democrats.

Speaking at the Bertelsmann Forum on 3rd April 1992, Chancellor Kohl also elaborated Germany's unchanged vision of the 'New Europe' by employing language precisely matched by Gorbachev in his Oslo Nobel Peace Prize speech in June 1992, and at Fulton, Missouri on 6th May 1992. He insisted that 'we shall only be able to create... Greater Europe, provided we irrevocably advance the present European core.... There is no question of 'either/or' here, but only of 'both/and'.... There is no alternative to a

policy which aims at combination, unless we wish to challenge fate.... Security no longer against one another, but with one another. The European Union Treaty introduces a new and decisive stage in the process of European union which within a few years will lead to the creation of the United States of Europe'. These 'states', like the American States, will have been stripped of their sovereignty - which will by then have been usurped and supplanted by the Leninist collective form of 'governance' which is completely alien to the British tradition, and a continuing source of non-stop aggravation and friction.

Interviewed in the globalist-minded Time magazine of 30th September 1996, Dr Kohl further announced: 'If we want to safeguard the peace and freedom of the European peoples in the 21st century, then we must join forces. The century that is drawing to a close was one marked by nationalism. This had terrible consequences, not least in Germany and due to Germany'.

'Horrific crimes against other peoples and many individuals were committed in Germany's name. I do not want to return to this time. I do not think that the nation state, in the form that emerged in the nineteenth century and existed in the twentieth century, can guarantee our future. Our generation has a duty to construct the 'European House'. If we fail to do so, we will relapse into old errors'.

By thus affecting to 'sublimate' Germany's war guilt, the leading Pan-Germans have been able to tap cynically into the malleable and gullible West European psyche, which responds to such bold, brazen stimuli roughly as follows: 'Look, the Germans have now expressed remorse for their former heinous and barbaric behaviour. They are saying to us, in part: " We know the German soul better than you do, because we are Germans ourselves. Therefore we know for sure that the only way of suppressing the German tendency to augment German power by seizing the assets of others, is to tie Germany down collectively and permanently ('irrevocably'), so that other Europeans can influence and tame the naturally aggressive and acquisitive tendency of the German race. Moreover, by this means, the other Europeans will themselves be reassured that the German problem has been solved once and for all'.

But this is all eyewash: what the Pan-Germans mean, in translation, is that the 'Lebensraum' they seek is the space vacated by abolishing the sovereignty of all the other regional nation states, with the exception of Germany, hiding behind the 'mask of federalism': THIS is the new 'Lebensraum'.

For, like the Soviet Leninist strategists, who carefully tested prospective Western responses to given Soviet provocations and scenarios for three decades, in advance of the intended dismantling of the Stalinist model - using the multiple specialist institutes of the Academy of [Leninist] Sciences as agencies for that purpose - the Nazi International had concluded that this 'chest-beating' approach was likely to prove by far the most fruitful means of achieving the Nazi International's objectives by subtlety and stealth, especially among the French, who apparently cannot see through this dimension of Germany's two-faced behaviour. The Pan-Germans were right.

Moreover this subtle psychological approach had another advantage: it masked a threat of blackmail. Dr Kohl himself referred on several occasions to the possibility of war if Germany does not achieve its objectives. His

rationale was varied to suit his audiences, but the device of blaming Germany itself for past errors, and implying that Germany cannot be trusted in the future unless it is incorporated into a Greater Europe, was disingenuous - not least because of the latent threat that Germany will be forced to 'take matters into its own hands' (which is what the newly re-formed German General Staff may well be planning) if it does not finally get its own way: 'Greater Germany' masquerading under the 'European Union' label.

This German stance has had particular attractions for small countries like Luxembourg - the home of Jacques Santer, the former President of the European Commission, who lost no opportunity to publicise the Pan-German and Leninist theme that European foreign and security policy must be collectivised. On 5th November 1996, for example, Santer pronounced: 'To those who argue that such matters are the essential domain of national sovereignty and are inappropriate for the European Union, I say: The world has changed forever. Solitary national action in almost all foreign and defence domains is over. We live in a world of burden-sharing and consensus'.

Traditionally, Germany's Ambassador to Moscow has tended to echo Soviet policy in his public statements, and to identify with his hosts. This was certainly the case when Otto von der Gablentz, Bonn's Ambassador to Russia, was, like Genscher, given access to the platform provided by the journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 'International Affairs' [issue of June 1994, Number 6]. According to the Leninist journal, the German Ambassador observed, in an interview published therein by the apparatchik B. Pyadyshev, that 'national sovereignty... is becoming irrelevant and meaningless for all that many still cling to it'. (Now Pyadyshev just happened to be stationed in London at the Soviet Embassy in the late 1960s, when von der Gablentz was a diplomat at the German Embassy in Belgravia).

And in the course of this interview, the German Ambassador revealed the enormous size of the German Embassy in Moscow [in 1994], noting, in answer to Pyadyshev's question 'How many diplomats do you have on the staff?' that: 'Our Embassy is made up not only of staff of the Foreign Ministry. We also have representatives of many other Ministries and Government agencies, such as the Bundesbank. Links with Russia are too important to be represented by diplomats alone. The list of diplomats we present to the Russian Foreign Ministry every year includes employees of other agencies. Ours is a large Embassy with about 290 people, including Russians. Besides, there are the offices of several hundred German firms [sic], among them powerful ones like Daimler-Benz or Siemens. The total number of employees may be 500, at the least. But not all of them belong to the Embassy'.

A handful of prominent Germans have appeared to express certain reservations in recent years about Bonn's relentless attacks on the nation state - one of them being Herr Oskar Lafontaine, the leader of the Opposition in the mid-1990s. He appeared to contradict Dr Kohl with the following remark: 'When a declaration of belief in the United States of Europe is reiterated... that can only mean that the new united Germany is only a transitional state BECAUSE WE WANT TO PRESERVE IT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE'. It turns out that the Leader of Germany's

Opposition was explaining the basic core of Germany's deception strategy. Since Germany will be at the centre of the regional bloc provided it stops at the Urals, Germany will survive the transition, emerging as 'Greater Germany' by another name: Federalism is just a mask. But if the Soviet model of 'universal European integration' prevails, Germany will disappear like all the other EU nation states that have been merged by their illumined elites against their peoples' preferences, into the prospective 'single space from the Atlantic to the Pacific'. Germany is content for all the other states to vanish for ever, but adamant that Germany itself is to be 'preserved'.

So the 'United States of Europe' is itself 'just a mask', within which all nation states except Germany will have been destroyed. Leninism will have been applied in the interests of Greater Germany. Therefore, Pan-Germanism is 'free-riding' on the momentum of Leninism. Berlin's self-confidence is such that it is prepared to be 'pulled along' by the Leninist World Collectivist Revolution, in the expectation of being able to alight from the Soviet Leninist train at a station called 'Greater Germany'. The train of the World Revolution, these Pan-Germans assume, will then pull out of the station, leaving the Pan-German project 'complete'.

To press home their non-stop offensive against the nation state, so as to demonstrate that this stance was shared at the pinnacle of the German structures, the Pan-German strategists in control of policy even went so far as to enlist the propaganda assistance of the President of the Federal Republic, Dr Professor Roman Herzog [see page 154], who is supposed to be above politics, like the Queen. As we have seen, in his notorious speech before German historians on 17th September 1996<sup>67</sup>, this President of one of the most important countries in the world called openly for his nation to cease to exist - like a turkey voting for Christmas. He loudly proclaimed the Gorbachev-Genscher 'line', that 'the world has entered a new era' - 'Jacques Santer's 'the world has changed forever' - a dogmatic cliché beloved of the 'General Staff' of Lenin's World Revolution:

'The principle of erecting boundaries from which the nation state arose in the nineteenth century' was 'as of little further use as is the expansion with which the nation state was also associated... no state today can any longer protect its population or its territory by itself, whether militarily or environmentally'. Accordingly, the nation state... had 'ceased to exist as an impermeable structure and, to be quite plain, nor should it exist any longer'. Note Dr Herzog's insistence that no nation state can protect itself 'environmentally' - a reference to the worldwide success of the Soviet strategists' global environmentalism campaign, implemented following the Chernobyl 'accident'<sup>68</sup>, a campaign to which Moscow has devoted massive resources and to which it attaches exceptional importance as a 'transmission belt' fostering the creation of the intended global 'common mind'<sup>69</sup>.

Professor Herzog continued with the familiar propaganda 'line' that 'the nation state is too small for the major problems of life and too big for the minor ones. Indeed, we see this every day: many problems, often ones of vital significance, have for a long time not been capable of resolution at national level. The way for us in the future can only be: Europe'. Lenin will

have jumped for joy in his Mausoleum (if that is truly his grave).

'The nation state is on the point of saying goodbye, not the nation', added the German President - in a reference to the official obfuscation that while the nation state is to disappear, 'cultural differences' as evoked in the Maastricht Treaty, will be preserved, to make up for the 'Member States' intended loss of sovereignty. 'The nation state, with the concepts of sovereignty that go with it, has out lived itself. Neither can the nation state any longer pursue an autonomous economic policy'.

'The European Union must continue to remain an example of the fact that the principle of involvement guarantees greater stability than that of the balance of power, that integration is more promising than division. It would be absurd if Europe were to forget the strategy of integration just at the moment in which the rest of the world is learning from it. And it would be equally absurd if, after 50 years of artificial and enforced separation between East and West, not the common European but the old national inheritance should come to the fore'. That is, there must be no reversion to the 'thesis' (independent nation states in Europe), but we will press ahead to the 'synthesis' (the collectivisation of sovereignty).

'By "Europe", we' [that is to say, the Pan-German elite] 'mean neither a bureaucratic superstate, nor simply a free trade zone. There are accordingly two main dangers for the Europe of the future. If the European Union is not structured to reflect the interests of its citizens, it will play into the hands of those who wish to return to the nation state' (as though the fate of the nation state is sealed for all time: Marxist 'irreversibility' principle, again). Moreover, a lack of unity within the Union will equally be of benefit to the advocates of the nation state' - those mindless, delinquents of a bygone era.

And the President of Germany was not just insistent that the nation state was finished, but also that the teaching of national history - he was addressing the 41st Convention of German Historians, after all - was redundant, as well: indeed, he had come in order to instruct German historians to stop teaching national history altogether:

'In an era in which the principle of the nation state is outdated, there is no point in national history, either. The science of history must concern itself particularly with the history of European and non-European countries, not attitively [sic] however, but integratively' - that is to say, in conformity with the collectivist blueprint for global control. And then, in a brief reference to the revolutionary 'tendency' for countries to amalgamate or to be grouped together in regions ready for global control, Dr Herzog concluded that 'in order to be able to hold its own in this new concert of global regions, Europe urgently needs to amalgamate and to develop a well-rounded global policy'.

In the course of this astonishing speech, Dr Herzog also cited the French revolutionist Montesquieu, who said that 'if I knew something that was profitable for my country but harmful for Europe and mankind I would consider it as a crime'. 'This reasoning', President Herzog said, reminding his historians of the link between 1789 and 1989, 'is now over two hundred years old. But it is obviously eternally new, and it is worth spreading'. In December 1996, one of the Kremlin's ex-translators, now resident

in the United States, whom the Author met at a reception in New York, took it upon himself to explain international revolutionary developments in terms of the pronouncements of Montesquieu.

Under Article 17 of the collectivist Maastricht Treaty, all residents of the European Union are 'citizens' of the EU Collective. It follows that Presidents and Monarchs are 'citizens' of the European Union Collective, as well. This provides the twisted rationale for President Herzog's vituperative dismissal of the relevance of the nation state, and for his insistence that it has outlived its usefulness, even though he continued to serve as President.

Dr Herzog's subversive remarks have special resonance for Britain, where Queen Elizabeth II is the Sovereign and Constitutional Head of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. She is the custodian, in her person, of the sovereignty of the British people which was passed to her in February 1952 on the death of her father. This was confirmed initially when the Queen took the Oath of Accession, and was finally solemnised at the Queen's Coronation in 1953 after Her Majesty had been recognised and universally accepted as the undoubted and rightful Sovereign of the British people. In November 2000 - after a correspondent who had taken care to prepare his case thoroughly, had written to the Prime Minister, Tony Blair; to the then Leader of the Opposition, William Hague; to the Leader of the House of Lords, who was then Baroness Jay; and to the Lord Chief Justice and other official office-holders and dignitaries - asking: 'Is Her Majesty the Queen Sovereign?', he received either no answer at all, or else a non-committal, weak, diversionary reply. Mr Blair, being unable to answer the question himself, redirected the enquiry to the Home Office, which likewise prevaricated. Indeed, a hallmark of the Blair Government has been its Ministers' arrogant reluctance to answer letters and parliamentary questions. Likewise, Mr Blair has reportedly made a point, on occasion, of 'standing the Queen up' by failing to turn up on time, or at all, for his weekly scheduled audiences.

The position under English law, of course, is that Her Majesty remains Sovereign until the moment of her death, when sovereignty will pass automatically to the next rightful heir to the British Throne. However, the Prime Minister's problem appears to be that since, under Article 17 of the Maastricht Treaty, the Queen is a 'citizen' of the European Union, her Sovereignty has been usurped. Those UK Ministers and officials who permitted this scandalous state of affairs to develop are accordingly *prima facie* traitors and ought to be indicted for treason. But so far as President Herzog of Germany has been concerned, his status as a 'citizen' of the EU Collective appears to be entirely acceptable, because the EU is just a 'mask' for emerging 'Greater Germany'.

When, following the correspondent's letters to selected leaders, an attempt was made by Christopher Gill MP in January 2001 to put down a question asking the Prime Minister whether Her Majesty is Sovereign, the Table Office at the House of Commons replied in the following astonishing language: 'Last night you sought to table a question to the Prime Minister concerning the effect of the UK's membership of the European Union on the constitutional position of Her Majesty the Queen. You will recall that I explained I would need to check the admissibility of the question with other colleagues before it could be tabled. It has been pointed

out to me that the question as drafted in effect seeks the Prime Minister's view on the interpretation of the law, in this case the Treaties of the European Communities and associated European treaties and UK legislation. It is not possible to table questions to Ministers seeking interpretation of the law, as this is a matter for the appropriate courts, not Ministers'.

It would accordingly appear to be unclear whether Her Majesty the Queen is Sovereign - and, by extension, whether any legislation passed by the Westminster Parliament since Britain made the mistake of joining the European Communities in 1972, is valid. For evidently until the matter is decided by 'the appropriate courts', the question of whether Her Majesty is Sovereign and thus able to act as Head of State and hence give the Royal Assent to legislation passed by the Westminster Parliament, remains up in the air. This Kafkaesque situation reflects the fact that, as noted, under the Collective Treaty, all residents of the European Union are its citizens; and the Queen is a resident of the European Union. Therefore, if EU law has precedence over British law, the Queen, being an EU citizen, is not Sovereign. Welcome to a classic example of the fundamentally demented chaos that is bound to result from all revolutionary experiments in political collectivisation.

It may be asked: Why does no British Government ever take any steps to have this matter clarified? There are two possible answers to this question:

(1) If the matter were to be resolved and it were to transpire that, indeed, The Queen is not Sovereign, then all legislation to which Her Majesty has given the Royal Assent since Britain acceded to the EEC is null and void, because she had no power to give the Royal Assent. Alternatively:

(2) Successive UK Governments since the beginning of the collapse in 1970 have preferred this issue to remain unresolved because if it were to be concluded by 'the appropriate courts' that The Queen is Sovereign, then correspondingly all EU legislation in the UK is null and void because it is presupposed that EU law has precedence over UK law, which cannot be the case if The Queen is Sovereign. By contrast, if it does transpire that The Queen is not Sovereign, then, certainly, all legislation passed since Britain joined the EEC is indeed called into question.

Either way - whether The Queen is or is not Sovereign - the logic of the above leads to the conclusion that all EU law may be invalid in the United Kingdom.

Thus the real reason this key issue has never been clarified is that the British Government's deceitful EU 'coup d'etat by installments' policy would be exposed as illegal if the issue were ever to be addressed in the courts. Furthermore, as reviewed on page 209, the Treaty of Rome was reportedly not signed - so the basis of all EU law throughout the Collective may be open to legal challenge on that ground alone. It is concluded that EU law may have no standing in the United Kingdom and that successive conniving UK Governments have been shirking this central issue.

In an article published in The Times of London on 27th April 1996, Karl Lamers, who was then foreign affairs spokesman for the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag, condescended to recognise that 'British doubts are deeply rooted. The British concern is about the destruction of the national identity and the nation state, which is seen by the British as the only legitimate expression of the popular will. Germans, by contrast, say that there has long been a supranational reality created by our European civilisation. Common problems spawn common interests; our vital interests are identical'.



Whereupon Herr Lamers delivered a further broadside in Germany's psychological warfare offensive designed to help the stupid British to abandon their love of national sovereignty which it is the central purpose of the European Union to collectivise: 'The Euro-optimists take as their starting point the objective external reality.... The Eurosceptics (in Britain) deal with the inner, subjective reality of the consciousness of the British people. It is, if you like, the forces of Logic pitted against the forces of Psycho-logic. It must be the task of democratic politics to help narrow this gap. Otherwise politics will cease to be effective. A community makes sense if it can begin to solve its existential problems. If the nation state can no longer do that by itself, its failure undermines its political legitimacy'<sup>70</sup>.

In other words, Britain had no right to continue existing as a nation state, and it must be 'brought to reason' so that it comes to full acceptance of German prescriptions and intentions without further tedious prevarication. Note that, for Herr Lamers, the Pan-German position was 'logical', whereas the perceived British tendency to 'cling' to the nation state was 'psychological'. Once again here, the truth was turned upside-down.

The essence of Germany's continuing, updated strategy to realise Hitler's objective of a Greater European Political Collective dominated by the Germans, has never been in doubt - not least, since the German legislature adopted several amendments to the Basic Law (Constitution) on 22nd December, 1992, in order to 'legalise' ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. A new Article 23 was incorporated, the previous one having been repealed by the Unification Treaty of 31st August 1990. The revised Article, known as the 'Article on European Union', contains the following:

'With a view to establishing a United Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is committed to democratic, rule-of-law, social and federative principles as well as to the principle of subsidiarity, and ensures protection of basic rights comparable in substance to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the [German] Federation may transfer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as amendments to its statutory foundations and comparable regulations which amend or supplement the content of this Basic Law or make such amendments and supplements possible, shall be subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.

(2): The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Lander, shall be involved in matters concerning the European Union...'

[Under point (7), the amendment stated:] The following paragraph (1a) shall be inserted after paragraph (1) of Article 24 [of the Basic Law]:

(1a): Where the Lander have the right to exercise sovereign powers and to perform sovereign tasks they may with the consent of the Federal Government transfer sovereign rights to transfrontier institutions in neighbouring regions'.

This means that Germany can extend its sovereignty into Moravia and Bohemia, as provided for under the secret accord reached between President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in Geneva, in 1990.

As for Dr Professor Herzog, he faced both ways at the 1997 Konigswinter Conference, held in Berlin, in March that year. In a welcoming speech, he suggested that 'Britons and Germans can build on common values, convictions and interests. The debate on Europe can only reach a fruitful conclusion' - that is to say, a conclusion acceptable to the German strategy elite - 'if we help to gain general acceptance for one idea, namely that the 'Europe of-Fatherlands' is possible. The European nations can be Fatherlands and still integrate'.

## RUSSIAN ANXIETIES ABOUT GERMANY'S REAL INTENTIONS

For its part, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has never ceased to elaborate its interpretation of the community of interests between Germany and Russia. In their article published in 'International Affairs' [Volume 44, #10, 1995, November 1995: see also page 154] entitled 'Russia and Germany: Entering a New Stage of Relation'<sup>71</sup>, Vladimir Grinin, Director of the Ministry's 4th European Department, and Igor Bratchikov, from the same department, itemised the two countries' 'common' interests. 'There is no doubt that Russia and Germany have common interests'. Promotion of international stability 'on the basis of common democratic values' was a conspicuous element of the relationship. Using the Communists' strategic word 'line' - the Leninists' code-word for strategy - the Soviet authors proclaimed that 'the German line has become a top positive priority in Russia's foreign policy'. The accuracy of this official assessment was subsequently confirmed when Yeltsin was replaced by the German-speaker, KGB/GRU Colonel Vladimir Putin, who had served a key part of his intelligence career in East Germany where he was almost certainly in charge of preparing the 'second echelon' of fake 'non'-Communist actives for the roles they were to play in the period leading up to and following the removal of the Berlin Wall at the end of the 40-year occupation period [page 149], and the unification of Germany.

Elaborating upon their theme of 'the German line', Messrs. Grinin and Bratchikov concluded that 'the modern interpretation of the strategic partnership pattern between Russia and Germany implies their comprehensive and close interaction based upon confidence and a reasonable balance of interests' [implying that these basically differ], 'the timely settlement of inevitable contradictions, and coordination of long-term goals and practical actions on the international scene'.

In these passages, the two Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials revealed the following facts:

\* Russia and Germany have a strategic partnership 'pattern'.

\* They are engaged in the coordination of long-term goals.

\* Nevertheless, 'inevitable contradictions' arise in this 'strategic partnership'. This reference makes it clear that while Germany and the 'former' Soviet Union have pooled their efforts and resources to coordinate long-term objectives, nevertheless, fundamentally, their interests and objectives diverge. Hence the published evidence, notably in 'International Affairs', of never-ending Russian official agitation to foster what these authors called 'significant social forces in Germany and Russia' which would need to 'protect' the Russian-German relationship from 'the vicissitudes of political struggle in both countries'.

An undertone of concern about Germany's real intentions was also expressed by Igor Maksimychev, of the Russian Institute of Europe, in his 'International Affairs' article in 1997: Germany, this Soviet author wrote, 'has assumed a central position in Europe which has overcome a past division. This given truth is still not fully understood by Europeans, including the Germans themselves. The status of the region's restored centre (Germany) is placing very definite geopolitical obligations on it, that are binding to

the Continent as a whole'. Whereupon Igor Maksimychev retailed the Pan-Germans' formula: 'An equal partnership is possible... only with a Western

Europe that is poor in resources, which, without the riches of Russia would not be able to defend its independent status in the world in the 21st century. In addition, Russia is linked to the rest of Europe by common historical, religious and cultural routes, a closeness in psychological frame of mind and manner of conduct in stressful situations'. This last statement was, of course, raise: the Western mentality bears no resemblance to the Mongol mentality of the Soviet Leninists. But the Russian official continued:

'At the turning point of 1990-91, practically no-one had any doubt that a democratic [sic!] Russia would become an inseparable part of Great Europe.... [Subsequently, however], there had arisen, 'after scandalous blunders on the part of Russian politics'... 'a tendency towards excluding Rus-

sia from Europe'. It was at this point in Maksimychev's argument that he revealed that President Jacques Chirac had chaired a Russian-German-French Trilateral Commission which coordinates strategy between the three powers: 'If the rebirth of the slogan 'common house of Europe' is for some reason undesirable, then there should now be a return to the concept of constructing a Great Europe (especially as serious preparatory work has already been performed by a Russian-German-French Commission headed by Jacques Chirac back before he was elected President)'.

The existence of this trilateral commission had been all but unknown among interested observers in the West before this reference, and probably remained so long afterwards. But since France was enticed into collaboration with Germany under Chancellor Adenauer, by means of the Treaty of the Elysee of 22nd January 1963, the existence of this Commission is not surprising - and helps to explain the continuing subservience of France to Russo-German strategy. Such behaviour is, at the same time, dictated not only by the terms of the Franco-German Treaty, but also by the terms of the Franco-Russian Bilateral Treaty of February 1992 which effectively turned France into a fully-engaged agent for the Soviets.

The Maksimychev article also invoked 'Francois Mitterrand's unduly forgotten idea of a 'European Federation, as the final goal of European integration', as though Lenin's concept had been invented by the corrupt and probably blackmailed 'former' Communist, President Mitterrand. Then, predicting Russia's next move, the Sovietisation of Germany - at least, in respect of German policy and strategy, which was to become further oriented towards Moscow - the Institute of Europe author wrote:

'Russia's concentration of strength and attention on European affairs is inevitable, since it is only in this direction that it may realistically count on positive advancement in the area of international cooperation.... The intensification of Russian-German relations and the rapprochement of Russia with Germany will be in the forefront of Russian foreign policy concerns'. Put another way, any residual ambiguity concerning the essential identity of interests and long-term collectivist geopolitical objectives shared by Germany and the charade of 'non'-Soviet Russia, will in due course be dispensed with. BUT...

In an ominous paragraph, indicative of mounting anxiety about Germany's motives, at high levels within the continuing Soviet structures, Igor Maksimychev further warned that 'in the depths of German society, first and foremost within the political elite, decisive thoughts are now being nurtured to come out of the shade, to abandon the cosy trenches at the rear and directly place the responsibility on themselves for settling the situation in Europe and in the world, thanks to the new circumstance which has created an opportunity for this'.

In this single statement, this senior Leninist strategy apparatchik bared Moscow's intimate understanding of the German elite's Nazi International mentality and psychology, and the Leninists' deep knowledge of underlying German strategic intentions. The warning makes it clear that the Soviet strategists are fundamentally uncomfortable with the seamless ease with which the German strategic elite has taken to boldly reasserting its ambitions for European hegemony along the lines re-worked by the contemporary Pan-German heirs of the Nazi International.

Then, mimicking the standard Pan-German line that 'developed' Europe needs Russia's raw materials, which provide the basis for a decisive community of interests between Russia and Germany, the Leninist author continued in the usual convoluted Soviet Aesopian prose - which, however, when untangled, revealed the essence of the tensions that are clearly building up between these two evil powers:

'For Germany as the centre of the economic and political strength of the European Union, one perspective is becoming more obvious: Western Europe may survive as an innovation centre (centre of power) on a global scale, only if it is capable of supplying itself with the necessary depths in trading areas plus a practically inexhaustible supply of natural resources'.

To tease out the Moscow strategists' anxieties, a careful review of the next paragraph, which must therefore be revisited, is necessary:

[Therefore] 'Russia must take upon itself, at least declaratively, the initiating role in the process of setting universal European integration into motion; and, secondly, Russia's primary addressee in this matter may and must become Germany, whose political elite is already debating the future of Great Europe. Russian diplomacy is obliged to offer all Europeans, as quickly as possible, a positive programme for the provision of security and integration within the framework of the Continent as a whole' - the pretext being that the Germans were in a hurry, which meant that the collective security system needed to be rushed into place, before the Germans again became too strong and arrogant to be bothered to listen to anyone other than the heirs of the Nazi International strategists. More to the point, the essence of Moscow's anxieties focuses upon the divergence between the Soviet 'line' that 'universal European integration' is necessary, and the Pan-German aim of regional European integration (stopping at the Urals, at the very furthest).

Indeed, throughout this revealing article, which ended - as has been noted - with a confirmation that Moscow and Bonn have a secret strategic relationship, the author invoked the absolute indispensability of universal European integration - namely, 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok':

'The sum total of the active factors from the post-confrontational period in Europe brought the united Germany to the position of Russia's main partner, not only in Western Europe, but on the European Continent in general. It was Germany that became Russia's anchor...'

Implying the existence either of an underlying timetable, or anxiety that the Germans were growing too strong and arrogant too rapidly for Soviet diplomacy to be effective, Maksimychev insisted that existing Russian-German bilateral treaty arrangements could form the framework for the completion of the Comintern's collective security remit/or the whole of Europe:

'If time has not completely run out for creating the foundations of the universal European system of security and integration for the Continent in its entirety, then it would be easiest to begin this process in the context of Russian-German cooperation, the exclusive nature of which was determined by the Treaty of 9th November 1990. The possibilities with this treaty, which bears the signature of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, are not all exhausted, but are actually only partially exposed. Germany... enjoys extraordinary influence in the system of Western alliances.... [More generally, as regards German ambitions] the policy of 'low profile' that is customary to the 'old' Federal Republic of Germany is temporarily being maintained; however, it cannot suffice for Germany's new position in Europe for long'.

Clearly, Moscow is perturbed by what it interprets as evidence that Germany (as, of course, should be expected) is, in reality, pursuing strictly its own 'line' - to the prospective detriment of the 'mutual line' which, nevertheless, the author confirms exists.

That confirmation - that Germany and the 'former' Soviet Union are secretly working together in pursuit of the mutual strategy to federalise and collectivise the whole of Europe, and every dimension of Europeans' existence - is contained in the concluding paragraph of the article, in which the importance of a secret mutual strategy is finally revealed:

'By the year 2000, one may expect the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany to grow in forcefulness and to more energetically advance specifically German goals in Europe. The experience of the military catastrophes of the 20th century proves that a real danger for Russia from the West exists only when Germany is actively involved in anti-Russian plans and activities' - a Soviet official admission that Moscow does not regard the United States, France or Great Britain as threats at all (although Maksimychev chides 'France and Great Britain' for wanting 'to enter further into their roles as global nuclear powers').

'Therefore, traditionally, even secretly, the crux of all the goals that are put forth by our country on the organisation of a collective security in Europe was the efficient limitation of West (now unified) Germany's ability to take hostile actions against us or to participate in such actions'.

'Today we have the opportunity to influence the settlement of problems in universal European security directly through our bilateral relations with Germany, which are of a special nature' ['special' = secret].

In this statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry official's use of the clause 'even secretly', together with his description of Russia's bilateral

relations with Germany being 'of a special nature', provide complete proof of the existence of a secret mutual German-Soviet strategy and of the acknowledged 'coordination of long-term goals'. Yet while the two powers are working secretly and coordinating their long-term objectives, the Russian Leninists are increasingly concerned that Germany may in a sense be double-crossing them: hence their evident obsession with nagging the Germans to pursue 'universal European integration', rather than just the consolidation of their regional 'Greater Germany', masked by federalism.

From their perspective, the only ways this can be guaranteed, more or less, are by subterfuge: for instance, by means of the hyperactivity of agents and agents of influence, and by having their own controlled operatives rise to high policymaking positions in the German official structures. Hence rumours that Gerhard Schroder's Cabinet may harbour at least two 'former' Stasi agents. Since 'the Berlin Wall fell into the West' rather than the other way round, the Government and bureaucracy in Berlin is indeed crawling with personnel from the former East Germany. About 1.5 million ethnic Germans from the 'former' USSR, most of whom spoke hardly any German at all when a reliable source reported on this subject to the Author in 1996, installed themselves in the former West Germany from around 1990 onwards. Russian was suddenly heard in the streets of many towns and villages, especially in the Heidelberg area, close to a large NATO base.

It is clear from official observations from Moscow, however, that Russia, while pursuing a cynical secret strategy to collectivise the whole of Europe and to build a 'common Eurasian' political space stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and allowing Germany the latitude it needs to drive European collectivisation and federalism using the European Union as its main instrument for this purpose, also remains cautious and nervous of Germany's bona fides: and with good reason. For Moscow knows from historical experience that the Pan-Germans are not to be trusted.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the specialist institutes of the Russian Academy of [Leninist] Sciences, understand perfectly well that the Germans are in this for themselves. Therefore, an extraordinary paradox characterises Germany's Faustian Pact with the covert Communists in Moscow. On the one hand, both these evil parties see, in close secret strategic coordination, the vehicle for the realisation of their geopolitical objectives. On the other hand, the Soviet strategists clearly recognise that Germany is, in reality, primarily interested in the consolidation of its own political gains, and in the seamless pursuit and final realisation of the long-postponed objectives inherited from the Nazis, and conveyed to their heirs down the decades via Dr Adenauer's Nazi-infiltrated political structures.

The Germans, for their part, are so confident of their achievements and prospective success, that they appear relatively impervious to any signs of Soviet anxiety. This is a recipe for BIG trouble in the future. Trouble over the prospective transfer of the Czech lands to Germany provided for under the secret accord reached between Gorbachev and Kohl in 1990, has the potential to escalate, as the Pan-Germans encounter strategic opposition to the realisation of that illegitimate gain, and wake up to what that means for their plans.

## RAISING THE STAKES: TWO STUDIES IN GERMAN OBTUSENESS

### Case One: The Bundesbank intermeddles in foreign affairs

By 2000, the Germans were, indeed, as Igor Maksimychev had predicted, all but impervious to the transparency of their objectives, and were no longer bothering to hide the fact that the Pan-German federalisation model - NOT the 'universal European integration' model espoused by Moscow - was their purpose, and that its realisation was 'inevitable'. Two examples of this Nazi-style arrogance surfaced - in September 2000 and January 2001 - which will illustrate this ominous reality. The first example illustrates the recklessness of the Pan-German project itself; and the second illustrates the recklessness of the Berlin Government as it starts to test the limits of the Soviets' patience over regional security.

On 29th September 2000, Dr Jiirgen Stark, the Deputy Governor of the Bundesbank, addressed the Bank for International Settlements [BIS] /Bundesbank Conference in Frankfurt-am-Main on the subject of 'The Role of the Euro in the World: Past Developments and Future Perspectives'<sup>72</sup>. In this speech, Dr Stark stepped out of his role as Deputy Governor of the German central bank, to intermeddle in politics. Specifically, he said: 'The Euro is not merely the result of a technical exchange rate arrangement but also is an expression of the willingness and determination to achieve further integration. Such further progress is therefore the precondition for the credibility of the monetary union'.

Observers of German strategy, and of the gradualist revolutionary 'coup d'etat by installments' modus operandi of the European Union Collective, had been anticipating that as soon as Economic and Monetary Union [EMU] had been launched, there would be calls from all the familiar circles for 'deeper integration' and a decisive commitment to political union (that is, the abandonment of all residual sovereignty) in order to ensure the 'success' of monetary and currency collectivisation. Note the arrogance embedded in this hypocritical position: the cynical 'builders of Europe' were perfectly prepared to take the historically unprecedented risk of abolishing and collectivising national currencies - knowing that the new collectivised regime would 'lack credibility' because the Single Currency was not backed by a Single Government.

Indeed, knowing this, they resolved, on the basis of the incremental principle, to exploit the absence of a Single Government as a means of rationalising the urgency of the need for political union. Dr Stark was quite unabashed about this - even going so far as to admit that the Euro lacked credibility: after all, if further integration is a precondition for 'the credibility of the monetary union', it manifestly lacks credibility - which was indeed the case, since by mid-September 2000, the US dollar had appreciated by well over 30% in terms of the Euro, since the collective currency's launch.

Dr Stark then revealed what practical steps could be taken to achieve further political integration: 'An indication from France and the United Kingdom of their willingness to give up their seats on the United Nations Security Council in favour of a European seat on this body would be a very clear signal of the willingness to make progress towards a political union'.

Of course, the permanent seats of Britain and France on the United Nations Security Council, which enable these two countries of global importance to maintain significant positions of world power in the modern geopolitical context, are beyond the competence of the Bundesbank, and ought not to be commented upon by that institution. The job of the Bundesbank under the collectivised monetary and currency regime is to fulfil its obligations under the collective treaty and to perform the monetary and other tasks appropriate to a central bank.

For the Deputy Governor of the Bundesbank to presume to intermeddle in a foreign affairs issue of such sensitivity is not merely scandalous, but - more to the

point - indicative of the supreme confidence and arrogance with which the heirs of the Nazi International are continuing to pursue their Pan-German geopolitical objectives, and to wage this continuing war 'by other means'. 'For us the war has never stopped and, as is well known, in war every ruse is permissible' [see page 184]. Thus, even the Bundesbank can be used to pressurise 'Member States' to fall into line with the requirements of Pan-German strategy. Can it be imagined that the Governor of the Bank of England would ever pronounce on a political issue?

The Political Counsellor at the German Embassy in London, Herr Helmut Hoffmann, subsequently confirmed that Dr Stark's statements that the Euro is 'an expression of the willingness and determination to achieve further integration', and that 'France and the United Kingdom should give up their seats on the UN Security Council in favour of a European seat', represented an accurate reflection of German official aspirations.

Dr Jiirgen Stark elaborated: 'The future international role of the Euro will depend not least on the extent to which European integration can be successfully deepened; only in this way can monetary union be credible in future, too'. In other words, Economic and Monetary Union was promoted under false pretenses, on the basis of a dodgy prospectus which Dr Stark admits to have been incomplete and misleading: according to his assessment, monetary and currency collectivisation never stood a chance of 'working in the absence of political integration'.

But monetary union [EMU] was of course cynically 'sold' to the somnolent EU 'partners' as being feasible without political union. It is typical of the cynicism of the Pan-German strategists that they understood from the outset that the weak 'Member States', to the extent that they opposed political union, would 'go along' with the German collectivist EMU agenda and ignore the argument that it could not 'work' without political union, precisely for fear of raising the subject and thus accelerating the trend towards that outcome.

The fact that the prospectus was false was of course in no way admitted - illustrating the level of devious bravado which is so characteristic of the heirs of the Nazi International. Nor, as has been shown, is it unreasonable to describe the Deputy Governor of the Bundesbank as such: after all, for years, the Bundesbank provided a safe haven for prominent officials from Hitler's Reichsbank. The Pan-German Nazi mentality is alive and well at the Bundesbank today.

A further irony surrounds the Bundesbank's readiness to pontificate on foreign affairs and geopolitics. It concerns Dr Otmar Issing, formerly the Chief Economist at the Bundesbank, who moved seamlessly to the same position with the European Central Bank - the realisation of the Nazi International's 'Europa Bank' blueprint. In 1998, while still with the Bundesbank, Dr Issing was responsible for drafting the 'Opinion of the Central Bank Council concerning the convergence of the European Union in view of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union', a report called for by Chancellor Kohl's Government under Section 13 (1) of the Bundesbank Act. Dr Otmar Issing used this technical report as a means of placing the Bundesbank's pessimism about EMU on record, for future reference. The report included what this Author judged, by the normally restrained standards of central banking language, to be devastating criticisms of the inadequacy of the EU 'Member States' preparations for Economic and Monetary Union, such that any reasonably well-informed reader of the report would be bound to conclude that the Bundesbank had entertained deep reservations about the chances of the EU's collectivised monetary and currency policy succeeding. In the event, the Bundesbank's technical views were more than fully justified, since the Euro proceeded to depreciate steadily and steeply from the day after its launch, ignoring the orchestrated hype that followed.



At a seminar given at the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1998, the Author formally asked Dr Issing why, since he had been the author of the Bundesbank's report containing severe criticisms of the adequacy of the 'Member States' preparations for Economic and Monetary Union, he had moved to the position of Chief Economist with the European Central Bank, which was responsible for implementing a currency collectivisation project that Dr Issing had essentially written off in advance as running a sizeable risk of failure. After refusing to answer the question, Dr Issing fell back on the excuse that 'the decision to proceed with Economic and Monetary Union was political', and he could not possibly comment on political matters<sup>73</sup> (unlike Dr Jiirgen Stark).

## RAISING THE STAKES

### Case Two: Berlin seeks its own settlement over Kaliningrad

Under the secret Geneva agreement reached in 1990 between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Gorbachev to carve up Central Europe, as discussed on pages 200-205, 'the Federal Republic of Germany will not become engaged in issues concerning Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and will not consider them to be an area of [Germany's] economic interest, above and beyond an acceptable level'.

The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, which is one of the three most heavily militarised regions in the world (matching the huge Russian military territory of Mosdok, Ingushetia, on the northern border of Chechnya), is cut off from Russian territory by Lithuania. The secret accord did not preclude Germany specifically from raising the issue of German involvement in Konigsberg (Kaliningrad), formerly part of East Prussia, but the matter was covered by the qualification 'above and beyond an acceptable level'. The fact that the Kaliningrad issue was not included in the secret Geneva accord shows that both sides knew in 1990 that it was liable to be contentious, given the historical background - and given the Soviets' use of what was destined to become an enclave, as a military territory. That Kaliningrad, omitted from the Geneva accord because it was prospectively so troublesome, had already become an openly festering sore by the mid-1990s, was alluded to by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparatchiks Grinin and Bratchikov in their article for 'International Affairs'<sup>74</sup>, in which they acknowledged that Russia and Germany 'coordinate long-term goals':

'The problem of Kaliningrad is another issue. For some time now, there has been excessive [sic] activity of certain circles [sic] in the Federal Republic of Germany regarding this Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea. Some more directly, others gradually are promoting projects which, being implemented, will lead to the separation of the region from Russia with prospects for its "internationalisation" and progressive re-Germanisation'.

'Although the current German Government more than once dissociated itself flatly from such plans and formally rejected any claims to the former North-Eastern Prussia, it cannot be excluded that, given certain conditions in Germany, there may come to the fore some forces which would declare as anachronistic the territorial outcomes of World War II and would raise the problem of giving back peacefully to the Germans what was lost as a result of the defeat. In this connection, it is worth watching the activities of those social groups in the Federal Republic of Germany which have programmes of re-Germanisation of the former German territories. We believe that responsible German politicians will do their best in their country so that the Federal Republic's actions correspond with [the] political statements of her leaders'.

Obviously, if the Russian Foreign Ministry believed that 'responsible' German politicians would refrain from intermeddling in Kaliningrad, there would have been

no need for these complaints to have been raised and published in 'International Affairs'. Far from being content that the Germans would never revert to this issue, the Russian strategists seemed only too well aware that Germany had its eye on the return of the East Prussian territories in some form or other. And because the Leninist strategists know everything there is to know about the use of 'federalism as a mask' for ulterior geopolitical motives, they were on their guard from the outset against the likelihood that the German strategists would be unable to 'keep their hands off' this extremely dangerous issue, and would begin suggesting some kind of joint or collectivised control, or a form of 'internationalisation' for Königsberg.

One must acknowledge the accuracy of their perceptions and their ability to read the Pan-German mind correctly. As the European Union's 'eastwards expansion' imperative has proceeded inexorably in accordance with strategy, therefore, the Leninist strategists have become progressively more concerned at Germany's brazen attitudes and intentions towards Kaliningrad - which the Soviet planners deliberately chose as the location for their northern 'Mosdok', not least since under Soviet control, the region has always been used as a military and naval centre. It is run by the military without reference to the 'civilian' Government in Moscow.

The German strategists could of course see that a colossal Soviet military base would be located on the coastline of their 'eastwards-expanded' Europe; nor would they have been ignorant of its purpose. For the Soviets planned and built up this military territory as a means of ensuring that the Europeans could never forget that the model of European collectivisation and integration was to be the model favoured by the Soviets - namely, 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' - rather than the model lusted after by the Pan-German heirs of the Nazi International, 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals', which presupposes German regional hegemony - and the relegation of Russia to 'the fringes of Asia'. As Grinin and Bratchikov pointed out in 1995, 'the West and Germany, in particular... are making a strategic miscalculation in the long run [by] cutting themselves off from us and "jostling" Russia into Asia'.

On the contrary, Russia insists on being totally integrated into the emerging European structures, at every level. Such a 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' would, of course, have Moscow as its centre of gravity and coordination headquarters for the intended collective security system, rather than Brussels (or Berlin, as the Pan-Germans ultimately intend). Here, the reply to the perceptive question by Allan Little, a BBC correspondent, as to where the 'centre of gravity' of the new collective security system would be, given in the interview in November 1994 by a senior Ukrainian Government official named Boris Tarasiuk, is deeply instructive [see page 119]: 'Well, I could tell you that I know the answer to this question, but I would prefer rather not to answer it [because]... I think the time hasn't come yet for giving an answer'.

But the heirs of the Nazi International are not interested in the answer that the Soviets want and intend to give - since it would conflict with what they have in mind. Being the world's best chess-players, the Soviets had worked all this out many years - even decades - in advance. Therefore, it is not too much of an exaggeration to suggest that the fate of humanity may come to depend upon that of Kaliningrad.

On 21st January 2001, The Sunday Telegraph published a well-researched analysis, filed from Berlin, indicating precisely that the German Government had 'launched a secret initiative to acquire economic domination over the former East Prussian capital of Königsberg in return for waiving part of of Moscow's debts to Berlin. Russia's Baltic enclave was captured by the Red Army and renamed Kaliningrad in 1945'<sup>75</sup>. In the course of a private visit to Moscow earlier in January 2001 by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, the German leader had 'floated' the idea of a trading agreement between Kaliningrad and the European Union - which, the report argued, 'would effectively return the territory to

Berlin's sphere of influence. The suggestion was raised in the course of discussions with President Vladimir Putin over the contentious issue of Russia's earlier refusal to make the necessary repayments'.

'Also under discussion was a Russian proposal to offer Germany equity stakes in Russian companies, in partial lieu of repayments that the Russians were claiming they could not make because of their faltering economy' - although the KGB, which controls the colossal flows-of-funds derived from the operations of Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU) in the global drug business, could probably make the repayments direct from its own secret funds. If implemented, the acquisition of stakes in Russian corporations (covertly controlled, through 'licensed' KGB/GRU nominees, by the state - the 'New Form' of Lenin's 'state-controlled capitalism' model) would give Germany unprecedented influence over Russian economic policy and the rehabilitation of the Russian economy. Of course, the model for such arrangements originated in the 1920s, as reviewed earlier.

Until news of this German initiative over Kaliningrad surfaced, it had been universally assumed in the West - but not in Moscow, as the officially expressed anxieties which have been cited confirm - that Kaliningrad, which is about the size of Northern Ireland - had been 'irrevocably' consigned to Russia. The Sunday Telegraph's report, however, revealed how far the German strategists had already been prepared to press this issue - in fulfilment of the Russian Foreign Ministry's published fears: 'Any suggestion publicly that Germany may be attempting to reclaim East Prussia', the newspaper noted, 'continues to be politically and diplomatically taboo - particularly as Germany has officially declared 2001 "Prussian year" and is involved in a comprehensive reappraisal of the former German state that was disbanded by the Second World War victors in 1946'. Therefore, in order to avoid giving the impression that Germany was indeed pressing this issue, Chancellor Schroder was reported to have passed on the idea of an EU association agreement for Kaliningrad to the Swedish Prime Minister, Goeran Persson, given that Sweden held the six-month rotating EU Presidency at the time - so that Sweden, rather than Germany, could promote the initiative.

The Swedish authorities had already indicated that they would make Kaliningrad a priority issue during Sweden's presidency (to June 2001). And a German spokesman confirmed in January 2001 that the proposal would 'be discussed at the next Russian-German Summit in April and later at the EU-Russian Summit in May'. Sweden's motives were said to be environmental: Mr Persson said in a January interview that 'the [Kaliningrad] region is heavily polluted. There are diseases such as Aids and tuberculosis, and there is nuclear waste. Almost every problem imaginable can be found in Kaliningrad'. An estimated 30% of Kaliningrad's million Russian residents are living below the poverty line - ostensibly because the Supreme Soviet handed Kaliningrad to the 'unreformed' military in 1993.

But the Kaliningrad issue is about pressures much greater than those arising from the appalling neglect, waste, pollution and decay perceived to exist inside this Russian military territory. At the geopolitically 'visible' level, there is the prospect that the absorption of Poland and Lithuania into the European Union Collective during the first decade of the 21st century would leave the enclave prospectively even more cut off from its hinterland than is the case today: according to The Sunday Telegraph's report, 'Poland and Lithuania will insist on visas from Kaliningrad citizens wishing to enter their territories'. These prospects had been envisaged by Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, the 'Prussian' State Secretary of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, writing on [German-Russian] 'Common Long-term Interests' in the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal ['International Affairs', Volume 45, Number 5, 1999]<sup>76</sup> - so that none of this was anything new when Germany's Kaliningrad initiative moved fully into the public domain in January 2001. According to von Ploetz:

The European Union's eastern expansion will literally force the European Union and Russia to get into a mood for direct neighbour-to-neighbour partnership. The Kaliningrad Region will be an enclave inside the EU territory and, apart from Russia, only EU

states will have an outlet to the Baltic Sea. It will be of particular importance that, as a result of the Baltic States' accession to the European Union, considerable Russian-speaking minorities will become EU citizens, which means that the EU and Russia will live side by side and [will] depend on each other.... We must address in common the challenges of the times. Internal affairs become common affairs'.

Of course when 'considerable Russian-speaking minorities' have become European Union citizens, they will be able to relocate to most parts of the EU Collective, which will prospectively undermine security in the European Union and will further facilitate the spread of organised crime, as well as giving Moscow yet more scope for the exploitation of its Leninist revolutionary instrument of 'criminalism'. But that is not the main point here. What could be seen surfacing as this book had to go to press was the emergence into full view of the most sensitive bone of contention masquerading as a bargaining counter, in the history of the EU Collective.

For it is over Kaliningrad that the Germans were expecting to be able to pull off their greatest coup since 1990 - in the form of a 'deal' facilitating the wholesale Rappallo-style penetration of Russian corporations (a hazardous enterprise, since the assets the Germans will have acquired will become vulnerable to confiscation, a standard Communist procedure, in the future). Since almost the only viable Russian corporations are those which operate within the continuing Soviet military-industrial complex, any such outcome will again involve Germany deeply in the Soviet armaments industry - and will give Germany the access to Soviet raw materials about which so much was written on both sides from 1918 onwards.

But the Soviets were well prepared for this developing showdown. As noted on page 54, a Reuters report backed by separate press stories dated 3rd January 2001, in the dying days of President Bill Clinton's Administration, asserted that 'American officials had evidence that Moscow was moving tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea'. Over the past six months', one US official said, 'there has been some movement of tactical nuclear weapons into Kaliningrad: we don't know how many, we don't know what type, and we don't know why'.

If American officials under President Clinton had been doing their jobs properly, they would have read the references to the Kaliningrad issue in 'International Affairs', of which only two have been mentioned here - and could have reached the same conclusion as the Author. For the explanation of the Russians' deployment of tactical nuclear weapons into the Kaliningrad enclave is clear in the context of the foregoing analysis: these weapons signal that Moscow will insist that Russian-German 'cooperation' will have to conform to the Soviet 'universal integration model' of 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok', rather than to the Pan-German regional-federative model of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'.

#### WHY THE KALININGRAD ISSUE IS SO CRITICAL

The unbroken continuity of Soviet Leninist strategy driven by the 'seething' logic of the World Revolution, and the unbroken continuity of Pan-German strategy driven by German lust for control (idolatry) and arrogance, meet head-on over the issue of Kaliningrad (Konigsberg). Let us carefully review once more what the Russian Foreign Ministry apparatchiks Grinin and Bratchikov wrote in their 'International Affairs' article [Volume 41, Number 10, November 1995], with their observations [see page 233] that: 'The problem of Kaliningrad is another issue' [that is, bone of contention]. 'For some time now, there have [sic] been excessive activity of certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany regarding this enclave on the Baltic Sea. Some more directly, others indirectly, are promoting projects which, being implemented, will lead to separation of the region from Russia with prospects for its "internationalisation" and progressive re-Germanisation. It is sometimes hard to avoid [the] impression that tactics of promoting material and



Map showing the location of the two Soviet strategic military areas which are intended to procure delivery of the 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Vladivostok' settlement. The Russian militarised enclave of Kaliningrad is 'matched' to the south by Mosdok, a huge military area developed under President Yeltsin. In 1993, General Pavel Grachev boasted in public that the Soviets would be able to wage regional or world war from this single military territory. The map shows that these two strategic military territories are located so as to 'guarantee' that the Soviet model - 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' - prevails over the German model of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'. The geographical locations of Kaliningrad and Mosdok send a signal to Berlin that no settlement can be reached in Europe without Moscow's sanction, and that the only model it will approve is 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok', or 'universal European integration', in line with the Leninist programme. The Pan-Germans, in their arrogance, appear not to be hearing this message - which may spell extreme danger ahead for the European Continent, for the corrupt and compromised European Union, and indeed for the whole world. Germany is likely to find that its ambitions, hidden as in Hitler's concept, behind 'the mask of federalism', are frustrated by Moscow.

other prerequisites for subsequent political actions are again being used. Although the current German Government more than once dissociated itself flatly from such plans and formally rejected any claims to the former North-Eastern Prussia, it cannot be excluded that, given certain conditions in Germany, there may come to the fore some forces that would declare as anachronistic the territorial outcomes of World War II and would raise the problem of giving back peacefully to the Germans what was lost as a result of the defeat. In this connection, it is worth watching the activities of those social groups in the Federal Republic that have programmes of 're-Germanisation' of the former German territories'.

The apparatchiks then issued a veiled warning to the [then] Kohl Government, adding: 'We believe that responsible German politicians will do their best in their country so that the Federal Republic's actions correspond with the political statements of their leaders' - a reference to assertions by Chancellor Kohl and other leading Germans that united Germany harboured no claims on the former eastern territories<sup>77</sup>.

The Leninists' interest in leveraging this situation to achieve the fulfilment of their collective security objective was also mentioned in this article: The experience of history and the interests of all European nations dictate the necessity to insert Russia and Germany into a single coordinate system in the field of security'.

In other words, Kaliningrad represents a concrete and permanent reminder to the Germans, in particular, that no Eurasian security settlement is possible without Russia - and that Moscow's model of collective security is the model which must prevail. A few paragraphs later, came the memorable remark about the dangers of 'relegating Russia to Asia', which would be the necessary concomitant of a Pan-German 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals': 'The West, and Germany, in particular, cutting themselves off from us and "jostling" Russia into Asia, are making a strategic miscalculation in the long run'.

As discussed, by January 1997, the Russian [Leninist] Academician Igor Maksimychev was also complaining in the same issue of the official journal that 'by the year 2000, one may expect the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany to grow in forcefulness and to more energetically advance specifically German goals in Europe'. But in the same article, Maksimychev had acknowledged Germany as the driving-force behind the collectivisation ('unification') of Europe: Germany was 'the pace-setter, the organiser, the producer for work on erecting the structure of Great Europe. Germany will acquire its own unique place on the European Continent which can never again be reproduced'.

It is concluded that Moscow has been accommodating Germany's 'covert' Pan-Germanism while Berlin seeks the 'completion' of pan-European regional federalisation beneath the mask of the EU, but will cease to tolerate what it will regard as Berlin's 'excesses' as soon as the Pan-Germans seek to 'alight from the regional European integration 'train'. The Soviet Leninists will insist that they stay on board their 'Universal European Integration Express': hence the movement of Soviet tactical nuclear missiles to the Kaliningrad military enclave.

While both these evil powers are engaged in strategic deception and tactical dialectical ploys designed to outsmart the other under the cover of 'cooperation' and professions of a strategic relationship buttressed by acknowledged secret accords, the obvious potential for miscalculation would seem to have been underestimated in Western capitals. The reality seems to be that neither the continuing covert Leninists, possessed by the spirit of Lenin because they are 'in Lenin's mind', nor the obsessed Pan-German heirs of Nazism, whatever their contemporary political labels, recognise the determination of the other side that their power model is intended to prevail. The Germans, in particular, seem more and more inclined to recklessness.

## CONCLUDING STUDY NOTES

### German postwar strategic deception

On 3rd April 1952, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, usually considered to have been the mouthpiece of the Bonn Foreign Office, proclaimed that 'Chancellor Adenauer follows a bold plan: First rearmament, followed later on by talks with the Russians in order to persuade them to remove their armies behind the Bug River. For this goal, the Chancellor has been working tenaciously for some time'.

Dr Adenauer's 'tremendous bold plan' was prepared by the Ribbentrop diplomats who had flocked back to Bonn from the German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid, and from other outposts of the Nazi International. The plan was based upon the accurate calculation that the United States had become so deeply committed to its pledge to defend Europe from the Communist menace, that it was willing to pour billions of dollars (the seedbed of the Eurodollar market) into the strengthening and rearming of a German-dominated Europe. Thus, notwithstanding the 'temporary setback of the catastrophe' of Germany's utter defeat in 1945, the Pan-Germans now saw that they were closer to the realisation of their plan to establish their German-dominated 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' than they had ever been in the past. After Germany had been rearmed, Dr Konrad Adenauer's grandiose plan envisaged negotiations with Russia, with the prospect of procuring territorial concessions from the Kremlin in Eastern Europe, in exchange for which Germany, along with the whole of the Continent of Western Europe, would break away from NATO.

The Pan-Germans have all along been rather more open and brazen about their regional geopolitical intentions than the Soviets, who encase their intentions within their Aesopian language of dual meanings. But the opportunistic convergence of Pan-German strategy with Leninist objectives was apparent almost from the beginning: for instance, the pro-Adenauer press, led by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 'Christ und Welt', the Deutsche Zeitung (Stuttgart) and other papers, published editorials in the early 1950s assuring the Soviets that Dr Konrad Adenauer's policy presupposed the creation of the collective security arrangements necessary to satisfy both the Germans and the Russians - but that this could only be achieved 'once Greater Germany had become a third superpower, capable of deterring the United States from starting a preventive war'. It should be recalled that sentiment in those days was heavily influenced by the recent experience of the war in Korea, which many had thought at the time might represent the de facto outbreak of the Third World War. These editorials appeared to defy Adenauer's reported warning to Germans, before he became Chancellor, that 'we must move very cautiously. We ought not to give the impression either in Germany or in the United States that we shall collaborate in any way with the Russians'.

When the pro-Adenauer press did just that a few years later, the Western allies in general, and the Americans in particular, took no notice. Nor was any notice taken of T. H. Tetens' book 'Germany Plots with the Kremlin' [New York, 1953]<sup>78</sup>, in which that author brought forward 'a wealth of material providing irrefutable proof that Dr Adenauer's whole timetable in dealing with the Western Powers has been carefully prepared by those "irresponsible" Haushofer-Ribbentrop disciples who, from Madrid and Buenos Aires, regularly issue directives to their former Nazi colleagues in the Bonn Foreign Office and in the leading German papers'.

However some American observers understood what was happening: for instance, US News stated in its issue of 18th January 1952 that 'a strong Western Germany is on the horizon.... Germany will again be a big power in Western Europe and, instead of Western Europe bossing Germany, it may be the other way round. This is not the way the U.S. planned, it but it is the way things are going'.

Yet the State Department need not have been surprised, since on 25th June 1945, William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, had testified before Congress that the Nazis had [see page 186] made careful plans to carry on in foreign countries a wide range of activities necessary to support an eventual resurgence of German power. But President Roosevelt had died in April 1945, and the existence of this huge external Nazi network was disregarded as a factor because the United States' policy towards Germany was already being reviewed. The new policy of postwar appeasement in the face of German defiance was implemented in total disregard of the German record and of the Nazi mentality, and without a thorough review of the evidence of intended strategic continuity which had been discovered in occupied Germany by the victors. The only relic of the 'old' Roosevelt hardline approach to the defeated Germany - consolidated under Secretary of State James Byrnes, before he was replaced by President Truman in favour of General George C. Marshall with the final victory of the Kennanite appeasers - was the apparent compact to the effect that Germany was to be occupied by the wartime Allies for 40 years, a 'biblical number' [see page 149]. (The use of symbology in geopolitics is a large and under-researched subject. The facts that 1989, when the Berlin Wall was 'pushed into the West', was the bicentenary of the French Revolution, and that the KGB's code-name for the fake August coup' was Gologtha [see page 53, and Part One, Note 47], confirm this - as does the fact that Felix Dzerzhinsky the founder of the Cheka (VchK-KGB), was born on 11th September. Moreover the 30th anniversary of Nikita Khrushchev's death was 11th September 2001, the notorious date of the Twin Towers/Pentagon atrocities. Khrushchev was the instigator of the upgraded and refocused long-range Leninist World Revolution deception strategy which is the source of today's global instability).

#### Long tradition of German East-West dialectics

The political and ideological notion that Germany should be aligned with the East against the West is an old and deeply-rooted tradition of German foreign policy. It featured prominently in the diplomatic scheming of Frederick the Great 250+ years ago, and it dominated the policies of the Iron Chancellor, Bismarck, during the second half of the 19th century. It was implicit in the plans for 'the Kaiser's Europe', and it became central to the plans hatched by the Weimar Republic's policymakers. Next, it was Hitler's 'great solution' at the opening of the Second World War. Thereafter, as has been seen, it was integrated into Pan-German planning for the future.

And, of course the German Generals had assisted the Bolsheviks by shipping, on General Ludendorff's borders, Lenin and 60 Bolsheviks in two sealed Pullman cars from Switzerland to Germany for release on the Finnish border with the assignment to undermine the democratic Government of Kerensky, to sever Russia's connections with the Allies, and to make a separate peace with Germany. In their lust to circumvent the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the Reichswehr had entered into secret transactions with the Red Army as early as 1920 - under which German military experts and armaments firms erected aircraft and tank factories in Russia, and poison gas plants and laboratories for biological warfare. In return, the Red Army had allowed German staff officers and special cadres to use Soviet military establishments in order to study tank warfare and tactical problems of the modern battlefield. The main supporters of an eastwards orientation for Germany in those days were the Reichswehr Minister, General Hans von Seeckt, the 'father' of the modern German army, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, who subsequently became Germany's Ambassador to Moscow.

Throughout the 250+ years during which the tendency of the Germans to pursue a policy of orientation towards Russia grew, the parallel tendency is observed



of ambivalence towards Germany's relations with the West. At times, the relationship has been so strained, as after the First World War, that little pretence of any interest in a Western orientation of policy was observed. At other times, Germany appeared to 'warm' to the West - but always, in part, to mask the political elite's fundamental orientation towards the East. This de facto 'dialectical' behaviour has become so ingrained that it is second-nature to the heirs of the Pan-Germans, whom the other Western powers ought to trust no more than they should trust the Russians.

#### Bilateral treaties and secret alliances

The fulcrum of Germany's 'Westpolitik' remains the Franco-German Treaty - known as the Treaty of the Elysee - signed on 22nd January 1963 by Dr Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. From time to time, the importance of this bilateral treaty is alluded to: for instance, two EC Commissioners, Pascal Lamy and Giinter Verheugen, said in January 2002 that 'the Franco-German "matrix" is, and always will be, the determining factor' in the EU Collective.

Under the heading PROGRAMME, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ARTICLE 1, this key bilateral treaty, which dominates and permeates Franco-German relations, provides that:

'The two Governments will consult before any decision on all important questions of foreign policy and, in the first place, on questions of common interest, with a view to reaching as far as possible an analogous position. This consultation will bear among others [sic] on the following subjects:

O Problems relating to the European Communities and to European political cooperation;

O East-West relations both on the political and on the economic planes;

O Matters dealt with within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the international organisations in which the two Governments are interested, notably the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations and its specialised institutions'.

Article 2 of the PROGRAMME specified closer cooperation in the field of intelligence: 'The collaboration already established in the field of information will be continued and developed between the interested services in Paris and Bonn and between missions in third countries'. Under the subheading Defence, the bilateral treaty called for much closer military cooperation between France and Germany, and required the competent authorities of the two countries [to] endeavour to bring their doctrines closer together with a view to reaching common conceptions<sup>79</sup>.

Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand alluded to the significance of this 'foundation stone' of modern Franco-German cooperation, in a Joint Statement issued at their meeting in Munich on 18th September 1990, in which they invoked 'the achievement of German unification, which we jointly welcome [and which] gives a new dimension and a broader horizon to our cooperation, the aim of which has been from the very outset to advance together the cause of European unification in all spheres'<sup>80</sup>.

Thus the Pan-Germans 'turned' the French under Charles de Gaulle, and harnessed them as co-conspirators and 'co-builders' of the 'New Europe' - converting them into fully paid-up members of the Club of Collectivists.

Alert of course to this background, the Soviets courted France, especially when preparing their 'bilateral treaty offensive', which continued seamlessly from the Gorbachev period into the Yeltsin era. The 'Treaty on Accord and Cooperation between the USSR and France', signed by President Mikhail Gorbachev, MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, President Francois Mitterrand, Michel Rocard and Roland Dumas at Rambouillet on 29th October 1990 was never ratified by the

Assemblée Nationale, which thought that the Soviet Union had collapsed. But, before anyone could say 'collapsible Communism', a revised text had been prepared by the Soviet-Russian intelligence authorities and the Russian Foreign Ministry, which was duly signed in Paris by President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, President Mitterrand, M. Dumas (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Edith Cresson, the French Prime Minister, on 7th February 1992<sup>81</sup>. This bilateral treaty effectively converted France into an ally of and agent for Russia - grafting this role onto France's similarly burdensome relationship with Germany arising from the 'Treaty of the Elysee' - thereby prospectively compromising France's relationships with Britain and the United States.

Later, thanks to the information contained in the important cited article by Igor Maksimychev published in 'International Affairs' in February 1997<sup>82</sup>, it emerged that Jacques Chirac had headed a Russian-German-French Commission prior to his election as President. The deliberations of this Trilateral Commission will have been significantly driven and influenced by the German and French bilateral treaties with Russia, but especially by the following stipulations in the Russian-French Treaty:

Article 3: '... The sides shall strive for maximum possible coordination of their positions... with a view to implementing joint or concerted actions when they deem this necessary' [= same as 'an analogous position'].

Article 4: 'The Russian Federation and the French Republic shall pool their efforts to establish new relations in the sphere of security among all European states and to build a peaceful Europe with a community of interests endowed with permanent security and cooperation mechanisms. The sides shall cooperate with each other and with other interested states with a view to concluding a treaty on European security. The French Republic emphasises the importance of forming a European union...'

Article 6: 'The Russian Federation and the French Republic shall promote the transformation of Europe into a common rule-of-law and democratic area. They shall help to prevent the emergence of new splits on the European Continent and strengthen the bonds of solidarity between themselves and among all European states within the framework of a confederative approach.... France pledges to promote rapprochement between the EC and Russia, particularly by means of concluding agreements between them, with a view to assisting its integration in the European economy'.

Article 11: 'The Russian Federation and the French Republic shall develop cooperation in the spheres of the economy, industry, science and technology. The closest cooperation shall be effected in spheres of special interest to the future of both states and to developing the prospect of creating a European area'.

Article 12: '[the two sides] have agreed to draw up cooperation and cadre-training programmes [a Soviet phrase: ideological training - Ed.]. The sides shall promote the realisation of cadre-training programmes... within the framework of efforts being made at the European and international levels'.

Article 14: '[they] attach paramount significance to environmental protection'.

This treaty was concluded for a period of ten years, and could be continued for successive periods of five years 'if neither side informs the other of its decision to denounce the treaty by means of a written notification one year before the expiry of the corresponding period'. The French did not indicate any intention of denouncing the Franco-Russian Treaty, and subsequent events have implied that it will have been renewed for a further ten years, on expiry in February 2002.

The reason this deduction could be made as this book went to press, is as follows. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reported in *The Sunday Telegraph* on 26th January 2002 that two socialist European Commissioners, Pascal Lamy of France and

Gunter Verheugen of Germany, had publicly reiterated that the Franco-German 'matrix' is, and always would be, the 'determining factor' within the European Union. They suggested that the two countries should 'move ahead as an advance guard, forming a confederation with a shared army and foreign policy'. This would enable France to fulfil its obligation TO RUSSIA under international law, as laid down in its bilateral treaty with Russia, to 'strengthen the bonds of solidarity between themselves and among all European states within the framework of a confederative approach'. For under the cited clauses of the Russian-French Treaty, signed as the continuing Soviet Leninists took advantage of the rush of enthusiasm which swept the world following 'the collapse of Communism', the French committed themselves under international law to the implementation of RUSSIAN strategy.

The significance of this intervention cannot be over-emphasised.

In the first place, Mr Evans-Pritchard took care to label the European Commissioners concerned as 'socialist', which caused no surprise but did underline that these international socialists are working in 'synchronicity' with the 'confederative'-collectivist 'Line' of the Revolution (the existence of which few observers in the West acknowledge and which even fewer begin to understand).

Secondly, note that the 'call for' a Franco-German confederation was made not just by a European Commissioner from France (in fulfilment of Article 6 of the Franco-Russian bilateral Treaty), but also by a Commissioner from Germany — highlighting the significance of the trilateral axis formalised by, for instance, the Trilateral Commission which the Russian Foreign Ministry has revealed was chaired by Jacques Chirac before he became the President of France.

Thirdly, given the timing of this 'call' immediately ahead of the end of the initial ten-year period of the Franco-Russian Treaty, the two socialist European Commissioners were 'helping' France to appear to be anxious to fulfil its obligations towards Russia specified in Article 6 of the Franco-Russian Treaty. Thus their intervention could be construed as representing a signal to the third member of the trilateral group, in connection with diplomatic overtures behind-the-scenes ahead of the formal renewal of the bilateral treaty. Since it happened that this work went to press in late January 2002, immediately ahead of the end of the ten-year period specified in the Franco-Russian Treaty signed on 7th February 2002, it was not possible to state here definitively whether that treaty had been renewed. But given the above intervention, the likelihood must have been high; and there had been no record of either side having given the necessary year's notice of withdrawal.

The incident serves, finally, to help illustrate the central theme of this book - namely, that the Soviet/Russian Leninist agenda which demands and presupposes the abolition of national sovereignty through its collectivisation ('pooling') by means of 'the confederative approach' (Lenin and Stalin's federalism), drives and intermingles with the German-French agenda - which part of the French Establishment believes to be concerned with the 'building' of General de Gaulle's 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok', but which French international socialists and Communists probably recognise is to be merged with Russia's World Revolution agenda, and yet which the Pan-Germans intend should conform to their model.

Extensive penetration of the Pan-German structures by international socialists, Stasi agents and 'former' Communists from East Germany imply the likelihood of internal struggle inside Germany between the Pan-German ('Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' purists) and infiltrated leftists from the East (such as Angela Merkel) whose geopolitical orientation is towards the Leninist global programme of 'universal European integration' ('Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'), as 'revealed' by Igor Maksimychev in 'International Affairs' in 1997. Since the Russians

have comprehensively recruited France via the Franco-Russian Treaty, it was no accident that Mr Maksimychev expressed anxiety that the Germans must be brought to realise that they have only one choice: to go along 100% with the Soviet Leninist agenda. This was the crucial significance of Maksimychev's carefully phrased assertion that 'Russia must take upon itself, at least declaratively, the initiating role in the process of setting universal European integration into motion, and, secondly, that Russia's primary addressee in this matter may and must become Germany, whose political elite is already debating the future of Great Europe'.

It is quite clear from all this that Russia's chief concern is to ensure that the European Union Collective's 'eastwards expansion imperative' does not stop at the borders with Ukraine and Belarus, but that the European collectivists must understand that there can be no 'final solution' until the Soviet agenda to collectivise sovereignty and security on a 'universal' basis has been completed.

Moscow's anxiety on this central (from Russia's Leninist point of view) issue is interesting, because France and Germany (fronted by Hans-Dietrich Genscher) had long since jointly skewed the policy of the European Collective to align it ever more closely with the objectives of Soviet strategy, notably the establishment of a system of 'collective security' - as had become clear, for instance, as early as 4th February 1991, when the French authorities had issued the following statement:

'M. Dumas and Mr Genscher presented to the Intergovernmental Conference [planning the Maastricht Treaty] a common Franco-German proposal, based on the Mitterrand-Kohl letter, for the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of Political Union:

O The Common Foreign and Security Policy [subsequently implemented] must ultimately open up the prospect of a Common Defence Policy.

O A European security and defence identity will have to be reflected by the development of a European pillar within NATO. [Note: The word 'pillar' extensively used today by the EU structures is borrowed from Nazi / Pan-German usage].

O [Identical to a proposal floated by President Gorbachev:] 'The European Council will lay down the directives and guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in its widest sense<sup>83</sup> (the italicised words here being code for 'to include the 'former' Soviet Union in order to 'allay' Russian concerns).

To complete the maze of bilateral and trilateral strategic 'cooperation' between Germany, France and Russia, the Germans and Russians have secret accords which determine the 'Tine' of their mutual relations. As we have seen, again, this fact was revealed by Igor Maksimychev in his 'International Affairs' article in February 1997, which stated: 'Therefore, traditionally, even secretly, the crux of all the goals that are set forth by our country on the organisation of a collective security in Europe was the effective limitation of West (now unified) Germany's ability to take hostile actions against us or to participate in such actions. Today we have the opportunity to influence the settlement of problems in universal European security directly through our bilateral relations with Germany, which are of a special [= secret] nature'.

In 'secret', the Soviet Leninist strategists are engaged in leveraging West European 'sympathy' for the 'understandable' fear of a 'resurgence' of German power, to press home their case for (a) 'universal European integration' and (b) its corollary, the Comintern's intended collective security regime. Of course, the latent 'threat' of any 'resurgence' of German power is greatly exaggerated, and is being exploited by the Soviet strategists in pursuit of their objectives - not because the threat is tangible, as they know perfectly well. And to add to the irony, prominent German figures use the same ploy in pursuit of their Pan-German agenda - reverting time and again to verbal images of the 'great suffering' experienced by Europeans in Two World Wars

due to the world's failure to 'satisfy' German aspirations (code for ambitions).

As the Russian apparatchik, Maksimychev, added in his article, '... by the year 2000, one may expect the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany to grow in forcefulness and to more energetically advance specifically German goals in Europe'<sup>84</sup>. As if to provide timely substance to this dialectic, the German Navy was deployed internationally in early 2002, for the first time since the Second World War. On 25th January 2002, the BBC's 24-hour News Service showed pictures of a state-of-the-art German destroyer deployed off Djibouti in connection with 'the war against terrorism' and under overall American command. One of three such German ships sent to the area, it flew not, as might have been expected, the European Union's ubiquitous blue flag with the 12 yellow stars, but rather the German flag which displays a black iron cross on a white background. In thus removing the 'mask of federalism' which the Nazi International-Pan-German 'Line' has been exploiting in furtherance of the final fulfilment of German geopolitical ambitions, the Germans also, wittingly or unwittingly, provided their collaborator-rivals, the Russian Leninists, with the kind of ammunition that will have been welcomed in Moscow to reinforce the Leninist strategists' relentless push for collective security.

#### Moscow's warnings to Germany in the 1990s

It is clear that Moscow sees Germany as its primary instrument to ensure the wholesale collectivisation of European national sovereignty. 'Europe needs Germany', Maksimychev wrote, 'whose historical mission will become all-European construction and the completion of continental integration, from which not one European will be excluded' [= TOTAL FEDERALISATION/COLLECTIVISATION]. The Author hopes that this statement alone will deter any sceptics who have persevered thus far, from contradicting the assessment that the collectivisation imperative of the Revolution requires 'universal' application, from which there can be no exceptions. For 'Europe needs Germany', read: 'The Leninist World Revolution needs Germany to push the reluctant Europeans into Lenin's 'universal European federation' on its behalf. Because (unspoken) Germany's single-minded, idolatrous pursuit of its Pan-German objectives beneath 'the mask of federalism' is simultaneously furthering - for the time being - the realisation of the Soviet objective, Mr Maksimychev noted, the 'unrolling of events' had 'brought the united Germany to the position of Russia's main partner, not only in Western Europe, but on the European Continent in general'.

BUT (unspoken) the problem for the Moscow strategists would remain how to contain German ambitions and channel them in the direction intended by Lenin's continuing World Revolution, of which they are in charge, along with their Chinese Communist 'comrades in arms'. So Maksimychev warned that 'the concept of a Great Europe presents Germany with a starting ground for the gradual rise to the pedestal of the Continent's leader, and it is only on this path that it may receive the opportunity to avoid silent rivalry, stealthy blows, and backheels since nobody else will have the sufficient prerequisites to occupy that pedestal' [sic]. This snide Bolshevik passage clearly exposes the lack of trust that underlies Russian professions that Germany is Russia's most important European 'partner' and collaborator.

In order to contain the expected onslaught of 'German forcefulness', the well-informed Maksimychev warned the Germans that any course other than the closest cooperation with Russia (unspoken: 'on our terms, not yours') would be sure to lead to disaster, as had happened twice in the 20th century. Specifically, the Institute of Europe's apparatchik elaborated: 'The experience of the military catastrophes of the 20th century proves that a real danger for Russia exists only when Germany is actively involved in anti-Russian plans and activities'. In

short, it is only when Germany's ambitions and energies have been recruited in aid of the Revolution, that the Germans are not an actual or potential menace.

Thus the Soviet Leninist strategists rationalise for international consumption their overt and covert alliance with Germany by stressing the need for Moscow to 'organise collective security' in order to contain German militarism. However, while this rationalisation has historical justification, it masks the Leninists' true motive - which is to implement the Comintern's remit, dating from the 1920s, of fostering the establishment of a collective security system, the centre of gravity of which will not be Berlin (as the Germans intend), but rather Moscow itself. Inherent in this stance is the standard Soviet warning that no security and political settlement can be engineered under German hegemony, since Moscow will insist upon full participation - the message that is forcefully implied by the locations of the Kaliningrad and Mosdok military districts shown in the map on page 237.

The reason this warning must be taken seriously - which the heirs of the Pan-German strategists are evidently not doing, at least to Moscow's satisfaction - is that the consolidation of a collective security system in Eurasia, which Moscow believes would 'tame the German menace for ever' and leave the Soviets effectively with de facto military supremacy - has, since the 1920s, been considered 'the highest goal' of Moscow's foreign policy. By 'highest goal', the Leninists mean exactly that: it is not the second or the third priority, but the first. Hence, any indication (from the Germans) that this is not clearly understood rings alarm bells in Moscow<sup>85</sup>.

Yet, as Germany's lust to re-establish its economic (at least) hegemony over the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad suggests, the Pan-German planners have their own ideas about collective security, which infringe the unwritten stand-off over Kaliningrad. They feel strong enough to have embarked upon a sustained campaign to acquire economic domination over the Kaliningrad enclave through the EU (i.e., using 'federalism as a mask') - in return for waiving part of Russia's huge outstanding debt burden in Germany's favour; at least, this was one manifestation of Germany's campaign to re-acquire a measure of influence over the enclave. This is literally 'playing with fire', and it reflects the modern Pan-Germans' confidence, determination and self-belief, as well as Berlin's assessment that Germany must strike while Russia is (erroneously) perceived to be weak.

That perception, in turn, reflects the failure of the German Foreign Office to interpret the Leninists' 'weak look' (Sun-Tzu) correctly. It also epitomises their growing general arrogance, signs of which have been emerging for some years - for example, in the lectures which successive senior Germans see fit to deliver to the British (as in the case of the article by Karl Lamers and the speech at the German-British Forum by Joschka Fischer). Nor has Nazi 'anti-semitism' - the most conspicuous manifestation of Pan-German arrogance - yet been consigned to the history books. On the contrary, after the former British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, had addressed the Konrad Adenauer Institute - the main centre of continuing Nazi Pan-Germanism - on 26th February 1997, the Pan-Germans' house journal, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, wrote: 'Als habe ihn seine Rede nicht ganz uberzeugt, schloss der Jude Rifkind - ironisch apologetisch - mit dem deutsch hervorgebrachten Lutherwort: "Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders": 'As if he was not completely convinced by his own words, the Jew Rifkind - ironically, apologetically - [ended] with a quote from Luther, delivered in German, 'Here I stand, I can do no other'.

When the inevitable storm of protest reached the ears of the author of the piece - Michaela Wiegel, aged 28, the newspaper's specialist on European affairs - she retorted with undiminished arrogance: 'Is it an insult in English to call somebody a Jew? I am mortified that anyone could have read it like that. I was only trying

to underline how surprising it was that somebody who is Jewish should quote the leading German Protestant reformer<sup>186</sup>.

But Nazi newspapers in the 1930s used to preface almost any description of leading liberal politicians with the prefix 'Der Jude'. As a perceptive British official, who attended the lecture, observed afterwards:

'The real question is why [the newspaper] allowed such a phrase to stay in their columns'. The answer to this is that Mr Rifkind - a gentleman who 'turned the other cheek' to what seemed like a calculated insult - was addressing a meeting at the main Pan-German centre, and the Pan-Germans' favourite newspaper was reporting his speech. A leading British Jew, Sir Ivan Lawrence, a member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, commented: 'The Germans ought to apologise without being asked. I have never known such a thing in recent years. It stirs up our worst forebodings about closer political union with Germany'.

Unfortunately, those forebodings have not yet been translated into the necessary arms'-length attitude on the part of successive British Governments - as a result of which the United Kingdom is being dragged to oblivion as a nation, by stealth - via the 'coup d'etat by installments' method. Nor, interestingly, did the British Jewish community, which is believed to be solidly in favour of continued British membership of the European Union Collective, draw the appropriate conclusions from this episode, with its direct invocation and 'revisiting' of the familiar Nazi attitude.

The correct conclusions have never been drawn, because successive British Governments have been led by collectivists, or by leaders who learned on the job and made colossal mistakes in the process, like Mrs Thatcher: when she finally 'understood', she was bundled out of office. A question mark, as noted earlier, stands over the geopolitical orientation of John Major; while, as also discussed, Edward Heath deceived the British people, as the official papers released under the 30-year rule have finally proved. The Blair Government is Fabian: no more need be said.

Given the blindness of British policymakers, who have 'bought' the German 'line' that 'cooperation' (wholesale regional collectivisation) is more profitable than continuing to play the traditional balance-of-power game, it is no surprise that the tensions which lie just beneath the surface of the smooth professed facade of Russian-German 'cooperation', appear to be unrecognised. But Moscow has the advantage that its non-stop insistence that its 'security interests' must be accommodated have some validity, given that Germany, as it grows in strength and arrogance, appears to be overlooking the following, as the Leninists see them, 'basic facts of life'.

The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, signed by the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France in Moscow on 12th September 1990, augmented by signatures for the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic (requiring ratification by the united Germany, which became a reality on 3rd October 1990), defined 'the external boundaries of united Germany as 'definitive' (Preamble, page 1, paragraphs, 1,2 and 5).

Interviewed by 'International Affairs' [Volume 41, Number 5, dated June 1995], Admiral Vladimir Yegorov pointed out that the text of the Treaty 'rules out the possibility of either legal or political misinterpretation'.

Moreover, the Treaty on the Final German Settlement stressed that 'the united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not assert any in the future'. Therefore, the Soviet Admiral noted, 'it thus rules out the very possibility of Germany laying any claim to Kaliningrad and to the Kaliningrad region'. The Admiral further pointed out that the Germans had undertaken to delete from the German Constitution various provisions running counter to that undertaking, primarily Article 23, which allowed the possibility of

extending the 1949 Federal German Constitution 'to the other parts of Germany'.

The Admiral's article concluded with the following two forceful statements:

O 'Thus the Potsdam decision to transfer Königsberg to our country was a Four Power accord whose substance predetermined its irrevocability and irreversibility'; and:

O 'Thus the final German statement has drawn the line once and for all at the problem of the status of Königsberg and the adjoining area as an inseparable and integral part of the territory of our country, to which Russia has legal title as indisputable from the point of view of international law and from any other, as the sovereign title of any other state to its territory. On ratifying [the Treaty on the German Final Settlement] our Parliament pointed out that 'this also closes the question of the Kaliningrad Region'<sup>87</sup>.

In March 1994, the Russian Defence Minister of the day, General Pavel Grachev, announced the formation of the Kaliningrad Special Area. Admiral Yegorov told 'International Affairs' that 'the Kaliningrad Special Area has been established on the basis of the remaining forces of the Baltic Fleet, troops of the 11th Separate Guards Field Army, and the zonal air defence formation. It reports directly to the Russian Defence Ministry and General Staff, and its main task is... preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation on the basis of the inviolability of existing frontiers, which implies that Russia's ownership of the territory of Kaliningrad Region is final and irrevocable'.

The reader may wonder why Kaliningrad's territorial boundary - enclosing an area which is entirely under the control of the Soviet military - is inviolable, when the Soviets have abandoned the Stalinist model, with its 'fixed' boundaries, and replaced it with the Leninist model, within which all territorial boundaries are provisional, expendable and ultimately to be eliminated. The explanation lies in the fact that the Soviets' strategy involves leveraging their presence in Kaliningrad to procure their 'primary goal' - collective security according to their model. The truth of this was clarified further when the interviewer, Valery Gromek, a 'Krasnaya zvezda' correspondent, asked the Admiral the following pre-agreed 'bombshell' question:

'The further evolution of the situation around the troops of the Kaliningrad Special Area will depend to a considerable extent on, among other things, the position of neighbouring countries on the issue of mutual security, won't it?'

To which Admiral Yegorov replied: 'The Command of the Kaliningrad region expects their position to be realistic, reasonable and neighbourly. We give priority in our relations with neighbours to progress towards a rapprochement. We already traversed an appreciable part of this road. The important thing is to make this trend irreversible'. In other words, the regional countries - which is to say, the European Union, since Poland, Lithuania the other Baltic States will become members of the political collective - must acquiesce in our model of collective security. As the Soviet Admiral added: 'I'm certain that any problem bearing on the interests of all or most countries can only be resolved collectively'.

Yet, while making their 'Stalinist' position on Kaliningrad, and the need for a collective security system of which Moscow can approve, crystal clear, the Leninist strategists are active participants in the Baltic Sea States Council - which has a membership made up of 162 participating regions from all the Baltic countries - and in the European Union's regional policy, which promotes inter alia cross-border cooperation as a medium-term weapon to undermine the 'need' for traditional territorial borders, and thus the 'need' for sovereignty. Specifically, the Soviet military administration of the Kaliningrad Region participates within the specialised EU regional program, Interreg-II-S-Baltica, which established its General Secretariat in Rostok in early 1998. This political participation ultimately reflects the continuing subjection of the Soviet military to the CPSU's Administrative Organs Department. ■



## POSTSCRIPT

## Joschka Fischer: Marxist, alleged terrorist and advocate of violence

The following Note elaborates further on the narrative concerning the Schroder Government's Marxist, violence-advocating Minister of Foreign Affairs [page 157]:

On 24th January 2001, Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, arrived in London, where he addressed the German-British Forum at Claridges Hotel, and where he was awarded a prize for his 'contribution to Anglo-German dialogue' [see Note 21, page 254]. The fact that he had been ordered to appear only days earlier in a Frankfurt court to testify at the trial of a Left-wing terrorist, Hans-Joachim Klein, accused of involvement in three murders during an attack on the OPEC meeting held in Vienna in 1975, appeared to have no impact on the organisers of the Claridges event. Fischer was a hyperactive member of the shady Marxist 'Sponti' movement, along with Klein, a former car mechanic, in the late 1960s and early 1970s [see pages 153-254]. Klein had already informed the Frankfurt court that he regarded Fischer as a leader and an 'example among the clique' of murderous 'Sponti' activists in Frankfurt at that time.

Questions were asked about allegations that Herr Fischer's car, which he gave to Klein for repair during the period in question, was used to carry a stolen US Army handgun, believed to have been used in the murder of a German Free Democrat politician, Hainz Karry, as late as 1981. Joschka Fischer was also reported to have been involved in street protests in Frankfurt on 10th May 1976, the day after the co-leader of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, hanged herself in the Stammheim prison, Stuttgart. Fischer had been accused of supporting the use of petrol bombs during the demonstration. Earlier in January 2001, the German press had published photographs showing Fischer bringing his clenched fist down on an already injured policeman. During the demonstration, the 'Sponti' protesters showered police with petrol bombs, severely injuring an officer, Jurgen Weber. Herr Weber's lawyers insisted that Herr Fischer bore 'moral responsibility' for the debilitating injuries that their client had sustained. After the incident, Herr Fischer was arrested, but he was later released for lack of evidence. Asked in early January 2001 by the magazine *Der Spiegel* whether he could definitely rule out suggestions that he advocated the use of such weapons, Fischer equivocated, saying that 'this did not correspond with my attitude or convictions. To that extent, I can rule it out'.

However, as shown below, Herr Fischer appears to be a liar, so his statements are hard to take seriously. Interviewed on German television prior to his humiliating appearance in court, Herr Fischer said: 'I make no attempt to justify my behaviour; all I can do is try and explain the circumstances surrounding such incidents'<sup>188</sup>.

Prior to the appearance of the German Federal Vice-Chancellor, Foreign Affairs, at Claridges, there had been frantic phone calls and diplomatic activity between London and Berlin, as the Blair (Fabian) Government attempted not to persuade Herr Fischer to cancel his appearance because of his unsavoury past and because this was liable to contaminate the British Government's putative strategy to bounce Britain into the Euro regime following the then forthcoming General Election (if the Labour Party were to win), but rather to pressurise Fischer to tone down his expected remarks, given Herr Fischer's rabid advocacy of 'ever more integration' and 'total federalism'. The British Government was not, it seemed, in the slightest concerned that Herr Fischer played around with terrorism in his youth, was implicated with a murderer alleged to have been an accomplice of Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, known as 'Carlos the Jackal', and may have supported the throwing of petrol bombs at police cars. No, the Foreign Office's anxieties were altogether more banal and self-interested: all that Number 10 Downing Street wanted was to ensure that Herr Fischer did not deliver a provocative federalist speech which might

cause a 'Eurosceptic backlash' ahead of the British General Election, contributing further to the Blair Government's discomfort. The Labour Government's strategy had been to brush the issue of 'Europe' and Britain's prospective participation in the disastrous EU collective currency project, under the carpet until after the poll - after which one option would have been to launch a propaganda barrage, largely funded by the European Commission itself, to persuade the British of the unspeakable wonders and benefits of currency collectivisation.

Without confirming, before arriving at Claridges Hotel, that he would moderate his comments in any way, the German Foreign Minister proceeded, at the award ceremony, to distort the objective truth in his speech with comments such as these:

'The nightmare of British Eurosceptics, the so-called 'superstate', a new sovereign that would abolish the old nation states along with their democratic governments, is... nothing but a synthetic construct that has nothing whatsoever to do with European reality [undefined]'

'The idea that European integration means the end of Europe's nation states derives from a strange misconception that integration is a kind of zero-sum game. The truth is, integration is in its essence, a win-win formula [terms not defined]. With its cultural and democratic traditions, the nation state is the primary source of identity for the citizens of all European countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future'<sup>89</sup>.

This was, of course, nothing more nor less than the old Pan-German 'line' that the medicine of destruction of national sovereignty was to be made less unpleasant for the sceptical European peoples to swallow by hyping the splendor of the diversity of Europe's different cultures, which must be 'preserved' and 'enriched' within the 'New Europe'. In other words, the redundancy of the nation state (with the exception of 'Greater Germany') did not mean that national identities were also about to be abolished. Of course, this is a crude diversion, designed to mollify those who resent the relentless onslaught against the nation state in fulfilment of Lenin's dictum that 'we set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state' - so as to minimise the pent-up resentments that the merging of nation states will certainly generate.

So much, then, for the unequivocal statement by Herr Fischer's own President, Dr Professor Roman Herzog, on 17th September 1996, that 'the "nation state" in the style of the last century has ceased to exist as an impermeable structure, and to be quite plain, nor should it exist any longer.... Moreover the nation state is too small for the major problems and too big for the minor ones'<sup>90</sup>. And so much, too, for all those anti-nation state observations by former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and for the provocative remarks of Karl Lamers in his article in *The Times* of 27th April 1996:

The British concern is about the destruction of national identity and of the nation state, which is seen by the British as the only legitimate expression of the popular will. Germans, by contrast, say that there has long been a supranational reality created by our European civilisation. Common problems spawn common interests; our vital interests are identical'<sup>91</sup>. Herr Lamers had then argued: 'There is no question of abolishing nations' (unstated: They will simply be undermined by the EU political collective until, in strict and precise accordance with the Marxist-Leninist prescription, they will 'wither away'). 'On the contrary: Europe secures the future of nations\* and their identity' [\*no mention of 'states']. This was the same deceptive message as that proclaimed by Joschka Fischer at Claridges Hotel: 'With its cultural and democratic traditions, the nation is the primary source of identity for the citizens of all European countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future'.

However the 'nation states' tangentially alluded to by these practitioners of Pan-German strategic deception will have no sovereignty once 'integration' and 'federation' have been completed - since 'federation is a transitional form

towards the complete union... of all nations'<sup>92</sup>. And the familiar associated Pan-German rhetoric about 'democratic and cultural traditions' masks indeed the intent that the shells of the EU nation states will be 'allowed' of necessity for the time being, to retain their pathetic rubber-stamp legislatures which have delegated general powers to the European Commission, but which the national populations continue in error to believe retain the real power and authority of nation states, as in the past - contrary to the objective European Union reality. The shells of the inwardly corrupted and stripped nation states will just 'be allowed' to retain their separate 'cultures', which the collective has not yet devised a way of 'homogenising': because the abolition of language and cultural differences, handed down from Babel so to speak, is still beyond the capabilities of even the Brussels socio-political engineers at the moment.

In short, the cynical fiddling with 'cultural identity' is just about the most hollow of all the EU's desperate ruses, designed to cover up the fact that in the intended European federated political collective, the constituent nation states will have been deprived of all sovereignty, and will exist in 'shell format' only.

Herr Fischer completed his journey into the perverse and deceitful wonderland of two-faced Pan-German strategic Euro-deception, by adding:

'The EU is never going to be a state, let alone some kind of superstate. No-one wants a centralised super-bureaucracy with anonymous actors and structures totally remote from the ordinary citizen' - a more or less accurate description of the EU political collective as it already exists.

However, Herr Fischer - who took particular pleasure in citing the remarks about the necessity of 'pooling significant areas of policy' attributed to the confused Mrs Thatcher during the British European Referendum campaign (when she supported British entry to the EEC) - was speaking 'the truth' in the Leninist (deceptive) sense that, as a Communist {see below}, his objective was the establishment of a Single World Communist Government, so that the European Union will indeed never be allowed a chance to become a state or a superstate: for, as a regional form of 'governance', its function will be solely to serve as one of the key subsidiary components of the intended World Government structures. The 'legitimacy' of the intended World Communist Government is to be 'justified' by a World Parliament of representatives of the proliferating army of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), almost all of which have sprung up in the past 20 years and which are all Marxist in geopolitical orientation - and deeply Leninist in concept, given their unique flexibility and their 'fungible' nature. Nor does Herr Fischer, as a true Leninist, even pretend to believe that the World Revolution's objectives, which he clearly supports, can be achieved without violence - which is certainly intended at the crucial final stages of the World Revolution, as Anatoliy Golitsyn has explained<sup>93</sup>. On the contrary, Fischer revealed his true political colours in the Austrian magazine, Profit, published in June 1997, in which he brazenly declared: 'I realise more and more the extent to which I have remained a Marxist.... Europe is objectively a Left project'<sup>94</sup>. It is indeed!

And in his book, published in Germany in 1998 entitled 'Für einen neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag' ('For a New Social Contract'), Fischer referred repeatedly to Marx's Communist Manifesto, and to the need to adapt historical materialism to the contemporary situation - a 'line' replicated on 27th September 1999 by that 'former' Trotskyite, Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister, in a speech in Strasbourg, in which he proclaimed that 'the state must create for itself new instruments of regulation adapted to the reality of present-day capitalism'<sup>95</sup>. Moreover Fischer's 'new social contract' - which he expounded in advance of the election that swept Chancellor Kohl from office - contained the following statements of intent (or 'theses'):

□ 'The state will have to make it clear that it can no longer guarantee living standards and social security. It will declare [sic!] that these are too burdensome and that capitalism is responsible for this state of affairs'.

□ 'Globalisation must now be presented to the world's populations as an historic necessity. It must be organised, channelled and used as a means of securing totalitarian control in all spheres of human society'. If globalisation were 'left to the capitalists', this would lead to [unspecified] catastrophe.

□ 'At special times in history, violence is needed, to change society'<sup>96</sup>.

Thus the German Foreign Minister under Gerhard Schroder confessed openly:

1. That he despises capitalism, which is incapable of 'guaranteeing living standards and social security' - a bizarre statement considering the abject failure of all Communist experiments to date and the manifest superiority of capitalism as a means of raising living standards and enhancing wealth and therefore human welfare.

2. That globalisation is the natural ally of the World Revolution, which he by his own admission supports and promotes (the 'street protests' orchestrated in recent years to disrupt international meetings being a revolutionary dialectical operation which this Author knows to be directed from an office building in Budapest).

3. That he advocates totalitarian dictatorship, applicable to the whole of mankind (which will be the inevitable corollary of World (Communist) Government).

4. That revolutionary violence is OK to consummate the World Revolution. Joschka Fischer is thus a devotee not only of Lenin but also of Stalin, who wrote as follows in 'Foundations of Leninism' [Marxist Library, V, page 8, citing Lenin, 'State and Revolution', Selected Works, International Publishers, VII, page 37]: 'Lenin is right in saying that 'the revolution is impossible without the violent destruction of the machinery of the bourgeois state and its replacement by new machinery' (which the EU Collective 'provides'). The fact that the Revolution is succeeding in Europe without the 'violent destruction of the machinery of the bourgeois state', but rather through rampant Euro-legalism, is (significantly) overlooked by Fischer, whose revolutionary background has taught him that Lenin's Revolution always retains the option to resort to violence. And it does so in conformity with Marx's declaration in a letter to Kugelmann dated 12th April 1871 that the Revolution must not merely 'transfer the military-bureaucratic apparatus from one hand to the other... but smash it'. In 1997, Fischer declared himself to be a fervent Marxist. Since Gerhard Schroder is himself a 'former' Communist, German foreign policy fell into the hands of Communists, which is why German and Russian strategies today appear to be indistinguishable.

Herr Fischer's noxious prescriptions for humanity are a matter of record, and should have been taken into account by the British Labour Government - just as Gorbachev's crude display of boorish thuggery in London in 1984 should have warned the Thatcher Government with what kind of individual, and with what variant of Bolshevik mentality, they were about to deal.

As noted above, in seeking to excuse himself in January 2001 from his violent past in general, and from his alleged advocacy of the use of petrol bombs against the police in particular, Joschka Fischer had told Der Spiegel that 'this did not correspond with my attitude or convictions'. Yet in 1998, Fischer wrote that 'violence is needed, to change society'. From this contradiction in his own testimony, it can be seen that Herr Fischer is a liar, as well as a Communist and an advocate of revolutionary violence and totalitarian control. If Fischer did not condone violence in 1975, as he has claimed, he certainly advocated it, by his own arrogant self-publicised admission, in 1998.

Perhaps it was 'not for nothing', as they say in Moscow, that the cynical President Putin's translator 'inadvertently' referred to Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, at the end of a two-day summit meeting on 18th June 2000, as 'the German Fuhrer'<sup>97</sup>. ■

## Notes and references:

1. 'The World Germanica', by Dorothy Thompson, Herald Tribune, New York, 31st May 1940.
2. 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' (European Economic Community), Proceedings of seminars held in 1941, presided over by the Reich Economics Minister and President of the Deutsche Reichsbank, Dr Walther Funk, Haude & Spenersche Verlagsbuchhandlung Max Paschke, Berlin, 1942 and 1943.
3. Radio address by the Dutch Ambassador to Washington, Dr Alexander Loudon, a man with deep knowledge of German history, late 1943, cited by T. H. Tetens, 'Germany Plots with the Kremlin', Henry Schuman Inc., New York, 1953, page 69.
4. Report filed from Lisbon by Burnet Hershey, foreign correspondent for the Hearst Press, 25th January 1943.
5. Report filed from Madrid by Harold Denny, foreign correspondent for The New York Times, 17th January 1944.
6. Well before the German collapse, the Nazis exported vast sums of money. Part of these funds were used to finance the German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid, and its affiliates in other capitals and centres around the world. See, for instance: 'Hitler's Hidden Treasure', 'United Nations World', April 1952; and 'Rebirth of the Nazi International', 'The Nation', United States, 5th April 1952.
7. Under the title 'Generalplan 1945', several documents were drawn up during the closing days of the Third Reich which were captured in June 1945 by the Allies, together with the official files of the short-lived Doenitz Government in Flensburg. These documents were also initialised by Grand Admiral Doenitz and Field Marshal Keitel. The first document outlined a new Nazi political movement destined to preserve German racial principles. In this respect, Nazism diverged sharply from Lenin's Communism, since Lenin, and Marx before him, advocated the wholesale mixing of races as a means of achieving revolutionary objectives. This indeed is the inspiration behind the opening of the flood-gates by the United States and Britain to immigrants of all races: in both countries, the calculation by the Left is that these immigrants will be liable to cast their votes for parties of the Left, advocates of open-ended socialism. The second document sketched a New European Order ('Europäisches Friedensordnung'), which reveals a close resemblance to Dr Konrad Adenauer's proposals for united Europe. In the third document, entitled 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', the German High Command emphasised the conspicuous mutual advantages for Russia and Germany of a Soviet-German alliance against the West. Documents cited by Tetens, op. cit.
8. 'Tydenik Politika', Prague, 14th-20th November 1991, which contained the detail of a secret agreement worked out by Soviet and German experts in October 1990 concerning geopolitical issues. Among the heads of agreement were provision for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, which duly ensued at the end of 1992, and for destabilising Yugoslavia and bringing Croatia and Slovenia into the German sphere of influence. Bohemia and Moravia were also to be incorporated into the German sphere of influence and completely absorbed by Germany within the space of 12-15 years - that is to say, between 2002 and 2005.
9. 'The Overcoming of the Catastrophe', one of the documents prepared by Pan-German Nazi officials in the final stages of Germany's collapse [see Note 7], speculated on the prospects of a German alliance with the Soviet Union. It argued, for instance, that 'while to remain in the coalition of the enemy would mean for the Soviet Union continuous friction with Great Britain and America in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East, a coalition with Germany would free for the Soviet Union the road from the Persian Gulf to the oilfields of Kirkuk and to the Mediterranean. Such a separate peace is possible only by considerable mutual assurances'. The authors of this document made it plain that they refused to accept Germany's defeat for the second time - and advanced 7 points which they recommended should be put to the Soviets:
  - (1) 'Germany and the Soviet Union join together in creating a "Socialistic Union". Tying-in with the independence of the 16 Soviet Republics in 1943', the European peoples form nationally defined, self-governing states, allies through a defence and economic union. Internal forms within the states are to be decided by the people'.

[\* The 'independence' granted to the Soviet Republics by Stalin in 1943 was cosmetic, transitory, reversible and duly reversed after the war. It was implemented to enhance the 'weak look', to disguise from Germany and the West that the Republics remained controlled, subservient and beholden to Moscow, as before: it was the precursor of the false 'independence' of the 'former' Soviet Republics sanctioned from the top in 1991, which again enhanced the 'weak look' [Sun-Tzu], and prepared the ground for the progressive, piecemeal adhesion of the non-Muslim 'former' Republics to 'the new European Soviet' - the eastwards-expanding, socialist European Union political and economic collective].

  - (2) 'Germany recognises the Soviet Republics of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Greece, and perhaps Turkey'.
  - (3) 'The Western part of Upper Silesia and all the parts of the Warthegau and Western Prussia which were parts of Prussia until 1918 remain German territory. Germany obtains a stronger influence in Old Bohemia and in the South-East'.
  - (4) [Prisoner-of-war provision: mutual exchange].
  - (5) 'Germany gets a free hand in Northern and Western Europe, especially against Great Britain'.
  - (6) 'The whole "Socialistic Union" supports Germany, especially through deliveries of raw materials'.
  - (7) 'Germany supports Soviet Russia in reconstructing the war-devastated areas'.
10. See Note 6. The funding of the Nazi International's establishments continued for many years, probably to the present day. Organisations such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, named after the Pan-German post-First World War President, are candidates for continuing loci of the heirs of the Nazi International.
11. Cited by T. H. Tetens, 'Germany Plots with the Kremlin', Henry Schuman, Inc, New York, 1953, page 8, op. cit.
12. Tetens, op. cit., page 49.
13. The 'Madrid Circular' letter was a secret Memorandum issued by the Nazi International's German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid, a copy of which was intercepted in the mail en route from Madrid to one of the other Nazi International centres. Dated September 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, the 'Madrid Circular' contained key directives instructing West German diplomats and agents in respect of their relations with the Western powers. It undoubtedly served as a blueprint for the foreign policy of the Bonn Government; while, in a

larger sense, the document represented a General Staff plan for a 'new' German approach to the achievement of Germany's unchanged objectives. In short, the 'Madrid Circular' perpetuated Hitler's resolve to never to concede anything: 'We shall never capitulate. We shall not give in at the eleventh hour. We shall go on fighting even after twelve o'clock' (one of Hitler's rare speeches during the war [9th November 1943]).

14. In 1932, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, an enthusiast for European unification, drafted a 'top secret' memorandum to the German Government and to the German General Staff, in which he suggested the unification of Europe, beginning with the creation of a German-French combine in economics, armaments and foreign policy. The Count intended to use his plan as a means of helping Germany to overcome the consequences of Germany's defeat in the First World War, and as a lever to help prize open the door for Germany to dominate trade in Europe and Africa. Two decades later, the Pan-Germans were swift to praise the Schuman Plan, which contained all the basic principles contained in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's memorandum. For some reason, this document has been regarded by other analysts as particularly important, whereas it represented merely a collection of Pan-Germanist ideas which had been in circulation since the Kaiser's time, and earlier.

15. The Franco-German Treaty was signed by General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and by Dr Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 22nd January 1963. Earlier, on 14th January 1963, the day after the European Economic Community had fixed the basic features of the disastrous Common Agricultural Policy, one of the key dimensions of 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', President de Gaulle had declared that Britain was not ready for membership of the Community. The complete text of the Treaty was republished in *International Currency Review*, Volume 23, Number 3.

16. The Soviet draft treaty submitted in Geneva on 20th July 1955 reiterated the Preamble of the Warsaw Pact which had been signed on 14th May 1955, which asserted, in conformity with the Comintern's remit, that The Contracting Parties, reaffirm[ing] their desire to create a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of European States, irrespective of their social and political structure, whereby the said States may be enabled to combine their efforts in the interests of ensuring peace in Europe... [etc.]... In the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty concerning collective security, a goal which the Contracting Parties shall steadfastly strive to achieve, the present Treaty shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the General European Treaty comes into force'. Of course, the 'Contracting Parties' with the exception of the USSR were all ordered to sign this document; and throughout its existence, the Warsaw Pact remained effectively little more than a front for the Soviet military.

17. The German Factor of European Security', Igor Maksimychov, Head Researcher at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of [Leninist] Sciences, and a 'doctor of political science', 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 43, Number 1, 1997.

18. 'Russia and Germany: Entering a new Stage of Relations', Vladimir Grinin, Director of the 4th European Department, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Igor Bratchikov, the Deputy Director, 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 10, 1995 (November).

19. Notorious address by Dr Professor Roman Herzog, President of the German Federal Republic before the 41st Convention of German Historians, Munich, 17th September 1996. The President denigrated the nation state, saying that it was long past its 'sell-by date'. To outside observers, this spectacle of a turkey voting for Christmas made no sense at all: it was widely dismissed as an eccentric outburst. But seen in the context of the unbroken continuity of Pan-German strategy, as elaborated by the Nazi International, and against the background of German impatience with the status quo, it makes sense. In particular, the speech signalled clearly that the German establishment remains dedicated, at the highest level, to the final implementation of the Pan-German intentions of the Nazi International, reformulated at the German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid.

20. Speech by Herr Joschka Fischer entitled 'From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration', given at Humboldt University, Berlin, on 12th May 2000. In this speech, the German Federal Vice-Chancellor, Federal Affairs, also said: 'Let's not misunderstand each other: closer cooperation does not automatically lead to full integration, either by the centre of gravity [i.e., Germany - Ed.] or straight away by the majority of members. Initially, enhanced cooperation means nothing more than increased inter-governmentalisation under pressure from the facts .... The steps towards a constituent treaty - and exactly that will be the precondition for full integration - require a deliberate political act to re-establish Europe'.

21. 'Fischer faces court link to violent past', despatch from Berlin by Tony Paterson, *The Sunday Telegraph*, 14th January 2001. The appearance of Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, in a German court in connection with violent terrorist activities dating from 1976 appeared to have been completely forgotten in London just over one week later. On 24th January, Herr Fischer was the guest speaker at the German-British Forum at Claridges Hotel, London. The Forum awarded a prize to Herr Fischer for 'his contribution to the Anglo-German dialogue', in recognition of a notorious speech at Humboldt University, Berlin, in May 1999, in which Fischer had called for the creation of a 'European Government', an elected European Commission President and a new second chamber of the European Parliament. Alarmed that Fischer would use this occasion to make a provocative speech in favour of a federal Europe which could harm the Labour (Fabian) Government's prospects at the General Election expected in 2001, senior British officials urgently contacted their counterparts in Berlin to warn that such a speech could 'cause a Eurosceptic backlash'. *The Financial Times* was quite unabashed in reporting prominently that any such speech 'could undermine Tony Blair's efforts to prevent Europe, particularly the Euro, from becoming an election issue'.

22. 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' (European Economic Community), Proceedings of seminars held in 1941, presided over by the Reich Economics Minister and President of the Deutsche Reichsbank, Dr Walther Funk, Haude & Spenerische Verlagsbuchhandlung Max Paschke, Berlin, 1942 and 1943. [Note 2].

23. 'Germany and Lebensraum: The secret German-Russian carve-up of Europe', *International Currency Review Occasional Paper* Number 4, September 1993.

24. Tetens, T. H., op. cit.

25. Bernard Connally, *The Rotten Heart of Europe: The Dirty War for Europe's Money*, Faber and Faber, London, 1995.

26. David Marsh, 'The Bundesbank: The Bank that Rules Europe', David Marsh, Heinemann, London, 1992, p.132.
27. The phrase 'coup d'etat by installments' was used by Konrad Heiden in his book 'Der Fuehrer', published in Boston, 1944, on page 579 (publisher unrecorded); cited by Henry Ashby Turner Jr., Stille Professor of History, Yale University, in 'Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933', Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Massachusetts, October 1996.
28. Henry Ashby Turner Jr., Stille Professor of History, Yale University, in 'Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933', Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, MA, op. cit., October 1996, pages 163 etseq.
29. Henry Ashby Turner Jr., 'Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933'. op. cit, page 164.
30. 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism', Moscow, 1960, collective authorship, pages 735-53. The extended document, produced largely under the direction of Georgi Arbatov, later a top strategic adviser to Gorbachev and the strategy collective, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, was in fact an updated version of texts used by the Communists since the 1920s, and elaborated under Stalin.
31. Niall Ferguson, fellow and Tutor in Modern History at Jesus College, Oxford, 'The Pity of War', Penguin Books, London, 1998, pages 168 et seq.
32. Ferguson, Niall, op. cit, page 410.
33. Joel Carmichael, 'A Short History of the Russian Revolution', Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, London, 1976.
34. 'Fearing the loss of the war, the German General Staff pulled a master trick. In 1917, on [General Erich von] Ludendorff's order, Lenin and 60 leading Bolsheviks were shipped in two sealed Pullman cars from Switzerland to Germany and released on the Finnish border with the assignment to undermine the democratic Kerensky Government, break Russia away from the Allies and make a separate peace with Imperial Germany. The scheme worked well, but the German General Staff would never have dreamed that the same Bolsheviks would be able to create a tough military machine which, 25 years later, could withstand Germany's juggernaut. Not only did the German Generals help Bolshevism in Russia; they also worked to build up the modern Red Army. In their desire to circumvent the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the Reichswehr, in 1920, made secret deals with the Red Army. German military experts and German armaments firms erected airplane and tank factories in Russia, poison gas plants, and laboratories for biological warfare. In turn, the Red Army allowed German staff officers and special cadres the use of the military establishments in order to study tank warfare and tactical problems of modern blitzkrieg'. Tetens, T. H., 'Germany Plots with the Kremlin', op. cit, page 48.
35. Carl Joubert, 'Russia as it Really Is', Eveleigh Nash, London, 1904, page 131. Carl Joubert, an American who spent nine years in Russia at the turn of the 20th century, described in moving detail the plight of Jews under late 19th century Tsarism: 'Has the world forgotten the massacres in Kieff in 1880, 1881, and 1882, or in Kharkoff in 1882, in Warsaw in 1881, or in Novgorod in 1884, or in Kischineff and Gomel in 1903? In Kieff, the houses of the Jews were fired and pillaged. The children were torn from their mothers' breasts and dashed to pieces before their eyes. Four hundred souls were destroyed in two days. And whilst the smoke in Kieff rose to heaven and her streets ran red with blood, in a Jewish town, seventy versts away, a fanatic[al] priest was inflaming the passions of the moujiks against the Jews. He told a story that the Jews had stolen a Christian child and would use his blood for their Passover. No Jewish family was left alive in the place'.

Then at the massacre at Kischineff last year the scenes of horror surpassed even those at Kieff. The young Jewish girls were outraged before the eyes of their parents. One frantic woman tore herself from her captors and rushed to her daughter's rescue, but a blow from the butt of a soldier's rifle scattered her brains. The Pristav and the Politzmaister, with police and soldiery, looked on at the slaughter'.

Under a system introduced by M. Pobiedonostseff, the Tsar's Procurator of the Holy Synod from 1880 to 1904, this official was also the Tsar's 'first adviser'. He was responsible for the 'May Laws' and for the regime of rigorous persecution of all unorthodox persons, whether Jews, Christians, or Muslims. The Protestant 'Stundists' suffered afflictions under this ogre which were almost as terrible as those suffered by the Jews. Pobiedonostseff was accused by Carl Joubert and other observers of direct responsibility for 'the murder of thousands of innocent persons, the violation of countless women and girls [and] the destruction by fire of the homes of tens of thousands of helpless Jews'. Alexander III was completely in Pobiedonostseff's power, and turned a deaf ear to the appeals of the civilised cries of persecuted Jews and others, refusing with coarse oaths to hear their names mentioned in his presence'. Pobiedonostseff's influence with Nicholas II was almost as pronounced; and Joubert concluded that 'old age has not weakened his savage hatred of the heretic'.

According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica [Volume 24, page 475: 'Within a few weeks the whole of Western Russia, from the Black Sea to the Baltic, was smoking with the ruins of Jewish homes. Scores of Jewish women were dishonoured, hundreds of men, women and children were slaughtered, and tens of thousands were reduced to beggary and left without a shelter. Murders, riots or incendiary outrages took place in no fewer than 167 towns and villages, including Warsaw, Odessa and Kieff. Europe had witnessed no such scenes of savagery since the Black Death massacres in the 14th century'. The foregoing referred, by the way, just to the course of events in the first year of Pobiedonostseff's supremacy. In Warsaw, between 12th and 15th December 1881, 298 business houses, 690 small shops, and 519 private houses were burned or made desolate. The synagogues were polluted, and nearly a hundred Jews were never accounted for. Earlier, on 8th May 1881, 2,000 Jews had been left homeless in Kiev, their houses pillaged and burned, stores sacked, men murdered in the streets, women raped in public, and babies thrown from the windows of the houses.

Indeed, detailed acquaintance with the horrific list of pogroms which occurred in 1881 alone (not to mention in subsequent years), is more than enough to provide an explanation for the high quotient of Jews who became revolutionaries, and for the revenge affected by the Bolsheviks on the general population in the Soviet Great Terror.

On the basis of his findings, Carl Joubert accurately predicted the forthcoming Russian Revolution. In an 'Open Letter to the Tsar', published at the end of his book, Joubert wrote: 'Your Majesty [who was known as the Holy Tsar, or the 'Zembla Bogh'- the God on Earth, or the Little Father] is worshipped and beloved of his people. So was Louis XVI of France. France had only one Marat; but there are more men of his [evil] stamp in Russia than your Majesty could count. There are also many Robespierres and Dantons. The Reign of

Terror in France will sink into insignificance and oblivion when the day of the Russian Revolution dawns.... The seeds of revolution are already sown in your Majesty's dominions. There are mothers bringing up sons who will be the judges of vengeance, and who are now learning to lisp the word. There are in foreign universities young Russians who are studying science with set jaws, and thinking; but they will not always be thinking. In the breasts of every humble moujik there is a consuming fire. He is ignorant and cannot diagnose the malady, and he is patient in his suffering. But when the young men return from the foreign universities and tell him the real nature of his disease, and fan the smouldering fire within him, the bestial flame of savagery will leap out, destroying in wanton fury all whom he is incited to destroy'.

Perhaps understandably, the obverse of the still widespread assumption that the Russian Revolution was a 'Jewish plot', is the belief among many Jews that 'Christians' were responsible for the pogroms in late 19th century Russia. This is inaccurate, since the perpetrators were of course not Christians at all. They may have belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church, but this, like many other Christian churches, does not necessarily evince or practice true Christianity. To be a Christian, one must, as Jesus Christ taught, be 'born anew in the Spirit'. One cannot be a Christian, truly, without being 'born again': the phrase 'born again' Christian is thus a tautology. And any Christian 'born again', and thus 'in Christ', could not and would not have performed such heinous deeds. An understanding of this can only come from knowledge of true Christianity, which diverges sharply from what is taught in the main Christian denominations (which in some cases, have turned almost everything of Christ 'upside down').

A study of the pogroms against the Jews in Russia certainly provides the objective student with a sobering rationale for understanding the Russian Revolution - which of course unleashed a terror of an order of magnitude yet greater than the programs themselves. And the Devil was able to procure a further visitation - by polluting the minds of Adolf Hitler and his associates, who were mesmerised by the proportion of Jews among the leaders and cadres of Lenin's Revolution: a mania that led directly to the Holocaust. Thus was the evil perpetrated in the last decades of 19th century Russia by Pobiedonostseff and those he and others instigated, visited upon subsequent generations on a vastly greater scale.

36. Professor Richard Pipes, of Harvard University, 'Russia under the Bolshevik Regime', Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1993, pages 425-427. Military collaboration between the Soviets and the Germans continued until September 1933, nine months after Hitler came to power, to the great benefit of both armies.

37. 'Europe's Road to War: The Balkanisation of Europe: The Failure of Collective Security', Paul-Marie Couteaux, first published in 1977 as 'L'Europe vers la Guerre', Editions Michalon; English language edition abridged and translated by Ian Milne, The June Press, London 1999.

38. Information given to the author by the 'GRU defector' Victor Suvorov (not his real name).

39. Directive of the German High Command on Political Warfare in the USA, issued by the Nazi Chief of the Intelligence Division of the German High Command, Admiral Walter Wilhelm Canaris, on 15th March 1944. The document laid bare the basic German strategy of scaring the United States with Bolshevism - the threat that Germany and the rest of Europe were in danger of wholesale Bolshevisation - while, at the same time, recommending a long-range policy of Russo-German collaboration. The Nazis and their successors have understood and applied the dialectical method throughout - in the sense that they have been running 'opposing' policies simultaneously: the fake pro-Western policy 'of expedience', and the long-range policy of close collaboration and identity of strategic objectives with the Soviets/Russians.

40. President Roosevelt was referred to in the 'Madrid Circular' as 'Rosenfeld'. In fact this name was frequently used by the Nazis, who tried to show in their propaganda that President Roosevelt was a descendant of a Dutch Jewish family from New York.

41. The 'Madrid Circular', labelled TOP SECRET, and 'Completed, Beginning of September 1950', with distribution ordered for 'Dr M. v. T', Bonn, and for Nazi International recipients in Rome, Barcelona, Buenos Aires and South Africa, was a secret memorandum, intercepted by a Western intelligence service, which was issued by the German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid (the Nazi International's Headquarters). It amounted to a general analysis, from the continuing Nazi perspective, of the world geopolitical situation following the outbreak of the Korean War. The Geopolitical Centre was known to issue secret memoranda, containing directives, from time to time. The memoranda were distributed among Pan-German circles in Bonn and in other parts of the world. The Madrid document constituted a blueprint to guide the foreign policy of the Bonn Government. It also represented, in a larger sense, a General Staff plan for a revised, updated, German approach to realising Germany's full potential, en route to dividing and conquering the world.

42. Summary: The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, was not only involved in left-wing terrorism and agitation activity in the 1970s, but is on record as confirming that he is a Marxist (Communist), advocates a global world dictatorship, denies that the nation state can provide welfare and security for its citizens (i.e., is redundant), and is in favour of the use of violence in pursuit of revolutionary objectives. Notwithstanding this pedigree, the German-British Forum invited Fischer to address a dinner meeting at Claridges Hotel, London, on 24th January 2001, at which it honoured him with an award for his contribution to the furtherance of Anglo-German dialogue. Instead of expressing concern at all of this, the Fabian Government of Tony Blair was reported, ahead of Fischer's visit to London, to be concerned only with the likelihood that Fischer would deliver a speech promoting the establishment of a European Federation, a European Government and so on - which Ministers were anxious should not occur, for fear of the speech being seized upon by the 'Euro-sceptic movement' and developed as an election issue. Urgent representations were made by British officials to Berlin, in an attempt to obtain assurances that Fischer's remarks would be toned down in deference to the Government's pre-election anxieties. This episode illustrated the depths of cynicism to which British foreign and domestic policy has sunk, and showed that the British Fabian Government placed its petty electoral considerations above the issues raised by the German Foreign Minister's petrol-bomb-linked past behaviour, and his speech advocating a global dictatorship and the use of violence to achieve the realisation of Lenin's objectives. Coincidentally, on the same day that Fischer addressed the British-German Forum, a senior Minister,



Peter Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, had to resign (for a second time, this being in fact the first occasion on which a British Minister has ever left a Government in disgrace twice) after he appeared to have lied and misled his colleagues. The official 'spin' surrounding this matter suggested that the 'integrity' of the UK Government had been tainted by Mandelson's conduct. It was of course much more seriously tainted by the failure of the Foreign Secretary to make it clear to the thick-skinned German authorities that, in the circumstances, the presence of Herr Fischer, in view of the disgrace that he brings to Germany, let alone his hosts, would not be welcome in the British capital.

43. 'The German Talks Back', Heinrich Hauser, a German newspaperman, Henry Holt, 1945. This book became a best-seller in the German-American neighbourhoods of New York, Chicago, Cleveland and St Paul. The publishers apologised in newspaper advertisements for presenting 'this angry and incendiary book ... which will prove infuriating reading to Americans'. In addition to expressing extreme hatred for and jealousy of the United States, Hauser said that Germans were 'disgusted with Western civilisation, the culmination of which was and is the United States'. Hauser argued that the Germans have no choice but to go with the East. It was Hauser's contention that the Germans 'must be provided with a dream powerful enough to justify the sacrifice of 8 to 10 million lives', and he added: 'There is only one great ideology left which as a nation we have not yet tried - Communism. If the Germans accept Communism for their new dream and ideology and do it quickly, they will be lifted almost overnight from the status of outcast lepers [the status to which, of course, they had wantonly condemned themselves - Ed.] to the status of allies of the biggest land power on earth.... If one has to embrace Communism in order to get Lebensraum, what of it?'

44. The lure of German-Russian rapprochement was and is not just confined to the minds of the heirs of the Nazi International. This voice of German Realpolitik has 'many echoes'. For instance an anti-Communist, Friedrich Stampfer, a former member of the German Parliament, published an article in the 'Neue Volkszeitung', New York, in December 1944, in which he severely criticised the wartime allies for planning a long-term occupation, demilitarisation of Germany and total eradication of its war potential. Stampfer, who was a Social Democratic leader during the Weimar Republic, warned the West that unless leniency was shown, Germany would turn to the East. This was nothing but bluff (encouraged, in fact, by the Nazi International), since under occupation the Germans would not be free to form their own alliances. After both World Wars, leading German-American circles conducted large-scale 'whining' campaigns in order to rescue the Fatherland from the consequences of military defeat. As soon as these 'campaigns of pity' had yielded the anticipated results (by changing Western policy towards Germany), they switched back to German Realpolitik. The Adenauer Government, and the 'Madrid Circular', praised the 300+ German-language dailies and magazines in the United States, for their success in disseminating fraudulent reports serving to discredit the American Occupation, and for branding the Nuremberg trials as illegal, and American statesmen as tools of Jewish revenge. This defiant attitude became rampant after the Second World War. The view of Hauser and Stampfer that, if necessary in the interests of Realpolitik, Germany would side with the Soviets, was widely disseminated in these publications.

45. Tetens, T. H., 'Germany Plots with the Kremlin', op. cit., page 73.

46. Dr Joseph Retinger was a professional Polish revolutionary and perpetual 'behind-the-scenes' agitator for European unification who seemed to have the entree at the highest levels on both sides of the Atlantic. This small, often ailing, scruffy fellow, who lived in a depressing mansion block in Westminster, was a mason of high degree. In the biography of Retinger written by his fellow exiled Pole and sidekick, John Pomian, entitled 'Joseph Retinger: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise' (Sussex University Press, 1972), Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands, who provided a short Foreword, wrote of the Bilderberg Conferences, ostensibly established with the blessing of (former SS officer) Prince Bernhard himself, that 'with his typical modesty, Dr Retinger always contrived to remain in the background; but he was, in point of fact, the prime mover' [behind the Bilderberg influence-building operation]. Of course he was: for Retinger was a long-term revolutionary agent of the Comintern. According to Prince Bernhard, Retinger was 'deeply concerned about the divergencies, already visible or impending, between the United States and Europe on certain important issues. He considered it of vital interest for the free world to smooth over these differences and reconcile all those who belong naturally to one and the same community. This marked the beginning of those meetings between eminent American and European personalities that were later to be known as the 'Bilderberg Conferences'. However, the real significance of these conferences is that they provide a continuing framework for selling 'convergence' - a concept developed by the Soviet long-range strategists. In the Leninist lexicon, 'convergence' is an Aesopian word with a hidden meaning. To naive Western policymakers and opinion-formers, 'convergence' means rapprochement between the West and the East, with the West moving 50% 'leftwards', and the East moving 50% 'rightwards' (towards Western norms) - although the continuing World Revolution has procured that the meaning of 'Left', 'Centre' and 'Right' is constantly drifting to the Left, as a result of the cultural offensive which seeks to replace Western norms with 'garbage values', and to establish a new 'cultural hegemony' along the lines advocated by Antonio Gramsci, the influential Italian Communist. To the Leninists themselves, 'convergence' means the convergence of the West towards the East (that is, 100% movement to the Left by the West). In agitating for and acting as the 'prime mover' of the Bilderberg Conferences, Retinger was therefore not in fact establishing a means of 'smoothing over and reconciling differences' between the United States and Europe, but rather setting in motion a mechanism which would provide the World Revolution with a permanent 'influence-building' and networking framework which the Leninist strategists would exploit over the years to influence Western thinking in furtherance of Soviet strategic objectives. A study of the lists of attendees at successive Bilderberg Conferences in recent years shows that a significant number of leftists and fellow-travelling Marxists are 'tapped' (invited) to participate at Bilderberg Meetings. These people - of whom a conspicuous example has been the former Editor of The Observer, London, Will Hutton, the author of a book entitled 'The State We're In', in which he argued that the political establishment must be 'smashed' (a word used in this sense only by revolutionaries) - are carefully selected to ensure that the discussions conform with the agenda of the Left. As an SS officer, Prince Bernhard

absorbed his preference for the destruction of nation states through their merging within the Nazis' intended 'Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', from the wartime Nazi entourage in which he functioned.

47. The 'pillar' image, extensively used by the European Union Collective today, is derived from Hitler's 'Main Kampf'. In Volume 2, Chapter 11, 'Propaganda and Organisation' (following Chapter 10, entitled 'Federalism as a Mask'), Hitler uses the imagery of a 'three-pillar structure' in reference to the 'Old Reich' - the pillars being the monarchistic state 'form', civil service and the army, and appears to be bemoaning the destruction of the old state destroyed by the revolution of 1918. Hitler then redefines the 'three-pillar' structure, changing the three pillars to 'popularity, force and tradition' - all combining to create an 'unshakeable authority'. There is a parallel between the three-pillar structure of governance as envisaged by Hitler and the 'three pillars' encapsulated by the collective treaties of the European Union, which are: 1: The European Community; 2: Foreign and Security Policy; and 3: Justice and Home Affairs [source: Weatherill, S., and Beaumont, P., 'EU Law' (London, Penguin Books, 1999, 3rd Edition)]. Many other Nazi-era Pan-German notions and practices have been imported into the European Union Collective's framework: for instance, Qualified Majority Voting, a mechanism for accelerating and ensuring the approval of measures proposed by the European Führer-Commission, is borrowed from the practice used in earlier decades by the German states. The author is grateful to Mike McDonald, of Chorlton, Manchester, for some of these insights.

48. Tetens, T. H., op. cit, page 131.

49. Tetens, T. H., op. cit, page 131. 'Der Weg' [The Way, or 'The Road'] was inspired by the thinking and propaganda material disseminated by the German Geopolitical Centre in Madrid. Hitler's grave mistake in attacking Russia merely served to promote, in the eyes of these Nazi planners, the concept of Soviet-German collaboration developed by General Karl Haushofer following the First World War. It is interesting that 'put' (Russian) means 'way' or 'path', as in Putin.

50. Tetens, T. H., op. cit, page 149. On the preceding page, Tetens wrote (1953): 'Even today in his own party, the Christian Democratic Union, Dr Adenauer is disliked and feared for his adherence to authoritarian concepts of government. Frequently, German papers have complained about Dr Adenauer's disregard of wishes of the people and of democratic procedure. His extreme conservatism prevented him from going along with the Nazis [sic], although there were no great differences between his own nationalistic outlook and the foreign policies of the Nazi Party.... It is significant that Dr Adenauer surrounded himself in the Chancellery and in his Foreign Office with dozens of former Nazis who had served as top schemers under Ribbentrop and Dr Goebbels'. Dr Konrad Adenauer's 'non'-association with the Nazi Party is not documented, and if true, was at best cosmetic. But the US authorities placed great hopes in Dr Adenauer from the beginning, in part precisely because he was, on paper, 'not a Nazi'. His relations with Washington were carefully cultivated long before he became Chancellor in the Bonn Republic in 1949. Adenauer was one of the first German politicians who was allowed to travel to the United States (in 1946) and to propagate his views there. It was while Dr Adenauer was in the United States that Drew Middleton noted his 'fondness for large, even grandiose, political conceptions and theories'. Diplomats found it 'difficult to reconcile these flights of thought with the urgency of Germany's needs at the moment'.

51. According to contemporary German newspaper reports, Nazi diplomats managed to escape investigation and punishment either by going underground in 1945, or else by posing as members of the resistance against Hitler. Such Nazis founded the organisation with the wholly misleading title of 'Evangelisches Hilfswerk' (Evangelical Relief Committee) shortly before or immediately following the Nazi collapse. As soon as they realised that nothing had happened to them, they grew considerably bolder, organising a 'shadow' foreign office called 'Büro für Friedensfragen' ('Bureau for Peace Problems'), an innocent-sounding title which masked the fact that those involved were all continuing Nazis. (This was the *modus operandi* of the Nazi International: it manifested - and continues to manifest - itself behind the cover of innocuous-sounding organisations, one of which is today the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a 'convergence' think-tank which promotes German-Russian collaboration and the Single European Space). When Dr Adenauer organised his Government's new Foreign Ministry, the whole of this Ribbentrop group was transferred from Stuttgart to Bonn.

52. The technique of a central revolutionary agitprop organisation spawning innumerable subsidiary, related or interlinked pressure groups, including groups which appear to have no link to the 'parent' revolutionary organisation at all, is vigorously pursued in the United States by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), which is located in offices immediately adjacent to Legislative Branch offices on Capitol Hill. The British intelligence writer Brian Crozier published evidence in 'The Spectator', London, to show that IPS had been established to serve the interests of the KGB and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. IPS launched legal action against the author and the publication, but later withdrew its suit abruptly with no explanation. The inspiration and direction of IPS is to energise in the United States the Bolshevik-Leninist cultural offensive which seeks to replace civilised norms, traditions and values with 'garbage values', in accordance with a Directive laid down in the 'Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Section V: The Tasks of the Party in the Spheres of Ideology, Education, Instruction, Science and Culture', which deployed the ideas and prescription of the Italian revolutionary, Antonio Gramsci. His insight was that the Communists' hopes for spontaneous revolution were illusory, and that, in order to capture power in a state, the Revolution must first 'capture the culture'. By culture, Gramsci meant the powerful non-Government institutions of great influence throughout the nation - churches, trade unions, the mass media, political parties (through infiltration, as in Britain, the United States and elsewhere), universities and other centres of education, foundations and business organisations. (Thus, for instance, in Britain, Will Hutton, the former Editor of The Observer [see Note 46] resurfaced as chief executive of The Industrial Society, an influence-building organisation). Antonio Gramsci 'stood Marx on his head, arguing that the cultural superstructure determines the political and economic base', according to Scott Powell, writing in 'Policy Review', Summer 1988, Number 45, page 65. 'Like Gramsci, the IPS recognizes the imperative of "the long march through the institutions" - the

media, the universities, public interest, religious, and cultural institutions. By working through such institutions, cultural values can be changed and morals softened, setting the stage of political and economic power to fall into the hands of the radical left. IPS publications, films, and works address issues of humanistic appeal, but frame those issues with creative [i.e. Leninist - Ed.] semantics that induce a biased perception of reality. The fact that IPS is regularly referred to as a "liberal" organisation indicates either that the IPS has successfully masked its radical character in the eyes of traditional liberals, or else that the meaning of liberalism has radically changed. In either case, the Institute's efforts have sown seeds of doubt, confusion and guilt among constituencies that identify with liberalism. And by focusing blame on the full range of American institutions, IPS perspectives weaken faith in the system while at the same time promoting a subliminal means of inducing behavior modification'.

53. In the spring of 1949, the former Nazi German Ambassador to Moscow, Rudolf von Nadolny, travelled from the Soviet Zone to talk things over with leading industrial, political and military Germans in the West. Another trans-zone 'convergence' merchant was ex-Chancellor Joseph Wirth, who made frequent visits to East Germany.

54. The full text of this passage from the Editorial entitled 'Courage Towards a Rapallo', published in the weekly 'Der Fortschritt', Essen, 16th May 1952, read as follows: 'Never before has the world political situation been so favourable for Germany as it is today.... It is not for nothing that both power blocs concentrate their efforts on Germany in order to dominate it politically and economically. Therein lies our chance and our obligation. Our economy has to be kept independent from both sides.... This is the way that leads towards sovereignty and equality which finally will eliminate those clauses which were imposed upon us as a result of the lost war.... While integration with the West restricts our industry to markets where we are subjected to a cut-throat competition, the Eastern bloc offers us markets where countless millions are hungry for our industrial goods. Here (in the East) is Germany's market.... Thirty years ago, on 16th April 1922, there were courageous men who, in Rapallo, through direct Russo-German negotiations, brought [about] a great turning point in Germany's postwar policy.... The situation in present-day Germany should exhort our leading statesmen to show courage... courage towards a Rapallo policy'.

55. The Haushofer-Hitler and Kennan-Pentagon blueprints for Germany are shown by this comparison:

Hitler-Haushofer  
BLUEPRINT FOR GERMANY

1. Liquidation of Versailles Treaty.
2. German equality (= Hitler's demand for 'Gleichberechtigung').
3. A prosperous German economy.
4. A powerful German Army.
5. Economic integration of Europe with Germany. Europe with Germany.
6. A strong European Continent with Germany as 'the bulwark against the East'.

Kennan-Pentagon  
BLUEPRINT FOR GERMANY

1. Liquidation of Potsdam Agreement.
2. German equality (= Adenauer's demand for 'Gleichberechtigung').
3. A prosperous German economy.
4. A powerful German Armed Forces.
5. Economic integration of
6. A strong European Continent with Germany as 'the bulwark

In the 'Madrid Circular' of September 1950, the Nazi geopoliticians boasted that Germany's quick resurrection had been the consequence of their 'superb planning\*', which had resulted in 'the first broad cracks in the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements': 'It is our great asset in the ledger of geopolitical schooling and planning that five years after Potsdam, the aims of our enemies have been abandoned, Germany's strength has been preserved, and the Fatherland can look forward to a revival rich in possibilities. The revival of Germany was not a gift of the Americans but exclusively the result of our own far-sighted planning.... Five years after Potsdam, the Yankees are stuck deep in the mud; they are now seeking the advice of our generals whom they formerly called criminals; they come pleading for our help against Russia. The American policy of reconciliation with Germany was very advantageous [for us] because it gave us a breathing spell at the very beginning; it was precisely this policy which smashed the allied front. Roosevelt's death opened the way to those forces who advocated a positive or, at least, a more moderate programme towards Germany, and whose blueprint for a postwar world was entirely opposed to that of Roosevelt. These circles [led by the indoctrinated Pan-Germanist, George Kennan - Ed.] recognised in the Russian victory a strengthening of Communism, and they feared its complications and the shattering effects it entailed for the capitalistic system'. The 'Madrid Circular' had elaborated: 'These considerations resulted in a plan - first formulated secretly in Washington and later openly discussed, aiming at the creation of a united Europe as a bulwark against Russia, with the proviso that a strengthened and rearmed Germany be incorporated in such a combination'.

But of course this plan, which the Kennanites adopted as though they had first thought of it, was nothing more than the same blueprint as that originally intended by the Kaiser, elaborated by General Karl Haushofer and Dr Gustaf Stresemann, and by the Nazi planners under Hitler and subsequently at the Nazi International HQ in Madrid. The fantastic consequences of this long-range German geopolitical planning become absolutely clear if we compare the plan which Hitler and General Haushofer had devised for 'Greater Germany, and the Kennan-Pentagon blueprint for a resurrected Reich, as shown above. This comparison shows that the Americans simply adopted Hitler's plans. The supreme irony, of course, is that because the Americans never understood the dialectical relationship of National Socialism to International Socialism (Communism), their perception that a united Europe would provide a bulwark against Soviet Communism was flawed from the outset: the Soviets, in any case, set about at once to ensure, by means of the deployment of agents, agents of influence, blackmail and other standard Leninist methods, that the emerging European Communities would be established with the poten-

tial for a decisively collectivist orientation. That policy has proved so outstandingly successful that the European Union has become a primary instrument for the completion of Lenin's World Revolution.

\* 'Our superb planning' can be traced back to a 15-page memorandum from the German geopolitician Dr Colin Ross to the German Foreign Office dated 27th July 1943, entitled 'Plan for an Ideological Campaign in the United States', in which Dr Ross proposed the immediate implementation of a carefully planned psychological warfare offensive to undermine the anticipated Allied military victory. Dr Ross regarded US public opinion as the weakest link because the American people seemed especially susceptible to 'scare propaganda' hinting that a defeated Germany would join the ranks of Bolshevism. The memorandum, which was addressed to the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, von Steengracht, became the guideline for Germany's highly successful blackmail diplomacy in postwar America. The paper also argued that 'in the case of total military collapse, we must continue the struggle by means of psychological warfare until the day arrives when weapons can speak again. Psychological warfare will prove especially successful in the USA, where many groups (weiter Kreise) are fed up with the war. [To carry out psychological warfare] it is necessary to set up a far-flung organisation.... We must do everything possible to impress upon American public opinion that after the liberation of Europe they will become involved in an endless maze of insoluble contradictions. However great their sacrifices may be, they will end up in a blind alley, exactly as happened in 1918 under Wilson's grandiose planning'.

56. The 'Tydenik Politika' article in 'Rada' (Ukraine) dated 25th December 1992 was noted by the BBC Monitoring Service, 25th January 1993, at ref: SU/1595 A1/1. 'Tydenik Politika' had a mixed, even unsavoury, reputation: but later events proved this leak to be well-sourced.

57. Document Number One contained within the bundle of papers entitled 'Generalplan 1945', drawn up during the closing days of the Third Reich. The papers were captured by the Allies together with the files of the short-lived Doenitz Government in Flensburg. The document contained the following defiant statement, which shows that a perverse loyalty to Hitler was perpetuated, despite dissatisfaction with 'rotten party bureaucracy' and 'a self-deceiving Government caste': BERLIN, 3RD APRIL 1945: The German Freedom Movement... faithful to the oath of the Fuhrer, and with fealty to his work, the movement disassociates itself: (a) From rotten party bureaucracy; (b) From a self-deceiving Government caste; (c) From a policy of adventure; (d) From political narrow-mindedness ('Weltanschaulichen Starrsinn'); [and] From falling back into the capitalistic system'.

58. Tetens, T H., op. cit., page 247.

59. Report in *Corriere della Sera* highlighted by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in his Eurofile column, *The Daily Telegraph*, 20th October 2000.

60. English language text of the Treaty of Rome, page 164, Final Provisions.

61. 'International Affairs', April 1993, Volume 39, Number 2, pages 31-36, published by the Russian Foreign Ministry, 14 Gorokhovskiy Pereulok, Moscow 103064, Russia.

62. When the Mason learns that the key to the warrior on the block is the proper application of the dynamo of living power, he has learned the mystery of his Craft. The seething energies of Lucifer are in his hands and before he may step onward and upward, he must prove his ability to properly apply energy'. [Manley P. Hall, *The Lost Keys of Freemasonry*, Macoy Publishing and Masonic Supply Company, Inc., Richmond, VA, 1923, page 48; 12th printing, 1976. Manley P. Hall was an Adept of the Occult]. The Masonic secret that most members of the Craft (Masons) never learn is that only the Mason who 'learns the proper application of the dynamo of living power' will have 'the seething energies of Lucifer in his hand'. Documentation of the fact that LUCIFER (Satan) is the source of 'the Light'(false light) that Masons seek, is to be found on page 321 of Albert Pike's book 'Morals and Dogma', which was routinely handed to all Masons receiving advanced degrees, at least up until 1972. The process of 'learning the proper application of the dynamo of living power' and of obtaining 'the seething energies of Lucifer' is code for inviting demonic possession. It is possible for whole groups, even societies, to invite demonic possession, as happened under the Nazis. There is a tangible deadness and a perverse evil about the European Union Collective and all its works - especially its routine deviousness and lies, and most of all its 'seething energies', which point to possession, or at least an orientation towards it. So it was appropriate that the EU selected as successor to the discredited Jacques Santer, the former President of the European Commission, Sig. Romano Prodi, a former Italian Prime Minister who has been named in Italian scandals and who is notable for having claimed, in an Affidavit deposited in connection with the case surrounding a predecessor, the murdered Prime Minister Aldo Moro, that he (Prodi) had established the location of the former Prime Minister's body in the course of playing with an ouija ('YES-YES') board on a Saturday afternoon when he was relaxing with friends. Ouija board activity is extremely dangerous and invites demonic infestation.

63. 'The more states are intertwined with one another, the more durable will be the net of their relationships': previously cited, crucially revealing statement by Andrei Kozyrev, the former Russian Foreign Minister, in 'Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung', 8th January 1995, citing what Kozyrev had earlier told 'Frankfurter Rundschau'. Both newspapers have a long record of promoting transnationalism and European collectivism.

64. 'We need to forge a chain of relationships binding us together in a durable peace': remarks by the former British Prime Minister, John Major, speaking in Moscow even as the Soviet military staged their largest, most menacing and most provocative 'post-Soviet' display of naked military force at Poklonnaya Gora, Moscow, on 9th May 1995; as cited in *The Times*, London, 10th May 1995, page 10.

65. 'I look forward to the day when Russia is a fully-fledged member of the European Community': John Major, in his notorious 1992 New Year's Day broadcast on BBC Radio 4.

66. Close observers engaged in reconsidering the curious career and behaviour of John Major have raised a number of question marks surrounding his stewardship. His sympathies seemed on key occasions to be for the Soviets. Furthermore, his victory at the General Election in 1992 was warmly welcomed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the following terms: This development is a great encouragement for those of us who hold the same convictions. I am particularly happy to be working together with you in ... doing our utmost to help establish the unity Europe'.

67. The notorious address by Dr Professor Roman Herzog, the Pan-Germanist President of the Federal

Republic of Germany, before the 41st Convention of German Historians, Munich, 17th September 1996, in which Dr Herzog said: The "nation state" in the style of the last century has ceased to exist as an impermeable structure, and to be quite plain, nor should it exist any longer'. Thus the nation state was perhaps tolerable as long as it was 'permeable', which is to say, could be flooded with outside influences, so that it would lose its way and its identity and in due course would cease to be recognisable as a nation state.

68. Environmentalism Note: While the Soviet Leninist strategic collective was fronted by Mikhail Gorbachev, preparations for the consolidation of the 'common mind' on a global scale were given a substantial boost. (In reading what follows, it is important to recall that the Aesopian language employed typically encases a hidden meaning - and also to be aware that under overt Communism, decisions and prescriptions ostensibly applied in a domestic (USSR) context were, in fact, intended as models for the whole world). Addressing the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also referred to in Soviet sources as the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy) on 25th July 1988, MVD General Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, explained that 'a year ago we established a Scientific Coordinating Centre designed to maintain constant ties with scientific centres in this country and abroad. The idea is being advanced for a special [= secret - Ed.] subdivision for scientific and technological cooperation which could engage in the whole gamut of global problems which are exerting an increasing influence on foreign policy and diplomacy. Examples are ecology, alternative sources of energy and outer space, which have already become subjects of diplomatic talks and interstate relations'.

'A special [= secret - Ed.] centre has been set up at the [Foreign] Ministry on the basis of our Higher [Lenin] School. The Institute of Sociological Studies of the USSR Academy of [Leninist] Sciences is helping us form this service. It has already carried out a number of interesting investigations, the findings of which are taken into consideration in our work. In the broader context, we are talking about the creation of a mechanism that would make it possible to correlate [global] public opinion with planned foreign policy actions, and to shape public opinion'.

A possible application of this 'mechanism' had occurred in 1986. Following the 'accident' at the Chernobyl nuclear power station - which took place at 1.25 a.m. on a Saturday morning, 26th April 1986 - the Soviets embarked upon the first phases of their global 'environmentalism' campaign, designed to accelerate the creation of the controlled 'common mind' globally, while paving the way for the eventual abolition of private property and providing the 'rationale' for exercising the eventual option of 'population reduction' - stressing against this background that the 'planet' was obviously in grave danger and that 'if matters continue as they are', the human race may perish. 'Global issues' like 'environmentalism' have been developed by the 'General Staff' of the World Revolution as weapons with which to attack the nation state as being 'redundant' and unsuited to dealing with such issues.

69. The creation of the 'common mind', as touched upon earlier, is the central objective of the 'Gramsci dimension' of the World Revolution. According to Antonio Gramsci, the cultural superstructure determines the economic base - which is the opposite of the Marxist assumption. Therefore, by changing the 'culture', a new 'cultural hegemony' can be established, addressing 'issues of humanistic appeal... framed with creative semantics that bias the perception of reality' [Scott Powell, 'Policy Review', Summer 1988: see Note 52]. In the 'Draft Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Documents of Current History, Number 16', published by Crosscurrents Press, Inc., New York 1961, page 106, under the heading: 'V: The Tasks of the Party in the Spheres of Ideology, Education, Instruction, Science and Culture', the CPSU strategists of the World Revolution stated: 'Special importance is attached by the Party to the moulding of the rising generation'. This was a reference to the KGB-Party's launch of the 'permissive society' which manifested itself in the disarray of the 1960s, setting the stage for the moral collapse of today and creating a cadre of morally disoriented, cynical leaders who have risen to the top in many Western countries: Britain, France, Germany and, until the arrival of the new Bush Administration, the United States under the 'Scum Administration' of Bill Clinton, a revolutionary allegedly turned by Czech Intelligence in the early 1970s, to whom Lord Rees-Mogg referred in an op-ed. piece in The Times, London, as 'that creep'. Addressing the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the CPSU General Secretary, acclaimed the success of the 'permissive society' launch in preparing the ground for the development of 'the common mind' and of a cadre of leftist leaders in the West who would accelerate the rush towards the completion of Lenin's World Revolution, in the following Aesopian statement: The 1960s will occupy a special place in the history of world socialism'.

70. Article in The Times, London, entitled 'Beyond the Nation State - a German Vision of Europe', 27th April 1996, by Karl Lamers, Foreign Affairs Spokesman for the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag, and an adviser to Kohl.

71. 'Russia and Germany: Entering a New Stage of Relations', Vladimir Grinin and Igor Bratchikov, published in International Affairs, Volume 41, #10, [November] 1995.

72. 'The Role of the Euro in the World: Past Developments and Future Perspectives', Dr Jiirgen Stark, Deputy Governor, Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Bank for International Settlements/ Bundesbank Conference, Frankfurt-am-Main, 29th September 2000.

73. The author alluded to this encounter with Dr Otmar Issing in several subsequent issues of International Currency Review and Economic Intelligence Review.

74. Grinin and Bratchikov, op. cit.: see for instance, Note 71.

75. 'Germany in Secret Talks with Russia to take back Konigsberg', filed by Tony Paterson from Berlin, The Sunday Telegraph, 21 st January 2001.

76. 'Common Long-term Interests', Hans-Freidrich von Ploetz, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany, 'International Affairs', published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Volume 45, Number 5, 1999, pages 86 etseq.

77. 'Russia and Germany: Entering a New Stage of Relations', Vladimir Grinin and Igor Bratchikov, 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, op. cit, Volume 41, #10, [November] 1995.

78. Tetens, T. H., op. cit. The references to German press articles are taken from this source.
79. The Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation (The Treaty of the Elysee) signed on 22nd January 1963 by Dr Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle, which is of indefinite length, the text containing no cancellation clauses and no specified time-limit. The Joint Declaration (preamble) includes the phrase: '... a reinforcing of cooperation between the two countries constitutes an indispensable stage on the way to a united Europe, which is the aim of the two peoples', and notes 'the solidarity uniting the two peoples, as much from the point of view of their security as from the point of view of their economic and cultural development'.
80. Joint Statement by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand at their meeting in Munich on 18th September 1990, cited by Hans-Dietrich Genscher in a Policy Statement on the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, in the Bundestag, 20th September 1990.
81. The full texts of both French-Soviet bilateral treaties (the aborted Soviet draft and the revised Russian text) were published in 'Soviet Analyst', Volume 21, Number 5, April-May 1992, pages 6-12. The Leninist strategists, whose military intelligence experts and Foreign Ministry apparatchiks drafted the texts, developed their 'bilateral treaty offensive' as a means of enmeshing each West European country in a network of treaty relationships so that each would be burdened under international law with obligations towards Moscow which would serve Moscow's strategic interests. But at the Conference on the Future of International Security convened at the Cenin Palace of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague on 25th-26th April 1991, Manfred Woerner, who was then Secretary-General of NATO, said that the creation of an interlocking network of bilateral and multilateral treaties was highly commendable: 'Our discussions will help us to create, through incremental steps, in a process overtime, a mutually reinforcing security system where multilateral and bilateral ties unfold their synergistic effects'. There was no recognition on Woerner's part that the Soviets were implementing their 'bilateral treaty offensive' for their own strategic purposes, which diverge from those of the West- although this should perhaps not come as any surprise given that Manfred Woerner was of a Pan-German political orientation.
82. The German Factor of European Security', Igor Maksimychev, 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 43, Number 1, February 1997.
83. Excerpts from the Franco-German Proposal on a Common Security Policy, released by the French Embassy, Moscow, 4th February 1991.
84. Maksimychev, I., op. cit: see Note 82.
85. 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 41, Number 7: previously cited seminal article by Sergei Rogov, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the USA and Canada.
86. 'German paper defends its "Jew Rifkind" remark', Roger Boyes and Philip Webster, The Times, London, 22nd February 1997.
87. The Security Interests of Russia and Europe in the Baltic', interview with Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, Commander the Soviet Baltic Fleet, conducted by Valery Gromek, a correspondent with 'Krasnaya zvezda', 'International Affairs', journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Volume 41, Number 6, June 1995. The article's subheading read: 'Kaliningrad Region in the System of Russia's Foreign Relations'.
88. 'Fischer faces court link to violent past: A terrorist trial could prove to be the undoing of Germany's Foreign Minister', The Sunday Telegraph, 14th January 2001, page 25.
89. UK press reports on Joschka Fischer's address at Claridges Hotel on 24th January 2001, including 'Fischer taunts Tories on Europe: EU will never become a superstate, says German', Benedict Brogan and Toby Helm, The Daily Telegraph, 20th January 2001.
90. See Note 67.
91. See Note 70.
92. Theses on the National and Colonial Question adopted by the Second Comintern Congress, 28th July 1920, Protokoll, 11, page 224; 'The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents, Volume 1:1919-1922', selected and edited by Jane Degras, Oxford University Press, London, 1956.
93. It is worth reiterating that in his Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency dated March 1989, reproduced in 'The Perestroika Deception', Anatoly Golitsyn wrote: The final period of 'restructuring' in the United States and Western Europe would be accompanied not only by the physical extermination of active anti-Communists, but also by the extermination of the political, military, financial and religious elites. Blood would be spilled and political re-education camps would be introduced. The Communists would not hesitate to repeat the mass repressions of their revolution in 1917, of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe in the Second World War or of the Chinese Communist victory of 1949. This time, they would resort to mass repressions in order to prevent any possibility of revolt by the defeated, and to make their victory final'.
- This warning can helpfully be considered in the context of the fact that seminars and discussions have been held in various revolutionary circles, especially (most recently) at successive 'State of the World Forum' events run by Dr Jim Garrison under the label of the Gorbachev Foundation/USA, at which plans for 'population reduction' have been discussed. One speaker suggested that, 'in order to save the planet' ('planet' being a key 'revolutionary environmentalism' word), the world's population would need to be reduced by 90%. It should also be borne in mind that, contrary to the expectations of intelligence organisations, notably the CIA itself, almost all of Golitsyn's predictions published in his two books ('New Lies for Old' [1984] and 'The Perestroika Deception' [1995 and 1998]), have been fulfilled. In his book 'Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA' [Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1994], Mark Riebling, who carried out a methodical analysis of Golitsyn's predictions in 'New Lies for Old', credited the author with 'an accuracy record of nearly 94%', as of 1993.
94. Cited in a letter to The Daily Telegraph entitled 'Fischer's Marxist view of Europe', by Fred Naylor, of Corsham, Wiltshire, 24th January 2001: see also Note 96.

95. Speech by Lionel Jospin, 'former Trotskyite' French Prime Minister, Strasbourg, 27th September 1999, cited in 'Eurofacts', a Global Britain Publication, 45 Great Peter Street, London SW1P 3LT, 5th November 1999.

96. Joschka Fischer's revolutionary advocacy of violence 'to change society' (to what? - the objective is always unstated, but we know the answer, of course), published in his book 'Für einen neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag' ('For a New Social Contract'), was also cited by Fred Naylor in his letter to The Daily Telegraph of 24th January 2001: see Note 94.

97. In an interview with the Czech daily 'Lidove noviny' of 25th November 1999, the overt Soviet Union's last Defence Minister, Dmitri Yazov, told his Czech interviewer, Petra Prochazkova: 'Unfortunately, I know that you'll lose the Sudetenland once again'. The basis for this prediction -that the Czech Republic was to be carved up for a second time - was summarised on pages 200-205 of this book. Hence, the 'mistake' made by President Putin's interpreter does not appear to have been 'an accident'. ■

'We Germans do not want to have anything to do with the West, with the Yankees, with their capitalistic exploitation and their political arrogance. We Prussians have always been closely associated with the Russians; we Germans return gladly to the traditions of Bismarck... and we as a politically trained people have never forgotten Lenin's' intelligent words about the desirability of cooperation between Germany and Russia. We are actually predestined for an alliance with Moscow, all the more so since mutual cooperation with the integrated bloc of the Soviet states has attracted millions of Germans, educated under strict discipline. Who could resist us if both our Reichs were united?'

From: 'OPEN LETTER TO STALIN', 'Buerger Zeitung', German-language weekly circulating in Chicago, 1949:

written by BRUNO FRICKE, a former Nazi and Black Front leader.

'Heavy new increments of German agents have been pouring into Spain in recent days in an obvious effort by Germany to save what she can of a situation that has gone badly against her. A thousand Gestapo agents and other German representatives have appeared in Madrid alone in the past fortnight. Significant additions to the German population have been noted in other parts of Spain... Many of these agents are here in the plausible guise of executives, technicians and lesser employees of these interests, as well as cogs in Germany's vast diplomatic, consular and propaganda machinery. In Madrid, spies swarm in the big hotels in such numbers that even casual visitors cannot help noticing them'. HAROLD DENNY, The New York Times, 17th January 1944, in a despatch from Madrid, in which he reported on the presence of Nazis in the Spanish capital. They had arrived to set up the Nazi International's latest initiative, the German Geopolitical Centre, with a remit to establish the intellectual and practical means of ensuring the seamless continuity of Pan-Germanism after the war.

'With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is committed to... social and federative principles ['foderative Grundsatsse']'.

First sentence of new Article 23, inserted into the German Constitution by the Kohl Government specifically to 'enable' the Maastricht Treaty to be ratified [see page 225].

'Under no circumstances [is it our task] to promote Communist views'.

'Line' approved by the Soviet Politburo on 28th February 1922 as Lenin's agenda for the Genoa Conference, leading to the Treaty of Rapallo, attended on Lenin's behalf by GEORGIY CHICHERIN, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. The background context was Lenin's announcement, in 1921, of his 'New Economic Policy' [NEP] deception, upon which precedent Gorbachev's 'perestroika' and its aftermath, was modelled. The heirs of Lenin are today adhering strictly to this 'Line' of Lenin's Politburo.

'A Communist must be prepared to make every sacrifice and, if necessary, even resort to all sorts of schemes and stratagems, employ illegitimate methods, conceal the truth, in order to... conduct revolutionary work within...'

V. I. LENIN, 'Collected Works', Volume XVII, pages 142-145.

'No parliament can in any circumstances be for us Communists an arena of struggle for reforms.... The only question can be that of utilising bourgeois state institutions for their destruction'.

V. I. LENIN, 'Collected Works', Volume XXV, page 149.

# CONCLUSION: THE E.U. AS THE ENEMY OF ITS MEMBER STATES

## COLLABORATION MASKS MUTUAL STRATEGIC DECEPTION

In May 1940, the Reich Association for Economic Planning issued a document containing the statement mentioned on page 209: 'A continental-European economy under German leadership must... comprise all the peoples of the Continent from Gibraltar to the Urals and from the North Cape to the island of Cyprus... [but] on foreign-political grounds it appears to be necessary to designate this not as a German extended-area economy, but fundamentally always to speak of a European Economic Community' ['Europaisches Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft'].

Chapter 10, Volume Two of Hitler's 'Mein Kampf' was entitled 'FEDERALISM AS A MASK'<sup>1</sup>. Careful analysis of the typically 'roundabout' language still employed by covert Pan-Germans, the heirs of the Nazi International, today, has revealed that this 'line' is of the essence of Germany's hegemony ideology. In other words, there has never been any discontinuity of Pan-German strategy up to, through and since the Nazis were in power in Berlin.

Note the explicit geographical description of the scope and boundaries of the intended 'German extended-area economy': 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'<sup>2</sup>. Within this 'Thousand-Year Reich', the sovereignty of the captive nations will have been destroyed, in line with Lenin's pronouncement that 'we set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state'<sup>3</sup> - with one critical exception: Germany itself is to survive as Greater Germany, but under a different name. Hence, there was and is to be one rule (state survival) for the Germans, and another (state destruction) for all other captive European peoples. The European Union has developed exactly in accordance with the blueprint elaborated by the Nazis in the 1940s.

To ensure the realisation of their deception strategy, it is clear that the continuing Pan-German planners have, in practice, so to speak 'bolted the framework' of their strategy onto the revolutionary structures of the Leninist Communists. While the heirs of the Nazis have cunningly elaborated and perfected over the years their own version of diplomatic and propaganda double-talk comparable to a form of Leninist Aesopianism, as elaborated by Stresemann and Adenauer, they have made such spectacular progress with the fulfilment of the Nazi International's plans hatched at the German Geopolitical Centre, that they no longer bother to disguise them. But the Pan-Germans, reckless and ruthless as always, are running huge risks - because they are dealing in bad faith with both the continuing Soviet Leninists and with the confused West European Socialist Governments.

The fact that the continuing Pan-German strategists are secretly using 'federalism as a mask', as Hitler proclaimed in 'Mein Kampf, and are agitating day and night for regional federalisation and for the full collectivisation of residual sovereignty throughout the European Union, while seeking to disguise that this prescription will never apply to Greater Germany itself, alone justifies this book's finding that the European Union Collective is indeed the enemy of its Member States. That the EU is likewise responding



to the parallel pressures from the continuing Leninists for 'universal European integration', means that EU membership is truly a 'kiss of death' for those countries that have been led by their misguided elites into this terminal trap - from where their demoralised citizens are condemned to watching their countries being tortured, raped and beaten to death under the relentless pressures of the frenzied and accelerating 'coup d'etat by installments'.

Driven by the insane logic of Lenin's idolatrous World Revolution - which preaches 'change' while never revealing its hand by answering the rhetorical question 'change to WHAT?', and which presupposes total collectivisation for the whole of humanity - the covert Communists, who are currently following Lenin's deception instruction that, for the time being, 'under no circumstances [is it our task] to promote Communist views', insist that the only 'acceptable' prescription for Europe (by which they mean Eurasia<sup>4</sup>) must be 'universal European integration'. Lenin taught the revolutionaries to be meticulous with the use of words (a trick acquired also by the Pan-Germans). Thus the key-word here is 'universal' - which precludes any question of boundary limitations. For the Leninists claim that, because they are 'Europeans' and control the political space eastwards to the Pacific Ocean, 'universal European integration' means 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok', which they also refer to as 'Great Europe', and which must be 'guaranteed' by the Comintern's long-planned system of 'collective security', centred on Moscow. In other words, there has never been any true discontinuity of Soviet strategy since the 1920s, and especially since the 'changes' of 1989-91 - which represented a Leninist, rather than a genuine, 'Break with the Past'.

For the time being, it suits the interests of the 'General Staff of Lenin's World Revolution, for the European Union Collective - or the 'new European Soviet', as Gorbachev has accurately described it - to devote its seething revolutionary energies to the maximisation of federalisation and collectivisation within its inexplicably eastwards-expanding 'boundaries'. But despite bilateral treaties, the trilateral nexus with France, a complex bilateral and multilateral treaty network drafted by the Leninist apparat to ensure 100% European compliance with the Soviets' 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok' model, the continuing Leninist strategists know that the Germans are using European federalism 'as a mask' for the final realisation of their own previously thwarted idolatrous geopolitical ambitions.

While each side is engaged in strategic deception directed in part against the other, and in both cases against the naive socialist Europeans, both expect that their model alone shall prevail. The chess-playing Soviets took the precaution to ensure, by means of a threatening military posture [see page 237] which appears to have been largely overlooked, that only their prescription can ever be applied. They also left a time-bomb lying around in the Czech Republic. Additionally, to procure the intended 'Soviet' outcome, the Revolution has taken the necessary precautions, co-ordinated by Vladimir Putin and Soviet Military Intelligence while Putin was serving in East Germany, to ensure that Germany's political and bureaucratic structures have been extensively penetrated and taken over by covert and 'former' Communists from the east. The likelihood is that the Pan-Germans, having compromised as in the past with the Communists, and driven by their 'leaning towards Russia', will misinterpret the Leninists' intentions as they approach the realisation of their long-frustrated ambition to subsume Germany in its 'transitional format', within 'Greater Germany' by another name. They will overplay their hand.

Europe cannot look to France for any hope of rescue or salvation, since Paris is enmeshed in its insidious trilateral nexus with Germany and Russia - certain that its treaty relationship with Germany can only be to its advantage, and bound to the covert Leninist revolutionaries by the terms of its bilateral treaty of 7th February 1992, under the terms of which France has become an agent for Lenin's World Revolution. The smaller European powers are hobbled by the ideologues who control policy; and even in Portugal and Ireland, where the adverse economic consequences of their rash participation in the Economic and Monetary Collective's straightjacket are becoming daily more apparent, no serious official thought is being given to the logical step which will need to be taken if severe economic consequences are to be avoided. Ironically, though, the eccentric President of the European Commission, Signor Prodi, is on record as having mused that Italy might have to leave the collective currency regime, even though this is not permitted under the Collective Treaty.

Only the United Kingdom, which since the beginning of the 1970s has been systematically betrayed by its successive governments, led by the 'Conservatives', has, among the EU 'Member States' of world substance, contrived, though incompetence and fumbling, to hold back a little from the revolutionary onslaught. The slim chances of Britain escaping national annihilation were diminishing at an ever accelerating pace as this book was being finalised. For instance, on 6th February 2002, the European 'Parliament' approved the European Arrest Warrant [see page XXXIII] and blocked the habeas corpus safeguard established by English Common Law since the 13th century, as a means of preventing over-zealous or corrupt magistrates from incarcerating EU citizens from another EU country sine die in their own jails, or in those of a third EU country. This appallingly retrograde decision means that Britons, with effect from 2004, will be at risk of being arbitrarily arrested for crimes which are not recognised in English law, such as racism or xenophobia. The definition of 'terrorism' was extended to cover 'passive' support for proscribed groups (the list of which can be extended, of course, to include critics of the revolutionary EU collectivist dictatorship), and the legislation will enable a judge or a prosecuting magistrate anywhere in the EU Collective to order the extradition of a British citizen on the basis of suspicion alone, without any need for a dossier of evidence to be presented.

Thus the shape of 'The Beast' is emerging before our eyes, from behind the hideous edifice of Europe's Tower of Babel. Diabolically, it has the imprimatur of the captive nation states whose blind political elites have fallen into this Nazi-Soviet trap. For the EU is indeed The Enemy of its Member States. God will surely judge the 'useful idiots' and idolatrous ideologues responsible for leading their peoples into this pit. ■

1. 'Mein Kampf', Adolf Hitler, Translated by Ralph Manheim, Pimlico, London SW1V 2SA, 1993-2000, page 505.

2. In precise conformity with this Pan-German programme, the British Fabian Government was in the process, as this book went to press, of negotiating with the Spanish Government for the handing over of Gibraltar to Spain, or a 'compromise' arrangement en route to that outcome, contrary to the wishes of the 30,000 Gibraltarians. It was made clear in London that any agreement with Spain would override the preference of the Gibraltarians, who wish to remain British in perpetuity. In any fresh referendum, Gibraltarians would vote overwhelmingly to remain British, as they have always done in the past; yet London was evidently prepared to ignore, modify or fudge their long since democratically expressed wishes. But why should this cause surprise? After all, since 1970, British Governments, while paying lip-service to democracy, have all been engaged in its systematic destruction through participation in the European political collective - to which Westminster has handed 'general powers' and which, as has been shown, is the direct descendant of the Hitlerian model.

3. V. I. Lenin, 'State and Revolution', International Publishers, New York, 1961 Edition, page 68: see page XII.

4. It is only the 'northern tier' of 'former' Soviet Republics, together with Georgia and Armenia, which are destined for absorption into 'Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok'. For the Muslim 'former' Republics, the strategists (led in this connection by the Arabist, Yevgeniy Primakov) have an altogether different destiny planned - namely, that they are to form the seething components of an intended 'arc of Islamic extremism' which will expand to absorb the Middle East oil assets. Though cosmetically 'independent', this 'New Form' will be controlled by the Leninist 'General Staff' in Moscow.

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# EXPOSING THE WORLD REVOLUTION!

While attending the Conservative Political Action Committee [CPAC] conference in Virginia in early February 2002, the Author was approached by an unsmiling man who pointed to the leaflets promoting this book, and to some literature supporting Anatoliy Golitsyn's book *The Perestroika Deception*. 'I never heard this theory before', he exclaimed. Noting at once the visitor's attempt to downgrade the facts contained in these books to the status of a mere 'theory', the Author corrected him and pointed out that the works were fully documented and thus based upon FACTS rather than make-believe. Whereupon the visitor proceeded to address the Author in Russian. How was it possible, he seemed to be saying, that anyone in the West had managed to unravel the mysteries of Soviet deception strategy?

The moral of this story is as follows. Members of the 'General Staff' of Lenin's World Revolution fear EXPOSURE. They believe that their Leninist deception strategy is so well formulated that they will never be found out. They cannot imagine that stupid Westerners would ever wake up from their slumbers to the knowledge of the mysteries of their evil revolutionary tricks. They share with their fellow conspirators, the continuing Pan-German heirs of the Nazi International, a supremely arrogant Marxist conviction that their global control strategy will inevitably prevail. After all, the 'Magnificent New Programme' of which Aleksandr Shelepin boasted at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, and which provided the main pretext for Khrushchev's 50-megaton 'fireworks display' celebrating the triumph of Leninism, was supposed to be driven by a process of 'historical inevitability'.

When, occasionally, members of the 'General Staff' come across Westerners who DO UNDERSTAND the Leninist World Revolution in all its demonic complexities, they are dumfounded. What, they ask themselves, can possibly have gone wrong?

President Gorbachev speculated, at a press conference held with President Mitterrand on 6th May 1991, that the Soviet World Revolution strategy might be exposed. 'The dangers lie', he pronounced, in the fact that someone, analysing at some private moment or other, this or that instance or episode, or even event, including a dramatic event [A PREDICTION OF THE FAKE 'AUGUST COUP'], should not make hasty conclusions and cast doubt on all that has been acquired [BY THE WORLD REVOLUTION!] and what we have created in putting international relations onto new channels, onto new rails [AS OPPOSED TO A ROAD, FROM WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE TO TURN LEFT OR RIGHT], entering, as all of us have said, a period of peaceful development'.

The World Revolution's FEAR OF EXPOSURE is what inspires these 'politically incorrect' books! By buying and publicising titles published by Edward Harle Limited, you are helping to EXPOSE THE INVERTED PYRAMID OF LIES upon which the fragile edifice of the continuing and intensifying Leninist World Revolution is based. The more intelligent and influential people who become aware of revolutionary strategic deception in its contemporary manifestations, the closer we will come to exposing

and discrediting the demonic programme to enslave the whole of humanity which is unrolling before our eyes. For the World Revolution prospers because it is clever at hiding itself, and exploits the Leninist lie that 'there is no such thing as a conspiracy'. In reality, Lenin himself explained that the Revolution is a conspiracy: by discrediting all conspiracies, the 'General Staff' of the World Revolution have cleverly convinced journalists, in particular, that 'conspiracy theorists' require psychiatric treatment.

This complacent attitude reinforces the familiar 'Luciferian fog' which clouds Western minds and blinds the West's policymakers to understanding that the West is under terminal attack. Even when detailed evidence that this is so, is presented, the typical Western policymaker is liable to respond, as Lady Thatcher did in 1991 to the Author: 'I don't think we've been deceived - at least, I hope we haven't'. Well, the West's crisis today is a direct consequence of the fact that the British Prime Minister of the day allowed herself to be deceived by Mikhail Gorbachev. In order to ensure that Mrs Thatcher would be duped, the Soviets saw to it that her trusty intelligence adviser, Airey Neave MP - who would certainly have been able to warn her about the Soviets' deception strategy - was liquidated. He was blown up 'by the IRA' in his car as it left the House of Commons Car Park in 1979. The IRA acted on instructions from Moscow.

In 1992, the genuine Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn, warned this Author in writing that his life might be in danger due to the work he was doing in seeking to expose the World Revolution. Mr Golitsyn later explained that there was probably little danger, 'unless you influence policy'. This warning needs to be adjusted to read: 'Unless they think you are likely to influence policy'. So far, then, Western policy has not been influenced. But a large number of people and institutions have bought our 'politically incorrect' titles, and the constituency of those who realise that the West has been misled by the Bolsheviks is growing rapidly. You can help by spreading the word about these books - of which 'The European Union Collective' is the third in the series.